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**POSSIBLE VIOLATION OR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE  
CLARK AMENDMENT**

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**COMPLETED**

158

**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS**

**FIRST SESSION**

WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1987

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## POSSIBLE VIOLATION OR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CLARK AMENDMENT

WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1987

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met at 9:46 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Wolpe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will come to order.

Our hearing today is part of an effort by the subcommittee to investigate persistent and disturbing reports that the Administration has violated or circumvented the Clark Amendment. The Clark Amendment, which was in force from 1976 to 1985, stated, and I quote, "notwithstanding any law to the contrary, no assistance of any kind may be provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless and until Congress expressly authorizes such assistance by law."

There would be no need for today's hearing had a compelling body of circumstantial evidence not accumulated strongly suggesting that such violations or circumventions of the Clark Amendment did indeed occur.

In this connection, I am entering into the record a selected chronology of relevant events and reports that has been prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Africa. Copies, I may add, are available to Members and to the press.

Several aspects of the chronology strongly suggest the Administration may have violated the letter or spirit of the Clark Amendment. These include statements by Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] insurgency in Angola, that the Clark Amendment was meaningless, that the United States had "other channels" through which it could deliver material assistance, and that the United States was encouraging other countries to support UNITA; statements by present and former Administration officials, anonymously cited in the press, to the effect that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia agreed in 1981 to aid anticommunist groups around the world as part of the arrangement allowing Saudi Arabia to buy American AWACS radar planes, and that the Administration has several times requested financial help for rebel groups over the following five

years; statements by Jonas Savimbi indicating that external financial aid from Arab countries was insubstantial in 1979 to '81, but that by 1984 he was receiving 60 to 70 million dollars a year from such Arab friends as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, where UNITA officers were trained, and Egypt; reports in respected magazines and newspapers, including Time, Newsweek, and the Los Angeles Times, citing official sources, that the United States was violating or circumventing the Clark Amendment, and allegations by a California businessman that he was solicited to funnel Saudi funds to Angolan, Afghan, and Nicaraguan rebels as part of a joint United States-Saudi arrangement; a pattern of hedged denials of the above reports on the part of the CIA and State Department.

In response to a reporter's question in May 1980, how about aid to the Angolan rebels, Presidential Republican candidate Ronald Reagan replied, well, frankly, I would provide them with weapons.

That, of course, did not become legally possible, since in both 1980 and 1981 the Congress refused to repeal the Clark Amendment. What we are trying to determine in the subcommittee's ongoing investigation is whether the Administration sought to evade the clear intent of Congress through actions such as the use of foreign donors and private networks that became the precedents for subsequent efforts to evade the Boland Amendment on Nicaragua.

Today's hearing will take sworn testimony from Mr. Sam Joseph Bamieh, Chairman of the Industrial Development Group. Mr. Bamieh has been frequently quoted in press stories regarding the subject of our investigation, and has been extensively interviewed in the past two weeks by subcommittee staff. He is now prepared to offer testimony under oath that is far more extensive than what has appeared thus far on the public record.

In order that Mr. Bamieh's testimony may be presented in the most effective fashion, the subcommittee will employ the procedure familiar to those who have followed the Iran-Contra hearings. After a short five-minute statement by Mr. Bamieh regarding his personal and professional background, I will pose a systematic series of chronological questions designed to elicit Mr. Bamieh's full knowledge of the relevant events.

I will also enter into the record at appropriate points relevant documentation that has been obtained by the subcommittee staff. When Mr. Bamieh's testimony is concluded, members will have the opportunity to question Mr. Bamieh concerning his testimony.

Mr. Bamieh is accompanied this morning by his attorney, Mr. William Casselman II.

[Background material submitted by Representative Wolpe, see page 33.]

Mr. WOLPE. Before turning to our witness, I would like to invite Mr. Burton, the distinguished Ranking Member of the committee, to make any opening remarks he might care to make.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to start off by saying that throughout the history of the United States, the President has the constitutional right and authority to conduct foreign policy, and it appears that the Congress of the United States more and more is interfering with his constitutional prerogatives. And it really concerns me that the only two foreign policy investigations that are going on, the Iran-Contra

investigation, and now this investigation regarding the Clark Amendment and Angola, are investigations into the United States helping fight communism in the world.

The United States is attempting to stem the tide of Communist encroachment in our hemisphere in Nicaragua, and in Angola we have been helping Dr. Savimbi in his fight to stop the Communists and put that country into the democratic column. And yet here we have two committees of Congress bashing the President in foreign policy and in effect, aiding Communist governments by doing everything possible to undermine the President's policies.

I noticed that Mr. Bamieh has a tie clip on that appears to be from the President of the United States, and I find that ironic that he would be wearing that tie clip here at the same time he is ready to start attacking the Reagan Administration's foreign policy.

And now for my formal statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand that we in Congress sometimes hold hearings that are less geared to evaluating the real, pressing problems under the subcommittee's jurisdiction, in this case the continent of Africa, and more geared to catching a piece of the limelight right here inside the Beltway. But this really goes a bit too far.

I understand that the single witness on which this entire inquiry is based is a businessman who claims to have been defrauded and abused by Saudi Arabian officials. He sued the Saudis, settled out of court, and is now suing them again. Clearly, there is a real dispute here involving a significant amount of money. Whatever the dispute, it seems to be a personal one involving Mr. Bamieh and his money. I do not know who is right here, and I do not see why this committee is getting involved.

What I would like to know is why a man with a personal beef with the Saudi Arabian government is being brought here to testify on what amounts to hearsay at his own private hearing before this subcommittee. This hearsay, that an American official who is no longer with us, made a deal six years ago in possible circumvention of an amendment of questionable constitutionality that was overwhelmingly repealed by the Congress is so tenuous that even the Iran-Contra Committee would not touch it with a 10-foot pole. So now we have this subcommittee trying to launch a son of Iran-Contra hearing.

Television shows are supposed to have spinoffs, not Congressional hearings. The sad thing is that the little games we play in Congress sometimes hurt real people fighting in real wars for real freedom. Jonas Savimbi has been fighting for over a decade against an illegitimate communist regime bought and paid for by the Soviet Union and defended by 40,000 Communist Cuban troops. He is a black nationalist fighting for free elections, peace, and dignity for his country against ruthless Communist colonialism. And instead of cheering him on, and despite overwhelming bipartisan votes in his support in Congress, this subcommittee does everything in its power to pull the rug out from under him.

I think it is a disgrace, and I think the American people would be hard put to understand why there are still Members of Congress who have no trouble supporting Communist-dominated, Soviet-sponsored movements from South Africa to El Salvador, but will

not lift a finger for a movement fighting for democracy against 40,000 Cubans in Angola.

I would just like to make a remark for the record on a related matter that has appeared in the press recently, the question of establishing diplomatic relations with the MPLA regime in Luanda. President Carter refused to recognize the MPLA regime in Angola, which established a government by force in violation of the Alvor Agreement, to which UNITA was a signatory. The Cuban troops are the instruments by which the Alvor Agreement was violated. Their removal would not constitute grounds for establishing relations unless the Alvor Agreement were to be implemented in the process.

The litmus test for recognition cannot be only Cuban troop withdrawal; the litmus test must be national reconciliation in Angola without Cuban troops, as provided for by the Alvor Agreement. Without national reconciliation and free elections, there will be no peace in Angola, and no legitimate government to recognize.

So let's not be confused by pilots and smoke signals. Peace is the objective in Angola, not the peace of the gulag that the Cuban troops are trying to impose, but peace through true independence and national reconciliation for all Angolans.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton.

Before turning to Mr. Bamieh, I would like to enter into the record a letter I received from Congressman Hamilton, Chairman of the Select Committee to investigate covert arms transactions with Iran. We, when we learned of Mr. Bamieh's information, drew the subject to Mr. Hamilton's attention, and to that of the select committee. Mr. Bamieh was also interviewed by select committee staff.

I then received this response from Mr. Hamilton. I will read portions of it here: "I instructed the select committee staff to interview Mr. Bamieh, and they met with him several days ago. Although Mr. Bamieh has some special information regarding Saudi dealings in the Third World, including Africa, it has been determined that his public testimony before the select committee is not needed during the second phase of the committee's work."

He goes on to indicate that "I realize the importance to your subcommittee of any such United States-Saudi cooperation or involvement in Africa, especially in Angola during the period of time when the Clark Amendment was in effect. It is certainly appropriate for you to pursue this matter in your subcommittee."

"I appreciate your bringing this matter to my attention. You have raised a potential important area of inquiry. I regret the heavy schedule of the select committee until the August recess precludes further inquiry into this matter. I trust, however, that you will stay in touch with me on the progress of your subcommittee's work on this matter."

And, without objection, this letter will be inserted into the record at this point.

[The letter from Mr. Hamilton follows:]

## APPENDIX I

### THE CLARK AMENDMENT

PUBLIC LAW 96-533—DEC. 16, 1980

94 STAT. 3141

"(4) The authority of this subsection may not be used to authorize the use of more than \$250,000,000 of funds made available for use under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act, or the use of more than \$100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under this Act or any other law, in any fiscal year. Not more than \$50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year, unless such country is a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression.

22 USC 2751  
note.

"(5) The authority of this section may not be used to waive the limitations on transfers contained in section 610(a) of this Act."

22 USC 2369.

(b) Section 652 of such Act is amended by striking out ", 610(a), or 614(a)" and inserting in lieu thereof "or 610(a)".

22 USC 2411.

#### MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA

✓ Sec. 118. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance of any kind may be provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless and until—

22 USC 2293  
note.

(1) the President determines that such assistance should be furnished in the national security interests of the United States;

(2) the President submits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing—

Report to  
congressional  
committees.

(A) a description of the amounts and categories of assistance which he recommends be furnished and the identity of the proposed recipients of such assistance; and

(B) a certification that he has determined that the furnishing of such assistance is important to the national security interests of the United States and a detailed statement of the reasons supporting such determination; and

(3) the Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the furnishing of such assistance.

Joint resolution.

(b) If introduced within 30 days after the submission of the report required by paragraph (2) of subsection (a), a resolution under paragraph (3) of subsection (a) shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and in the House of Representatives in accordance with the procedures applicable to the consideration of resolutions of disapproval under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act.

90 Stat. 765.

22 USC 2776.

(c) The prohibition contained in subsection (a) does not apply with respect to assistance which is furnished solely for humanitarian purposes.

(d) The provisions of this section may not be waived under any other provision of law.

(e) Section 404 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is repealed.

Repeal.  
22 USC 2293  
note.

#### PROHIBITION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA

Sec. 119. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this title shall be made available for any aid or assistance to Nicaragua.

22 USC 2151  
note.



## APPENDIX 3

SELECTED CHRONOLOGY CONCERNING POSSIBLE VIOLATION OR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CLARK AMENDMENT. PREPARED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

**Committee on Foreign Affairs**

SELECTED CHRONOLOGY CONCERNING POSSIBLE VIOLATION OR CIRCUMVENTION  
OF THE CLARK AMENDMENT RESTRICTING DIRECT OR INDIRECT U.S. ASSISTANCE  
TO MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA

(Prepared by Staff of the Subcommittee on Africa)

- June 30, 1976 — Congress enacted the Clark Amendment which prohibited, notwithstanding any other provision of law, "assistance of any kind... for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless and until Congress expressly authorizes such assistance by law". Legislative action followed disclosure of U.S. covert paramilitary and political aid to two Angolan factions, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA and Holden Roberto's FNLA, which also received Chinese, North Korea and South African aid in resisting the Soviet and Cuban-aided MPLA faction. (A minor procedural revision was enacted by Congress on December 16, 1980).
- May 6, 1980 — In an interview published by the Wall Street Journal, Ronald Reagan, Republican candidate for President, stated, "Well, frankly I would provide them [UNITA forces] with weapons... Apparently he [Savimbi] is quite a force there, and he's never asked for any kind of help, except weapons, and I don't see anything wrong with someone who wants to free themselves from the rule of an outside power, which is Cubans and East Germans — I don't see why we shouldn't provide them the weapons to do it".
- February 7, 1981 — According to the New York Times, (June 1, 1981) a memorandum drafted principally by Chester A. Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State-designate for Africa, and subsequently approved by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and the White House, stated UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, would go along with a U.S. negotiating plan on Namibia and Angola because he was dependent on supplies from "parties we can directly influence".
- March 19, 1981 — Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Lannon Walker, testifying to the House Africa Subcommittee in favor of repeal of the Clark Amendment, said, "With or without the Clark Amendment, this administration can decide that it wishes to give assistance to X, Y, or Z. It would be difficult, it would be more complicated. They could, in fact, signal that. It could then have the very effects you [Representative Howard

arrangement - which was confirmed by present and former United States officials who were familiar with the AWACS sale - shows for the first time one of the origins of Saudi support for anti-Communist groups and King Fahd's personal involvement in the deal... The disclosure also demonstrates that the Reagan Administration used covert means to fund resistance groups such as the contras years earlier than had been publicly known before... 'I recall the Saudis agreeing to fund anti-Communist groups at the time of the AWACS sale, in connection with the sale' [said] one former Administration official, adding that how the informal agreement would be implemented was never explicitly defined. He and other present and former United States officials agreed to discuss the matter only if their names were not published". An "American businessman" also informed the *Times* that "King Fahd told him that he had negotiated a reduction in the number of Americans to be involved in operating the planes. In return, the King reportedly said, the Saudis had agreed to an American request that they 'fund movements to fight communists... [saying] It's up to the U.S. Government to tell us where'. Lastly, "Congressional investigators and Administration officials say the Administration has requested financial help from Saudi Arabia for rebel groups several times over the last five years".

Previously, an article in the *San Francisco Examiner* (July 27, 1986), citing two CIA and one military intelligence sources, described the AWACS for financing-Third World-anti-Communist guerrillas deal as an "informal arrangement" and a "back channel operation involving the National Security Council and the Saudis". A Congressional aide who was briefed on Saudi aid to "anti-Communist insurgents, most notably in Afghanistan... said the arrangement is called 'the AWACS rule'", the story continued. In addition, a *New York Times* story (October 22, 1986) cited a "California businessman" who maintained he had been informed of the same arrangement by Prince Bandar BIN SULTAN, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. The chief beneficiaries "were said to be rebels in Angola and anti-Soviet guerilla forces in Afghanistan".

**1981 and Possibly Later** — The staff of the House Subcommittee on Africa was told in 1982 and subsequently on June 25, 1987 by a reliable source that he heard from a U.S. official that U.S. military personnel were either observing or participating in training of UNITA forces in Morocco "at least" during 1981.

**January 21, 1982** — In a Rabat, Morocco interview published in *Tempo*, a conservative Portuguese weekly, Jonas Savimbi stated, "The American Government seeks to create a vitality in southern Africa, in Namibia, in Angola, but let's not kid ourselves: that Clark Amendment gives to understand that the American Government is limited in these issues. But a country such as the

USA does not need to give missiles, as such, for there are other ways to provide assistance. If they want to give assistance, they can always give it. The Clark Amendment doesn't mean anything. It is a question of principle which leads the Government to respect the policy it has and which is already approved. So the situation is now a thing of the past. It was a situation that was created in 1976, America was still experiencing the syndrome of Vietnam, of Watergate. Besides, the one who introduced the amendment lost in the elections. The self-same Committee that had elected the individual to the Senate was a victim of the Clark Amendment. Therefore, for the Administration to rid itself of a piece of legislation that is limiting its diplomatic and political action is one thing, and material assistance is another. Material assistance is not dependent on or limited by the Clark Amendment. A great nation such as the United States has other channels... As a consequence of having made a trip to the United States, which I consider to have been of great importance to UNITA, many African nations, many Arabic nations, are now more interested in giving us substantial aid that we need".

**February 15, 1983** — At a hearing the the House Subcommittee on Africa on "Namibia and Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa", the following exchange took place between Subcommittee Chairman Wolpe and Assistant Secretary of State Crocker:

- Mr. Wolpe: First of all, what is the American Government's understanding at the moment as to where UNITA receives its external assistance? Where does it come from? What does it consist of?
- Mr. Crocker: There have been historically other sources of external support [than South Africa], but I would prefer to get you a written answer to that question.
- Mr. Wolpe: If the United States were to ask Morocco to help UNITA or assist Morocco in subsequent training, would you consider that a violation of the Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S. direct or indirect military aid to Angola?...
- Mr. Crocker: I am not a lawyer, but I would expect it would certainly be a question that one should put to a lawyer, because there is a Clark Amendment and we have made every effort to respect the law in the conduct of our African policies, as in our other policies.

We have also said repeatedly that we have no plan or intention to provide material support to UNITA.

Mr. Wolpe: What kind of assistance has been extended [to UNITA] by the Zairan Government?

Mr. Crocker: ...We would be glad to get you an answer to that question too.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Material was not submitted.

May 15, 1983 — A Los Angeles Times story concerning a two-year old secret Army unit called Intelligence Support Activity which "conducted operations in place such as Nicaragua, and El Salvador, Africa, and Southeast Asia" according to "various U.S. government officials", states that "In one [African] nation with which the United States has no diplomatic relations, arms and bullet proof vests were provided to cooperative persons for information about military deployments, according to one knowledgeable official".

May 16, 1983 — Time Magazine reported that "According to intelligence analysts, the U.S. — is suspected of circumventing the ban on covert operations in Angola in order to keep alive the anti-Communist insurgency there".

May 31, 1983 — A Christian Science Monitor series on UNITA reported that: "Saudi Arabia has furnished UNITA with substantial financial backing".

October 10, 1983 — Newsweek in a cover story entitled "The Secret Warriors: The CIA is Back in Business", reported that "Training, arms and financial assistance are also given [by the CIA] to military forces in ... Angola". A Washington Times report (October 4) stated the reaction of the CIA and State Department to the Newsweek story: "CIA and State Department spokesman yesterday hedged their denials"... A CIA spokesman told the Washington Times he was 'pretty sure we can deny' the report of cover aid going to rebel forces in Angola and that 'we follow the law' and, "State Department spokesman Alan Romberg said, since the Clark Amendment was still in effect, he assumed the report of CIA aid 'must be untrue'".

February 17, 1984 — In an interview published in the French newspaper Le Figaro, Jonas Savimbi stated, "The Americans are giving us absolutely nothing. It is just that American sympathy is a little more active and they say to friendly countries that support us, 'Carry on, you are doing the right thing'". Savimbi also mentioned that "some 80 percent of our officers were trained in Morocco".

February 1984 — A New York Times story (February 4, 1987) cited a "California businessman" as saying he was asked by Prince Bandar, the Saudi Arabia Ambassador, to funnel Saudi funds to the contras and, "In addition to the contras... Prince Bandar mentioned Saudi assistance for Angolan rebels and for the guerillas in Afghanistan".

A March 1987 article in Regardie's magazine profiles California businessman Sam Bamieh, and says that during a February 1984 meeting at the Majestic Hotel in Cannes France, "Bandar gestured towards the sea, and told Bamieh that at that very moment, William Casey was on a yacht with King Fand, allegedly discussing aid to the Contras and to the Angolan rebels". The CIA is reported to have denied that there was such a boat trip, but a source at the NSC acknowledged that: "We made special naval provisions to secure the area where they were supposed to take the boat trip."

August 28, 1984 — In an interview published in the Washington Post, "Savimbi said he receives funding, as much as \$60 million to \$70 million a year 'from many Arab friends', including Saudi Arabia Egypt and Morocco".

September 1, 1984 — Expresso, a centrist Portuguese weekly, noted that "UNITA admits that a great many of its instructors and officers were trained in Morocco, first by the French military forces (between 1971 and 1981), and now by units in the army of Hassan II".

September 8, 1984 — Expresso published an interview with Savimbi of July 26, 1984 in which he discussed UNITA's annual budget: "Well, we have already spoken here of \$85 million. It depends on availability. It could be, perhaps, \$50 million, and \$70 million another year, because the money is discussed with the countries which have it... At any event, for UNITA to operate the budget can never be below \$30 million per year".

February 21, 1985 — During a House Africa Subcommittee hearing on Namibia, the following exchange occurred between Congressman George Crockett and Assistant Secretary Crocker:

Mr. Crockett: It is generally believed that South Africa supports UNITA in Angola. Has our government given any support, directly or indirectly, to UNITA?

Mr. Crocker: No, Congressman, it has not; that would be against the law.

March 1985 -- Following hearings by the House Africa Subcommittee on foreign aid, the following question was submitted to the State Department and the following response was received:

Q: There have been increasing reports that the Zaire Government security services are facilitating the shipment of supplies to UNITA. Press and other reports (including [Angolan] President dos Santos' statements) indicate there is an air link from Kinshasa airport to airstrips on the Zaire/Angola border, as well as road transport across the border. In view of these numerous reports over the last two years, what have you done to investigate this and what are your findings?

A. We are aware of reports of Zairian facilitative assistance to UNITA. President dos Santos recently visited Zaire, and we understand that a mechanism has been established to discuss mutual security concerns on a regular basis.

August 8, 1985 -- Congress repeals the Clark Amendment.

December 8, 1986 -- During testimony by former NSC Director Robert McFarlane before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Iran/Contra affair, the following exchange occurred:

Mr. Wolpe: During the period of the Clark amendment, all American assistance to military forces in Angola had been prohibited. There were numerous reports [of] the prohibitions being circumvented by encouraging third parties to help UNITA [or] by putting such parties [into] contact with individuals such as former CIA personnel or others who could help UNITA.

Do you have any knowledge whether the information in those reports was accurate?

Mr. McFarlane: I don't know. If the point is that there were efforts among private United States and Americans to get such reports, I don't know of any such efforts, and ...

Mr. Wolpe: Or third parties, third countries?

Mr. McFarlane: It occurs to me that there was a report of -- not of a solicitation, but of an offer of a third country that we could deal with in closed session. I don't know of any others.

## APPENDIX 4

CHRONOLOGY OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA  
FROM 1975 TO JANUARY 29, 1986, PREPARED BY THE LIBRARY OF  
CONGRESS

January 29, 1986

TO: The House Subcommittee on Africa  
Attn: Steve Weissman

FROM: Frankie Denise King  
Analyst in African Affairs

SUBJECT: Chronology of South African Military Involvement in Angola from  
1975 to the present.

The following is a chronology of events and reports related to South Africa's military involvement in Angola since 1975. The compilation was made using journal and newspaper articles, CRS products on the subject, and other reference sources. The relevant general sources are noted with the entries, and full citations are provided in the bibliography appended to the memo. Newspaper articles are cited with entries.

1975

June 19, 1975 -- South African troops reportedly took up positions at the Ruscana Falls on the Cunene River just inside Angola. (John Marcum, 1978)

August 1975 -- South African troops moved into Angola. The South African government maintained that its forces were "protecting" the Cunene Dam from attacks by the South West African (Namibian) nationalist liberation movement, the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO). (Southern Africa Perspectives, Angola Chronology, 1976)

Late August, 1975 -- South Africans reportedly agreed to set up training camps for Jonas Savimbi's anti-communist rebel movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Colombo, South of Silva Porto. (John Marcum, 1978)

Early September, 1975 -- South African troops backed by helicopters swept some 35 miles north through the Ongiva Pereira de Eca and Rocadas region. (John Marcum, 1978)

September 1975 -- South African and U.S. news sources reported big increases in Soviet weaponry to the Angolan government's military arm, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), including rockets and tanks from March onwards. (Southern Africa Perspectives, 1976)

September 21, 1975 -- A South African Commandant and 18 instructors arrived in Silva Porto. (John Marcum, 1978)

September 24, 1975 -- The South African Army sent a liaison officer to help UNITA plan to halt an MPLA advance on Nova Lisboa. (Survey of Race Relations, 1977)

October 6, 1975 -- South Africa along with UNITA troops halted the Angolan Government's military forces, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) advancing on Nova Lisboa. (John Marcum, 1978)

October 14, 1975 -- South Africa mounted "Operation Zulu" against the MPLA at a staging base at Runtu, Namibia; MPLA forces were dislodged at Pereira de Eca. (John Marcum, 1978)

October 19, 1975 -- The Washington Post (10/19/76, Uys) reported South African raids into Angola while in "hot pursuit" of SWAPO guerrillas from Namibia. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

Mid-October -- The Washington Post (1/6/76, Binder) reported that South African armored forces were racing through south central Angola against light opposition, and ran into Cuban troops supporting the MPLA. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

October 25, 1975 -- The Washington Post (10/25/75, News Dispatches), reported MPLA charges that South Africa and Zaire had invaded Angola from across its southern border; force was estimated at 800 to 1,000. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

Early November, 1975 -- Heavy armored South African forces advancing up the coast with troops from UNITA and Holden Roberto's pro-Western National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) inflicted serious defeats on the MPLA, capturing many towns, including Sa da Bandeira, Mocmedes, and the ports of Benguela, Lobito, and Nova Redondo. (Southern Africa Perspectives, 1976)

November 10, 1975 -- Savimbi reportedly flew to Pretoria to meet with Prime Minister Vorster and South African military officials to persuade them to delay their withdrawal from Angola. (John Marcum, 1978)

Mid-November, 1975 -- South African forces confronted a regrouped MPLA force that had been reinforced by elements of Cuban expeditionary forces numbering around 3,000. (John Marcum, 1978)

November 18, 1975 -- South Africa's Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, denied reports that South African troops were operating deep inside Angola in support of the FNLA and UNITA. Muller did acknowledge that South African troops were just over the Angolan border protecting Cunene hydro-electric project. (CRS, Angolan Chronology, Branaman, 1976)

November 27, 1975 -- The London Times reported that the South African Minister of Defense, Mr. P.W. Botha, appealed to the Western powers to play a more direct role in preventing the Soviet Union from establishing a permanent foothold in Angola. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Branaman, 1976)



December 1975 -- Reports appeared of South African military advisors working closely with UNITA and the FNLA on all battlefronts; heavy concentrations of South African troops in the south, and South African fighter bombers operating from bases in Zaire. (Southern Africa Perspectives, 1976)

December 1, 1975 -- South Africa announced it had photographs of captured training manuals used by Cubans in Angola, and documents showing Soviet amphibious armored cars deep in Angolan territory. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Walker, 1976)

December 17, 1975 -- According to the Washington Post (12/18/75, Mosely) and the London Times (12/18/75, Kennedy), South Africa announced it was sending commando reservists into Angola, and tacitly acknowledged that its forces were already fighting deep inside Angola. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

December 18, 1975 -- South Africa announced that it would send reservists into the Angola battle zone and extend national service for some conscripts. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Branaman, 1976)

December 19, 1975 -- According to the New York Times (12/19/75, Kaufman) and the Chicago Tribune (12/20/75, Wire Services), South Africans were serving in tactical and training capacities in Angola, and giving advice and supplies to UNITA. Top military men from South Africa had weekly consultations with Mobutu, Kaunda, Roberto, and Savimbi. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

December 20, 1975 -- Savimbi reportedly flew to Pretoria again to persuade the South Africans to delay their withdrawal from Angola. (John Marcum, 1978)

December 28, 1975 -- According to the Washington Post (12/29/75, News Dispatches), South Africa had given increasing indications that it was considering pulling out of the Angolan civil war. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

#### 1976

January 1, 1976 -- The Washington Post reported that South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, had made his first open appeal for the West to get directly involved in the Angolan Civil War. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Branaman, 1976)

January 5, 1976 -- The New York Times (1/6/76, Reuters) unofficially estimated the number of South African troops in Angola to be at 1,000-6,000. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

January 6, 1976 -- The Washington Post (1/6/76, Marder) estimated that South Africa had 1,000-5,000 troops in Angola, with thousands manning supply lines. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

January 6, 1976 -- According to the Washington Post (1/7/76, Reuters), the State Department denied reports that the U.S. had been coordinating its strategy in Angola with South Africa, or that the U.S. had requested South Africa to send troops to Angola to resist the MPLA. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

January 10, 1976 -- The South African Defense Minister, Piet Botha, indicated that his government was prepared to withdraw its troops from the Angolan civil war. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1976)

January 23, 1976 -- The Washington Post (1/23/76 and 1/24/76, news dispatches) reported that South Africa was alluding to a withdrawal of its estimated 1,200 man force from Angola's civil war. (CRS Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

January 25, 1976 -- According to the Washington Post (1/26/76, Ottaway) and the New York Times (1/26/76, Kamm), South African troops began their withdrawal from deep within Angola to the southern portion of the country, leaving important material, artillery, communications equipment, with UNITA. UNITA, confirming the South African withdrawal, said it was not leaving Angola, but moving to "non-operational areas" and remaining on alert. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

January 27, 1976 -- The Washington Post (1/28/76, Ottaway) reported that UNITA had decided to bring in European and American mercenaries to replace withdrawing South African troops. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal 1976)

February 3, 1976 -- The Washington Post (2/4/76, Nossiter) stated that South Africa continued to hold a strip up to 50 miles deep across southern Angola. According to Defense Minister, Piet Botha, approximately 4,000-5,000 troops were patrolling this buffer zone. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

February 5, 1976 -- The New York Times (2/7/76, Kamm) indicated that South African officials said they had intervened in Angola on the understanding that the U.S. would rush sufficient supplies there to help counter Soviet moves. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

February 7, 1976 -- The Washington Post reported that the MPLA had promised Namibia guerrilla forces material assistance in their efforts to gain independence from South Africa. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1976)

February 12, 1976 -- The Washington Post (2/13/76, Wright) reported that French military sources in Kinshasa, Zaire had said that South Africa had apparently re-entered the war in Angola, sending 5,000 to 6,000 troops to the north. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

February 13, 1976 -- MPLA Foreign Minister, Eduardo dos Santos, issued a statement indicating that the MPLA would guarantee the interests of South African projects in Angola in exchange for diplomatic recognition

by Pretoria. (CRS, Angola Chronology, 1977)

March 14, 1976 -- According to the New York Times (3/14/76, Hoffman), South Africa had informed African delegates at the U.N. over the past few days, it would withdraw all troops from Angola in return for an arrangement regarding the Cunene River hydroelectric irrigation complex. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

March 21, 1976 -- The Washington Post (3/21/76, Weintraub) reported that South Africa had announced that it would withdraw its remaining 3,000 to 4,000 troops inside Angola if the assurances it received on the safety of the Cunene dam project proved to be correct. The withdrawal was to take place in six days. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

March 25, 1976 -- The New York Times (3/26/76, AP) and the Washington Post (3/26/76, Ottaway) reported that South Africa had withdrawn all of its forces from southern Angola by March 27 after receiving assurances from the Angolan government. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

March 26, 1976 -- The Washington Post (3/27/76, Ottaway) reported that local officials of UNITA had appealed to South Africa for asylum, asking that they be allowed to follow South African troops when they left Angola. (CRS, Angola Chronology, Lowenthal, 1976)

March 27, 1976 -- The Washington Post (3/28/76, Ottaway) and the New York Times (3/28/76, Reuters) report that South African troops had completed their withdrawal from southern Angola, along with 1600 Angolan refugees cared for by South Africans in their base camps in Angola. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1976)

March 31, 1976 -- The United Nations Security Council approved a resolution 387(1976) which denounced South Africa's aggression against Angola. (United Nations Yearbook, 1977)

April 1976 -- Cuban troops halted their withdrawal from Angola according to MPLA officials because of overflights by South African aircraft and guerrilla raids by UNITA military units, allegedly reconstructed and retrained at South African Defense Force (SADF) facilities in Namibia. (Africa Notes, John Marcum, Dec. 20, 1985)

May 7, 1976 -- Angolan President Agostinho Neto for the first time indirectly accused Zaire and South Africa of continuing to back armed incursions into Angola. (House Foreign Affairs Committee Print Chronologies, 1976)

May 19, 1976 -- South Africa announced that it would establish a 1,000-mile buffer zone along the border between Angola and South West Africa (Namibia) to stem the recurrent forays by black nationalist guerrillas into South West Africa from sanctuaries in Angola. (CRS, Angola Chronology, 1977)

June 13, 1976 -- The New York Times reported that UNITA had resumed guerrilla activity along the Benguela railroad line. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1976)

1977

January 3, 1977 -- In an official report released by the South African Defense Ministry explaining Pretoria's involvement in Angola's civil war from September 1975 to March 1976, it was confirmed that South African forces had joined UNITA and FNLA forces against the MPLA. The report stated that the official number of South African soldiers in Angola had been 2,000. (Facts on File, 1977)

1978

April 17, 1978 -- South African Defense Minister, Piet Botha, told the South African Parliament that the United States had flown arms to South African bases in Angola during the civil war there. According to Botha, the U.S. had encouraged South African involvement in Angola and then "left us in a lurch." (Foreign Affairs Committee Print Chronologies, 1978)

Early May, 1978 -- South Africa launched an attack against a SWAPO camp in Kassinga, about 160 miles north of the Angolan-Namibian border. (Foreign Policy, #31, Gerald Bender, 1978)

May 6, 1978 -- The U.N. Security Council unanimously condemned the raid by SADF into Angola. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1978)

June 16, 1978 -- U.N. representatives said that 600 Namibians had been killed and over 400 wounded in the attack on the SWAPO camp in Kassinga, Angola. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1978)

December 14, 1978 -- President Neto told Sen. George McGovern and U.S. reporters that Cuban troops in Angola were "mainly a problem regarding South Africa because we are being attacked daily by the South Africans." He charged that South Africa had been attacking Namibian guerrillas as well as arming Angolan guerrillas. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1978)

1979

March 6, 1979 -- For the first time since their withdrawal in 1976, South African troops and planes attacked SWAPO bases in Angola. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

March, 1979 -- SADF carried out a joint air and ground operation during which SADF claimed to have destroyed a dozen SWAPO encampments in Angola and in Zambia. (Jaster, 1985)

October 31, 1979 -- The Angolan Ambassador in Belgium said that South African troops had landed in two southern Angolan cities more than 100 miles inside the country and blown up strategic rail lines and bridges. Angola charged that 18 civilians were killed in the raid. South Africa would not explicitly deny or confirm the report. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1979)

December 20, 1979 -- The Angolan Defense Ministry issued a statement claiming that Angolan armed forces had shot down a South African Mirage fighter on Decem-

ber 14, killing the pilot. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1979)

#### 1980

June 7, 1980 -- South African security forces successfully launched a two-day ground and air assault on SWAPO bases in Angola under the code name "Operation Smokeshell." (Survey of Race Relations, 1980)

June 13, 1980 -- South African Prime Minister, Botha, disclosed to Parliament that in the preceding week, South African air and ground forces had raided SWAPO bases in Angola, leaving 200 guerrillas and 165 African troops dead. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1980)

June 26, 1980 -- An Angolan Defense Ministry statement said that on June 7, 3,000 South African troops had occupied towns in southern Angola and killed more than 300 civilians. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1980)

June 26, 1980 -- The Angolan news Agency, ANGOP, reported that a South African helicopter was shot down inside Angola on June 25. SADF confirmed the Angolan report adding that the crew was attacked by Angolan soldiers and the flight engineer killed. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1980)

June 27, 1980 -- In a letter to U.N. Sec.-Gen. Waldheim, South Africa admitted to the military operation in southern Angola but denied that it was directed against Angolan government troops or that it was on the scale claimed by Angola authorities. The letter also said that South African forces were in the process of returning to bases in Namibia. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1980)

June 27, 1980 -- A U.N. Security Council resolution 475(1980) condemned South Africa's invasion of Angola and asked Pretoria to withdraw all its troops immediately. (U.S. Participation in the U.N., 1979-1980)

End of June -- A withdrawal of South African security forces from Angola was completed. (Survey of Race Relations, 1980)

July, 1980 -- A small elite force of South African troops was dropped by helicopters near a SWAPO base at Chitido in Angola, killing 27 guerrillas. (Survey of Race Relations, 1980)

October 21, 1980 -- South Africa began a five-day attack on SWAPO a base in southwest Angola killing 28 guerrillas and MPLA soldiers. (Survey of Race Relations, 1980 and Jaster, 1985)

#### 1981

January 6, 1981 -- South Africa reportedly launched cross-border attacks on several villages twenty-five miles inside Angola. (Jaster, 1985)

January 11-21, 1981 -- The Angolan news agency, ANGOP, reported that South African forces based in Namibia had made a series of raids into southern Angola.

(Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

March 1981 -- The South African Air Force (SAAF) bombed a large SWAPO training base which was situated 440 km north of the border near the town of Lubango. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

April 24, 1981 -- In an interview with the Washington Post, Angolan Foreign Minister, Paulo T. Jorge, said that when Namibia becomes independent and the aggression against Angola from South Africa was finished, Angola would send home the Cuban troops that had been there since 1975. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

May 26, 1981 -- In response to allegations of atrocities, South Africa furnished information about its 32nd Battalion (nicknamed the "Buffalo Battalion") used for raids into Angola. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

July 1981 -- South African forces launched "Operation Carnation", consisting of a number of small-scale cross-border raids into eastern and central Angola against alleged SWAPO patrol bases. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

July 30, 1981 -- The commander of SADF in Namibia acknowledged that the SADF had made a number of cross-border assaults into Angola during July, but he denied the Angolan charge that SADF had occupied several Angolan towns. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

Early August, 1981 -- A large display of weapons captured from SWAPO by South African forces was shown to journalists at a press conference in Oshakati. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

August 10, 1981 -- At a press conference, Major Gen. Charles Lloyd of the South West Africa Territorial Forces (SWATF) said that information had reached the South African security forces about an early warning radar system that had been installed in southern Angola. Russian ground-to-air missiles at the port of Mocimedes and inland at Lubango had also been reported, according to Lloyd. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

August 23, 1981 -- SAAF fighter-bombers attacked and destroyed installations at Mocimedes and Lubango. Planes also dropped leaflets on the MPLA's military camps and various civilian centers that warned of imminent action against SWAPO bases and advised the Angolans to steer clear of the targets. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

August 24, 1981 -- South Africa/South West Africa (SA/SWA) task forces consisting of infantry transported in armored personnel carriers, artillery, and armored cars launched "Operation Protea", invading Angola at a number of points. In the West, a motorized column drove some sixty miles north to attack targets near Xangongo, while South African jets attacked radar and missile installations under construction in Cahama and Chibemba. In the east, a second column pursued a SWAPO guerilla band 120 miles north of the border. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981 and Jaster, 1985)

August 25, 1981 -- Angola charged that two South African armored columns had crossed into southern Angola and were mounting attacks 60 miles inside the country. Angola's press also reported that South African jets had bombed areas 200 miles from the border and South African reconnaissance flights had flown over a 300-mile wide area from Porto Alexandre. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

August 26, 1981 -- South African Prime Minister Botha acknowledged that South African forces had crossed into Angola and clashed with Angolan forces. He defended the attack as a followup operation in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

August 26, 1981 -- South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha, admitted to Parliament that an incursion into Angola was underway, but said Angolan claims of an invasion were "absolute misrepresentation." (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

August 28, 1981 -- South Africa announced that its forces were returning to their bases in Namibia after completing their "limited task" in Angola. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

August 29, 1981 -- SA/SWA troops began a phased tactical withdrawal which was halted within Angola at Ongiva (about 50 km north of the border) (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

August 29, 1981 -- According to South African officials, during South Africa's incursion into southern Angola at least 250 Angolan troops were killed, and Angolan aircraft and radar systems were destroyed. (Foreign Affairs Committee Print Chronologies, 1981)

August 31, 1981 -- The United States vetoed the proposed U.N. Security Council resolution condemning South Africa for the incursion into Angola. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

September 2, 1981 -- Reports indicated that the majority of the SA/SWA forces had left Angola. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

September 2, 1981 -- A SADF spokesman said that two Soviet lieutenant colonels and an undisclosed number of Soviet soldiers had been killed during the incursion into Angola. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

September 4, 1981 -- South Africa confirmed that two Soviet women had been killed during the incursion into Angola. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

September 4, 1981 -- The Washington Post reported widespread devastation in the area of South African operations in Angola and said that the region had been turned into a "no-man's land." (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

September 15, 1981 -- South Africa claimed that its Army had killed "about 1,000" people during its 12-day incursion into Angola. The dead were reportedly Angolan government soldiers and SWAPO guerrillas. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

September 22, 1981 -- The Angolan Defense Ministry charged that South African Armed Forces were continuing to carry out operations in the southern part of the country. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

October 28, 1981 -- Angola claimed that its forces had shot down two South African planes and a helicopter during new raids by South Africa in the southern part of the country. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

November 1, 1981 -- SA/SWA forces began "Operation Daisy" -- an 18-day search-and-destroy mission -- during which massive air and land attacks were reportedly made on SWAPO bases in Angola. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

November 4, 1981 -- Two South African Mirage jets shot down an Angolan MiG-21 plane over Angolan territory, according to military authorities in Pretoria and Luanda. (Survey of Race Relations, 1981)

November 30, 1981 -- Angola's oil refinery was attacked and set on fire. UNITA claimed responsibility, but the Angolan government accused South Africa of responsibility for the attack. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

December 13, 1981 -- According to the New York Times, Angola continued to blame South African mercenaries for the Nov. 30 oil refinery attack and displayed a captured notebook containing information on the refinery written in English and Afrikaans, as well as a mangled foot of an alleged white mercenary killed when a mine he was carrying exploded. (Foreign Affairs Committee Chronologies, 1981)

#### 1982

February 4, 1982 -- In a joint statement in Luanda, the Foreign Ministers of Angola (Paulo Jorge) and Cuba (Isidoro Malmierca Peoli) committed their governments to a Cuban withdrawal "as soon as all signs of a possible invasion" by South Africa had ended. (Gerald Bender, "The Continuing Crisis in Angola", 1978)

March 13, 1982 -- South Africa launched "Operation Super", in which 45 men from the "crack 32 Anti-Insurgency Battalion" took SWAPO men training at Cumbena in the south-west of Angola by surprise; 201 SWAPO men were reportedly killed, 40 escaped and 3 South Africans died. (Survey of Race Relations, 1982 and Jaster, 1985)

April, 1982 -- According to the New York Times, the Angolan news Agency, ANGOP, claimed that seven people were killed and 18 wounded when South African warplanes made three raids on Angolan villages carried out on April 4, 21, and 27. (New York Times, 5/3/82, AP)



Wolpe] are talking about. The players in Africa would say, "Aha, the Reagan Administration is in fact determined; maybe they are prevented by the Congress, maybe it is difficult, but that is their intention".

July 22 - 24, 1981 — A Washington Post series quoted Savimbi on recent external financing of UNITA: "What I can say is that from 1977 to 1979-80 we received a total of about \$10 million from several sources outside. From the end of 1979 and through 1980 and 1981 we did not receive any really substantial money, but we have been managing. The major suppliers of funds [Arabs] have stopped. The minor ones are still there but it is \$500,000 or \$250,000, not those [Arabs] who used to give us millions. They cut us off because they had no encouragement from any major power. But it is true that many people have given us money... independent African countries [Morocco, Senegal, the Ivory Coast], Arab countries [Saudi Arabia, Qatar] and others; not money to buy weapons, but to buy medicines and various other things. No Western European governments have given money; in Europe only individual friends and some companies".

December 12, 1981 — In an interview published in the Washington Post, Savimbi stated, "We are supported by Morocco - we get military training in Morocco. There's Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Togo... We got support from France until Mitterand came in".

December 15, 1981 — A House-Senate Conference on foreign aid legislation rejected the Administration's request to repeal the Clark Amendment.

December 17, 1981 — According to a Wall Street Journal story and interview, "Mr. Savimbi came away from his Washington meetings [with Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, other top State Department officials and Congressional leaders of both parties] saying he is satisfied that the United States will give him political and diplomatic support".

Late 1981 and Afterward — The New York Times (February 4, 1987) reported that, "King Fahd and other top Saudi Arabian officials agreed in 1981 to aid anti-Communist resistance groups around the world as part of the arrangement allowing them to buy sophisticated American AWACS radar planes, according to United States officials and other familiar with the deal". [NOTE: Final negotiations with the Saudis on the controversial sale of the AWACS planes were handled by Major-General Richard V. Secord, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Near East and South Asia and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Richard V. Murphy in late September 1981 according to the Washington Post (September 30, 1981)]. According to the Times, "The disclosure of the 1981

June 17, 1982 -- South African Prime Minister Botha said in a speech at a military base in Namibia that South Africa would not complete all phases of the proposed Western peace plan for the territory "unless the Cubans left Angola." (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

July 22, 1982 -- SA/SWA security forces bombed SWAPO bases near Mupa in Angola and seized SWAPO guerrilla documents. (Survey of Race Relations, 1982)

August 10, 1982 -- A statement was issued in Pretoria claiming that 201 SWAPO guerrillas had been killed during a South African raid into southern Angola. (On August 11, another claim added 113 to the list.) [Economist (London), 8/14/82, vol. 284]

August 13, 1982 -- Angola radio alleged that South African troops had penetrated more than 200 km into southern Angola. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

August 19, 1982 -- South Africa's Minister of Defense, Magnus Malan, issued a warning to Angola against the introduction of SAM-3 and SAM-6 heat-seeking antiaircraft missiles along the border. (Survey of Race Relations, 1982)

August 19, 1982 -- South African radio reported that the Minister of Defense and National Security, Magnus Malan, had said that the U.S. would have to assure the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola before a Namibian settlement would be possible. (Malan also said that South Africa would leave Angola in peace if it would stop supporting SWAPO). (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

August 22, 1982 -- According to the New York Times, the Angolan Defense Ministry said that it is expecting new South African attacks after an increase in reconnaissance flights by South African aircraft, according to ANGOP. (New York Times, 8/23/82, Reuters)

October 5, 1982 -- A SAAF Canberra bomber, escorted by two Mirage fighters, flew over southern Angolan territory to reconnoitre a build-up of missile installations, SWAPO concentrations, and logistical installations in the area. The SAAF aircraft were attacked by two MiG-21's painted in the camouflage colors of the Angolan Air Force. One of the planes was shot down. (Survey of Race Relations, 1982)

October 15, 1982 -- The Angolan Ambassador to France announced that Angola was willing to have talks with South Africa on the presence of Cuban troops, but stipulated several conditions: that South Africa cease all military attacks on Angola, respect Angola's sovereignty, withdraw all South African troops from southern Angola, end all aid to UNITA, and agree to allow a U.N. military contingent to be based in an independent Namibia. (Survey of Race Relations, 1982)

November 11, 1982 -- The Angolan news agency, ANGOP, claimed that South African Marines had blown up two key bridges across the Giraul River, north of the port of Mocimedes, cutting the railway line. (A SADF spokesman denied the charge). (Survey of Race Relations, 1982)

November 16, 1982 -- Under the auspices of the International Red Cross, Angola handed over the bodies of three South African soldiers killed in action and released three Americans; UNITA released three Russians and three members of the Roman Catholic Church; and South Africa released Sergeant-Major Nicolai Pestretsov (captured in Operation Protea in 1981) and the bodies of four other Russians, 94 Angolan soldiers, a Cuban soldier, and the body of another Cuban (Survey of Race Relations, 1982 and Washington Post, 11/17/82, Ross)

### 1983

Mid-1983 -- The Economist (London) reported South African military intelligence had put forward a plan for a sudden advance into Luanda, in cooperation with UNITA with the aim of bringing Savimbi to power in Angola. (Cover for such an operation would be a pre-emptive strike against the annual SWAPO offensive across the Angolan border.) [The Economist (London), March 30, 1985]

June, 1983 -- Angola accused South Africa of killing four Angolan soldiers in an incident near Cahoma in the southern Cunene province. ANGOP said that such incidents were part of increased attacks against Angola and accused the SADF of close co-operation with UNITA. (South Africa denied the charges). (Survey of Race Relations, 1983)

August, 1983 -- ANGOP alleged that SADF Impala jets had bombed the town of Cangamba, which was totally destroyed. (SADF denied the charges.) (Survey of Race Relations, 1983)

October 10-21, 1983 -- ANGOP claimed that 28 South African aircraft had violated Angola's airspace in action supported by UNITA. (Survey of Race Relations, 1983)

November, 1983 -- ANGOP claimed that the MPLA army, FAPLA, had clashed with a SADF mine-laying patrol near Cuvelai, 200 km east of Lubango. ANGOP also claimed that SADF was using chemical weapons, including teargas. (Survey of Race Relations, 1983)

Late November, 1983 -- The Economist (London) alleged that UNITA guerrillas received various types of support from a "key player" in the Angolan war, South Africa. (Survey of Race Relations, 1983)

December 6, 1983 -- South Africa launched "Operation Askari" against Angola. (Survey of Race Relations, 1983)

December 8, 1983 -- Top officials of the Angolan and South African governments met on Cape Verde to discuss a regional peace plan. (Angola, in a statement issued after the talks, rejected the concept of "linkage" between a Namibian settlement and the withdrawal of Cuban troops on its territory. (CRS, IB81063, Copson.

December 15, 1983 -- Angola called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council on South African raids into the southern part of its territory. (Survey of Race Relations, 1983)

December 28, 1983 -- The South African Broadcasting Corporation charged that the Angolans were providing sanctuary for SWAPO guerillas instead of "staying out of the way" and have actually begun their own strikes against isolated South African units, according to the New York Times. (New York Times, 12/29/83, AP)

December 29, 1983 -- SAAF launched an attack on SWAPO headquarters near the southern Angola city of Lubango. South African military chief, Gen. Constand Viljoen, said his forces were also deploying jets and artillery against surface-to-air missiles in Angola. (Survey of Race Relations, 1983 and the New York Times, 12/30/83, AP)

#### 1984

January 7, 1984 -- The chief of SADF, Gen. Constand Viljoen announced that South African forces had fought a three-day battle (lasting from Tuesday to Thursday) inside Angola, killing 324 guerrillas, Cubans, and Angolan soldiers; and destroying 11 Soviet-made tanks. (The Washington Post, 1/8/84, Sparks)

January 13, 1984 -- South Africa was reportedly pulling out a 2,000 man force that had entered southern Angola in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas from Namibia on Dec. 6, 1983. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

January 31, 1984 -- A 30-day cease-fire agreement between Angola and South Africa was signed in Lusaka, Zambia involving a staged South African withdrawal from southern Angola. A joint-monitoring commission was to be established on the Angolan/Namibian border. [CRS, IB81063, Copson and the Economist (London), March 30, 1985].

February 25, 1984 -- According to the New York Times, delegations from South Africa and Angola met in southern Angola to discuss reports that black nationalist guerillas were moving into areas being vacated by South African forces. (New York Times, 2/26/84, AP)

March 19, 1984 -- Angolan President dos Santos, visiting Cuba, issued a joint statement with Pres. Castro stating a number of conditions to be met before permitting a Cuban withdrawal, including a halt of supplies from South Africa to UNITA, a withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, and independence for Namibia in accordance with U.N. resolution 435. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

May 21, 1984 -- The New York Times reported that according to Zambian officials, the Foreign Minister of South Africa, Roelof Botha, met with senior Angolan officials in Lusaka, Zambia to discuss the South Africa troop withdrawal from southern Angola. (New York Times, 5/22/84, Cowell).

Mid-1984 -- South African Defense Minister, Magnus Malan, visited Mr. Savimbi at his headquarters in Jamba and gave him the South African government's personal pledge of support to strengthen UNITA and weaken the MPLA. [The Economist (London), March 30, 1985].

October 14, 1984 -- The Washington Post reported that Angolan President dos Santos, had stated that a continuing refusal by South Africa to withdraw its armed forces from southern Angola threatened the peace effort. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

November, 1984 -- More talks took place between South Africa, Angola, and the United States. [The Economist (London), March 30, 1985].

November 23, 1984 -- The Washington Post reported that Angolan President dos Santos, in a letter to the U.N. Secretary General demanded that South Africa end its support for UNITA as well as a reduction in the number of Cuban troops. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

November 26, 1984 -- The South African Foreign Minister, R. F. Botha, confirmed that his country wanted Cuban troops to leave Angola within 12 weeks of the arrival of a U.N. force in Namibia. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

#### 1985

January 12, 1985 -- UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi appeared in a news clip on South African television to deny that he had been killed, wounded, or captured. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

April 17, 1985 -- South Africa formally ended a five-month occupation of southern Angola according to the New York Times. (New York Times, 12/20/85, UPI)

May 23, 1985 -- A South African commando team was intercepted near Gulf Oil during a sabotage mission against oil installations in Cabinda. This team was alleged to be carrying UNITA leaflets, which according to the unit's captain, were to be left behind. After the Angolan interception, SADF Chief, Gen. Constand Viljoen, admitted that South Africa had troops secretly stationed in northern Angola for more than a month after Pretoria claimed they had withdrawn. (Washington Post, 05/24/85, Sparks; CSIS, Africa Notes, Dec. 20, 1985; and the Christian Science Monitor, 5/24/85, Laurence)

May, 1985 -- Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos suspended direct contact with Pretoria after the May 23 interception of the South African military commando unit. (Washington Post, 9/24/85, Deyoung)

June 30, 1985 -- South African security forces pursued fleeing SWAPO guerrillas into Angola, reportedly killing 45. (CRS, IB81063, Copson)

September 11, 1985 -- The first direct SADF intervention during the latest operations in the Mavinga area was reported on this date when South African Mirage and Canberra aircraft carried out reconnaissance flights and later bombed advancing FAPLA troops. (U.N. Security Council, November 22, 1985)

September 16, 1985 -- According to the Washington Post, South African forces launched a raid into southern Angola in what military officials said was a pre-emptive strike against Namibian guerrillas based there. (Washington Post, 9/17/85, Frankel).

Mid-September - Mid October, 1985 -- Further South African air reconnaissance and attacks against FAPLA targets were reported to have occurred on 17, 19, 27, 29 and 30 September and on 1, 3, 4, 15 and 17 October. (U.N. Security Council, Commission of Investigation Established Under Res. 571, 1985, November 22, 1985)

September 17, 1985 -- South African armed forces crossed into Angola with massive air and ground attacks on military units in Cunene province, Cuando Cubango, and Moxico. South Africa said this was another anti-SWAPO operation, but critics claimed it was in support of UNITA. (U.N. Security Council, November 22, 1985)

September 17, 1985 -- A 22-year-old South African medical orderly working with Jonas Savimbi's rebel forces inside Angola, had been killed by Angolan troops, according to South African military announcements. (Washington Post, 9/18/85, Frankel and the U.N. Security Council, November 22, 1985)

September 18, 1985 -- According to the New York Times, South African military officials said that a raid into Angola that began 2 days before was continuing and that nearly 500 soldiers had been deployed to track down a battalion of Namibian insurgents. (New York Times, 9/19/85, Rule)

September 19, 1985 -- The Angolan Permanent Rep. to the U.N. requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation arising out of South Africa's raids against Angola and the threat they posed to international peace and security. The Permanent Rep. also claimed that the SAAF had carried out air attacks in the Mavinga area of Cuando Cubango and was still bombing the area. (U.N. Security Council, November 22, 1985)

September 20, 1985 -- According to the New York Times, South Africa had acknowledged for the first time that it was supporting the [UNITA] rebels fighting the Angola Government with material, humanitarian, and moral assistance. (New York Times, 9/21/85, Cowell and the U.N. Security Council, November 22, 1985)

September 22, 1985 -- According to the Washington Post and the New York Times, about 500 South African troops returned to their bases in Namibia after a week-long raid into Angola in which 15 Namibian guerillas were killed and at 54 were captured. (The Washington Post, 9/23/85, Reuter and the New York Times, 12/20/85, UPI)

September 23, 1985 -- The Washington Post reported that South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan had warned that the Angolan government's two-month-old offensive against rebels in Southern Angola threatened his country's regional security interest. He said his army would "react" against the threat. (The Washington Post, 9/24/85, Frankel)

September 30, 1985 -- According to the Washington Post, Angola said that South African planes had attacked its forces in its southeastern province, killing more than 50 soldiers in an operation aimed at supporting South African ground troops helping Angolan rebels. (The Washington Post, 10/1/85, Reuter)

October 7, 1985 -- The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 574(1985) concerning South Africa's alleged invasion of Angola. (U.N. Security Council, Nov. 22, 1985)

November 22, 1985 -- The U.N. Security Council published a report by its Commission of Investigation consisting of representatives of Australia, Egypt, and Peru, on the extent of South African military involvement in Angola between September and October 1985. The Commission, after a visit to Angola, called for international assistance "to alleviate the suffering of those people who have been displaced and/or otherwise affected by South African aggression..." (U.N. Security Council, November 22, 1985)

December 19, 1985 -- According to the New York Times (12/20/85, UPI), South African television reported that its army had mounted a raid into Angola for the third time in recent months, killing at least six Namibian guerrillas and capturing weapons. (New York Times, 12/20/85, UPI)

1986

January 11, 1986 -- The Angolan government charged that South Africa had deployed three battalions from Namibia deep inside the Angolan province of Cunene a week before. (An Angolan army spokesman said on Jan. 9 that the South African forces, which moved into Angola from Namibia, had abducted two Angolan militiamen.) (The Washington Post, 1/12/86, Neuter)

APPENDIX 5

ISSUE BRIEF: ANGOLA UPDATED, APRIL 28, 1987, PREPARED BY THE  
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# Issue Brief

Order Code IB81063

ANGOLA: ISSUES FOR THE UNITED STATES  
UPDATED 04/28/87

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0430



ISSUE DEFINITION

An Administration official testified on Feb. 18, 1986, that the United States had decided to supply covert military assistance to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrilla movement in Angola; and some reports suggest that this aid included shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Administration spokesmen have argued in favor of aiding UNITA as a means of pressuring Angola to enter into negotiations leading to a withdrawal of Cuban troops and a general settlement of southern Africa's conflicts. Others argue in favor of an expanded aid program to Savimbi because they believe he is in a position to inflict a significant defeat on the Marxist Angolan government and its Soviet ally. A third view is that U.S. aid to Savimbi will destabilize southern Africa, leading to further Soviet and Cuban intervention and intensified fighting costly to the region and to U.S. interests.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSISAIDING UNITA: PRO-COM SUMMARY

Pro. The arguments made in favor of aiding the UNITA guerrillas in Angola include the following.

1. UNITA guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi is anti-Soviet, friendly to the United States, and supported by a large part of the Angolan population. His movement was unfairly deprived of the opportunity to test its strength in an election when the Cuban-backed and Marxist MPLA seized the Angolan capital in 1975 -- with Soviet support.
2. UNITA in recent years has expanded its operations throughout the country and it has apparently succeeded in defeating a 1983 offensive directed against its headquarters in southeastern Angola. Consequently, UNITA may now have a real chance either to defeat the MPLA regime or force it into negotiations aimed at free elections.
3. By enhancing its role in Angola, the United States will acquire a "bargaining chip" useful in negotiations with the Soviets. A UNITA victory would constitute a significant setback for the Soviet Union, possibly making that country less interventionist and more amenable to the settlement of regional conflicts elsewhere, as in Afghanistan or Central America.
4. It is important for the United States to challenge the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence in mineral-rich and strategically-located southern Africa. A government victory in Angola -- which has great development potential itself, which borders other economically-important countries, and which has a long coastline on the South Atlantic -- would be contrary to U.S. interests.
5. A new and more forceful policy is needed in southern Africa because Administration efforts to arrange a Cuban withdrawal from Angola in conjunction with a settlement of the Namibia conflict have not borne fruit.
6. The United States has taken a strong stand in support of human rights and democratic principles in South Africa. Now it must show its

even-handedness by supporting the same principles -- and opposing communism -- in Angola.

Con. Arguments advanced in opposition to assisting UNITA include the following.

1. Aid to UNITA entangles the United States in an 11 year-old civil war which UNITA has little prospect of winning. Too little is known about Savimbi's political beliefs, the extent of his popularity, or his likely policies should he come to power to justify U.S. aid. Should UNITA face defeat, the United States would come under pressure to expand its aid to a questionable ally.
2. The Angolan government, whatever its ideology, has done nothing to threaten or endanger the United States. Indeed, Angola welcomes U.S. investment and has sought diplomatic ties and U.S. economic assistance.
3. Whatever assistance the United States might provide Savimbi would likely be countered by the Soviet Union and Cuba, escalating their involvement in southern Africa. Mineral rich Zaire could be threatened if it serves as a base for U.S. supplies to UNITA.
4. Aid to UNITA aligns the United States with the white government of South Africa, which has openly acknowledged its support for Savimbi and publicly sought a U.S. commitment to his cause. This identification with South Africa harms the United States in its relations with many African and third-world nations, and with black South Africans -- while encouraging the South African government to believe it has U.S. support for deepening its own military involvement in Angola and possibly other countries.
5. Far from providing the United States with a bargaining chip against the Soviet Union, U.S. aid to UNITA is so widely criticized in Africa and so unlikely to meet with success as to constitute a U.S. liability. A major gain for the Soviets was the suspension of U.S./Angolan discussions aimed at achieving a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in conjunction with a peace settlement in Namibia.
6. U.S. assistance to UNITA makes it difficult for the United States to argue convincingly in other situations that it is opposed to subversion and the intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another.

#### The Clark amendment

Section 118 of the International Security Assistance and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 [P.L. 96-533] -- a somewhat modified version of the original "Clark amendment" -- prohibited the furnishing of assistance of any kind "for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola" unless the President determined such assistance to be in the national security interest of the United States, and so reported to the Congress specifying the amount and the recipient of the aid. Before such aid could be given, Congress, acting under expedited procedures, would have had to enact a joint resolution of approval. The act did not prohibit the furnishing of assistance for solely humanitarian purposes, and it could not be waived under any other provision of law.

President Carter had listed the Clark amendment among a number of other congressionally-imposed restrictions that he wanted removed because, he maintained, they made it difficult for him to respond to Soviet and Cuban advances in Africa. The Reagan Administration announced on Mar. 19, 1981, that it would seek repeal of the Clark amendment, explaining the move as part of an effort to restore the President's rightful authority in foreign policy. Critics of the proposed repeal, noting past U.S. covert involvement in Angola and believing that at least some members of the administration were sympathetic to the UNITA opposition guerrillas, were concerned that repeal might be the first step toward a renewal of a U.S. covert role -- which they opposed. Efforts to repeal the Clark amendment in 1981 did not succeed.

Senator Symms renewed the repeal effort in 1985, and his amendment to overturn the Clark amendment was accepted by the Senate (63-34) as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (S. 1003) on June 11. Repeal was finally enacted into law, however, through the Foreign Assistance authorization (S. 960/H.R. 1555), which was signed into law by the President (P.L. 99-83, Sec. 811) on Aug. 8, 1985. An amendment to repeal the Clark amendment had been offered to this bill by Representative Stratton and accepted by the House on July 10. The provision was retained in House-Senate conference.

The Reagan Administration supported the successful repeal of the Clark amendment in 1985, although spokesmen insisted that there were no plans to help the Angolan guerrillas. Some critics of the Clark amendment felt that the Administration should have been more outspoken in advocating repeal and questioned the willingness of the Administration -- or at least of some members of the Administration -- to challenge the MPLA government in Angola. Supporters of the Clark amendment, however, perceived the Administration as well pleased with the success of the repeal movement and suspected that with the prohibition out of the way the executive branch would rapidly go forward with aid to Savimbi. An attempt to re-impose legislation similar to the Clark amendment was defeated in the House on Sept. 17, 1986, during debate on the Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 4759).

#### Background to U.S.-Angolan Relations

The situation in Angola today began to take shape in the late 1950s when the first organized efforts were begun to end Angola's 400 years of rule by Portugal. Available evidence indicates that the first American involvement came when the Kennedy Administration, responding to evidence of Soviet and Chinese activity there, started to channel, through the CIA, small amounts of aid to one liberation organization, the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), headed by Holden Roberto. The move was an attempt to protect American interests should Portugal be expelled from Angola. The United States could not openly oppose Portugal, a NATO ally, but it wanted good relations with the group expected to form the government of an independent Angola. Neither the FNLA nor other groups were very successful in challenging the Portuguese in the early years, and when the Nixon Administration came into office it is reported to have ended support for Roberto so as not to jeopardize U.S. access to military bases in the Azores.

In 1974, following a coup in Lisbon, Portugal announced it would grant Angola independence. A three-sided dispute erupted among the major groups that had fought for independence: the FNLA, backed largely by China and Zaire; the Marxist MPLA, supported by the Soviet Union; and UNITA, based among the Ovimbundu people and led by the Chinese-influenced Jonas Savimbi.

The Portuguese hammered out a short-lived settlement, the Alvor agreement, in January 1975, setting up a transitional tripartite government that was to draft a constitution and organize elections.

Each of the three parties, however, was wary of the others, and they began to bolster their military forces and seek foreign assistance. The MPLA took the most drastic step when it turned to the Soviet Union and Cuba for large-scale military aid. Throughout the first nine months of 1975, Soviet supplies and Cuban advisors entered Angola at an increasing rate. As far as is known, it was not until September-October that the first Cuban combat troops began to arrive.

The Ford Administration, despite some hesitancy, also became involved, reportedly deciding to give \$300,000 in new covert assistance to the FULA as early as January 1975. \$300,000 was reportedly given to the FULA early in 1975. Two African presidents, Zaire's Mobutu, who provided sanctuary to the FULA, and Zambia's Kaunda, who supported UNITA, lobbied Secretary of State Kissinger to increase U.S. involvement in Angola and quash the growing Soviet and Cuban presence. By July, Kissinger had decided, according to press reports, that the domestic U.S. reaction to involvement in Vietnam had cooled sufficiently to permit a program of covert military aid in Angola.

Despite U.S. involvement, the MPLA had gotten the upper hand in the fighting, and when the Portuguese withdrew on Nov. 11, 1975, the MPLA was in control of the capital and was able to declare a People's Republic of Angola. Immediately, the MPLA began to receive sharply stepped-up Soviet and Cuban aid, and by December, an estimated \$40 million to \$60 million in Soviet assistance had arrived along with 3,500 to 5,000 Cuban combat troops and 400 Soviet advisors.

Over the course of 1975, African opinion had been divided between those more strongly socialist governments that favored an MPLA victory and others, such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia, that favored a settlement of the sort embodied in the Alvor agreement. In October, South African troops entered Angola on a mission whose scope and purpose remain unclear. (Some earlier South African incursions had also taken place.) South African forces appear to have cooperated with UNITA and FULA and may have penetrated to within 100 miles of the capital, Luanda. This intervention led to a groundswell of African support for the MPLA. Many who had favored a compromise became staunch supporters of the MPLA, and in February 1976, the MPLA regime was recognized by the Organization of African Unity. Meanwhile, Britain, France, and China had apparently ended their support of guerrilla movements in order to avoid the risk of damaging relations with the black African states. Only the United States and South Africa continued to support the Angolan opposition movements, contributing to a perception throughout Africa that some sort of U.S.-South African alliance existed.

Estimates of foreign involvement in Angola in 1975 -- as reported in various public sources -- include the following: United States, \$32 million in arms and several CIA operatives; Soviet Union, \$150 million in arms and 400 advisors; Cuba, \$2 million in arms, 6,000-10,000 troops; South Africa, 1,200 troops.

Within the U.S. Government there was much dispute over the covert action program. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Nathaniel Davis, resigned in mid-1975 in protest against Angola policy, arguing that the United States was becoming involved in a situation over which it had little control; that the covert operation would soon be exposed with negative

political consequences; and that U.S. assistance to the guerrilla movements was only encouraging heightened Soviet involvement.

In Congress, dissatisfaction was growing as members became aware of the details of the U.S. operation. On Dec. 17, 1975, Senator Tunney introduced a 1-year provision, amending the defense appropriations bill, to cut off aid and prohibit further U.S. involvement in Angola. This predecessor to the Clark amendment passed the Senate on Dec. 19, 54-22, and the House approved it by a vote of 323-99 on Jan. 27, 1976. President Ford reluctantly signed the bill on Feb. 10, complaining that the Tunney amendment showed that Congress had "lost their guts." The language of the Clark amendment was contained in both the House and Senate committee versions of the 1976 security assistance authorization bills (H.R. 16380/S. 3439) as they were brought to the floor of each house. There were no floor attempts to delete the Clark amendment from these bills, and consequently it was enacted into law, as Sec. 404 of P.L. 94-329, without a separate vote.

Meanwhile, in the first months of 1976, with the help of some 10,000 to 12,000 Cuban troops, the MPLA consolidated its control over Angola, while UNITA withdrew to sparsely-inhabited territory in the southeast. The bulk of the South African force had withdrawn in January.

The Administration adapted to the new situation in Angola, however, authorizing the Boeing and Gulf corporations to resume normal business relationships with the Angolan government. Angola's admission to the United Nations, initially vetoed by the United States, was permitted. Kissinger, evidently deciding that U.S. relations with black Africa had been damaged during the crisis, undertook a tour of Africa and launched an unsuccessful effort to formulate a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian conflict.

#### The Carter Administration

The Carter Administration continued to withhold recognition from Angola because of the presence of what grew to be 15,000 to 21,000 Cuban troops supporting what the Administration said were "Soviet objectives" in the region. Development assistance was in any case prohibited by Congress. The Administration did, however, work toward a reconciliation with the Angolan government on an array of issues of mutual concern, including a negotiated settlement in Namibia, increased trade and investment, and Export-Import Bank financing for Angolan projects. Emergency food aid under Title II of P.L. 480 was provided to Angola.

The Carter Administration gave the following as its principal reasons for attempting to bridge the gap in relations with Angola: (1) Angola was the site of an ever-growing number of opportunities for American business; (2) the possibility of normalization of relations with the United States might persuade Angola to turn away from its reliance on the Soviet Union and Cuba; (3) U.S. information-gathering activities both for business and political purposes were hampered by not having an embassy in Luanda; and (4) American citizens doing business in Angola as well as Americans imprisoned there were, in the absence of an embassy, without direct official representation.

#### Current situation in Angola

The government in power today in Luanda, the capital of Angola, is an MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government headed by

President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, successor to Agostinho Neto, long a leader in the Angolan independence movement who died in 1979.

There is evidence of stress within the MPLA and some analysts believe that a more nationalistic, black African faction within the movement is engaged in a hidden struggle with a more militantly Marxist group in which whites and mestizos play a major role. An attempted coup in May 1977 is thought to have represented an effort by militant left-wing elements to seize power. In October 1984, a militant foreign minister, Paulo Jorge, was dismissed, and Lucia Lara, once thought of as the MPLA's ideological master, was dropped from the MPLA politburo in November 1985.

Observers of the Angolan situation differ considerably in their evaluation of the Marxist MPLA government. Some see it as little more than a pawn in what is perceived as a Soviet scheme to dominate mineral-rich southern Africa, and they point to the presence of an estimated 30,000-35,000 Cuban troops organized in combat units, together with 5,000 to 10,000 other Cubans and Soviet and East German advisors, as evidence for their view. Others argue that the MPLA is a fundamentally nationalist movement, with greater intellectual and organizational resources than its rivals, committed to economic development and dependent on Cuban troops primarily to defend the country against South African incursions and South African-supported guerrillas.

The MPLA regime faces some severe problems in its attempt to govern Angola. Despite the country's economic potential, based on rich endowments of land and resources, Angola is hampered by shortages of skilled manpower and capital brought on by the flight of 300,000 or more Portuguese farmers, technicians, and other workers after Portugal's announcement of its intention to withdraw. These settlers made up a large proportion of the skilled labor in the modern sector of the economy and they took with them much of the country's capital. Much equipment that remained soon fell into disrepair. For this reason, the Angolan government has been active in seeking development aid from Western donors, and it welcomes foreign investment with Angolan participation.

A second major problem for the Angolan government is the armed resistance that continues in some parts of the country. The most effective of the guerrilla movements today is UNITA, headed by European-educated Dr. Jonas Savimbi. UNITA membership is drawn primarily from the Ovimbundu ethnic group that inhabits the center of the country and constitutes about 40% of the Angolan population. Savimbi received guerrilla training in China in 1964-1965, and some of UNITA's early statements reflected the influence of Chinese revolutionary concepts.

Savimbi's current political orientation is a subject of considerable controversy. His public statements are marked by nationalistic sentiments and strong opposition to the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola, leading many to view him as western-oriented, democratic, and an excellent ally for the United States. Others argue, however, that Savimbi is essentially a socialist, or perhaps an opportunist who shifts his ideological line to suit the wishes of his audience. The policies he might follow should he come to power, from this perspective, are essentially unpredictable.

Estimates of UNITA's strength vary, but U.S. analysts now credit the movement with 30,000 to 40,000 followers -- although it may be that not all of Savimbi's forces are fully armed. UNITA has a base centered on its "capital" at Jamba in southeastern Angola, where Savimbi has welcomed

journalists and other visitors. The organization has long paralyzed the Benguela railway, which connects mining regions in Zambia and Zaire with the Atlantic, and it appears to have an ability to carry out strikes throughout wide areas of Angola.

Critics of Savimbi argue that he is dependent on South Africa for arms as well as other military assistance, and that some ostensible UNITA operations in which towns were taken and held have actually been carried out by South African personnel and mercenaries recruited through South Africa. On May 21, 1985, two South African soldiers were killed and one captured near a Gulf Oil storage facility in Angola's northern Cabinda province. The soldiers were part of a team reportedly carrying high explosives, and their interception raised questions about responsibility for earlier sabotage incidents in Angola that had been attributed to UNITA. Savimbi's defenders, however, maintain that he relies on South Africa no more than is necessary to maintain his organization's viability against the Soviet and Cuban threat and that UNITA carries out major operations independent of any direct South African support.

South African attacks in the southern part of Angola are another factor that could potentially endanger the regime. According to South Africa, these raids have been aimed solely at the bases of SWAPO, the Namibian guerrilla movement, but Angola claims that Angolan towns and military installations have also been hit and that Angolan civilians have been killed. Angola sees South Africa's attacks as aimed primarily at supporting UNITA.

In January 1984, South Africa agreed to withdraw troops that had been in southern Angola, participating in a major drive known as "Operation Askari," and entered into a cease-fire agreement with Angola. Under the agreement, which U.S. diplomats helped arrange, joint South African-Angolan monitoring teams began to patrol the border region to prevent cross-border guerrilla movements. Some South African troops -- at least in small numbers -- evidently remained in Angola after the agreement was signed, however, and on June 29, 1985, South African forces crossed the border in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas who had reportedly carried out several small attacks. This event, together with South African participation in the May 21 raid in Cabinda, left the status of the cease fire in question. South African forces re-entered southwestern Angola for 6 days in September 1985, and incursions were reported in December 1985 as well as May 1986.

In September 1985, reports began to appear of a large-scale Angolan government offensive against UNITA in its stronghold in southeastern Angola. UNITA and its supporters alleged extensive Soviet and Cuban participation in this offensive, and Soviet tanks, planes, and helicopters were said to be involved. The degree of Soviet and Cuban combat involvement cannot be independently confirmed, but press reports indicate that the Soviets channeled \$2 billion in preparation for the attack, which was a response to widening UNITA raids on economic targets around the country.

The Angolan offensive seemed to make significant headway during September, but in October UNITA officials took reporters to a battlefield site where a major defeat for the MPLA appeared to have taken place.

In response to the Angolan offensive, South Africa for the first time openly acknowledged that it supports Savimbi's forces. The South African Defense Minister, General Magnus Malan, said on Sept. 22, 1985, that his country had provided moral, material, and humanitarian assistance to UNITA -- which he said was critical in stopping Marxist advances in southern Africa.

Nelan threatened possible South African armed intervention on Savimbi's behalf and challenged the United States to come to UNITA's assistance. He added that South Africa had sent a high level delegation to the United States, reportedly to seek U.S. backing should South Africa provide military aid to UNITA.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union strenuously affirmed its commitment to the survival of the MPLA. On May 11, 1986, the Soviets issued a joint statement with the Angolan government stating their readiness "to undertake concerted action in defense of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Angola."

By April of 1986, Angolan forces together with Cuban and possibly Soviet advisors were reported poised for a new offensive against Savimbi's headquarters in southeastern Angola. Some analysts believe that the 1986 offensive made further, limited gains against UNITA, but others assert that it was stymied by U.S. anti-aircraft missiles supplied to Savimbi. In any event, press reports in early 1987 indicated that a third offensive against Savimbi was in preparation. UNITA, for its part, has claimed new successes in northeastern Angola and reports numerous battlefield successes against the MPLA.

#### U.S. Interests

For some observers, Angola is too remote from the United States and from vital U.S. interests to be of significant concern to U.S. policy makers. While the international situation in southern Africa may raise humanitarian issues of interest to individual Americans and groups, they argue, there is no compelling reason for the United States to become involved in what, they maintain, could prove a costly entanglement. Those who take this position tend to doubt that the Soviet Union will be able to make lasting gains in southern Africa, and they generally minimize any threat arising from regional instability to shipping lanes or to U.S. mineral supplies.

A contrasting view is that the Soviet and Cuban role in Angola threatens shipping to Europe and the United States from the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, endangers Angola's neighbors (including mineral-rich South Africa), and raises the prospect of a belt of Marxist states stretching across the region. Those who hold this view generally favor determined U.S. action to expel Soviet and Cuban influence from Angola.

Still a third view is that Angola, even with its Marxist regime, could become a significant U.S. trading partner and an important site for U.S. investment. Those who take this position note that Angola, with its oil reserves, mineral wealth, hydroelectric potential, and rich agricultural highlands, could be a wealthy country. They point out that the United States, because of its oil imports from Angola, is already Angola's leading trading partner and that Angola is third, behind Nigeria and South Africa, as the largest U.S. customer in sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. imports from Angola in 1985 amounted to \$995 million, while exports to Angola were valued at \$144 million. Thus, some argue, the United States would be well-advised to avoid alienating the Angolan government and to seek a reduction in Soviet and Cuban influence in Angola only through peaceful means.

#### The Policy Debate



The Reagan Administration has followed a policy of "constructive engagement" in southern Africa, aimed at promoting long-term regional stability through improved communications among all the governments there, the peaceful settlement of regional disputes, economic growth, gradual racial reform in South Africa, and a reconciliation in Angola. An important element of this policy has been the proposed "linkage" between a phased reduction in the number of Cuban troops in Angola and step-by-step progress toward independence for Namibia in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

At times, this policy has appeared on the verge of success, but the United States has to date proven unable to bring Angola and South Africa together on the terms and conditions of a settlement. Moreover, Angola to date refuses to consider negotiations with Savimbi, whom it condemns as a rebel.

With the repeal of the Clark amendment and the 1985 offensive against Savimbi, many Americans came to favor some form of aid to UNITA. On Feb. 18, 1986, following Savimbi's January-February visit to the United States, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the decision to aid Savimbi had been made and that "the process is in motion." Press accounts spoke of an initial commitment of \$10 million to \$15 million in covert military assistance to Savimbi. Crocker's testimony suggested that the Administration did not view a UNITA military victory as a possibility, but rather regarded the covert assistance as a means of pressing Angola to agree to some form of negotiated settlement with Savimbi and on the Cuban troop issue. But on Mar. 30, 1986, the Washington Post reported that the Administration had decided to supply Savimbi with highly-accurate shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. (For further information, see CRS Report 86-649 F, Stinger Air Defense Missiles: Weapons Facts, by Steven R. Bowman.)

For some critics, aid to Savimbi is a mistake that will only make negotiated solutions in southern Africa less likely, while allowing the Soviets and Cubans new opportunities to expand their influence in the region. Many who hold this view support legislation to prohibit involvement in Angola.

Other critics, however, believe that the Administration has not gone far enough in assisting UNITA. They would like to see a large-scale assistance program, including anti-tank and additional anti-aircraft weapons, intended to overthrow the Angolan regime and bring Savimbi to power or at least raise the price to the Soviet Union of its Angolan involvement. Many are suspicious of a covert program, on the grounds that it can be too easily kept limited, and favor mandatory legislation that would create a substantial, public program of aid to UNITA.

The Angolan operations of the Chevron/Gulf Corporation have become controversial in connection with the Angolan policy debate. Some argue that it is contradictory for the United States to aid UNITA while permitting Chevron/Gulf to continue operations that provide foreign exchange to the Angolan government. Chevron/Gulf owns a 49% share of the Cabinda Gulf Corporation, which produces an estimated 75% of Angola's oil through its operations in oil-rich Cabinda province. In 1987, Cabinda Gulf was reportedly producing an average of 200,000 barrels of oil a day, taking 98,000 barrels a day for Chevron (half of which was shipped to the United States) and turning the rest over to the Angolan national oil company. Chevron/Gulf's investment in Angola is valued at \$600 million. The Angolan government reportedly derives about 90% of its foreign exchange from oil sales. (In February 1987, Chevron said it would sell one-fifth of its share

in Cabinda Gulf as a revenue raising measure.)

Many observers believe the United States should take steps to force Chevron/Gulf (as well as other U.S. companies that are involved in petroleum and other economic sectors on a smaller scale) out of Angola in order to weaken the Angolan government. Others favor prohibiting the U.S. Export-Import Bank from providing loans, as it has in the past, to fund the expansion of Cabinda Gulf operations. Legislation passed in 1986 effectively prohibits Ex-Im Bank loans for exports to Angola except for food and agricultural commodities (Export-Import Bank Amendments Act (P.L. 99-472)). Opponents of such actions, however, regard Chevron/Gulf operations in Angola as a good business opportunity that would be taken up by European or other firms if Cabinda Gulf's role were terminated or restricted. Some also maintain that the importance of Cabinda Gulf's operations require Angola to moderate its policies toward the United States and to cooperate with U.S. regional peace initiatives.

#### LEGISLATION

H.R. 340 (Dannemeyer)

Authorizes \$27 million in military assistance to UNITA. Introduced on Jan. 6, 1987; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs. Referred to the subcommittees on Africa and on Arms Control on Jan. 26.

H.R. 1074 (McCollum)

Prohibits loans to and investments in Angola; bans trade. President may terminate provisions of the Act if he determines that Angola has held free elections and met other conditions, and that Cuban troops have withdrawn. Introduced on Feb. 10, 1987; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Ways and Means.

S.Res. 174. (DeConcini)

States the sense of the Senate that the United States should encourage national reconciliation in Angola; stress the holding of free elections; continue multilateral initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement and a Soviet/Cuban withdrawal; and oppose the continued military buildup in Angola. Requests the President to block business transactions that conflict with U.S. security interests in Angola. Introduced on Mar. 24, 1987; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

#### HEARINGS

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.  
Subcommittee on Africa. Angola: intervention or  
negotiation. Hearings, 99th Congress, 1st session.  
Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1985. 200 p.  
Hearings held Oct. 31 and Nov. 12, 1985.

#### REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.  
Angola: Conflict assessment and U.S. policy options [by]

Raymond V. Copson.  
 CRS Report No. 86-189 F

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 04/24/87 -- Angola reported that it had shot down a plane piloted by an American on Apr. 21. The pilot, later identified as Joe Longo of Greensburg, Pa., was reported in good health.
- 04/18/87 -- The Washington Post reported that U.S. Army Special Forces contingent had begun joint maneuvers with Zairian troops at the Kamina airbase in southern Zaire. According to the Post, congressional critics of the maneuvers believe that the Administration is seeking to develop the base as a transfer point for arms going to UNITA in Angola. A Defense Department spokesman, however, said that the maneuvers, involving fewer than 150 personnel, did "not relate in any way to current world problems or tensions."
- 04/06/87 -- Chester Crocker, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, met officials of the Angolan government in Brazzaville, Congo. A State Department spokesman said on Apr. 7 that "the two sides discussed the continuing effort to achieve a negotiated solution to Namibia and Angola."
- 04/04/87 -- Secretary of State Shultz, in a letter to Senator Dole, denied reports that the State Department had advocated an end to U.S. aid to UNITA in a recent interagency discussion. According to the Secretary, "UNITA is a legitimate nationalist movement whose interests must be taken into account if there is to be peace and national reconciliation in Angola." (For text, see Congressional Record, Apr. 7, 1987, p. S4715.)
- 03/26/87 -- UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi issued a statement saying he would be ready to permit the re-opening of the Benguela Railway, the 1200 mile line running from southern Zaire to the Angolan harbor at Lobito.
- 03/19/87 -- Cape Verde banned stopovers by Santa Lucia Airways, alleging that the airline had been transporting U.S. arms to UNITA.
- 03/13/87 -- The Washington Times reported that UNITA's base in southeastern Angola was threatened by a new buildup of Soviet-supported government forces and Cuban troops. Newly introduced Soviet mobile radar was a source of particular concern to South African intelligence sources, according to the Times.
- 02/22/87 -- The New York Times reported that the Defense Department was seeking an agreement with Zaire on the use of the Kamina airbase in the southern part of the

country.

- 02/04/87 -- Chevron Corporation announced that it was selling one-fifth of its share in the Angolan state petroleum company. According to Chevron, the move was not politically motivated but intended to reduce the company's debt.
- 02/03/87 -- The New York Times, reporting on alleged Saudi Arabian involvement in funding the "contras" in Nicaragua, noted that possible Saudi aid to the guerillas in Angola had also been mentioned by a businessman in contract with the Saudi royal family.
- 02/01/87 -- The New York Times reported accounts by eyewitnesses and diplomats claiming that the CIA was supplying Savimbi through a little used airbase at Kamina in Zaire's Shaba province.
- 11/12/86 -- Angolan president dos Santos charged that the United States was increasing its assistance to UNITA. The increased aid was hampering the peace process in southern Africa, dos Santos alleged.
- 07/29/86 -- The Washington Post, as part of a continuing series on Angola and UNITA, reported allegations that UNITA had carried out a massacre in February 1986 at Canabatelata in northern Angola. Deaths were reported to total 107, including a local Methodist pastor and his family. Allegations of other similar incidents were also reported, but a UNITA spokesman vigorously denied all such charges.
- 06/10/86 -- South Africa denied an Angolan charge that it was responsible for attacks on Cuban and Soviet ships in the harbor at Namibe (Nocamedes).
- 05/31/86 -- Africa Insider, a Washington-based newsletter, reported that a protest from IAS Guernsey, an Anglo-Irish company, over an alleged missile attack on one of its planes, was causing concern at the Department of Defense. The plane, leased to a diamond mining operation and carrying a crew of Canadians and Americans, had been downed over Angola.
- 04/11/86 -- The Washington Post reported that FELA leader Holden Roberto was in Washington to appeal for assistance. (While Roberto was reportedly living in a Paris suburb, an FELA military official accompanying him maintained that the movement had 5,000 men in the field.)
- 02/18/86 -- The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that the United States had decided to provide Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement with military assistance. "The decision has been made and the process is in motion," Crocker stated.

- 02/03/86 -- UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, in an interview with the Washington Post, said his movement would suspend plans to attack Gulf Oil installations in Angola only if Chevron/Gulf halted its lobbying against him. (A Chevron/Gulf spokesman denied any such lobbying.)
- 01/28/86 -- A statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker was widely interpreted as suggesting that the Gulf Oil subsidiary of the Chevron Oil Company should consider leaving Angola. (According to Crocker, Chevron and other companies in Angola should consider "that they are in the middle of a war zone, that they are also in the middle of a rather hot political debate in this country, and that they should be thinking about U.S. national interests....")
- 11/25/85 -- One hundred and one Members of Congress sent a letter to President Reagan urging him not to provide assistance to anti-government guerrillas in Angola. (Representative Wolpe also circulated a letter from David Rockefeller, retired chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, saying that mediation efforts still had a chance to produce a settlement in Angola.)
- 11/16/85 -- UNITA claimed to have killed 15 Soviets in a bomb blast in Central Angola.
- 07/13/85 -- The Angolan government announced that it was cutting off talks with the United States on a regional peace settlement because of congressional action to repeal the Clark Amendment.
- 06/02/85 -- UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, speaking at a news conference in Jamba, Angola, called on Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment and charged that State Department was undermining White House policy toward his country. (Savimbi's remarks were made while UNITA was hosting a meeting of anti-communist movements from Afghanistan, Laos, and Nicaragua. The meeting received support from American Lewis Lehrman, who was also present.)
- 05/28/85 -- A wounded South African commando, reportedly captured near a Gulf Oil storage depot in northern Angola, said that his team had been sent into the area to blow up Gulf storage tanks. The ultimate aim of the mission, he stated, was to reduce Angolan aid to the SWAPO guerrillas from Namibia and to the African National Congress of South Africa.
- 11/23/84 -- The Washington Post reported that Angolan President dos Santos had sent a letter to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar offering to withdraw the 20,000 Cuban troops in the southern part of the country over three years in conjunction with a cease fire in Namibia and the arrival of a

UN force. (The letter also demanded that South Africa end its support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement.)

- 11/03/84 -- The New York Times reported an Angolan offer to reduce the number of Cuban troops on its territory from 30,000 to 10,000 and to deploy those remaining to the northern parts of the country. (The report came amidst intense U.S. efforts to mediate a settlement to regional conflicts through contacts with Angolan and South African officials.)
- 10/22/84 -- Angolan President dos Santos dismissed Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge, who had reportedly been critical of U.S. efforts to arrange a negotiated settlement to the region's conflicts.
- 10/14/84 -- The Washington Post reported that Angolan President dos Santos, in an interview, had pledged to work with the Reagan Administration in arranging a withdrawal of the Cuban troops in his country and independence for Namibia. He added, however, that a continuing refusal by South Africa to withdraw its armed forces from southern Angola threatens the peace effort.
- 07/31/84 -- The Angolan government acknowledged a "sabotage attack" against two ships in the harbor of Luanda. (UNITA opposition forces claimed that they had sunk a Soviet freighter and heavily damaged a Cuban ship.)
- 07/12/84 -- UNITA guerrilla forces reportedly attacked an oil pipeline which was part of the Gulf Oil facility in Cabinda province. UNITA claimed it had killed 22 in the attack, while the Angolan government acknowledged 10 deaths.
- 03/19/84 -- Angolan President dos Santos, visiting Cuba, issued a joint statement with President Castro stating that a Cuban withdrawal from Angola would begin when several conditions were met. These included a halt of supplies from South Africa to UNITA, a withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, and independence for Namibia in accordance with U.N. Resolution 435.
- 02/13/84 -- UNITA, in a statement issued in Lisbon, claimed that it had shot down a Boeing-737 airliner carrying Cuban and government troops. The Angolan government denied the claim.
- 01/31/84 -- A cease-fire agreement between Angola and South Africa came into effect. (Under the agreement, which was mediated by U.S. diplomats, South Africa would disengage its forces in southern Angola and joint monitoring teams would seek to halt the movement of guerrilla forces across the

Angola/Namibia border.)

- 11/10/83 -- UNITA claimed that it had shot down an Angolan Boeing-737 airliner on Nov. 8, killing all 126 passengers. According to UNITA, the plane was carrying Cuban and Angolan government troops. The Angolan government maintained that the plane had crashed because of a technical failure and that all but two of the passengers were civilians.
- 09/01/82 -- Prime Minister P.W. Botha of South Africa said that no settlement could be reached in South-West Africa (Namibia) until Cuban troops had withdrawn from Angola.
- 08/19/82 -- South African radio reported that the Minister of Defense and National Security, Gen. Magnus Malan, had said that the United States would have to assure the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola before a Namibia settlement would be possible. (Malan also said that South Africa would leave Angola in peace if it would stop supporting SWAPO.)
- 03/02/82 -- David Rockefeller, Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank's international advisory board, recommended that the United States establish diplomatic relations with Angola. (Rockefeller, speaking in Zimbabwe while on a 10-nation tour of Africa, said that the presence of Cuban troops and Soviet advisers had "no direct bearing on American business operations in Angola. Clearly, it has not interfered with our own banking relations.")
- 02/05/82 -- Cuba and Angola agreed to a joint statement which said that Cuba, without hesitation, would abide by any decision reached by the Angolan government on the withdrawal of Cuban forces.
- 01/20/82 -- Soviet Prime Minister Fikhonov, speaking to a visiting Angolan delegation at a luncheon in Moscow, warned of a U.S. "plot" to "intimidate" Angola and return it to the U.S. "sphere of influence."
- 12/10/81 -- President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, speaking on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the ruling MPLA party, offered to hold talks with the United States.
- Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA guerrilla movement in Angola, concluded what he referred to as a "breakthrough" series of meetings with U.S. officials in Washington. Savimbi claimed that his status had been "tremendously enhanced" by the sessions.
- 09/04/81 -- South Africa confirmed that two Soviet women had been killed during the incursion into Angola.
- 09/02/81 -- A South African Defense Force spokesman said that

two Soviet lieutenant colonels and an undisclosed number of Soviet soldiers had been killed during the incursion into Angola. A Soviet warrant officer, Sergeant Major Nikolai Feodorovich Pastretsov, had been captured, the spokesman added. (Half of the South African force in Angola, said to total 4,000 men, was reported to have been withdrawn.)

- 09/01/81 -- The Congressional Black Caucus called the U.S. veto of a U.N. resolution condemning South Africa's incursion into Angola "a dastardly act" marking "an all-time low in the morality of the Reagan administration's foreign policy."
- 08/31/81 -- The United States vetoed the proposed U.N. Security Council resolution condemning South Africa for its incursion into Angola. The vote on the resolution was 13 to 1, with Britain abstaining. (Charles Lichtenstein, acting as the U.S. representative while Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was out of the country, said that "the United States had to vote against a resolution which places the blame solely on the South Africa for the escalation of violence which plagues the entire region.")
- 07/08/81 -- The U.S. Export-Import Bank agreed to make a long-planned loan of \$85 million to Angola for the further development of Angola's offshore Cabinda oil fields. (The loan agreement, which will provide for gas re-pressurization at two main wells, was signed in Washington by the director of the Angolan central bank.)
- 05/06/80 -- Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan told the Wall Street Journal in an interview published on this date that "...frankly, I would provide them (UNITA) with weapons. It doesn't take American manpower; Savimbi, the leader, controls more than half of Angola.... I don't see anything wrong with someone who wants to free themselves from the rule of an outside power, which is Cubans and East Germans."
- 03/06/79 -- For the first time since their withdrawal in 1976, South African troops and planes attacked SWAPO bases in Angola.
- 05/27/77 -- President Neto announced that with the aid of Cuban troops his government had successfully crushed an attempted coup by supporters of a pro-Soviet faction within the MPLA.

#### ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES

- U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Southern Africa: U.S. regional policy at a crossroads? [by] Raymond W. Copson. [Washington] 1985.  
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