

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Dr. Marcum. Now we would like to turn to our second witness, Mr. Constantine Menges, Resident Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Menges.

**STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINE MENGES, RESIDENT FELLOW,  
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE**

Mr. MENGES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is my pleasure to be here. As a citizen and scholar on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, I am delighted to have a chance to appear before the Congress in response to your invitation.

I will begin my brief statement with a broad observation. I think we are here now in the spring of 1989 in the context of a Soviet foreign policy which has two elements, the element of normalization with the United States and detente, but also the element of continued support around the world for pro-Soviet regimes and groups that seek to maintain and take power.

I think that is important to reflect on because the question we all have is whether there is a real change in Soviet foreign policy and that of its allies, or whether the agreement in the Angolan Namibia matter is simply a means toward the Communist end.

It is important to recall that in the 1970's, and specifically in 1975, there was a similar period of U.S./Soviet summit meetings, of professed Soviet detente, of the U.S./Soviet/Moscow summit of 1972 when the Soviet Union promised that it was going to change the rules of international behavior, give up its wars of national liberation, and maintain a normal relationship with the free world and the United States.

During those years of detente in the 1970's, which I think we are seeing again today in terms of spirit, it is important to recall that while the summit meetings occurred, while there were hopes for a truly better U.S./Soviet relationship, and for a change in foreign policy under three American presidents, both parties at the same time, ten new pro-Soviet dictatorships were established by the second element of Soviet foreign policy, this process of indirect aggression.

Those ten new pro-Soviet dictatorships include Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, Mozambique during the Republican presidency, and during the Democratic presidency of those years, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan.

And, therefore, Mr. Chairman, I think that as we look at the current situation in Angola, we have to recall that it was a decision of the United States Congress to remove the means of pro-western black nationalists from being able to compete. It was the Congress of the United States that made the decision to cut off the aid to the pro-western black independence movement in Angola, which in turn led, and I agree completely with Chairman Burton, to the victory of the pro-Soviet MPLA, which has established a dictatorship that has brought enormous suffering to the people of Angola, a dictatorship that brought suffering to the people of Angola in the years 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, with the collectivization of agriculture, the nationalization of industry, mass arrests and oppression, all of which set the stage for what then came to be the reemergence after those years of relative peace in Angola, which I think we are

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## NEW REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 1989

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met at 1:50 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building. Hon. Howard Wolpe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLPE: The hearing will come to order.

Angola is the single place in Africa where the United States is involved in waging a war against an established government.

Moreover, since late 1985, American support of the UNITA insurgency has steadily deepened—simultaneously and ironically—with administration diplomatic efforts to negotiate the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and to bring peace and independence to Namibia.

Based on these facts alone, one would expect that American policy towards Angola's warring factions would be actively debated and understood in Congress and the administration. Yet that has not been the case. There has been no open discussion of the American policy toward Angola, whatsoever. Congress and the American people deserve much more than that.

For example, since American covert assistance to UNITA was first publicly acknowledged in February of 1986, there has been almost no scrutiny of administration claims that, on account of high democratic ideals, Jonas Savimbi and the UNITA movement which he heads deserve American diplomatic and covert support in their struggle against the Angolan government. This is the very cornerstone of American policy; it is also, in my judgment, a very dubious premise.

I have known Jonas Savimbi for almost a decade. Over that period, I and several other Members of Congress have questioned whether right-wing American supporters of UNITA, out of ideological zeal, are not overlooking disturbing aspects of Savimbi's past—his self-identification as a Maoist, his highly authoritarian, centralized governance of the UNITA movement, and his expression of support for South African President Botha's regime. I recall one instance, when Mr. Savimbi was in my office, back in, I think, 1981 when in response to questions from me he finally acknowledged that, indeed, he was a socialist but was much more comfortable with the Chinese model than the Soviet model of socialism. I only

wish that those who have been so studiously and assiduously espousing his cause could have been in on that meeting at that particular moment. Unfortunately, what little Congress and the American people have heard of Savimbi and UNITA has come almost exclusively from UNITA's own well-oiled public relations campaign or their supporters. Last year, according to Justice Department documents, UNITA's lobbying efforts totalled approximately \$2 million.

Today we hope to move the debate in Congress forward by examining credible new allegations that the UNITA insurgency, under Jonas Savimbi's leadership, has systematically detained, tortured and beaten to death dissidents and presided over the burning of "witches" in public bonfires. These charges deserve serious treatment. They come from former members of UNITA, individuals who have shown no apparent affection for the Angolan government; Amnesty International; and, most important, Fred Bridgland. Mr. Bridgland is a respected foreign correspondent who authored a 1987 biography of Savimbi and who until recently was openly sympathetic towards UNITA. Earlier this year, Mr. Bridgland returned from a visit to UNITA headquarters, in Jamba.

None of this implies that the Angolan government has not been equally guilty of serious human rights abuses. We have consistently taken testimony on this subject in the Subcommittee, including testimony by Amnesty International last month. But we are also not sending American tax dollars to the Angolan government; we are to UNITA.

Tragically, in the past several years, there has also been little open discussion of the character of the war between the MPLA government and UNITA. Recurrent allegations of outrageous battlefield practices and the massive human consequences these have for innocent Angolans, have not received sufficient attention.

Today we will examine a major new study by the respected independent monitoring group, Human Rights Watch, which blames both UNITA and the Angolan government for systematic and indiscriminate attacks on civilians through land mines—attacks which have produced the highest number of amputees in the world, up to 50,000. The Human Rights Watch report also charges that UNITA has forcibly conscripted thousands of civilians, taken hundreds of foreign hostages, and used starvation as a weapon. It calls attention to other serious human rights violations by both sides.

Each of these two vital issues—UNITA's internal character and the character of the war—must be confronted in some rational fashion if we are to comprehend the meaning of the United States' own actions in Angola.

We are directly involved in prosecuting a distant war, yet are we certain that Savimbi and the movement he leads is indeed everything that their public relations campaign claims? The record is indeed disturbing, and anti-democratic and raises the obvious question of whether the United States is wise to continue associating itself so closely with Savimbi and UNITA.

We are directly involved in prosecuting a war, yet are we certain that the practices of that war on the side that we are supporting are defensible? Again, the terribly costly record of indiscriminate

use of land mines is disturbing. I cannot understand how American interests are advanced by associating ourselves with such practices.

The hearing will open with a brief showing of the British Independent Television Network's recent feature on charges made against Mr. Savimbi and UNITA. It includes an appearance by Fred Bridgland and former of UNITA. Because of passport and other problems, they were unable to appear here personally. They have each informed us, however, that they stand firm on what they said on the ITN television program. Incidentally, this story was first broken March 9 by reporter Jonathan Kwitny on the public affairs program he hosts on New York public television.

Following the showing of this short film excerpt—it runs about 10 minutes—we will hear from a panel of private witnesses that include Professor John Marcum of the University of California at Santa Cruz, America's leading authority on Angola; Constantine Menges, Resident Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute and a former member of the National Security Council staff; and Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch. The hearing will conclude with a separate presentation and testimony from Mr. Gibson Lanpher, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

I will ask permission of my colleagues, when Mr. Burton arrives, to interrupt the proceedings at that point so that he might make any opening statements he wishes to make. He is being delayed because of a markup in another committee in which he is offering an amendment.

I would like to ask my colleagues who are here whether they have any opening statements they wish to make.

Mr. CROCKETT. I have none, Mr. Chairman.

With that, let us turn to the screening of the BBC film.

[Film shown.]

Mr. WOLPE. Let us take a short recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will resume, and we will continue the viewing of the BBC television tape.

[Film shown.]

Mr. WOLPE. That concludes the showing of the tape.

I made a misstatement earlier. The tape was shown on Independent Television Network, not on the BBC network.

At this point, I would like to turn to my distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Burton, to make any opening remarks that he might care to make.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to preface my remarks by saying that we saw the tape that you had there. I had a tape that I took myself with a VCR when I was in Jamba, and I talked to Tito Chingungi personally, and he is on this tape. We met with him, and Mr. Chingungi did not appear to me to be under duress, or under house arrest, or anything else, so anybody on the committee is welcome to look at this tape.

In addition, which was not reported. I talked to two captured MPLA guerrillas who are also on this tape, who told us that the Cubans are violating the 1988 Geneva accords which were signed by the Angolans, and the Cubans, and the South Africans, which said that they would not be below the 1530 parallel, or east of the 17th

meridian in combat, and these two captured MPLA soldiers told me that they were, in fact, there in combat along with them in violation of that agreement.

Mr. LUKENS. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON. I would be happy to yield to my colleague.

Mr. LUKENS. I wonder if the Chairman would allow us to have this tape shown as well. We have been exposed to the BBC tape, and this tape that does refute some of the allegations that I think would be rather damaging in BBC. I would like to see both sides.

Mr. WOLPE. I have no problems with having the tape shown. I wonder if it could be—at the conclusion of the witnesses this afternoon.

Mr. BURTON. I do not have any problem with that. The tape is about six hours long, so we would have to get the part out. I do not think anybody wants to sit down for six hours, but if my staff wants to isolate that part of the tape, I will be happy to show it to the people.

Mr. LUKENS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Burton, can you yield again?

I would be appropriate I think if at some time we schedule a shorter and abridged version of this tape in order to balance what we have seen. I would like to see both sides.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, I think you will be getting some testimony on the other side as well today, but we will be pleased to do that.

Mr. LUKENS. I would appreciate the visual testimony also, but I yield to you.

Mr. WOLPE. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Chairman. Exactly two months ago I was in Jamba as a guest of the Freedom Fighters, and Dr. Savimbi. What I saw there has direct bearing on the matter under discussion today. The old adage that seeing is believing is accurate.

There is indeed no substitute for personal experience. It is thus unfortunate that the authors of the Human Rights Watch Report, and I would like to stress that I certainly look forward to hearing what they have to say, but it is very unfortunate that they issued the report without having been on the ground in Angola. The Communist Government in Luanda refused them a visa, a fact which speaks volumes in itself. But neither did they go to Jamba in Free Angola.

I have here with me today a copy of an official invitation to America Watch issued by UNITA to visit their base camp in Jamba, and I urged them to do so. If you have problems, go over there and see for yourself, and we will be happy to facilitate that trip.

If and when Africa Watch goes into Jamba, I can tell them what they are likely to find. Deep in the jungle in southeastern Angola they will find a state within a state inhabited by people in mud huts, people busy at work, at school, at a uniform factory, at an electronics repair shop, a printing press, a radio station, and they work with pride, with a purpose in the face of great adversity. These remarkable people, many very young, having spent their entire lives fighting in the jungle, exhibit a spirit and enthusiasm that leaves a lasting impression. The comradeship, good natured for-

titude, high morale, and genuine ideals of these people, are striking indeed. It flies in the face of all the reports of dissension and rift.

What I saw over there is not something I believe can be faked. It is not something that can be manufactured for the benefit of foreign visitors. I can only testify to what I saw with my own eyes, and three of my colleagues were with me, a rare caliber of individuals united for a cause in which they deeply believed and are willing to die for, and that is the cause of freedom, that very spirit that can only be sensed by actually seeing and being in Jamba, is the same spirit that motivated our own founding fathers and freedom fighters in every human era from the Mackabees fighting against Syrian religious tyranny, to the partisans fighting the Nazis, to the Majahadins struggling against the Communist oppression in Afghanistan.

I ought to note that I also visited Luanda, and the contrast was a stark one indeed. A once beautiful city is now completely falling apart. The infrastructure is a mess. In fact, there was no running water at the airport, or at their parliament. It is a drab, dreary, and depressing atmosphere. Fear and decadence is palpable.

Behind that degenerate facade lies an even worse human rights record. Freedom House, Amnesty International, and our State Department, all agree this is one of the world's most repressive governments. I have here a list of 121 Angolan citizens publicly executed, tortured, or abducted for political reasons by the government since 1975. The actual number is surely and tragically much higher than that.

I would like to bring to your attention a matter which I think we all agree has serious implications. Last year there were several authoritative reports concerning the use of chemical weapons by the Cubans and the MPLA government against UNITA troops. The use of mustard gas and of nerve gas was confirmed by Dr. Alban Hendricks, Chief of Toxicology at the University of Belgium.

Dr. Hendricks' expertise on the effects of chemical weapons dates back to World War II. He was the doctor who diagnosed the victims of chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraqi War. In a letter to Senator DeConcini, Dr. Hendricks said "following further assertion analysis we have done in my department, there is no doubt anymore that the Cubans were using nerve gases against the troops of Dr. Savimbi."

I have here photos and a videotape, which you may look at if you like, Mr. Chairman, of the victims of Cuban chemical warfare in Angola. I just learned today that the West German television network, ZDF, will air a special expose this Friday further documenting these serious charges.

I have one more item for our consideration. Last December the Voice of America reported that the MPLA was negotiating with a Swiss business concern, and I do not think the public knows this, the Communist MPLA government was negotiating with a Swiss business concern for the purpose of setting up a toxic waste incinerator near the port of Namib in southern Angola. The Voice of America interviewed Arnold Kuntzler, a Swiss businessman involved in the negotiations. If there is any truth to these allegations, and they definitely merit serious investigation, if there is any



truth to them, then they speak volumes about the character of the MPLA.

To say that both sides commit human rights violations, and that therefore we should stop aid to UNITA, is a cop out, and it is also ludicrous. The argument is reminiscent of those who argue moral equivalence between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an insidious and repugnant argument. It is also false. War is ugly and destructive, and Angola is no exception. We all want that war to end. So the important question is what was the cause of that war, and how do we end it?

It was the MPLA that violated the ALVOR Agreement and invited the Cubans into Angola. It is the MPLA that refuses to negotiate for national reconciliation, the only way to end the war. The blame for the immense and tragic suffering of the Angolan people lies squarely at the doorsteps of Havana and Luanda.

Dr. Savimbi, I might add, is anxious to have reconciliation, and he is willing to sit down with President DeSantos anytime, anyplace, to discuss national reconciliation. The campaign to discredit UNITA is so orchestrated, and so transparent, that it is really almost comical. The target of this propaganda and disinformation campaign is the bipartisan support that Savimbi has so deservedly enjoyed in this country.

I told the Communist leaders in Luanda that such bipartisanship was going to continue, and I believe it will. They would like nothing better than to prove me wrong, and they will use any tactic to do so. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter this article from Newsday, which I have here, into the record.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection.

Mr. BURTON. It was written by Mark Moran, who helped draft the Clark Amendment in 1975. He has now repented, and he states "the U.S. should hang tough in Angola. Walk away now and the country will belong to the Marxists by default." That is precisely what will happen if we cut off our aid to Dr. Savimbi.

Mr. Chairman, I have a sign on my desk with a quote from Edmund Burke, and it says, "the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

Now is not the time to turn our back on yet another loyal ally of the United States. Rather, we should resolve and bolster our commitment to those fighting for freedom in Angola, to those committed to national reconciliation, to those struggling to bring peace and liberty to the suffering war-weary people of Angola. To do anything else at this point in our history would be to disavow our own principles, and values, and ideals.

With your further permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert this statement by Mr. Howard Phillips into the record, and also a statement by the "Angola Peace Fund," who have called for a delegation of non-partisan African-Americans to be allowed to inspect conditions on both sides of the conflict in Angola.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection, those will be entered into the record.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See app. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See app. 3.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

There is substantial interest in this hearing today on the part of members of Congress and outside of this committee as well. I believe we will be joined by Mr. McEwen and Mr. Dreier at some point, and we have also been already joined by Mr. Bill Richardson, a member of the House Intelligence Committee. I would like to welcome Mr. Richardson to the deliberations today.

I understand you wanted to make a brief statement?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is very brief.

I am a member of the Intelligence Committee. I have been to Jamba and Luanda. I also have great respect for Mr. Wolpe and Mr. Burton. Let me just tell you why I am here, Mr. Chairman.

I suspect that there are gross violations of human rights on both sides, but I am here to try to get the facts about UNITA. I have been in Jamba, and I have been reasonably impressed with the level of human rights respect by some of the Jamba individuals, UNITA individuals, that we met.

However, Mr. Chairman, I was disturbed by Mr. Bridgland's statement; I was disturbed by further reports; and most importantly, I had flat out asked Dr. Savimbi about several issues, one of which was an unrelated matter in a way, what his ties to South Africa were. And he professed a great—in a statement, a great dislike for Apartheid, but, Mr. Chairman, I am here because I think Dr. Savimbi lied to me. He was subsequently seen by myself in a TV interview on Thanksgiving Day on Christian Broadcasting by Mr. Pat Robertson, and literally defending Apartheid in South Africa, and when somebody's credibility like that I see in a juxtaposition as I did, I am here to get the facts for myself.

I deeply am not casting aspersions on the rest of the UNITA members that I met, but it was shocking the way Dr. Savimbi transformed what he told me and what he told, I guess, the world in this interview, and I am here because I doubt his word, and because I want to get the facts.

Mr. BURTON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. I would like to have the date of that television interview with Pat Robertson on CBN so that I can call him and get a copy of it because if that was—if that is, in fact, what happened, I think it would change some opinions of many of us.

I submit that it may have been the gentleman from New Mexico's interpretation of what was said, and I would like to see it for myself, so if you could give me the date that you saw that it would be very helpful.

Mr. WOLPE. I think we are going to have a whole day long television show.

Mr. BURTON. Well, since we are using that as information for our discussion, I think we need to see it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would be useful. I did not mean to suggest otherwise.

Mr. WOLPE. With that, I would like to turn now to our first panel of witnesses. I would like to invite our three witnesses to come forward to the table.

First of all, welcome to the committee, and then second, I would like to remind them that we have asked that they keep their oral presentations within five to seven minutes. The full text of their written testimony will be entered as part of the committee record. We would like to allow maximum time though for questions.

With that, I would like to turn first to Professor John Marcum of the University of California at Santa Cruz. Dr. Marcum.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN MARCUM, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SANTA CRUZ**

Mr. MARCUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will read a few excerpts from the prepared remarks that I have. I very much appreciate being invited to be with you today.

Three decades of internal war have devastated the people and economy of Angola, and the fratricidal protracted nature of that war.

Mr. WOLPE. Could I have the microphone right in front of you, please.

Mr. MARCUM. Sorry. Is this better?

The fratricidal protracted nature of that war has brutalized its protagonists. Reports of new and continuing violations of human rights in the conflict should come as no surprise. History suggests that internal insurgency and counter-insurgency that endure over long periods of time came to degenerate into especially violent dehumanizing warfare.

Together rulers and rebels become the victims of a degenerative culture of violence. The Philippines, Uruguay, El Salvador, Mozambique, are among the recent examples of this process that immediately come to mind.

I will skip over some of the history of the—the record of after independence of 1975, but suffice it to say that the government that came to power did use excessive force, and committed errors of judgment that contributed to the growth of insurgency, which was also South African supported. By the mid-1980's it was very clear that the country was involved in a continuation of conflict that had started in the early 1960's.

The insecurity within the government, within the country, led to actions on the part of the government, which interacting with insurgency further added to a degeneration of circumstances, and I think we all know the grim statistics that come out from the end of this. Some 60 to 100,000 battle dead, and tens of thousands of amputees, victims of indiscriminate use of land mines. The rising child mortality, which in 1986 alone resulted in the deaths of 55,000 youngsters 5 and younger. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, millions of dislocated persons. These are the costs of continuing warfare.

Employing the classic guerrilla tactic of military ambush, sabotage, and psychological intimidation, learned by its senior military commanders at training centers in Maoist China, immediately developed a formidable capacity with South African assistance, to destroy, be it railroads, bridges, dams, factories, or farms. Such ends justifies the means—warfare inevitably fostered on both sides a callousness toward human life.

This was illustrated most recently when—or very recently, because there may be very recent ones, when rebel forces reportedly set fire to a food storage depot in the town of Cuito, and then circled it with mines. Twenty civilians were blown to pieces as they tried to save sacks of corn and drums of oil.

The human consequences of prolonging rural insurgency on the local population image clearly I think from the recent Africa Watch report based on interviews with Angolan war refugees in Zaire and Zambia. The impact of such insurgency upon those who wage it is more difficult to assess.

But two general conclusions might be drawn concerning UNITA. One, an organization that has been immersed in over 20 years of nearly continuous guerrilla combat is unlikely to be an incubator of democratic behavior and political tolerance, and a rebel movement that alone relies upon mobilizing rather than re-educating traditional authority, notably the local Chiefs of Sobas and Ethnic Loyalties within a rural context where the burning dismemberment and drowning of witches or sorcerers is still common, and this according to an article that UNITA itself has distributed.

That kind of movement risks having its own political and military ranks divided and contaminated by such values and practices. While UNITA is publicly committed to pluralist, democratic values, its success as an insurgent movement is widely attributed to the political skill and acumen of one man, Jonas Savimbi. The flexibility from Mao to Botha, tenacity, guile, and flare that have rendered Savimbi, and thus UNITA, consummate survivalists, are not contrary to assumptions of some admirers, attributes that embody a promise of democratic rule in the eventuality of a UNITA victory. Consider the indispensable man argument conveyed by Savimbi's and UNITA's own words. Consider the cumulative pattern of authoritarianism suggested by persistent though vehemently denied reports of summary suppression of dissent within UNITA's leadership ranks.

Of himself, Savimbi states, "when you speak of UNITA, you speak of Savimbi." Of the adversary Angolan president Jose Eduardo dos Santos with whom he wishes to negotiate, he states, "it must be acknowledged I consider him an inferior element." UNITA's radio, The Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, continues to describe the movement as being "under the leadership of the supreme guide, Comrade President Dr. Jones Malheiero Savimbi." Such language sounds familiar and disturbing.

Without purporting to know the answers, one is compelled to ask searching questions about the fate of UNITA leaders believed to have challenged Jonas Savimbi's judgment. Is Manhattan College graduate and long time UNITA Foreign Secretary, Jorge Sangumba, alive and working inside Angola with UNITA as one is repeatedly assured by UNITA spokesmen, or has he been dead since 1979, 1980-81 at the hands of the movement as indicated by press accounts?

Did UNITA's leading Ovambo commander and University of Grenoble graduate Antonio Vakulukutu die of natural causes as stated by UNITA or as a consequence of challenging Jonas Savimbi's close alliance with South Africa as suggested by independent press reports?

Recent allegations of political coercion in Jamba, UNITA's such capital, by Savimbi biographer and journalist Fred Bridgland, among others, have given new reason for raising and pursuing questions about the nature of a movement that receives significant American military assistance as a champion of democracy.

As the United States reviews its policy toward Angola in the light of prospective regional military disengagement and the human costs of continuing war, it would do well to note that guerrilla insurgencies generally do not inaugurate democratic regimes.

For Angola, there is only one way out of the degenerative culture of violence, negotiated political accommodation. Should the United States not be pressing the Soviet Union to joint it and Western Europe in offering incentives for peaceful resolution rather than more arms for more human carnage?

Should Angola's warring adversaries not be confronted with an imaginative and insistently put multilateral offer to help them develop Angola's potential agricultural and mineral, as well as petroleum wealth, reconstruct and reopen the Benguela railroad to the benefit of all South Central Africa, and being the process of positive social transformation?

Should Angola's protagonists not be told that a cease fire, political negotiations that reach out to all sectors of the country, even in voluntary exiles, renunciation of any blocking personal political ambitions, and commitments to guarantee basic human rights, constitute the prerequisites for such an internationally assisted rescue?

The alternative is the continued ravage of war. Angola offers the United States an opportunity to assert international leadership. Instead of being satisfied with the role of replacement for South Africa as the principal external support for continued insurgency and suffering, the United States should become an imaginative, energetic, aggressive champion of political accommodation, political reason.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marcum follows:]

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#### WAR AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ANGOLA

Three decades of internal war have devastated the people and economy of Angola. The fratricidal, protracted nature of that war has brutalized its protagonists. Reports of new and continuing violations of human rights in the conflict should come as no surprise. History suggests that internal insurgency and counterinsurgency that endure over long periods of time tend to degenerate into especially violent, dehumanizing warfare. Together, rulers and rebels become the victims of a degenerative culture of violence. The Philippines, Uruguay, El Salvador and Mozambique are among recent examples of this process that immediately come to mind. In 1975, following thirteen years of anticolonial insurgency, Angola fell victim to the horrendous destruction of externally fueled civil war. Fifteen years later, that war continues unresolved by the international accord that has committed Cuba and South Africa to military withdrawal from Angola and Namibia, respectively.

In the period immediately after assuming power in 1975 with the assistance of Cuban and Soviet intervention, leaders of the nationalist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, acted with the early zealotry and intolerance characteristic of revolutionaries heady with newly won authority. It banned and jailed political opposition, curtailed religious freedom, barred independent trade unions, declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party and established centralized political control over the press and economy. The result was economic ruin, except for an enclave economy of largely foreign-run oil production along the country's north coast. Exploiting popular grievances and putting to good use material, logistical and instructional assistance from South African forces in Namibia's regrouped and reinvigorated competing movement, the Union for the Total

Independence of Angola, or UNITA, mounted a telling insurgency from bases in the lightly populated vastness of Angola's southeastern savannah.

By the mid-1980s, an experience-chastened MPLA government had relaxed the rigid Marxist orthodoxy with which it set out to govern the country. But by then, it was too late for economic decentralization, market reforms or increasing openness to western ties and ideas to arrest the deadly corrosion of internal war. In 1985, the U.S. Department of State cited a progressive, general decline in the human condition of Angolans. The MPLA and UNITA accused each other of practicing terrorism against their respective civilian supporters. Within government administered territory, "the deterioration of the security situation [had] contributed to the demise of judicial safeguards and due process" and there were allegations of arbitrary arrests and torture in Angolan prisons. (1) The government countered UNITA insurgency by creating regional military councils with broad authority, establishing "people's vigilance brigades," and increasing the firepower and size of armed forces that, according to some estimates, ultimately grew to exceed 300,000 and to consume much of the country's oil revenue. (2)

Angolan war statistics are grim: 60,000 to 100,000 battle dead, tens of thousands of amputees - victims of the indiscriminate use of land mines, rising child mortality, 55,000 youngsters under the age of five in 1986 alone; hundreds of thousands of refugees wasting in Zaire and Zambia and millions of rural villagers seeking the relative safety of disease-ridden urban slums. (3) Employing classic guerrilla tactics of military ambush, economic sabotage and psychological intimidation learned by its senior military commanders at training centers in Maoist China, UNITA developed

a formidable capacity (with South African assistance) to destroy, be it railroads, bridges, dams, factories or farms. Such ends-justifies-the-means warfare inevitably fostered on both sides a callousness toward human life. This was already evident in 1976 when UNITA forces retreating from the city of Huambo reportedly slaughtered 235 incarcerated MPLA supporters and dumped their bodies in a common grave. (4) It was illustrated most recently when rebel forces reportedly set fire to a food storage depot in the town of Cuito and encircled it with mines. Twenty civilians were blown to pieces as they tried to save sacks of corn and drums of oil. (5)

The human consequences of prolonged rural insurgency on the local populace emerge clearly from the recent Africa Watch report based on interviews (1988) with Angolan war refugees in Zaire and Zambia. (6) The impact of such insurgency upon those who wage it is more difficult to assess. But two general conclusions may be drawn concerning UNITA. An organization that has been immersed in over twenty years of nearly continuous guerrilla combat is unlikely to be an incubator of democratic behavior and political tolerance. And a rebel movement that long relies upon mobilizing traditional authority (viz. village sobas) and ethnic loyalties, rather than upon reeducating and transcending them, and does so within a rural context where the burning, dismemberment or drowning of "witches" or "sorcerers" is still common, risks having its own political and military ranks contaminated and divided by such values and practices. (7)

While UNITA is publicly committed to pluralist, democratic values, its success as an insurgent movement is widely attributed to the political skill and acumen of one man, Jonas Savimbi. The flexibility (from Mao to



Botha), tenacity, guile and stylistic flare that have rendered Savimbi, and thus UNITA, consummate survivalists, are not, contrary to the assumptions of some admirers, attributes that embody a promise of democratic rule in the eventuality of a UNITA victory. Consider the "indispensable man" arguments conveyed by Savimbi's and UNITA's own words. Consider the cumulative pattern of authoritarianism suggested by persistent though vehemently denied reports of summary suppression of dissent within UNITA leadership ranks.

Of himself, Jonas Savimbi states: "When you speak of UNITA, you speak of Savimbi." (8) Of the adversary, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, with whom he wishes to negotiate, he states: "It must be acknowledged, I consider [him] an inferior element." (9) UNITA's radio (The Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel) continues to describe the movement as being "under the leadership of its supreme guide, Comrade President Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi." (10) Such language sounds familiar, disturbing.

Without purporting to know the answers, one is compelled to ask searching questions about the fate of UNITA leaders believed to have challenged Jonas Savimbi's judgement. For example, is Manhattan College graduate and long time (1969-1978) UNITA foreign secretary, Jorge Sangumba, alive and working inside Angola with UNITA as one is repeatedly assured by UNITA spokesmen, or has he been dead since 1979-80 at the hands of the movement as indicated by press accounts? (11) Did UNITA's leading Ovambo commander and University of Grenoble graduate Antonio Yakulukutu die of natural causes as stated by UNITA or as a consequence of challenging Jonas Savimbi's close alliance with South Africa as suggested by

independent press reports? (12) Recent allegations by Savimbi biographer and journalist, Fred Bridgland, (13) among others, of internecine political coercion at Jamba, UNITA's bush capital, have given new reason for raising and pursuing questions about the nature of a movement that receives significant American military assistance as a champion of democracy.

As the United States reviews its policy toward Angola in the light of prospective regional military disengagement and the human costs of continuing war, it would do well to note the words of a political scientist little disposed to sympathy for a government such as that of the MPLA. "All revolutionary opponents of authoritarian regimes," Harvard's Samuel Huntington has observed, "claim to be democratic," but once in power, "almost all turn out to be authoritarian." "Guerrilla insurgencies do not inaugurate democratic regimes." (14)

For Angola, there is only one way out of the degenerative culture of violence - negotiated political accommodation. Should the United States not be pressing the Soviet Union to join it and Western Europe in offering incentives for peaceful resolution rather than in providing more arms for more human carnage? Building on the collaboration that led to the December 1988 agreement on Angola and Namibia, the United States and Soviet Union might further the causes of both formative superpower rapprochement and Angolan peace by agreeing to limit and symmetrically scale down their provision of arms to their respective Angolan clients.

Should Angola's warring adversaries not also be confronted with an imaginative and insistently put multilateral offer to help them develop their

country's potential agricultural and mineral, as well as petroleum, wealth, reconstruct and reopen the Benguela railroad to the benefit of all south-central Africa, and thus begin a process of positive social transformation?

Should Angola's protagonists not be told that a mutual ceasefire, political negotiations that reach out to include all sectors of the country (even involuntary exiles), renunciation of all blocking personal political ambitions, and commitment to internationally monitored guarantees of basic human rights constitute the prerequisites for an externally assisted rescue?

The alternative is the continued ravage of war. Angola offers the United States an opportunity to assert international leadership. Instead of being satisfied with the role of replacement for South Africa as the principal external support for continued insurgency and suffering, the United States could choose to become an imaginative, energetic, and aggressive champion of political accommodation, political reason. It should strive to generate a persuasive mix of multilateral aid incentives and then press them with a public vigor calculated to embarrass the callous, the doctrinaire, or the power-driven into acceding to the logic of compromise and peace.

- 1 U.S. Department of State, Angola Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1985, February 1986.
- 2 Time, October 17, 1988.
- 3 See U.S. Committee for Refugees, Uprooted Angolans: From Crisis to Catastrophe, 1987; Los Angeles Times, January 26, 1989.

- 4 Reported on site by Rene Lefort, Le Monde (Paris), February 18, 1976.
- 5 Reported by Stephen Smith, Liberation (Paris), January 19, 1989.
- 6 New York Times, April 9, 1989.
- 7 UNITA efforts to mitigate or limit the impact of witchcraft are described by Ferreira Fernandes in an article (O'Jornal [Lisbon], July 1, 1988) distributed by its Washington office. Reports of factional, inter-ethnic conflict within UNITA are long standing and recurrent. See, for example, The Guardian (London), December 24, 1984; and West Africa (London), February 22, 1985.
- 8 Jeune Afrique, March 30, 1988.
- 9 Ibid., December 7, 1988.
- 10 For example, broadcast of November 6, 1988, 0600 GMT.
- 11 Africa (Lisbon), May 11, 1988; Africa Confidential, December 8, 1988; Africa News, February 6, 1989.
- 12 Diario de Lisboa, December 20, 1984; Africa Confidential, December 8, 1988.
- 13 Sunday Telegraph, March 12, 1989.
- 14 Political Science Quarterly, Summer 1984.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Dr. Marcum. Now we would like to turn to our second witness, Mr. Constantine Menges, Resident Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Menges.

**STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINE MENGES, RESIDENT FELLOW,  
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Mr. MENGES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is my pleasure to be here. As a citizen and scholar on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, I am delighted to have a chance to appear before the Congress in response to your invitation.

I will begin my brief statement with a broad observation. I think we are here now in the spring of 1989 in the context of a Soviet foreign policy which has two elements, the element of normalization with the United States and detente, but also the element of continued support around the world for pro-Soviet regimes and groups that seek to maintain and take power.

I think that is important to reflect on because the question we all have is whether there is a real change in Soviet foreign policy and that of its allies, or whether the agreement in the Angolan Namibia matter is simply a means toward the Communist end.

It is important to recall that in the 1970's, and specifically in 1975, there was a similar period of U.S./Soviet summit meetings, of professed Soviet detente, of the U.S./Soviet/Moscow summit of 1972 when the Soviet Union promised that it was going to change the rules of international behavior, give up its wars of national liberation, and maintain a normal relationship with the free world and the United States.

During those years of detente in the 1970's, which I think we are seeing again today in terms of spirit, it is important to recall that while the summit meetings occurred, while there were hopes for a truly better U.S./Soviet relationship, and for a change in foreign policy under three American presidents, both parties at the same time, ten new pro-Soviet dictatorships were established by the second element of Soviet foreign policy, this process of indirect aggression.

Those ten new pro-Soviet dictatorships include Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, Mozambique during the Republican presidency, and during the Democratic presidency of those years, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan.

And, therefore, Mr. Chairman, I think that as we look at the current situation in Angola, we have to recall that it was a decision of the United States Congress to remove the means of pro-western black nationalists from being able to compete. It was the Congress of the United States that made the decision to cut off the aid to the pro-western black independence movement in Angola, which in turn led, and I agree completely with Chairman Burton, to the victory of the pro-Soviet MPLA, which has established a dictatorship that has brought enormous suffering to the people of Angola, a dictatorship that brought suffering to the people of Angola in the years 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, with the collectivization of agriculture, the nationalization of industry, mass arrests and oppression, all of which set the stage for what then came to be the reemergence after those years of relative peace in Angola, which I think we are