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DISASTER ASSISTANCE IN ANGOLA

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HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES, FOOD, AND ENERGY OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

NOVEMBER 5, 1975, FEBRUARY 26, AND MARCH 10, 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



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U.S. DOCS

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976

65-115

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¹ Resigned from committee Feb. 3, 1976.

² Assigned to committee, Feb. 18, 1976.

(II)

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1975	
Chamberlain, Robert, Officer in Charge of AID Affairs in Portuguese-Speaking Africa, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development	12
Dalton, William R., Assistant Director for Planning, Office of Foreign Disaster Relief Coordination, Agency for International Development	6
Lockwood, Edgar, Director, Washington Office on Africa	14
Mulcahy, Hon. Edward W., Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State	2
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1976	
Bowdler, Hon. William G., U.S. Ambassador to South Africa	45
Gervasi, Sean, consultant, Office of the Commission for Namibia, United Nations, and professor of economics, Brooklyn College, City University of New York	57
Mulcahy, Hon. Edward W., Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State	38
Reed, John A., Jr., Director, Africa Region, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)	54
Schaufele, Hon. William E., Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State	31
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1976	
Conroy, E. Dennis, Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development	105
Fugit, Edward F., Country Desk Officer for Angola, Department of State	87
Keuch, Robert L., Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice	129
Reed, John A., Jr., Director, Africa Region, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)	91
Schaufele, Hon. William E., Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State	76
Scott, Stanley S., Assistant Administrator, Africa Bureau, Agency for International Development	69

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement submitted by Department of Defense concerning the Africa-oriented elements in the Department's organization	63
Table on estimated strength of South Africa's military forces, as submitted by the Department of Defense	66
Statement by the Department of Defense on deployment of South African forces in Namibia	60
Letter from Department of State on scientific satellite observations of Angola, including a list of contributions of foreign governments to the International Red Cross appeals for Angola	82
Statement by the Department of Defense on Soviet military advisers in Congo (Brazzaville)	95
Statement by the Department of Defense on Chinese military presence in Mozambique	97

(III)

Table provided by AID on development training for Portuguese-speaking Africa	Page 105
Terms of the African-American Institute contract with the Agency for International Development	109
Table on U.S. exports to and imports from Angola, as submitted by AID	125
Statement by AID as to the possible boycott of Angolan coffee by the U.S. coffee buyers in 1975	126
Statement on the economic implications of dam projects and hydroelectric power, as submitted by AID	128
Letter from Department of Justice concerning legality of military activities of private persons in foreign countries	138

APPENDIX

1. Relevant excerpts from hearing before the Subcommittees on African Affairs and on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, on October 24, 1975, on "Security Supporting Assistance for Zaïre"	141
2. Prepared statement of Sean Gervasi	145
3. Department of Defense organizational structure annotated	155
4. Letter from the Department of State concerning allegations made by Sean Gervasi during February 26 hearing	156
5. Statement by Gulf Oil on Gulf's operations in Angola	160
6. Report of Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, on "An International Law Analysis of Certain Questions Relating to South Africa and Angola," by Moses Ferry, February 24, 1975	162
7. Letter from Chairman Diggs to Department of State requesting a witness to testify at March 10 hearing	172
8. Responses by the Department of State to questions submitted by Chairman Diggs on January 13, 1975	174
9. Text of press release on Angola issued by Chairman Diggs in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on January 11, 1975	178
10. Text of press release issued by Congressional Black Caucus on December 17, 1975, entitled "Congressional Black Caucus Demands End to United States Angola Intervention"	180
11. Article by Chairman Diggs written especially for the black press entitled "Why U.S. Must Stay Out of Angolan Civil War"	182
12. Relevant newspaper articles:	
"Libson Says It Can't Control Angola Strife," Washington Post, August 23, 1975	184
"Missing Americans," Washington Post, October 18, 1975	184
"United States, Soviet, China Reported Aiding Portgale, Angola," New York Times, September 25, 1975	185
"U.S. Plans To Boost Arms Aid to Zaïre," Washington Post, October 25, 1975	188
13. Report on a seminar between a group of Americans and an official delegation from the People's Republic of Angola, held in Havana, Cuba, February 26-29, 1976, by Robert S. Browne	190
14. Report of the Havana seminar by George M. House	190
15. Telegram sent by Chairman Diggs to the Department of State and the Department of Commerce concerning the revocation of export licenses for two Boeing 737 aircraft and responses by both agencies	204
16. Memorandum written to Hon. John V. Danney, Member, U.S. Senate, concerning Angola	206

DISASTER ASSISTANCE IN ANGOLA

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1975

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RESOURCES, FOOD, AND ENERGY
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Diggs. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today we are holding the first of three hearings entitled "Disaster Assistance in Angola." The purposes of today's hearing are to analyze: The nature and status of U.S. efforts to provide disaster assistance in Angola; the efforts made by the international community, including individual states and international organizations, with respect to disaster assistance; and, the impact of the war in Angola on the civilian population.

In order to understand fully the above issues, it will also be necessary to focus on those developments which have given rise to the current situation in Angola and to the resulting need for disaster assistance. Of critical importance in any effort to analyze the issue of U.S. disaster relief to Angola is the key question of overall U.S. policy toward Angola.

It is of particular concern that any efforts toward disaster assistance in Angola not be countered or negated by any U.S. assistance, either direct or indirect through other countries or third parties, to any of the parties involved in the current fighting in Angola. It is this fighting which has significantly contributed to and given rise to the need for disaster assistance and it will therefore be necessary to examine the U.S. policy and role with respect to the fighting in Angola.

The current refugee and disaster situation in Angola grows out of an internal war in Angola. However, there are abundant reports of involvement in this war by the major powers, including the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the United States, and by other countries. In order to examine the need for disaster assistance in Angola, it will, therefore, be necessary to know the extent of involvement, direct or indirect, by other countries in the Angolan fighting, with particular attention to the role of the United States.

Will the United States, for example, have contradictory policies whereby we offer disaster and refugee relief on the one hand but, through support of one or the other of the parties fighting in Angola, help to prolong and spread the conflict, thereby increasing the need

DISASTER ASSISTANCE IN ANGOLA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RESOURCES, FOOD, AND ENERGY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:13 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Diggs. The subcommittee will come to order. Today we are holding the third in a series of hearings entitled "Disaster Assistance in Angola." Because a number of questions put forward at the subcommittee's February 26 hearing resulted in what we consider incomplete response from witnesses from the State and Defense Departments, I have requested that these witnesses reappear today to answer further questions.

If they are not prepared to answer them to the fullest extent today, then it would be expected that any information not immediately available would be forthcoming and that they would reply in writing to the committee.

If there are any answers that would be considered under different circumstances, the witnesses should indicate that, according to their own security standards, the answer to such questions should either be handled in executive session or in direct conversations with interested members.

Out of all of these options, we would expect to get answers to questions reflecting the subcommittee's interest. There was really some serious question at our last meeting as to how much information was being made available at the conventional or traditional levels of the Departments that deal with African questions.

The issue of whether or not there is some decisionmaking process with respect to the issues at hand that is really outside of the State Department or outside of its African Bureau, could be the basis upon which the responses of necessity have to be incomplete. The same would apply to the Department of Defense because, for example, the witness stated that approximately no more than 5,000 South Africans were ever involved in the Angolan operation. Even the South African Defense Minister has admitted that some 4,000 to 5,000 South African troops have entered Angola.

It is my hope and the subcommittee's hope that the witnesses will be more responsive to the subcommittee's questions today.

The subcommittee will also hear testimony from the Agency for International Development (AID) on the following critical areas:

An updated economic profile of Angola, January 1975 to date, including such information as the country's exports and imports, U.S. trade with Angola, and the status of foreign investments including U.S. investments;

An analysis of Angola's economic needs and potential following the war in that country; and

An analysis of the reconstruction and economic assistance, short, medium, and long term, necessary for Angola to become economically viable.

The Department of Justice will also testify on the law governing the recruitment and involvement of American citizens in the fighting in Angola. The example set there reflects some potentialities down the line. As a matter of fact, the Belgian Ambassador or Belgian Mission in Cuba was recently quoted as saying that volunteers were being recruited in Cuba. Of course that is not mercenary but I would suspect that this so-called mercenary problem is going to accompany any further developments in Rhodesia, Namibia, or South Africa itself.

The subcommittee will respect the Department's desire not to comment on its pending investigation of American mercenary involvement in Angola, but looks forward to an open exchange on matters pertaining to the law itself.

So we begin our questions today with the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State, Mr. Schauffele. We are prepared to move directly into questions, unless Mr. Secretary, you have anything you wish to say formally?

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM E. SCHAUFFELE, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DIOGS. Mr. Schauffele, you indicated at the February 26 hearing that much of the southern part of the country still had not been taken by the MPLA forces. I wondered whether or not your intelligence indicated that was still the case and specifically how much of the southern part of Angola, both in terms of population and geographic area, is still not under control of the central government?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. It is difficult with the paucity of information that we have to give a precise answer to that particular question. I think I could state with perhaps some small exceptions, that that part of Angola stretching from the northern frontier down to somewhere south of the Beuguela Railroad line is controlled by the MPLA.

However, the situation further south of that becomes extremely fluid. We do not have a great deal of information. As far as we can deduce from the information we do have UNITA still controls a large area of the sparsely populated section of southeastern Angola.

It has guerrilla forces in the more densely populated Central Highlands where the MPLA forces control, from all appearances, the population centers and the major roads, but not all the area encompassed in that region.

All indications we have are that Mr. Savimbi is in a position as the accepted leader by most of the population in central and southern Angola and is acknowledged as such.

One of the uncertainties is to what extent the population, which normally had ties with UNITA, has followed along with the fighting forces of UNITA and left some of the population centers.

We just have no good information as to the extent of that refugee outflow. I would say that the MPLA controls nearly all of the major population centers in north, central, and southern Angola.

However, I do not know to what extent they control areas in the bush, outside that major road connections, in some parts of central Angola and a large part of southern Angola.

Mr. DIOGS. Let us move to the north, Mr. Secretary. You stated also at our last hearing that you were not sure to what extent FNLA was operating as an organized force in northern Angola.

I would like for you to be more explicit on that point, particularly since our own Government was in very close touch with that component of the UNITA-FNLA coalition?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. As far as we can tell, the FNLA is ineffective military organization in northern Angola. It is not operating. We think that there are still some small groups of FNLA troops which may still be positioned within the actual boundaries of Angola.

We see no evidence that there has been any significant combat in that area. It is very difficult, I might add here, with the common boundary with Zaire and the tribal connections of the FNLA, to differentiate exactly who is where and doing what.

Mr. DIOGS. According to your evaluations just stated of who controls what areas in Angola, are you in a position to say that to the extent of the information available to you that MPLA in effect controls substantially what is considered geographically as Angola or to turn it around, is there any question about the control of the essential territory of Angola by the People's Republic of Angola or MPLA?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. There is no question in my mind that the MPLA controls the major part of Angola. I would only make the additional statement that obviously its control, to a large extent, depends upon the continuing presence of 12,000 Cuban troops in the area.

Mr. DIOGS. I guess the point I was trying to establish here, one way or the other, is that control of the territory is an element of consideration with respect to the recognition of any country.

That is a standard international criterion. Since our country still has under consideration the question of recognition, I just wonder what part control of territory might play in this consideration, if all other things were equal and you were satisfied on every other account?

Would you still have a problem with recognition because of what you perceive to be the lack of control of the territory, either occasioned by the presence of the 12,000 Cubans you mentioned or by those several thousand South Africans that are also inside and who obviously in that same context, threaten control?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. On the question of recognition, certainly the control of the territory is one of the criteria which is normally applied

in assessing recognition. I think that in this particular situation, we are concerned still with two primary considerations.

One, is the attitudes and thoughts of the other countries in the area, the ones most concerned by the change of status in Angola. By that, I mean Zambia and Zaire. We are continuing our discussions with those two countries on that particular point. Neither has recognized the MPLA government in Angola.

Second, we are concerned and continue to be concerned as to the degree of dependence of MPLA upon foreign forces for the territory which it holds. This is an important consideration for us.

We still consider that at this particular juncture, it looks as if the control of a good part of Angola in the MPLA area is dependent upon the presence of Cuban forces.

Mr. Dinos. As you stated at our last hearing, you have noted the public statements of certain MPLA leaders indicating that they were receptive to establishing some communications with our Government and so on, but that you would prefer, presumably the Government would prefer to see something more concrete than just statements.

The question is what specific actions will the Executive want to see before it will give serious consideration to recognizing the People's Republic of Angola and working toward some normalcy in this relationship?

You have indicated that the presence of the Cuban troops and Soviet advisers, if you wanted to add that component, is a specific issue—that you would like to see some specific action with respect to their presence.

Are there any others?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. We would like to see some specific action which would indicate that the presence of and dependence on Cuban forces is at least reduced. We are observing the situation closely.

This is also evident in our conversations with the neighboring countries who, to one extent or another, also feel threatened by the presence of foreign troops in Angola. I cannot prescribe any specific action.

We observed the actions of the MPLA, we have observed the talks between President Mobutu and Mr. Neto and certainly there is movement in the relationships among the countries in the area.

However, we still have not seen any significant movement toward reducing the Cuban presence.

Mr. Dinos. How do you view the presence of South African troops?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. We view the presence of South African troops in much the same light. We believe they should be withdrawn.

Mr. Dinos. In other words, if the Cuban troops were withdrawn, they still would not have met your criteria as long as the South African troops are there or vice versa?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. That is a situation which is conceivable. We would hope that would not occur. We would like all foreign troops to be withdrawn. We have no information concerning the rumored contact which has been reported in the press and elsewhere, between South Africa and the MPLA about some kind of an arrangement.

We hope, in this case, that it can be worked out so that those troops would be withdrawn as well.

Mr. Dinos. That particular point disturbs me, particularly in recalling a similar answer from Ambassador Bowdler who was present at our last hearing. He indicated that he did not know anything about what these prospects were and that his communication with the South Africans apparently was not productive in any special intelligence.

This struck me as odd; it struck me in a much different way than what you are saying. You are saying the same thing but he is there every day and, not only is meeting with South African personnel and officials at the highest level during normal business hours, but in the evening, through the normal social exchanges and all the rest.

In view of all the sensitivities surrounding this issue, it was very difficult for me to accept his lack of knowledge about these things as opposed to someone like yourself, in the Department here in Washington and whose channels of communication are such that you could be completely circumvented.

There could be channels here in Washington involving Angola that are completely over your head, about which you would not even know, but it is very difficult for me to accept Ambassador Bowdler's statements indicating that he just does not know anything about anything.

I just wonder if that is a fair interpretation. You have been an ambassador yourself. Was there anything in Upper Volta going on or in any other country at the time of your ambassadorship, involving the United States, about which you did not know either through normal channels or through the extra communication system that all ambassadors have, particularly career Foreign Service officers?

It would appear to me, if that is the case, why do we have an ambassador there? I have been stressing all along that we ought to reduce our level of diplomatic relations and maybe we should recall the ambassador and just have an attaché there to satisfy the technicalities of diplomatic relationships.

If we do not have any better relationship than that then perhaps the point I have made from time to time has a lot more validity than even I realized.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. In almost any country in the world, which does not possess the kind of open society that we possess, and in most governments, if they choose, they can conceal information from the diplomatic representatives, as well as from others.

You asked somewhere in your statement whether I was unaware of anything involving the United States in Upper Volta or elsewhere? I do not think I was. However, I did know after the fact that there were certain things that did not involve the United States in which I could not get information about.

In regard to this particular situation in Angola, the decisions and actions of the South African Government did not involve the United States. They chose, as far as I can tell, not to inform us on what they were doing, or are doing now in terms of contacts with the MPLA.

I think in this particular situation, it is understandable that since the Government chose to adopt that particular policy, neither Ambassador Bowdler nor I have any direct information on this except for what we pick up through much the same sources as other observers.

I do not find it unusual that the South African Government chooses to conduct its business in that form.

Mr. DINGS. I was a little startled by your comments on the Zaire-PRA accord. Apparently you do not consider that accord recognition. I just wonder how you define the accord?

Obviously as you indicated, this is part of the consideration in our own recognition of problems. If we do not consider that some form of recognition or to the extent that we think that accord is limited, then obviously it would affect our own judgments.

Mr. SCHAUFFEL. We accept the agreement which was reached in Brazzaville, and the talks between President Mobutu and Mr. Neto so far, in the same way as Zaire accepts them; that there was a meeting, there was agreement on certain broad principles and there was formed a mixed commission which will conduct more detailed negotiations.

In the process of normalization of relations between two states, probably ending in recognition, this will take place. In view of the fact that our understanding is that Zaire does not consider this recognition, pending future negotiation of the modalities of some of the broad, more general principles which were agreed to, then we do not consider this recognition either.

It is only the countries themselves who can define whether they are recognized or not.

Mr. DINGS. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Solarz, raised a question about whether or not South Africa had made any approaches to our Government in terms of what help we might be able to give them in the event that they were attacked by Cubans or some other elements.

Ambassador Bowdler stated that no, not to his knowledge, had South Africa made any such approaches. The question, of course, is does anyone in the executive have knowledge as to whether or not the South Africans directly, indirectly, or through intermediaries, have made such an approach, trying to find out what we would do under those circumstances?

Mr. SCHAUFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of any such approaches. I can only support what Ambassador Bowdler said on February 26. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no approaches, either direct or indirect.

Mr. DINGS. Is the International Red Cross working in cooperation with this new government, to your knowledge?

Mr. SCHAUFFEL. Yes, sir, it is. The International Red Cross has an office in Luanda and is working there using that as its headquarters and in the distribution of assistance in Angola.

Mr. DINGS. The nine members of the EEC have recognized the People's Republic of Angola. I wonder how our Government evaluates this recognition in terms of our own standards? You indicated, in your view, that the Zaire accord does not constitute recognition per se, but just an accord.

How do you view the recognition by members of the EEC?

Mr. SCHAUFFEL. The members of the EEC of course have a right to grant recognition since they are sovereign states. I would say that some of their principles on questions of criteria for recognition are somewhat different from ours.

Some recognize states and not governments. Some recognize but make a differentiation between that and the establishment of diplo-

matic relations. I just do not know what the varying theories of recognition are in all the EEC nine states.

I do understand that some of these factors entered into their deliberations. For instance, I know France is a country that recognizes only states. That is a theory of international recognition which actually has a good deal of support among some lawyers in this country.

To what extent France interprets its recognition of Angola as acceptance of the government, I am not prepared to say. Their criteria for recognition and their definitions of recognition are sometimes different from ours.

Mr. DINGS. Except that particularly at the time of the OAU meeting a specific amount of stress was made by you if you were correctly quoted, that there was a division there and that 22 members of the OAU did not recognize the PRA. There were further statements made indicating that the recognition of the PRA was just by the eastern bloc countries and/or the so-called super militant leftwing kind of countries, and that this did not constitute, in your view, a legitimate assessment of the recognition question. Obviously the implication was that if some EEC countries, or certain other countries in Africa, particularly Zaire and some others, either recognized MPLA or entered into some kind of accord with them that this would be a factor in our own consideration.

We are now here on the 10th of March with the PRA having been recognized by over 80 countries that cut across the entire spectrum, ideologically, geographically, and otherwise, and yet we are still not satisfied.

We are still coming up with new criteria. It is within that kind of context that I ask about how you are now evaluating the recognition of these other countries.

Mr. SCHAUFFEL. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, the views of the states in Africa and in the immediate area are considered by the United States under any circumstances of recognition, yet there are states, as you know, which recognize governments in exile, whether or not they have any control over the area.

The stress we placed on the 22 which had not recognized the MPLA was insofar as it issued from me, to illustrate the importance we attached at that particular time to an African solution to the Angolan question and that there obviously was not a real African consensus.

Our Government and our consideration of the recognition questions has, in addition to the normal criteria which historically applied to recognition, always looked into a variety of factors in assessing the possibility or desirability of recognition.

We accept the fact that 41 of the African countries have recognized the MPLA as the government. We are also quite aware of the fact that the two African states most concerned have not yet recognized it.

We also realize that many other states have recognized—I believe 82 is the correct figure now. We are still considering in our own mind these other facts which I have indicated.

Mr. DINGS. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the reception of Secretary Kissinger on his proposed trip would be different if we have recognized the PRA by that time, particularly in view of the recogni-

tion by 41 African countries and in view of the high degree of sensitivity about this matter among African countries?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I am inclined to think, from the interests which have been expressed by African States in having a visit from the Secretary, that this particular consideration, although it might be of some reformatory, is not of such an overwhelming importance that it might affect their reception of him.

Mr. DINGS. We have this Earth resources technology satellite, as you know, Mr. Secretary, which is operated by an NASA tracking station in South Africa. I wonder if you have any knowledge of its having detected information regarding mineral and resource deposits in Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. I am sorry say I do not know. I know that there has been satellite exploration in other areas of the world, but I am afraid I just cannot answer that question at this time. I can try to find out.

Mr. DINGS. I wish you would. In March of 1973, the Department advised that NASA feels an obligation to make available to all countries over which the satellite travels data which is developed by the satellite.

I was interested in knowing whether or not the satellite had traveled over Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFFELE. We will reply to that question.

[The following letter was subsequently received:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 2, 1978.

Hon. CHARLES C. DINGS, Jr.,

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: During Assistant Secretary Schauffele's testimony March 10 before your Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy, he agreed to provide you with information on scientific satellite observations of Angola as well as on contributions of foreign governments to the International Red Cross appeals for Angola.

NASA has acquired a small amount of Landsat satellite imagery as a result of NASA's routine efforts to obtain coverage of the land areas of the world. In addition, NASA has acquired some data in support of a Botswanan land use study of the Okavango Delta. These data include some coverage of southeastern Angola. NASA provided these data to Botswanan scientists who are responsible for analysis of the imagery. I should note that the Botswanan project is one of over 50 Landsat investigations selected by NASA. The data acquired on Angola, as well as all Landsat data, is readily available for sale at a nominal charge to any purchaser. So far as we know, no requests for the existing coverage have been made by Angolans. We are not aware of any information on the mineral resources of Angola which have been developed based on the Landsat data acquired. Enclosed is a list provided by the International Red Cross of contributions to their appeals for funds for humanitarian relief in Angola.

I hope the foregoing has been responsive to your request.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Enclosure: As Stated.

CONTRIBUTIONS

Amounts received in cash, and in goods and services (in Swiss francs), as at 15 December 1975.

Governments:	
Belgium	152,302
Canada	1,290,000
Denmark	360,100
Germany, Federal Republic of	250,250
Netherlands	469,875
Norway	90,100
Switzerland	1,783,850
Switzerland (for refugees from Angola in Portugal)	35,000
United Kingdom	172,600
United States	1,004,000
Total	5,031,697
National Red Cross Societies:	
Belgium	10,750
Canada	52,997
Denmark	38,255
Finland	65,400
France	38,000
Germany, Federal Republic of	173,040
Greece	5,000
Ireland	22,085
Japan	0,003
Luxembourg	20,000
Monaco	2,000
Netherlands	45,000
New Zealand	5,475
Norway	98,100
Poland	15,600
Sweden	380,570
Switzerland	246,000
Thailand	687
United Kingdom	35,370
Total	1,274,728
Miscellaneous:	
Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (United Kingdom)	5,740
Church of Ireland, Bishop	5,410
Concern, Ireland	5,410
Oxfam United Kingdom	28,250
Save the Children Fund, Canada	0,581
Save the Children Fund, the United Kingdom	15,125
Others	2,134
From Cyprus action: ¹	108,410
1 Indian and 4 VW ambulance	23,208
Methodist Evangelical Church	358,733
EEC	
Canadian Red Cross:	
B.C. Agricultural Aid Fund	17,920
United Church	6,402
Sandog	25,000
World Council of Churches	26,500
Total	634,858

¹ Transferred from Cyprus action (a gift from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany).

The sum that was estimated would be needed for the Angola action until 31 December 1975 has not been fully covered. There is every likelihood that, for the first six months of 1976, there will be an appreciable increase in operational expenses, due mainly to higher transport costs.

Mr. DINGS. We have talked about the Government's alignment with South Africa in the Angola situation. Do you have any knowledge of any American private enterprises in South Africa which are supplying any equipment or have supplied, or financed such to or for the benefit of UNITA or FNLA at the time of our involvement.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No; I am not aware of any such involvement.

Mr. DINGS. Did any private enterprises raise any questions about this with the Department as to their having been solicited and your giving them some kind of guidance?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Not to my knowledge. To my knowledge, the only kinds of calls we ever got in the Department of State were people who wanted to be mercenaries.

Mr. DINGS. We will be taking up that with the Justice Department in a few moments. One other question on this exchange of information concerns the briefing of the South African Bureau of State Security, commonly known as "BOSS." Is there some routine briefing or communication between BOSS and the U.S. mission in South Africa?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. This question obviously has arisen before. I am not able to respond to that question myself. I can only suggest that you might perhaps wish to take it up with the agencies with which they had such exchanges.

Mr. DINGS. They would not be dealing with the mission itself?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. They are not dealing with the mission, if they are dealing with anybody.

Mr. DINGS. Do you have any knowledge about the continuation of any assistance by Western countries to UNITA or FNLA? Today the New York Times stated that France and Britain, as well as the United States provided covert aid.

I wondered if you had any special intelligence on that?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I am not aware of any.

Mr. DINGS. Finally, there is also an article, by Evans and Novak, "Cuban-Russian Threat to World Power" today, that talks about intense briefings of the President on what they call Cuba's sensational success in Angola and the implications.

It goes on to say, "The President is now considering a major effort, possibly a foreign policy speech, to make Congress more sensitive and to make them understand just how desperate this situation is."

The article goes on to talk about the possibility of a naval blockade of Cuba in order to keep Cuban troops and other military elements from engaging in these excursions in Africa. What is your comment on that?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Obviously the President is briefed constantly on matters of this sort. Certainly, over the past few months, he has been intensively briefed on the situation in Angola and South Africa, generally.

As far as the contentions made in the column about such things as a speech or consideration of a naval blockade of Cuba, I am unaware of any of those things. I do not know where Evans and Novak might have gotten this information.

At least to my knowledge, there has been no consideration given to any of those things.

Mr. DINGS. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I listened with a great deal of interest to your remarks concerning Angola for it is an issue that has troubled, not only the members of this committee, but also the entire Nation.

Since there is some consideration about aid to Angola tell us how many Angolan refugees there are?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes, sir. We cannot give exact figures, but we can give approximate figures. We think that there are probably close to 600,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire, and approximately, as best we can tell, some 12,000 Angolan refugees in the south.

We think that most of those Angolan refugees in the south are still in Angola but are in the very southern part of Angola.

Mr. GILMAN. Are there some Angolan refugees in other countries?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. There are some 25,000 in Zambia.

Mr. GILMAN. Was there a report that there were some refugees in South Africa?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. There are essentially the 12,000 about which I am talking.

Mr. GILMAN. In the south?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I think they were at least in the southern portion of Angola. Whether they were in the area in which South African troops were located, or whether they have now passed over the border, we do not know.

Mr. GILMAN. Were some Angolan refugees airlifted to Portugal?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes; that was some time ago. We participated in an international airlift to bring back people to Portugal and some are now being repatriated to Portugal by air from Windhoek the capital of Namibia so Mr. Fugit tells me.

Mr. GILMAN. Any idea of how many refugees are presently in Portugal?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. 350,000.

Mr. GILMAN. From Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. From Angola.

Mr. GILMAN. Are we then talking about close to 1 million Angolan refugees?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes; those who are in Portugal are Portuguese citizens. They are refugees from where they formerly lived in Angola, but are now in the care of the Portuguese Government.

Mr. GILMAN. I would assume there are probably some refugees within Angola that have been moved from the war zone. Is that correct?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Undoubtedly, but we just do not have any statistics on those.

Mr. GILMAN. Most of the hostility has ceased. Are refugees still leaving Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I suppose the movement—I will amend that. Traditionally in the past, during the Portuguese colonial period, there were a large number of refugees in Zaire from the northern part of Angola from the Bakongo tribe which is normally associated with the FNLA, so after independence that many of them returned to Angola.

However, because of the FNLA reverses, they have now returned to Zaire. We assume, but we do not know, the figures, but as the UNITA forces retreated to the southeastern corner of Angola, that some of the civilian population which is of the same ethnic and tribal origin, moved with them.

We just do not have any statistics on those.

Mr. GILMAN. Has the Soviet Union or Cuba made any effort to help repatriate or to give any relief for the refugees?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. We are not aware of any. There was not earlier, to our knowledge. Whether they are providing humanitarian assistance to refugees within Angola, we do not know.

Mr. GILMAN. Did we supply some funds last year, for aid to the refugees in Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. That is right. We have indicated we are willing to supply more.

Mr. GILMAN. What was the extent of our effort last year?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I think it was \$675,000.

Mr. GILMAN. Have we earmarked some additional funds this year?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes; I cannot remember the figure now. It is about another \$200,000 or \$300,000, I believe.

Mr. GILMAN. An additional \$300,000?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that fund furnished through the International Red Cross?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. That is correct. It is given to the International Red Cross to purchase food, blankets, tents, that sort of thing.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you know what other nations have contributed to Angolan refugees?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. From governments, there have been contributions from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom.

Mr. GILMAN. Where do we stand in comparison to their efforts.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Just within Angola, the biggest contributor was Switzerland, the second biggest was Canada and the third largest contributor was the United States.

I should say the figure for the United States is \$1,064,000 and includes only funds spent for refugees in Angola.

Mr. GILMAN. There has been no contribution by any of the Communist bloc nations?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Any contributions by any of the Arab nations?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No, sir. We have some contributions from National Red Cross Societies which include Poland, but none from any Arab nations.

Mr. DIGGS. Would the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. DIGGS. Would the Secretary have specific knowledge about what the South Africans have done with respect to Angolan refugees that have come into South Africa and into Namibia and just what been provided to those people?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. The South Africans have informed the United Nations that they have helped these refugees, given them shelter and

food, but of course we have no information regarding the magnitude of that assistance.

Mr. DIGGS. These are all white Angolans?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Mostly white Angolans, some mulatto Angolans who have decided to take refuge, get out of Angola.

Mr. DIGGS. Have there been attempts by black Angolans to come over the border, particularly into Namibia?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I will ask Mr. Fugit to answer the questions. He is more familiar with the details.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. FUGIT, COUNTRY DESK OFFICER FOR ANGOLA, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. FUGIT. I think there have been several attempts by black Angolans. They have not crossed into Namibia but they are being provided food and clothing.

Mr. DIGGS. You say they have not let them across?

Mr. FUGIT. I do not believe so.

Mr. DIGGS. In other words, the South Africans differentiate among refugees? They have not let any black Angolans over—even into Namibia. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. FUGIT. As far as I am aware, the camps are inside Angola. The Angolans came down south and the South Africans have provided food and clothing for them. The ones who had been let into Namibia had been the ones who were being repatriated to Portugal.

Mr. DIGGS. Is that the group that was turned around in Walvis Bay?

Mr. FUGIT. That is a group of people that fled from Mocimedes about a month ago, there were some blacks and whites.

Mr. GILMAN. Has the MPLA attempted to provide any relief for Angolan refugees?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. We would assume that in the normal course of conducting government programs, they are doing some relief, if for no other reason because it is a politically wise thing to do but we have no information on this.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, could we have the list of those countries that are providing refugee aid submitted to the committee for insertion in this portion of the record?

Mr. DIGGS. Without objection, so ordered.¹

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, how much is the U.S. investment in Angola at the present time?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. The U.S. investment in Angola was on the order of about \$250 million, mostly in the Gulf exploration of the oil fields.

Mr. GILMAN. What is the status of the oil fields at the present time?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. The oil fields, to our knowledge, are not operating. Gulf has paid the royalties and taxes and is presently negotiating with the Government of Angola presumably about resuming operations in the oil fields.

Mr. GILMAN. Is there any other substantial U.S. industrial investment?

¹ See attachment to letter from Assistant Secretary McCloskey, dated Apr. 2, 1976, in text at p. 82.

Mr. SCHAUFELI. No, sir. Most of the economic activity in Angola is primarily minerals, oil, diamonds, iron ore, and coffee.

Mr. GILMAN. I noted in Mr. Scott's prior testimony that we were one of the largest importers and one of the largest exporters to Angola in the past. What do we import from Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. I do not have a great deal of information. Excuse me. The imports from Angola are coffee and oil.

Mr. GILMAN. I would assume the coffee trade has also come to a halt?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. I presume so. The coffee plantations obviously have suffered a great deal during the fighting. As I recall, they require a great deal of constant care.

Mr. GILMAN. What exports have we been sending over to Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. In the past, this has always been manufactured goods, machinery, I do not think there is any specific category that sticks out.

Mr. GILMAN. What do you recommend for our long-range goal, our long-range policy with regard to Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. My recommendation would be that, obviously, we would like to see a situation in that part of the world in which Angola can live in peace with its neighbors and not represent, because of the presence of foreign troops, a potential threat in the area.

We would like to see an Angola which is an independent African state which can determine its own destiny. That is what we have always hoped for Angola.

We also hope that the Government of Angola will be able to reconcile all of the various forces which have been unleashed in this civil war over the past few months, so that there is a unified country.

Mr. GILMAN. Without military support, will the MPLA be able to maintain its governmental control?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. This is the question. Many people much more familiar with Angola than I, in a more profound sense, feel that without reconciliation among the three major groups, that it will be difficult for the MPLA to govern without that outside military support.

Mr. GILMAN. Without the military support, do you think the MPLA can bring together a coalition government?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. I think that depends on what the spirit of the negotiations, talks, or whatever tool is used to reconcile the various groups in Angola. The two opposing liberation movements, in effect, have been outlived by the MPLA.

The reconciliation, if it takes place, presumably will take place with respect to individuals. Certainly, the MPLA is in a strong position because it does have the foreign forces there to enforce order.

Mr. GILMAN. How many Cuban troops are there in Angola at the present time?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. As far as we can see, there has been no significant change in the numbers. In fact, it has probably gone up, although I have continued to refer to 12,000 Cubans.

We are pretty firmly convinced now that the number runs between 12,000 and 13,500. As far as we can tell, there has been no significant change in the number of Cubans.

Mr. GILMAN. Are there any Soviet troops in—

Mr. SCHAUFELI. There are no Soviet troops to our knowledge, but there are considerable numbers of Soviet advisers which in January was estimated to be about 400.

Mr. GILMAN. Are there any foreign troops in any other parts of the country?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. Not to my knowledge, except the South Africans in the south.

Mr. GILMAN. Approximately how many South Africans?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. The South African Defense Minister said there are 4,000 to 5,000 South Africans in the southern part of Angola.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. DIGGS. Two or three questions, that have come out of questions by the gentleman from New York on the Gulf consultations now.

Of course the royalties were cut off as a direct result of, as I understand, our Government's intervention with the Gulf officials. Now that they have resumed, have they resumed with your blessing? Did you call them and tell them that the suspension was off and they could do whatever they wanted to do now or something to that effect?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. We had no legal means to prevent Gulf from paying the royalties and taxes earlier. Gulf was presented with a problem that has arisen in other places in the past. That is, having two competing governments, each one claiming sovereignty over the same area.

They consulted with us about how to resolve this potential legal problem, where if they decided to pay to one side and the other side was subsequently victorious in establishing a government, they would be liable for a duplicate payment.

They did consult with us and they adopted what I gather is a normal procedure. This is to put the funds in escrow to be paid to the government at a later date. The only thing we specifically asked Gulf to do at that time was to remove its personnel from its operations.

Mr. DIGGS. The resumption of these payments was done without any consultation?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. No, we were informed.

Mr. DIGGS. After the fact? They did not consult with you in front?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. They informed us in advance that they were going to consult with the MPLA authorities about the payment and we did not object.

Mr. DIGGS. Their continued presence in Angola beyond the payments, that is not a subject of some kind of discussion with the Department?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. We know that they are discussing it, that they will be discussing it. I gather they did discuss the payment, made the payment and will be discussing later this month their future position in Angola.

Mr. DIGGS. Do you have any reservations about their future position in Angola?

Mr. SCHAUFELI. As far as we are concerned, they are perfectly free to continue their present course.

Mr. DINGS. Do you have any reservations about their future in Angola? Are you fearful that they might become nationalized or anything like that? Did you express any apprehensions?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Certainly that is a possibility. Our concern always about nationalization is not the act of nationalization itself, but the question of adequate and just compensation.

Whether in fact Gulf will eventually be nationalized, we do not know. Even if they are, what we would then be interested in would be the question of compensation. American firms have been nationalized all over the world.

Mr. DINGS. Mr. Gilman also referred to other commercial transactions, namely other imports. Of course you mentioned coffee. You said the imports of coffee had practically ceased, did practically cease during the conflict.

Does that mean that the imports of coffee by the United States were completely cut off or were just slowed down? What precisely did you mean?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I do not have any statistics on that, Mr. Chairman. I assume that any coffee which might have been exported during that period to the United States, continued to arrive in the United States.

What I referred to—what I mean to refer to was the production of coffee which I feel was probably affected by the civil war. I have no information about imports of coffee from Angola during this period.

I would only assume that anything that was in the process continued to come to the United States. Since most of the coffee came through the port of Luanda, presumably, they were a great many normal commercial ships calling at Luanda during this period.

Mr. DINGS. What I am getting at is did we engage in any discouragement of imports of coffee or other products from Angola which would be, I presume, consistent with our attitude toward that government?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I am not aware that we did.

Mr. DINGS. We are not engaged in some kind of a boycott of Angolan products?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No, sir.

Mr. DINGS. Or to try to discourage any imports under those circumstances?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No, sir, we are not.

Mr. DINGS. Just one final question, Mr. Secretary. Secretary Kissinger, in appearing before the full committee a few days ago, and within the past few days the President as well, have stated that, "the United States is not going to stand idly by and see these Cuban adventurers take over in Africa?"

I just wonder what your interpretation is of what the Secretary and the President meant when they made those statements?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I am afraid I really cannot answer the question. I am not privy to what the President or Secretary is thinking in any particular terms with regard to Cuba.

Mr. DINGS. There are just so many options he could exercise. The United States could intervene, as the President and Secretary Kissinger felt we should intervene in Angola, or we could intervene in a covert way. It could mean that he would come to the Congress and ask

for sufficient funds to intervene in an overt way. It could mean that he is just bluffing. There are not too many options there.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Of course there are a number of options and combinations of options. I do not think that I can, from my position, and in this kind of a situation, speculate on what the Secretary or President meant in making those statements, simply because I am not privy to what they are thinking.

Mr. DINGS. Do you believe it means we would intervene in Rhodesia, Namibia, South Africa, given the same set of circumstances as we intervened in Angola? I guess that gets the simple question.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. It is a simple question but nevertheless I do not think that I can be put in the position of trying to interpret what the Secretary or the President meant in referring to these particular situations.

Certainly the concern expressed by the administration over the Cuban propensity now to engage in operations in areas not only in foreign countries, but in areas far outside—far away from Cuba, is a very real concern.

I think it should be a real concern for other people. Their activities in Angola have been perhaps the largest and the most dramatic. Nevertheless, they have presence elsewhere. Certainly other countries are very concerned about the Cubans.

Mr. DINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Thank you and we will give you the answers to those questions which you requested.

Mr. DINGS. Mr. John Reed. As I indicated earlier, Mr. Reed, Director of the Africa Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, is being recalled for some collateral questions.

He was not asked to submit a prepared statement at this point. If the gentleman has any general statements to make, he is welcome to do it.

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. REED, JR., DIRECTOR, AFRICA REGION, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. REED. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. DINGS. We were particularly interested, Mr. Reed, in your response to the question about this alleged carrier task force on full alert and on contingency orders for a mission in Angola, the carrier *Saratoga* which put out of Norfolk and all of the rest.

You stated that those reports, to the best of your knowledge, were totally unfounded as it related to the *Saratoga* and so on.

I wonder if you have any information about any vessels—we called these vessels or these carrier task forces, and we referred to them by name. You have been engaging in some very tight answers to our questions.

We called it by name and you said you have no knowledge of these specific carriers or task force. We want to find out if No. 1, whether or not there is any report within the Department, whether it is to your knowledge or not, and whether or not any vessels, carriers or carrier

task force and so on had been put on full alert or received any contingency orders with respect to Angola? What U.S. vessels have had any missions related to the situation in Angola?

Mr. REED. I would like to commence by saying that I am sorry that I have given the impression of giving "tight" answers. I have tried to give very precise answers, I think precision is important and that ambiguity can lead only to misunderstanding and feelings that things have not been properly answered.

I have looked into the question of ships, their being alerted, movements and these sorts of things since I last testified before this subcommittee. The response that I gave you before was as I knew it to be at that time, quite correct.

The thing that may have confused the press at that time was the coincidence of a normal carrier task group exchange between our east coast and the 6th Fleet, with the carrier *Saratoga* as the chief ship. This carrier rotated to the Mediterranean during the period July 7, 1975 to January 17, 1976 to replace the carrier *Kennedy* which was then in the 6th Fleet and which subsequently has been returned to the east coast.

I have also asked our services whether there were alerts of any sort during this time. I have been informed that since September 1975, no U.S. vessels have been alerted. I am trying to give you a precise answer because I think there have been allegations that carriers were sent, that the United States was trying to face down the Soviet Union, and so forth.

These simply are not true.

Mr. DINGS. You also stated that the Department's position is that none of these military forces have been sent into Angola waters. I wondered precisely what you meant by Angolan waters?

Mr. REED. I was responding to a question which was directed toward operations there. I would be happy to explain that. I meant by Angolan waters—waters off the west coast of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea—those waters which would really bear on operations in that area.

The normal route of a carrier task group going from the east coast to the Mediterranean would lie just to the north of the Azores.

Mr. DINGS. The Washington Post stated a few weeks ago, the 24th of January to be exact, that fresh South African troops were seen leaving South African departure points toward Angola.

I wondered whether or not you had any special intelligence about any new deployment of South African troops in that area?

Mr. REED. This was the 24th of January?

Mr. DINGS. Right, and there have been other reports too, just as the Secretary indicated he felt there had been some slight buildup of the Cuban troops there. I wondered whether you had any knowledge of the buildup of South African troops?

Mr. REED. I am told the South Africans were, at that time, rotating troops in Namibia, and into the area north of the border of Namibia, the 50 kilometers which we spoke of before.

Mr. DINGS. You think it was just a rotation then, not additions?

Mr. REED. I am not really sure. There is no doubt, however, that the South Africans have increased their troop strength in Namibia and in Angola, in this strip to the north of the border.

Mr. DINGS. As you recall, Mr. Reed, we had quite a bit of discussion about the nature of an attaché's mission—a military attaché. I would like to get a little bit more on the record on that.

We had the Defense Department witnesses before the then subcommittee on Africa a few years ago—November 12, 1971, to be exact. Obviously changes may have taken place since that time.

At that time, the Defense Department stated that the primary channel of routine military contact with South Africa was through the exchange of attachés with the South African attaché and assistant attaché in Washington and the U.S. Defense, Army, Air Force and Navy attachés in South Africa. It was further stated that these attachés provided routine contacts with their counterpart services and report as customary on all matters of military interest. At that time, that included matters in Rhodesia and Namibia. Against that kind of background, I wonder if there has been some change in the mission of attachés. According to your response to the question the other day, you said he is just there sort of technically as a representative of our Government but he really does not get into much.

I would like to know about the nature and substance of any and all reports relating to Angola, Rhodesia, Namibia, which have been made by your attachés or has there been a change since this policy was enunciated 5 years ago?

Mr. REED. There has certainly not been a change in the role and modus operandi of our attachés. It is essentially as you have stated.

Mr. DINGS. If that is the case, then obviously he had been in touch or is in fact in touch now with the South Africans about these various matters and in—there is some kind of reporting system which enables us to know what is going on with respect to their intentions and their plans, certainly up to a point.

I am asking you, based on that kind of background and the statement you just made, what is the nature and substance of any and all reports in any way related to Angola which are being made and have been made by the South African and American attachés to or for the use or information of the other government?

Mr. REED. As Mr. Schaefle, indicated to you earlier, the information available to U.S. officials, be they diplomatic or military, in South Africa was highly restricted during the periods before, during and since South Africa intervened in Angola.

I think the extent of South African involvement there was not known within South Africa itself. It was certainly not made known to U.S. officials there, prior to the budget debate in South Africa, during which much information came out.

You were saying that, in the course of a normal day-to-day exchange, we would naturally have gotten information. I doubt that we would have received such information if the South Africans did not want to have us receive it.

We obviously hope to be able to get a good reading of South Africa—

Mr. DINGS. Doesn't he give interpretative reports? Anytime one of our diplomatic types has a conversation of what might be perceived to be of even remote importance, that conversation—it does not have to be a document nor a map or chart—is reported to the Department.

Mr. REED. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. DINGS. Conversation, pieces of corridor talk, as the general in-

formal expression is used, anything picked up at a cocktail party or anything at all is reported. I have seen these kinds of reports. Are you suggesting that you do not have the same kind of a reporting system?

Mr. REED. No, sir, the system is there. Quite obviously the system is intended to work in all cases. In many, however, if a government and its representatives are "close lipped," the amount of information reaching us would necessarily be restricted.

Mr. DIOS. I think the question is we wanted to get any and all reports. I guess we have to make the judgment as to whether or not the information is useful. You are suggesting or admitting that there are reports, but you are sort of downgrading its importance.

Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I am not trying to do that at all. What you have done is to stretch me to the limits of my knowledge on this particular subject. If you do want to know more about it, or want to see the reports themselves, if they are releasable, you must question intelligence officials.

Mr. DIOS. That is exactly what I am saying. I would have to make that kind of judgment myself. The subcommittee is asking that any and all reports relating to Angola, Rhodesia, and Namibia—and the Department itself made reference to its reporting on Rhodesia and Namibia in this testimony in 1971—from the defense attaché pertaining to these three countries/areas be made available to the subcommittee so that it can make a judgment as to the nature and substance of the kind of communications that our attachés have with the South African Government directly and indirectly through them with the Rhodesian Government.

Is that understood, that this is the kind of information that we would like to have?

Mr. REED. I understand what you are interested in having. Mr. Chairman, I am not in a position either to have it or comment on it. I would just say that I am sure the Department of Defense will be as forthcoming as possible in this regard.

I think you must either request this information from those who have it or have a witness come to you.

Mr. DIOS. I am asking the Department's view from you as the Department's representative, as Director of the African Region. I would presume you would take this back to the Department as a request of the subcommittee and that we would get a response based upon that request?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir. I am very willing to do this. We will provide what we can to you.¹

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. DIOS. I yield to you.

Mr. GILMAN. I would just like to direct a point of inquiry to the Chair. The information we are requesting is in relation to the disaster question in Angola—

Mr. DIOS. I find it difficult to discuss Angola now without discussing South Africa, and we will have specific hearings on South Africa where we will go into much more detail.

Once you rationalize a connection between Angola and South Africa, then the matter of disaster can be pretty easily rationalized because I view our policy in this regard as a disaster.

¹ The Department of Defense subsequently informed the subcommittee that the Defense Intelligence Agency would be supplying the answer to this question but at the time of printing no information was received.

I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Reed, how many military personnel do we have in Angola?

Mr. REED. The United States does not have any military personnel there.

Mr. GILMAN. Do we still have an adviser in Angola?

Mr. REED. We have never had any military advisers.

Mr. GILMAN. At any time, were there any reports of naval operations by either the Cubans or Soviets in supplying equipment or armament to Angola?

Mr. REED. Both the Cubans and Soviets operated naval vessels in support of Angola: the Cubans to transport troops, the Soviets to transport equipment. In some cases, they also had combat ships in the area, presumably associated with their Angolan operations.

Mr. GILMAN. Where did they embark? Where did they discharge their equipment and supplies?

Mr. REED. Their supplies initially were discharged in Congo-Brazzaville and then transhipped to Angola. They had, as you know, a major airlift from the Soviet Union to Congo-Brazzaville.

After the MPLA declared its independence and had firm control of Luanda, flights often were directed there from the Soviet Union with, of course, several stops along the way.

Equipment from ships was delivered to both places.

Mr. GILMAN. What combat vessels did they have in the Angolan waters?

Mr. REED. From press reports of operations in and toward Angolan waters and from sightings in ports along the way, I think we could say with some assurance, they had both a guided missile destroyer and one guided missile cruiser.

Mr. GILMAN. These were their vessels?

Mr. REED. Yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Where were they sighted?

Mr. REED. They made port calls in such places as Conakry, Guinea, and at least one other African country. The Soviets also had an LST there, but I do not know if you consider that a combat vessel.

Mr. GILMAN. Has there been any construction activity by the Soviet Union or the Cubans in building permanent installations since activities ceased?

Mr. REED. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you know how extensive the Soviet technical force was, the technical advisory force that you stated was assisting Angola?

Mr. REED. We believe the Soviet technical advisers were somewhere in the neighborhood of 400 people.

Mr. GILMAN. Were there any Soviet military advisers in other African countries who were assisting in this operation, as far as you know?

Mr. REED. Presumably those who were in Congo-Brazzaville would have been involved.

Mr. GILMAN. How extensive is that group?

Mr. REED. I will have to provide that for the record.

[The following was received from the Department of Defense for the record:]

SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

An estimated [security deletion] Soviet military advisers were present in Congo (Brazzaville) at the end of December 1973 [security deletion].

Mr. GILMAN. Besides the Cubans, were there any other countries that assisted the Soviets in their venture in Angola?

Mr. REED. Are you speaking of personnel and equipment?

Mr. GILMAN. Personnel, technical advice, equipment, and supplies?

Mr. REED. Since independence was declared, I believe a small contingent from Guinea, mainly logistical support troops, has been in Angola.

Mr. GILMAN. What about during the hostile period?

Mr. REED. This was during the period of hostilities.

Mr. GILMAN. Any other assistance?

Mr. REED. I know of no other.

Mr. GILMAN. There was a report that there were some Mig fighters in the Brazzaville area at one time. Was there any substantiation of that?

Mr. REED. You are talking about Brazzaville, in the Congo?

Mr. GILMAN. In and around Angola.

Mr. REED. There were a number of reports of deliveries. This has been one of the main questions for the intelligence community throughout the Angolan crisis: had Mig fighters been delivered to Brazzaville or Luanda.

Mr. GILMAN. Have we been able to substantiate that?

Mr. REED. We were not able to substantiate this at any time during the active hostilities.

Mr. GILMAN. What about now?

Mr. REED. My colleague tells me we have reports that aircraft, apparently fighter aircraft, have been observed in the Luanda area, but none to our knowledge has been used in combat. We have not seen them in the air.

Mr. GILMAN. Were they able to identify the type of aircraft?

Mr. REED. Not conclusively.

Mr. GILMAN. What effect would that have on the security of the region?

Mr. REED. U.S. security assistance to Zaire certainly is extremely important in maintaining stability in the region. Zaire has very long borders with both Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, major internal security needs, and major communications needs.

Most recently, because of its support of FNLA and UNITA it has incurred, at the least, the displeasure of the new Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

For these reasons, U.S. assistance is very important. Zaire is currently suffering a severe economic downturn because of the drop in the price of copper. It has what we perceive to be short term economic problems.

Mr. GILMAN. Militarily, what do you see as the importance of Angola to the Soviet Union?

Mr. REED. The chief military importance to the Soviet Union of Angola is the possibility that they might be able to acquire either ports from which Soviet vessels could be deployed or some sort of air facilities from which they could fly long range maritime patrol aircraft or, in the event of hostility, some type of strike aircraft to interdict the oil supply lines from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe and the United States.

Mr. GILMAN. How do you interpret the new relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuban reserves. Is the Soviet use of the Cuban adventures overseas—

Mr. REED. I think Secretary Kissinger has said it is a very serious development. It poses new challenges to the United States and the West, challenges which we are going to have to look at very closely.

Mr. GILMAN. There was a report that the Cubans were now sending the families of the troops to Angola. Is there any substantiation of that? Is there any chance of their becoming a permanent force?

Mr. REED. I do not think we have any clear knowledge of what the intentions of the Cubans are with regard to their force in Angola, whether they intend it to be a permanent force or indeed whether these reports—which I also have seen—are true.

Mr. GILMAN. There are also recent reports that the Soviet Union has begun to stockpile military equipment in Mozambique as a spill-over into the Angolan war and the possible further effort in southern Africa.

Do you have any substantiation of that?

Mr. REED. We have reports of delivery of Soviet equipment. The Soviet Union and China for some years have supported Rhodesian guerrilla groups. A number of them have been operating from Mozambique.

There have been indications within the past few weeks that the operations and training of these groups are quickening.

Mr. GILMAN. The Chinese are still there?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. To what extent?

Mr. REED. Their assistance to these groups and to Mozambique has been almost exclusively in the form of training. As to any details on the Chinese relationship, I would have to provide that for the record.

[The following was received from the Department of Defense for the record:]

CHINESE MILITARY PRESENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE

Approximately [security deletion] People's Republic of China advisers are involved in training and reorganizing Mozambique's Army. Some of these advisers are also assisting in training Rhodesian nationalist guerrillas based in Mozambique.

Mr. GILMAN. Are there foreign troops in Mozambique?

Mr. REED. Combat troops? Not to my knowledge.

Mr. GILMAN. Are there any steps we can take to prevent this effort or to slow down this effort?

Mr. REED. There may be. I can assure you that the executive branch is looking into those things that could be done to try to stabilize the situation in Africa.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you see any further activity by the Soviets or Cuban forces in any other part of Africa at the present time?

Mr. REED. Of course the Soviets give aid to a number of the African countries. Both they and the Cubans have a number of personnel in many of the same countries, training indigenous troops. Their activities are widespread.

Mr. GILMAN. Could you name a few of these countries?

Mr. REED. I believe Secretary Rumsfeld in a recent press conference spoke to Soviet assistance which has totaled more than \$2 billion in the past 5 years.

Mr. GILMAN. \$2 billion?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir. That is on the military side. The total reaches about \$3 billion counting both economic and military aid. The Soviets

have military advisers in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Congo, Nigeria, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, and of course, Angola.

Mr. GILMAN: What about the Chinese?

Mr. REED: The Chinese also have a number of training missions in Africa, but they have been involved to a much lesser extent.

Mr. GILMAN: Can you tell us where the Chinese training missions are located?

Mr. REED: The Chinese currently have personnel in Zaire, Burundi, Congo, Guinea, Tanzania, Mozambique, Sudan, Mali, Sierra Leone, and, I believe, in Zambia.

Mr. GILMAN: Do we have any training missions in those countries?

Mr. REED: We have a training mission in Zaire. We have none in any of the others.

Mr. DINGS: If the gentleman would yield at that point, I think, to complete the record, it would be useful to indicate at this point where we are involved in military assistance.

Ethiopia, for example, just to name an example we might put it all in there since there are other NATO countries which have provided military assistance to some of the same countries and also to some of the countries that you did not name.

In order to get the complete military picture and total involvement in Africa, we ought to put them all in.

Mr. REED: We will be happy to provide that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN: What do you see as the most critical area in South Africa now, following the Angolan problem?

Mr. REED: I believe the entire area is critical, sir. It is quite clear that there is great pressure on Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. We have applied some of that pressure.

Our policy is longstanding and well known. We oppose the regimes that either discriminate or deny majority rule. It seems quite clear that there will be increasing African and world pressure on all three countries.

It is here that you are going to have the major difficulty.

Mr. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DINGS: Just one final point, Mr. Reed. You are from what is called the little State Department complex?

Mr. REED: Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGS: How would you assess the attention that Africa is now getting over at DOD in view of these developments. The African component of DOD was a rather quiet operation, was it not, up until rather recently? I am not suggesting that it was a refugee for retirees because you do not seem to be in that category but it was something akin to that. The appointment of someone like yourself, does that suggest that the Department is finally beginning to put Africa into a different kind of context geopolitically? Does it suggest that they are broadening the base of Africa from just the cape, Ethiopia and a few "strategic" places like that?

Mr. REED: To answer your question very briefly, I would say, as you can imagine, that our office is not a quiet place. Without personalizing my response at all, I must say that obviously International Security Affairs and Defense follow the action, as it were.

The action is very much in and with Africa at this point. There is a great deal of interest within the Department of Defense, as there is in

¹The list provided by the Defense Department was received in classified form and was retained in the committee files.

the Congress and the country at large, in Africa. I would expect the activity in my office, and others like it, to continue to increase.

Mr. DINGS: That is encouraging. It is just too bad we have to wait for some crisis to put African priorities in the proper context. I guess we have to be grateful even for that kind of motivation—those of us who have been out here, sort of lonely voices over these many years.

Does that mean that your Department, your complex, has been beefed up?

Mr. REED: It does.

Mr. DINGS: It is in a growth pattern?

Mr. REED: It has been beefed up. I hope that it will continue to grow, for we need the people to make it operate properly.

Mr. DINGS: Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. REED: You are welcome.

Mr. DINGS: Mr. Stanley Scott is the new AID Assistant Administrator for Africa. This will be the first time that the gentleman has appeared before the subcommittee since his assignment.

He succeeded Dr. Sam Adams who retired on the 30th of last September, and came to that position from a background of distinguished service to the administration at the White House and in other capacities.

Without objection, the background of Mr. Scott will be entered into the record just before his statement. He does have a statement which he has submitted to the subcommittee.

Mr. DINGS: Mr. Scott, welcome aboard and you may proceed in whatever manner you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. STANLEY S. SCOTT, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, AFRICA BUREAU, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Stanley S. Scott was sworn in as Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development on November 10, 1975. He succeeded Dr. Samuel C. Adams, Jr. who retired September 30.

A member of the White House staff since June 1971, he had served as Assistant to the President for minority affairs since 1973. Previously, he was Assistant to the Director of Communications for the Executive Branch.

As a presidential assistant, Scott participated in a 1974 State Department conference of U.S. ambassadors to the Sahelian countries at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to review the U.S. Government relief and recovery efforts for the drought areas. He later visited Upper Volta, Ghana, Nigeria and Liberia.

He has been a presidential representative on delegations to various domestic and foreign conferences. Also, Scott has lectured widely on journalism and government affairs.

Before joining the White House staff, Scott served for four years as a radio newsmen at Westinghouse Broadcasting Corporation in New York City. He was an Assistant Director of Public Relations for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in New York (1968-67); general assignment news reporter, United Press International, New York (1964-66); general assignment news reporter, copy editor, and editorial writer, Atlanta Daily World, Atlanta, Ga. (1961-64); and editor-general manager, Memphis World, Memphis, Tenn. (1960-61).

Born in Bolivar, Tenn., July 2, 1933, Scott attended Palmer Memorial Institute, a preparatory school in Sedalia, N.C.; the University of Kansas in Lawrence (1951-53); and Lincoln University, Jefferson City, Mo. (1957-59), where he received his B.S. degree in Journalism. He served in the U.S. Army from 1954 to 1956, including one year in Korea.

Scott is married to the former Betty Lovejoy. They have three children and reside in Washington, D.C.

Mr. SCOTT: Thank you. I welcome the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to discuss economic assistance needs in Angola. In

view of your special interest in refugee disaster relief, I have asked Mr. Christian Holmes, to my right, Acting Director of AID's Office of Disaster Relief to accompany me today.

I am also joined by Dennis Conroy, Director of the Office of Regional Affairs of the Africa Bureau.

Mr. Chairman, in accordance with your request, I will address the question of Angola's economy and some of the particular economic problems Angola faces to the extent that we have reliable information from Angola now that the fighting among the liberation movements has ceased.

There has been little specific reporting on the state of Angola's economy and the amount of structural damage resulting from the fighting in Angola during the last 4 months. The International Committee of the Red Cross has been the only neutral organization operating within Angola since November 11, 1975, and the attention of the ICRC has been focused exclusively on the humanitarian needs of refugees and other war victims throughout Angola.

With that, the Angola economy, although still based on a traditional agricultural sector, was greatly diversified in the early 1970's.

This diversification has been biased in a variety of natural resources, particularly in mining; diamonds, oil and iron ore were being exported; substantial reserves in these resources are known to exist and there are potential deposits of other minerals as well.

The agricultural sector was diversified and various types of cash crops such as coffee, cotton, sisal, tobacco, and corn were being produced up until 1974, some of which were exported.

Angola was almost self-sufficient in foodstuff production, and under normal conditions, only limited imports were required to satisfy consumption needs.

Considerable areas with natural grazing grounds exist, providing favorable conditions for cattle production. There are sizable natural forest reserves. The variety of Angola's natural resources base, the adequate infrastructure, the electrical generating capacity in existence, and a considerable volume of capital investment, contributed to the development of a rather large and diversified manufacturing sector up until 1974, primarily of import substitution industries.

It is estimated that during the period 1963-73 the production and exports of coffee, crude oil, diamonds, and iron ore contributed about 75 percent of the increase in total export receipts.

In recent years crude oil has emerged as the major export product, accounting for 50 percent of Angola's exports. Angola had a persistent surplus in its overall trade account between 1968 and 1974 with a peak in 1974.

It is estimated that during the period 1961-73 GDP in real terms increased on average by some 8 to 9 percent per year, and that this relatively high growth rate continued in 1974 in spite of the adverse effects of political instability on the economy.

In 1974 Angola stood third highest in sub-Saharan African per capita income, about \$500 a year. However, as I will describe more fully below, economic activity in Angola deteriorated sharply in 1975.

It is believed that the Angolan resources can sustain a faster growth rate in the future provided that proper national economic policies emerge and that political stability is achieved.

According to figures supplied by the Foreign Trade Division of the Bureau of Census, U.S. foreign trade with Angola for the last 5 years was as follows:

In 1975, U.S. exports were \$56.4 million with \$434.8 million in U.S. imports with a U.S. balance of trade of -\$378.4 million; the figures in 1974 respectively were \$61.8 million, \$378.2 million for a balance of -\$316.4 million and in 1973, \$38.1 million, \$166.5 million for a balance of -\$128.4 million.

In 1973 and 1974 the United States was the largest customer of Angolan exports and the third most important supplier of the Angolan market.

Angola's overall balance of payments for the period 1972 through 1974 was favorable despite the movement of sizable amounts of private and investment capital out of the country.

An increase in private transfers abroad occurred in 1974 because a number of people sent their families to Portugal and then transferred funds to support them. There was also a slowing down of foreign investments in Angola in 1974.

In 1975 the economic outlook changed rapidly and the balance of payments for 1975 is expected to reflect the effects of the civil war and the current economic recession.

Business confidence and domestic production were affected, and foreign investment came to a standstill. Payments for exports were being delayed, especially in cases where negotiations between Angola and Portugal were involved, while payment terms for imports were tightened: Foreign suppliers demanded earlier and sometimes advance payments, and sources of financing in supplier countries became more difficult to find.

Exports of coffee were down in the first half of 1975, but, since harvesting was irregular over the past year, stocks have now been depleted. At the same time the physical flow of imports was interrupted by disruptions of port services and lack of business confidence.

There has been little information on economic conditions inside Angola since November 1975. With the exception of some highway and railroad bridges we do not believe there has been extensive damage to Angola's infrastructure by the war—the Benguela Railroad, incidentally, is privately owned and may be repaired by company engineers.

We understand this railroad is owned by the British.

Prior to independence there was sufficient road building equipment to maintain and repair the entire road network but we do not know if it is still operable. Reports are that sufficient trucks were abandoned by the Portuguese to support resumption of normal distribution.

Mechanical condition and fuel availability are not known at this time. Damage to water and power facilities is also unknown. The most serious damage to the economic system has been caused primarily by the departure of Portuguese.

With the cessation of hostilities, the return of Gulf Oil Co. operations and the payment of Angola of funds being held in escrow by Gulf, Angola's financial situation we believe will improve.

The main need in the short run is expected to be for humanitarian assistance for refugees and other war victims and for skilled personnel to reestablish government services and economic life in the agricultural and industrial sectors.

As you know, since July 1975 to date, the United States has provided \$674,000 for disaster relief in Angola. Of this amount, \$600,000 was given to the International Committee of the Red Cross, \$50,000 to support activities in Angola sponsored by the Church World Services, and \$24,000 for emergency relief of war victims following the outbreak of fighting in Luanda in June 1975.

AID presently has under consideration a request for additional funds from the ICRC to support an expanded relief effort in Angola over the next 6 months. This figure is \$6.4 million.

In addition to assistance provided for persons in Angola, the United States provided \$7.4 million financed from AID famine and disaster relief funds to assist with an airlift of refugees from Angola to Portugal prior to Angola's independence, November 11, 1975.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is working with the governments in neighboring countries to take care of the needs of refugees outside of Angola.

It is possible that a multilateral relief and rehabilitation effort may be required for Angola as soon as a full assessment of needs can be made.

Section 314(c) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 authorizes the President to use up to \$30 million of the funds made available under part I of the act for development of relief and rehabilitation assistance, including assistance through international or private voluntary organizations, to the former Portuguese colonies in Africa.

This authority would permit us to consider responding positively if the U.N. or other appropriate organization initiates a relief and rehabilitation program in Angola.

This would, in fact, be a continuation of our present policy with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance to Angola and the people who have been affected by the civil war.

Mr. Dinos. Thank you very much. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Scott, I regret that I have to go to another committee hearing for I want to address a number of questions to you. I appreciate your giving us the benefit of your knowledge about the economics of Angola at the present time.

Have you made some recommendation to AID concerning extent of our proposed assistance for the coming year?

Mr. Scott. Yes, we have. What we have done is on the matter of the \$6.4 million that we are considering. We are also thinking in terms of humanitarian assistance across the board to all the refugees on both sides.

We have also been involved in educational training for all three factions involved. We did not specify it in this statement but training has amounted to an initial \$400,000 with an additional \$1 million planned in fiscal year 1976 and we are training 15 individuals from each of the three competing factions. That training is largely underway.

We have plans for one of the factions that will be trained in Tanzania. I think that is the MPLA. We are trying to be evenhanded in our approach across the board in these efforts.

Mr. GILMAN. In other words, we anticipate spending approximately \$7 million for assistance in one form or another?

Mr. Scott. That has been the request, some \$6.4 million from the International Committee of the Red Cross. The President has an

authorization of \$30 million depending on what the requests are, but we are prepared to respond.

Mr. GILMAN. How important are copper shipments from Zaire and Zambia to the Angolan economy?

Mr. Scott. They are critically important in both instances where you have a downturn in the price of copper. There are balance-of-payment problems in Zaire and Zambia today.

Mr. GILMAN. Will MPLA's activity affect the copper situation?

Mr. Scott. I think any future problems in terms of the relationship between Zaire, Zambia, and the People's Republic of Angola will depend on what kind of agreements are reached as they continue to discuss and negotiate.

Mr. GILMAN. What do you see as to the future of the Gulf Oil Co. activities in that country?

Mr. Scott. As we stated, oil comes to about 50 percent of Angola's income. I think it could play a critical role—Gulf or someone else. We noted in the media today or last evening that Gulf had in fact turned over \$104 million that had been held in escrow.

I would think these funds would go a long way in helping to resolve and alleviate some of the immediate pressing economic problems in Angola.

Mr. GILMAN. About a quarter of the membership in the Senate sent a letter to President Ford seeking to lift the restrictions on the Eximbank loans to South Africa, similar to the loan consideration we sent to Southeast Asia and to some of the Communist bloc countries, including the Soviet Union.

What effect do you think this would have on our relations with other African nations if we were to do this?

Mr. Scott. I can only say as you are well aware that Secretary Schaefele deals with the policy considerations from the broad perspective. I would speculate that we would have increasing problems in terms of our development assistance with the African nations because from my limited experience, the chief consideration there is racism as it affects the African nations.

It would possibly create problems for us in developing assistance.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Dinos. As you know, Mr. Scott, the full committee put \$10 million for Angola disaster relief into their budget this morning.

Mr. Scott. Right.

Mr. Dinos. I wonder if you would care to comment on that, to indicate just what sort of an impact this meant perspectively, just what comes into your mind as to how this amount might be used?

Mr. Scott. Is that fiscal year 1976—1977?

Mr. Dinos. The 1977 budget.

Mr. Scott. I think this has—

Mr. Dinos. I might add that in principle, an amount, I do not know what, would obviously be considered for 1976. The 1977 budget was before the committee this morning. It is my understanding that the budget for 1976 would accommodate perhaps even a like amount.

I am not sure about that but it certainly would accompany some moneys. I just wondered what sort of plans this might generate assuming the availability of such funds.

Mr. Scott. I think this has to have a positive impact in terms of what our Agency might be requested to do in terms of United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. We are prepared to be responsive. Additional funds would help because I am told that we did get a fairly sizable cut in the fiscal year 1976 congressional appropriations.

The more money with which we have to work, of course, the more we are able to do, the more responsive we are able to be.

Mr. Digos. Let us talk additionally about the effect of the war in Angola on certain other problems or aspects of that society.

What has been the effect on population changes and movements that might have bearing on their activities? What has been the effect on the gross national product, the per capita gross revenues from major industries such as oil, coffee, and what not?

Mr. Scott. In terms of human resources, to our knowledge, there is displacement of some 250,000 to 255,000 persons in Angola because of the war disruptions. Figures were cited earlier by Secretary Schaefele. I think we are talking about anywhere from 600,000 to 1 million refugees over a 10-year period.

Presently, from our information, we are talking about some 25,000 refugees that crossed to Zambia. I think we have a figure of some 25,000 or so into Zaire. In terms of the immediate short-term impact of displacement and refugees crossing the Angola border, there has to have been a great deal of impact on the economy.

To our knowledge, there has been a freeze on coffee production. Stocks have been depleted; in terms of the oil, Gulf of course is now continuing to do business. We have little information in terms of water and generating capacity and this sort of activity.

I would imagine from the bits of information that there has been some impact. We are told that there has not been that much extensive damage, however, in terms of the infrastructure but there has been damage to transportation facilities, railroads, bridges, and highways.

Mr. Digos. Last July, Dennis Conroy, who at that time was Director of African Regional Affairs—

Mr. Scott. Who is here with us today, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Digos. Made a statement before the Senate subcommittee saying that Angola should not require large amounts of capital assistance but the United States should be in a position to provide technical help and settlement assistance. The problems facing an independent Angola and rural development, agriculture, research, technical training, university level education, and administration, will be great.

I am wondering if any developments have taken place since that statement was made which may have changed that analysis, that emphasis, those priorities?

Mr. Scott. In terms of our overall assessment, we are led to believe that situation pretty much remains the same because of the flight of refugees of Angola into Portugal prior to the outbreak of the hostilities.

Much of the skilled, experienced, managerial, technical help fled the country. A buildup of this resource will be needed, I think, to get things back on a normal business basis.

Mr. Digos. Do you have any further comments to make? We were quoting you.

STATEMENT OF E. DENNIS CONROY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Conroy. I think over the long run that is still a true statement. Angola, as Mr. Scott has indicated, just before the period of 1974, was the third richest country in Africa on a per capita basis.

It potentially has the resources to take care of its own capital needs. We would see the main need for technical assistance in the short run; however, although we lack hard information on what their current budgetary situation is.

Presumably the war, the civil war has affected revenues. Even though they will get the funds from Gulf which have been in escrow, they may need some sort of short-term assistance. I would not expect this would be very great, however.

Mr. Digos. How much has AID spent in the program for training under the \$25 million authorization for this year for Portugal and the Portuguese colonies in Africa?

Mr. Scott. To date, Mr. Chairman, we have spent \$400,000.

Mr. Digos. For training of Angolans?

Mr. Scott. Half of this \$400,000 has gone to Angola.

Mr. Digos. Only \$200,000 has been thus far expended for training of Angolans?

Mr. Scott. Right, Mr. Chairman. We have \$1 million earmarked for next year's training for Portuguese-speaking Africa.

Mr. Digos. Next year, you mean for—

Mr. Scott. Fiscal 1977.

Mr. Digos. What about 1976? I was talking about—

Mr. Conroy. That \$1 million would come out of fiscal year 1976 money but be used to start training next fall. That is the academic year 1976-77.

Mr. Digos. Could you tell us about the specific kinds of activities that these training funds are designed to serve? How much for each and so on?

Mr. Scott. The money is being divided equally among the three factions. I think we will have to provide the breakdown for the record. [The information requested follows:]

DEVELOPMENT TRAINING FOR PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING AFRICA

The kinds of training activities requested by the Portuguese Speaking Africans countries under the African-American Institute (AAI) contract are as follows:

Field	FNLA		UNITA	
	Number of participants	Duration of training (years)	Number of participants	Duration of training (years)
Angola—Training in the United States:				
Agriculture.....	1	4½	1	4½
Business administration.....	1	4½	1	4½
Economics.....	1	1½	1	4½
Economics and accounting.....			1	4
Education.....	1	3		
Electrical engineering.....	1	4½		
Engineering.....	1	4½	1	4½
Engineering chemical.....	1	4½	1	4½
Engineering metallurgical.....	1	4½		
Engineering naval.....			1	4½
Geological.....	1	4	4	4½
Mining engineering.....			1	4½
Natural resources development.....	1	4		
Health.....	1	4		

Field	FNLA		UNITA		MPLA	
	Number of participants	Duration of training (years)	Number of participants	Duration of training (years)	Number of participants	Duration of training (years)
Angola—Training in the United States:						
Agriculture.....	1	4			2	456
On.....					1	234
Business.....	1	5-6			6	2
Medicine.....					2	414
Nutrition.....					2	414
Public health.....					3	234
On.....						
United States						
Africa						
Cape Verde Islands:						
Accounting.....			2		414	
Agribusiness.....			1		214	
Business administration.....			1		214	
Economics.....			1		414	
Forestry.....			1		414	
Medicine.....			1		514	
Nursing.....			1		414	
Paramedical.....			1		314	
Technical assistant electronics.....			1		214	
On.....			1		214	
Technical assistant medicine.....			1		214	
On.....			1		214	
Congo, Kinshasa:						
Accounting.....			1		3	
Agribusiness.....			1		414	
Civil engineering.....			1		414	
Economics.....			1		414	
On.....			1		414	
Electrical engineering.....			1		414	
Languages.....			1		414	
Medicine.....			1		414	
Paramedical.....			1		414	
Technical assistant electronics.....			1		414	
Technical assistant medicine.....			1		414	
Telecommunications.....			1		414	
Trainers.....			1		414	
Veterinary training.....			1		414	
San Tome and Principe:						
Agribusiness.....			1		414	
Business administration.....			1		414	
Civil engineering.....			1		414	
Economics and finance.....			1		414	
Electrical engineering.....			1		414	
Electrical technician.....			1		414	
Laboratory technician.....			1		414	
Paralegal engineer.....			1		414	
Public administration or finance.....			1		414	
Sociology.....			1		414	
Not indicated.....			1		214	
Summary						
Angola.....					45	
FNLA.....					13	
For study in the United States.....					(11)	
For study in Africa.....					(2)	
Vacancy.....					(2)	
MPLA: For study in Africa.....					13	
UNITA: For study in the United States.....					11	
For study in Africa.....					(2)	
Vacancy.....					(2)	
Cape Verde: For study in Africa.....					23	
Congo-Kinshasa: For study in Africa.....					23	
San Tome and Principe: For study in Africa.....					13	

Mr. Digos. By the three factions?

Mr. CONROY. Former factions.

Mr. SCOTT. Former factions, yes.

Mr. Digos. Now that the matter has changed, how are you going to give money independently to the remnants of UNITA and FNLA? Or, is it all going through the official government?

Mr. SCOTT. These commitments had been made prior to the end of the hostilities. Money has already been expended in this area.

Mr. Digos. Are we still going to allocate that which is not expended based on that kind of distribution between the three factions or are we going to give it all to the People's Republic, the official government?

Mr. SCOTT. Now that we have one government in place, the determination would be to fund the money to the recognized government. Of course we have a problem there because we have not as yet recognized the government.

Mr. Digos. What do you do under those circumstances, dispense it through some international organization with the understanding that it is going to the government directly? How are you going to handle it?

Mr. CONROY. We have discussed this with the African American Institute. Essentially we have not made a decision. AAI is proposing that they be permitted to offer grants to the People's Republic of Angola for training of Angolans.

They are not proposing, and it is not suggested, that they offer grants this year to UNITA or FNLA. We frankly have not decided just how we will handle this because we have not as yet recognized—

Mr. SCOTT. I would suggest that we as an Agency are going to have to sit down and make a policy decision here.

Mr. Digos. In consultation with State?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. Digos. You mentioned AAI, I guess that is the African American Institute?

Mr. SCOTT. They are the contractor for this program.

Mr. Digos. Are they the sole contracting agency for this training program?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. Digos. Was this done on a bid basis?

Mr. CONROY. No, sir, it was done on a sole source selection based on a proposal from them, justified essentially by their long-term involvement in southern Africa and contacts with the officials from the liberation groups.

They seemed to us to be really the only organization that had, at the time we made this commitment, which was a year ago last January, the contacts with which to carry out this program.

Most of these countries, at that time, had not achieved independence.

Mr. Digos. What is their fee for the execution of the contract?

Mr. CONROY. We pay them the regular justified overhead payment. We do not pay a fee. Their overhead I believe is 55 percent of their total salary cost. We also provide some funds to handle the administration of the program; the total administration costs including overhead is 29 percent. There is no fee.

Mr. Diogo. Is that a cost plus sort of contract? They receive 29 percent of the contract and which goes to them, and then they get administrative costs on top of that?

Mr. Conroy. They get reimbursement for a number of people that are required to administer the program. I think it is three or four persons and some part-time persons in Africa. Then they get a 55 percent overhead. It is not really cost plus.

Overhead is to maintain the office space, heat, light, and general cost of operating the business.

Mr. Diogo. I think it would be useful for the record to have the terms of that contract included in the record at this point so we know with what we are dealing.

Mr. Scorr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Diogo. Are there any other training contracts that may be related to this matter in any way?

Mr. Scorr. No; this is the only training contract that we have for the Angolans.

Mr. Conroy. Southern Africa is under consideration?

Mr. Diogo. We have a regional development training program which I assume would go beyond Angola and get into other countries, is that correct? Could you tell us something about that contract which is also with AAI isn't it?

Mr. Conroy. Yes, sir, but it is really the same contract. The personnel being trained from Angola are being trained under that contract. The terms we just mentioned apply to the Angolan component as well as to the other components.

[The following information was subsequently submitted for inclusion in the record:]

TERMS OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE CONTRACT

COST REIMBURSEMENT TYPE CONTRACT		CONTRACT TYPE - COST
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT		
NEGOTIATED CONTRACT NO. AID/AFR-5-1153		
ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11281		AMOUNT \$795,236
CONTRACT FOR Development Training		Project No. 432-11-532-201
FOR Portuguese Speaking Africa		
ISSUING OFFICE (Name and Address)		CONTRACTOR (Name and Address)
Agency for International Development		African-American Institute
Regional Operations Division, Africa		4100
Office of Contract Management		811 United Nations Plaza
Washington, D.C. 20523		TRISTAR 500000
CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE		New York, New York 10017
ADMINISTRATED BY		CO-CONTRACTOR (Name and Address)
CNR/SCD/AFR		AFR/KA
MAIL VOUCHERS (Original & 3 copies)		ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA
TO: Office of Financial Management		PROJ. NO. 432-501-2-511800
Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. 20523		APPROPRIATION NO. 432-511800
EFFECTIVE DATE January 17, 1975		ALLOTMENT NO. 331-51-532-50-51
		ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE June 30, 1978
TYPES OF BUSINESS CHECK APPROPRIATE BOXES		
☐ SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP ☐ SMALL BUSINESS ☐ PARTNERSHIP ☐ LABOR SUPPLIED AREA ☐ JOINT VENTURE ☒ CORPORATION, INCORPORATED IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA		
The United States of America, hereinafter called the Government, represented by the Contracting Officer executing the contract, and the Contractor agree that the Contractor shall perform all the services set forth in the attached Schedule, for the consideration stated therein. The rights and obligations of the parties in this contract shall be subject to and governed by the Schedule and the General Provisions. To the extent of any inconsistency between the Schedule, the General Provisions and any specifications or other provisions which are made a part of this contract, by reference or otherwise, the Schedule and the General Provisions shall control. To the extent of any inconsistency between the Schedule and the General Provisions, the Schedule shall control. This Contract consists of this Cover Page, the Schedule of <u>13</u> Pages, including the Table of Contents and the General Provisions (from AID 150-41C, dated 2-2-68, and 4-15-68, amended January 1975). BY <u>The African-American Institute</u> UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter called the CONTRACTOR AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 432-444-9-1 BY <u>William E. DeLoe</u> (Signature of Contracting Officer) TYPED OR PRINTED NAME TYPED OR PRINTED NAME TITLE CONTRACTING OFFICER DATE <u>May 20, 1975</u> DATE <u>May 20, 1975</u>		

Mr. Dicos. What other components are there?

Mr. CONROY. Persons from Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome Principe are also in training. The training is open to Mozambique but they did not accept it in the first year. I understand they do plan to participate in the second year.

All of Portuguese speaking Africa has been included in that contract.

Mr. Dicos. But about \$200,000 is earmarked specifically for Angola is that right?

Mr. CONROY. Forty-five of the 102 persons were earmarked for Angola. That is roughly \$200,000.

Mr. Dicos. Mr. Conroy, back in July you stated that at least 40 training grants either in Africa or in the United States were made available in 1975 for selection through the Ministry of Education in Luanda.

I wonder how many training grants have been made available to date under those circumstances?

Mr. CONROY. This is the same 45 people we have been talking about. While training was offered to the three liberation groups, there was a transitional government in Angola at that time. We got the concurrence of the transitional government Ministry of Education to do this training. I think I said 40 last fall. As it finally worked out, we approved 45. I might give you some details on this.

Thirteen of the UNITA candidates are in language training in the United States and two are expected in the near future. The FNLA nominated 13 for training in the United States and two for study in Africa. Five of these are in the United States and two are in training in Africa now in university studies.

Two more are in language training and the others are expected to start soon.

The 15 nominated by the MPLA were requested for training in Tanzania arranged through the African American Institute. They have had discussions with the Tanzanian Government but they have not yet started training because of shortages of dormitory space, but they are expected to start in April of this year.

These are in various fields, some in university training, many of them, particularly for training in Africa, are rather short term technical type training, paramedical training for nurses, technical training to repair engines, this kind of practical training.

In most cases, however, language training is required which adds a year to the program.

Mr. Dicos. Mr. Scott, I was wondering what you meant by "proper national economic policies." You stated on page 3 of your testimony that it is believed that the Angolan resources can sustain a faster growth rate in the future provided that proper national economic policies emerge * * *. Is that your old capitalistic brogue coming out there?

Mr. SCOTT. That is more or less what we are referring to, Mr. Chairman. If all of the wheels are turning, if we get the management-technical skill training that is required to place into motion the businesses, the oil drilling, diamond mining, the ore, if everything is working, there should be stability with the tremendous promise of that country.

Mr. Dicos. I just wondered if that meant that we are using our own criteria here to determine what should be proper national policies or

whether or not you expect to accommodate the feelings of Angolans which obviously may not be as capitalistic as ours and maybe, as they apply to that society, may even be more proper?

Mr. SCOTT. I was referring more to—

Mr. Dicos. Am I reading too much—

Mr. SCOTT. I was referring to economic guidelines as opposed to political implications.

Mr. Dicos. On page 4, you talked about our being the largest customer of Angolan exports in 1973 and 1974, and you go on to point out we are the third most important supplier of the Angolan market.

I wondered if you could provide us with the details about major U.S. imports from Angola—or exports, a breakdown by amount and commodity for the 1973-75 period for the record?

Mr. SCOTT. We would be more than happy to, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, all we have with us today are the figures on the dollar amounts of the imports from Angola. This is primarily in oil and coffee.

In terms of our exports, we are talking about machinery. I have no breakdown on kinds.

[The information requested follows:]

U.S. EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM ANGOLA		
Angola		
U.S. imports:		
Commodity:		Amount
1973		\$190,689,000
Petroleum		57,588,000
Coffee		102,433,000
Other		6,668,000
1974		378,167,000
Petroleum		197,976,000
Coffee		165,645,000
Other		14,546,000
U.S. exports:		
Commodity:		
1973		38,002,000
Iron, steel tubes, and pipes		3,365,000
Construction and mining machinery		2,800,000
Tractors		2,749,000
Waste material from textile fiber		2,424,000
Cooling machinery equipment		1,750,000
Milled rice		1,707,000
Aircrafts		1,495,000
Communication equipment		1,443,000
Railway locomotives		1,226,000
Mechanical handling machinery and equipment		1,216,000
Others		17,827,000

U.S. EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM ANGOLA—Continued

U.S. exports—Continued	
Commodity:	Amount
1974	
Iron, steel tubes and pipes.....	\$61,741,000
Construction and mining machinery.....	7,002,000
Tractors.....	5,922,000
Passenger cars and trucks.....	5,497,000
Pumps and equipment.....	5,677,000
Mechanical handling machinery and equipment.....	2,908,000
Kraft paper and paperboard.....	2,446,000
Waste material from textile fiber.....	2,301,000
Heating and cooling machinery and equipment.....	2,310,000
Iron and steel finished structural parts.....	1,701,000
Iron and steel scrap.....	1,649,000
Other.....	1,430,000
	24,803,000

Mr. DIOGS. Also on that same page, you state that "exports of coffee were down in the first half of last year, which since harvesting was irregular over the past year, stocks have now been depleted."

I wondered what were the factors that resulted in this decrease in the first half of 1975? Did any of our buyers suspend, withhold or decrease their orders for coffee either on their own or at the "suggestion" of U.S. Government?

Mr. SCORR. I do not know as to whether it was business as usual, for our Government, in terms of trade, during the hostilities. We are told that in the heavy growth area where coffee is produced in Angola, there were major disruptions in terms of the war, which curtailed any coffee production during the hostilities.

That is the reason for the downturn in coffee production. As to whether we were involved in business as usual—I have no answer. We will have to provide that—when I say we, I refer to our country. [The information requested follows:]

COFFEE EXPORTS

To the best of our knowledge, there was no boycott of Angolan coffee by U.S. coffee buyers in 1975. There was no "suggestion" by the U.S. Government that U.S. buyers not buy Angolan coffee. Very little coffee was shipped in the first half of 1975 due to strikes by the dockers in Luanda and generally chaotic conditions on the docks and in the coffee growing regions of Angola.

Mr. DIOGS. On page 6, you talk about the fact that you have under consideration a request for additional funds from the Red Cross for the next 6 months. I wonder if you could give us more details about the nature of the request, the amount of it, the purpose of it, and what other countries are contributing. Are we just one other donor and part of a general effort here?

Mr. SCORR. Those are some of the considerations that we are deciding on now. We received the request from the International Committee of the Red Cross for \$8,400,000 for a short-term 6-month period to increase the size of medical teams, technicians, as well as medical supplies.

There is something that we possibly would want to join in with other donors as opposed to going through the Red Cross, possibly

through the United Nations. These are some of the considerations that are under advisement presently.

Mr. DIOGS. On that same page, you began touching on the refugee problem. You talked about the U.N. High Commissioner and how they are working with neighboring countries. I wondered, first of all, are you referring to refugees from Angola? Also could you give us some idea what we might be doing through your agency with respect to the refugee problem?

Mr. SCORR. We are primarily referring to refugees that have crossed the border in terms of what the U.N. High Commissioner for refugees is concentrating on right now. In terms of the International Committee of the Red Cross we are thinking of the refugees or those individuals dislocated inside of Angola.

Mr. DIOGS. Also on page 6, you make an interesting reference to the impact on the economic system of the departure of the Portuguese. Could you elaborate on that?

Mr. SCORR. We were referring to what has been the experience in former colonial countries where you have had liberation. You have had also the great exodus of the skilled personnel that dominated the society prior to liberation which will require massive training to replenish the needs of the various sectors of the society.

Mr. DIOGS. The way that statement is made it might be subject to some misinterpretation. The manpower problem, as you know from your own experience, is a cumulative one because of the policies of the Portuguese colonial government.

To say simply that the departure of the Portuguese was the primary cause of the most serious damage to the economic system, that adding to that collateral comment about how the Portuguese so-called selective system contributed to this, might give an erroneous impression.

Mr. SCORR. I understand what you are saying. I did not in any way mean to infer that the exodus of the nonblack meant that you would have a permanently paralyzed economy.

Mr. DIOGS. I think it is important to stress that because I know of two instances where a similar situation occurred in Zaïre, for example, where the Belgians left at the time Mobutu took over that country and there were only 14 college graduates in the whole place out of 15 or 20 million people. And see where they are today?

There is also the case of what the French did to Guinea Conakry when they left. They snatched the telephones out of the sockets and that sort of thing and the Guinea Conakry government or economy is not a model by any stretch of the imagination. They have, despite those limitations, overcome.

I think it is important to stress that. For example, I appeared on the "Aronsky Show" 2 or 3 days ago with Mr. Towsey from the head of the British Information Office and Professor Crocker. Mr. Towsey kept referring to responsible government, responsible elements in the government, and responsible elements in society in order to insure a viable community.

You know the implications, all of these code words, with which you and I are historically acquainted mean one thing. Once you take the white elements out of it, the whole thing is supposed to collapse.

I think it is important to put these things in the proper context.

Mr. Scott. For the record, I was more or less referring to the short-term impact of the exodus as opposed to long-term opportunities for those who remain in the society of Angola.

Mr. Diogo. You mentioned short term, what about long term? What does AID anticipate Angola's needs to be in terms of long-term reconstruction and rehabilitation and where we might fit into that picture?

Mr. Scott. As we stated earlier, while there is no major damage to our knowledge, the physical infrastructure itself, with the exodus of the nonwhites from Angola, there will be a need for training programs.

There will be a need for assistance in this area. While we have not had any direct requests as of yet because of our relations being in limbo, we would certainly take these measures under consideration along with the humanitarian requests we are now beginning to receive.

However, there will be a need for training to bring individuals to man the businesses, the machinery of government.

Mr. Diogo. You assume, in the absence of our direct relationship, that AID has been the right contact and that their training program is consistent with what the Angolans perceive to be their needs?

Mr. Scott. That is correct. Although this program was implemented prior to my arrival onboard with the Agency, I have been informed and I have no reason to doubt that we, in this instance, acted as a respondent to what the then three factions perceived to be their needs.

Mr. Diogo. I think the minority has some questions about the economic implications of the hydroelectric projects. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. Fox. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have added to the record, Mr. Scott's comments on the economic implications of the Cunene River dam projects in Angola. Please provide information on the sources of all financial investments into the dam project and your outlook for its future economic implications derived from hydroelectric power and use as an agricultural center for irrigation.

Mr. Diogo. You can provide that for the record. I would not expect you to have that kind of detail necessarily available but it is a very important question the gentleman has raised.

Mr. Scott. We would be more than happy to get that, sir.

[The information requested follows:]

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF DAM PROJECTS AND HYDROELECTRIC POWER

The major dam project is the Cunene River project which is taking shape in Angola and along the Namibia/Angolan border. It has great significance for the economic development of that area. According to our information, most of which comes from an article in the Financial Mail of May 9, 1975, water and power provided by the Cunene River would be extremely beneficial to Namibia and Angola. Over two-thirds of Namibia has an annual rainfall under 400mm and, if annual water consumption rises by only 8.5 percent, the area will probably exhaust its existing water supplies by the end of the century.

Mining development in Namibia and Angola has been held back by the shortage of water since power supplies are at present based on thermal stations fired by expensive imported coal.

In March 1973 the Gove Dam on the upper Cunene River in Angola was completed financed entirely by South Africa. A start has been made on a canal system running 130 kilometers from Caluque in Angola to Oshakati in northern Namibia to help Owambo farmers. A regulating dam at Caluque, with installed pumping capacity of 6m/sec, will be sufficient to provide water for the immediate needs of Owamboland as well as parts of Damaraaland and parts of the coastal desert.

Other work in progress, which is expected to complete Phase I by 1978, includes hydroelectric power station at the Ruacana Falls which will tap one-eighth of Cunene's power potential. Switch-on date for the first 80MW is May 1977 and the three turbines to be installed will eventually have a total capacity of 240MW.

The cost of tapping the Cunene's hydro potential will be around Rand 600 million (\$600 million), all provided by South Africa.

There are the irrigation schemes planned on both the Angolan and Namibia (South West Africa) sides of the border. Despite the potentially rich farming areas in Angola, little was done by the Portuguese to tap the river's resources. However, the area is believed to have considerable potential for irrigated agricultural development.

Angola controls the headwaters of the Cunene River. With the aid of the Gove and Caluque dams the water could be cut off or at least reduced—cutting the flow of water to the power generators downstream.

An agreement with the South African and the Portuguese governments provided that the royalty would be pegged at 3017c per unit—an annual amount of about Rand 800,000 (\$820,000).

Should the Caluque Dam be cut off from the canal through Owamboland, provision has been made to pump water—if there is any—from Ruacana to the canal system. Thus it appears the irrigation for the Owambo in Namibia (South West Africa) will be available.

Mr. Diogo. We do not have an AID program in South Africa so you do not have any direct counterpart there?

Mr. Scott. No, we do not.

Mr. Diogo. With whom do you work?

Mr. Scott. The economic officers of the embassy in order to get this kind of information. We have a regional officer traversing through the region of the south of Africa.

The individual who services Swaziland—

Mr. Diogo. You have an AID representative for the BLS countries?

Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Diogo. Even though we do not have an AID Commissioner in the Republic, is he permitted to go in and have discussions with our mission there? Is it through him that you get some ideas about economic or aid-potential situations?

Mr. Scott. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. We depend on our guy in the field out there for our input.

Mr. Diogo. Then we could readily expect answers to those questions?

Mr. Scott. Right.

Mr. Diogo. Thank you very much.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Diogo. Our final witness is Mr. Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice. Without objection, Mr. Keuch's background will be inserted in the record prior to his testimony.

Mr. Keuch, you have submitted a prepared statement and you may proceed and identify your colleagues.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. KEUCH, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Graduated: Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania—1953; and Dickinson School of Law—1960.

Appointed to the Department of Justice pursuant to the Attorney General's Honor Graduate Program—June 1960.

Served in the Internal Security and Criminal Division including Chief of the Appellate Section, Internal Security; and Chief of Special Litigation Section, Criminal Division.
Appointed Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, January 12, 1976.

Mr. Krocz. Thank you. I would like to introduce Mr. John Martin, who is the Deputy Chief of the Internal Security Section of the Criminal Division, and is accompanying me today.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to respond to your invitation to testify today on one aspect of the subcommittee's hearing on the subject of disaster assistance in Angola.

In your letter of March 1 to the Department you requested responses to three questions in connection with alleged mercenary recruitment for Angola. First, the laws governing the recruitment and involvement of American citizens in the fighting in Angola; second, the status of any such involvement and recruitment of or by American citizens both for participation in the fighting in Angola and for the training and benefit of any forces fighting in Angola; and third, the status of the Justice Department's investigation into the recruitment efforts, and any other involvement of American citizens, either in the United States or in other countries, with respect to fighting in Angola.

With respect to the latter two questions involving allegations of recruitment for service in Angola and our investigations, I appreciate the chairman's recognition that it would be inappropriate and contrary to longstanding Justice Department policy to comment specifically on any current investigative efforts.

In particular, it would not be fair for us today to discuss the identity of any individuals or groups currently under investigation.

Nevertheless I wish to assure the subcommittee that the Criminal Division, which has enforcement responsibility for the statutes I will discuss, has been aware of numerous allegations regarding recruitment efforts and is conducting appropriate investigations.

The principal statute covering the matter of enlistment or recruiting within the United States is contained in title 18, chapter 45, Foreign Relations, of the United States Code. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. 950(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:

Whoever, within the United States, * * * hires or retains another to enlist * * * in the service of any foreign * * * state, * * * as a soldier * * * shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.

Thus, section 950 prohibits the enlistment of or recruitment within the United States of any person for service in the armed forces of a foreign country. This statute is interpreted in *Goyon v. McCarthy*, 252 U.S. 171 (1920).

In addition, section 958 prohibits a U.S. citizen from accepting and exercising a commission in a foreign service in a war against a foreign nation with which the United States is at peace.

Section 960 prohibits the launching of a military or naval expedition from the United States against any nation with which the United States is at peace.

I might point out that with regard to the application of these statutes that, in general, it is not unlawful for a citizen or other person in the United States to leave the country with the intent to enlist abroad in a foreign military service. See *Wiborg v. United States*, 163 U.S. 632, 1896.

In addition to these statutes, 8 U.S.C. 1481(a) (3) provides that any citizen of the United States who enters the armed forces of a foreign state, without the written authorization of the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall lose his citizenship.

This provision, however, should be read in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Afroyim v. Ruck*, 357 U.S. 233, 1967 which held that an act of Congress could not divest a person of his U.S. citizenship absent voluntary abandonment thereof by the citizen himself.

Thus, a declaration of intent clearer than mere enlistment in a foreign army, is required for an effective renunciation of citizenship, notwithstanding the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3).

In connection with the activities of any foreign agent who may be involved in enlistment or recruitment within the United States, the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611, et seq., would apply.

For example, a registered agent who willfully fails to respect an activity such as recruiting would be liable to criminal penalties, 22 U.S.C. § 618(a) (2).

Any individual who within the United States dispenses any money for, or in the interest of, a foreign principal also comes within the act, 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) (iii).

These generally are the provisions of law currently governing any attempts at enlistment or recruitment within the United States. In that connection, I might point out that the "Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975", S. 1, specifically section 1203, has some revisions in connection with these activities.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and if you or the other members of the subcommittee have any questions, not relating to the identities of persons or groups under active investigation by the Department of Justice, I would be pleased to attempt to answer them at this time.

Mr. Dinos. Thank you very much, Mr. Keuch. The subcommittee is particularly interested in your Department's attitude on these questions. The fact that we have gone beyond any practical repetition of that mercenary problem in Angola should be viewed within the context that, given the same elements as in Angola, you might expect this problem to crop up in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa itself. It is within that context that implications from your statement can be drawn beyond the Angolan situation. A matter of precedent is very important.

First, we want you to take a look at section 960. You state that it prohibits launching of a military naval expedition from the United States against any "nation" with which the United States is at peace. Actually isn't the statute much more comprehensive than the word "nation"? Does it not prohibit any military naval expedition or enterprise against "the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state,

or of any colony, district or people" rather than just using the word you have used, "nation"?

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir. "Nation" was just an attempt to summarize the overall impact and thrust of the statute, but you are quite correct in detailing the terms of the statute.

Mr. DINGS. You also said that the scope of the prohibition is limited by the words "with whom the United States is at peace." But does not the language itself and the use of the commas in the statute after the words "foreign prince or state" suggest that the clause "with whom the United States is at peace" may only in fact modify the words "or of any colony, district or people"?

Mr. KETCH. That is not the way we interpret the statute. Unfortunately there has not been the type of litigation under the statute in which that precise question has come up. I think in every circumstance, it is a factual situation.

We have looked at the structure of the statute and feel that the intent is to prohibit those military activities launched against those entities, and you can look at the precise terms of the statute—with which we are at peace.

It should not apply in a situation when such an expedition is launched against a nation, to use my summary term—with which we are at war. But, frankly I am also going to say immediately that there is no judicial interpretation of that construction of the statute.

Mr. DINGS. That is the Attorney General's opinion—the interpretations you are giving?

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir, that has been the Department's feeling on the statute.

Mr. DINGS. What did an examination of legislative intent show?

Mr. KETCH. I believe it will support that interpretation and I will be very happy to provide some additional information concerning the examination.¹

Mr. DINGS. I would like to know what specifically is your rationale and any citation.

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGS. Legislative history. What is the meaning of the word "peace"?

Mr. KETCH. I think if I can take the converse problem, one of the problems we have, is what is the meaning of the converse situation, "at war"? We have struggled with that in the drafting of S. 1 and other statutes.

One of our difficulties is that there is no internationally accepted standard as to what is meant by "war or peace" situations. At a minimum, we believe—and again, I must say there is very little in the legislative history of the statute, one of the explanations being that these are redefinitions of statutes that go very far back into our history—I think at a minimum "peace" would cover a situation, or would be those in which there were not open hostilities or a declared war. The open question, we believe, for the statute might be a situation where there had been an outbreak of hostilities but there had been no declared war, there had been no official action taken by the United States.

That frankly would be an open question under the statute and we would again have to look at the legislative history but I am afraid we will find very little guidance because of the history I mentioned.

¹ See letter subsequently received from the Department of Justice on p. 135.

Mr. DINGS. Section 959 does not contain the limiting clause, "with whom the United States is at peace." Is that not so?

Mr. KETCH. That is correct.

Mr. DINGS. So the enlisting or entering of oneself or hiring or retaining of another to enlist or enter himself or herself or to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with the intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district or people in a military capacity is the object of the statute and is actionable under law?

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir, if that activity, of course, as you mentioned, is carried on in the United States.

Mr. DINGS. Both sections 959 and 960 refer to either an enterprise against a "State" or to enlisting or entering any in the service of a "State." Is a new State not recognized by the United States included within that term "State" as referred to in the legislation?

Mr. KETCH. I would believe the answer to that is yes, Mr. Chairman, but again, there has been very little judicial interpretation of the statutes because of the enactment of the history, the legislative history is not that helpful.

I might point out as to many of these questions, that the proposed redraft in S. 1 hopefully does take into account some of the problems you are highlighting in your questions. It might be appropriate, if you have no objection, to enter a draft of section 1203 of S. 1 into the record at this point.

I think it is an attempt to recodify the provisions and the intent of 959 and 960 and avoid some of the very questions and problems you are highlighting.¹

Mr. DINGS. I assumed you had some alternate because that one as presently constructed obviously is not going anywhere.

Mr. KETCH. This section, I hope is not one of the controversial ones.

Mr. DINGS. Both 959 and 960 make it a crime for whoever performs the proscribed acts. Does "whoever" refer to private persons only or does it refer both to private and public persons, that is, to Government officials?

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir, it would refer to both.

Mr. DINGS. Do we not have to understand the background of these statutes as part of our neutrality laws? Were they not enacted on the basic principles of public law that the engagement, recruitment and assignment of persons for military activities with foreign states, territories, or peoples is a function of the sovereign capacity of the Government and that no person should so enlist, recruit or enlist for service for another government without the "permission, knowledge, command or implied approbation" of the Government?

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir, that is a very good observation. In fact, the timing of the statutes goes back, of course, to other statutes and approaches of a time that, I guess, could be summarized as a turbulent one in foreign affairs.

You will notice, I think reflecting particularly your comments, that 959, when we are in a war with an ally and recruiting is done within this country with an ally, that can be done pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of Defense and State.

That illustrates this is exactly the thrust of the statutes.

¹ See letter subsequently received from the Department of Justice on p. 135.

Mr. DINGS. Does the statute make any distinction between public and private persons? It refers to "whoever" performs these acts.

Mr. KEUCH. No.

Mr. DINGS. Has there been any determination pursuant to the constitutional processes of this country that would grant such permission, knowledge, command or implied appropriation of the Government?

Mr. KEUCH. I am sorry, perhaps I did not follow your question.

Mr. DINGS. Has there been any determination pursuant to the constitutional processes of this country that would grant such permission, knowledge, command or implied appropriation of the Government?

Mr. KEUCH. It would permit us to prevent this type of activity. Again, we think it would be grounded in the policy or the concept, spoke of, that in the field of foreign affairs, the Congress has the power to paint with a broad brush, the intent is the country shall speak in one voice in foreign affairs.

We think, based on those two concepts, that the statute such as this and such as the recodification in 1203 of S. 1 would have constitutional support.

Mr. DINGS. In the view of the Department, does the statute make it a crime for a Government official without the proper constitutional authorization to participate in an act, having as its final purpose the enlisting into service of another for a foreign state, territory or people?

Mr. KEUCH. I think if done with the appropriate intent it may be that an act may have the necessary effect of the statute, but the statute does, I think, require that the individual does this with the intent that this be the result.

Again, in the interpretation of "whoever" our interpretation would be that it would apply to a government agency or a private individual equally.

Mr. DINGS. Suppose the CIA takes the incipient steps to "set on foot" a military enterprise or expedition against a foreign state, might it be in violation of the law?

Mr. KEUCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGS. On page 2, you state, and I am quoting you, "I point out with regard to the application of the statutes that, in general, it is not unlawful for a citizen or other persons in the United States to leave the country with the intent to enlist abroad in a foreign military service."

For that, you cite the *Wiborg* case. Was not the *Wiborg* case a prosecution under revised statute 8256 which was the forerunner of section 960?

Mr. KEUCH. Yes, sir, that is correct, but in the context, I believe the precise question upon which they reached this point, they were considering the claim of error in the judge's instructions.

They pointed out as a matter of law, the predecessor statute, and the recodification was not changed, that it was in general, not unlawful for an individual to leave the United States with this intent.

Mr. DINGS. I guess the question here is does this indicate that *Wiborg* did not directly concern section 959 respecting enlistment in a foreign service?

Mr. KEUCH. It certainly did not interpret 959 as you correctly put it and it was a predecessor statute. But the recodification came forward with the same provisions, therefore, we believe, confirming the interpretation.

If a statute is recodified following a decision, such as *Wiborg* and does not change, I would say that would be an appropriate consideration.

Mr. DINGS. Was not *Wiborg* in fact a prosecution against a ship captain for providing transportation for a military enterprise to Cuba, there to fight against Spain?

Mr. KEUCH. I believe the facts were that he was anchored off Barnegat lighthouse on the New Jersey coast and did, in effect, take on troops and I believe the distribution of weapons came after the individuals were aboard et cetera.

It certainly was not a conclusive factual situation, but, in the context of deciding the correctness or validity of the judgment and instructions in that case, it invoked the principle we cited.

Mr. DINGS. Are there not cases more on the point respecting the recruitment of American citizens for fighting in a foreign territory? Are you resting your interpretations just on that?

Mr. KEUCH. I have been told there is one other interpretation in a case we will provide for the record.¹ I am sorry we—Mr. Martin points we have cited it. It is *Gayon v. McCarthy*, which is in my statement on page 2, 252 U.S. 171.

Mr. DINGS. Isn't there, in fact, a case right on the point of what is meant in the section 959 prohibition of the retaining of another to enlist or go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with the intent to enlist or go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States? What about the case of the *United States v. Hertz*. An 1855 case whose citation is 26 Federal cases, page 293?

Mr. KEUCH. I believe that case is referred to in the Senate report on 1203. We cited *Gayon v. McCarthy* as a Supreme Court determination which we thought the most solid premise on which to rest.

I will be very happy to look at that and let you know if there is anything.¹

Mr. DINGS. The language of the *Hertz* case is very specific. It indicates how comprehensive the prohibition of the law is. There, defendant Hertz was indicted for the offense of having hired and retained certain persons to go out of the United States to enlist and enter themselves in the service of a foreign territory.

The question came up whether their going abroad and enlisting there was a crime under the statute. Also the question in that case was what is meant by hiring or retaining?

It is necessary that there be a promise to pay money when their service is performed. That is a question that also was raised in that case. You will look at that?

Mr. KEUCH. I certainly will. I will point out that *Gayon*, of course, was a situation where in this country, a letter of introduction was provided to some Mexican officials. The Supreme Court found that was within the terms of the statute, that type of promise of future recognition or remuneration.

Mr. DINGS. Our research on this case turned up some very instructive words by the court. I would just like to quote a paragraph.

¹ See letter subsequently received from the Department of Justice on p. 138.

It is not necessary that the consideration of the hiring shall be money. To give a person a railroad ticket that cost \$4, and board and lodge him for a week is as good a consideration for the contract of hiring as to pay him the money with which he would buy the ticket and pay for the board himself. If there be an engagement on the one side to do the particular thing, to go beyond the limits of the United States with the intent to enlist and on the other side, an engagement that when the act shall have been done, a consideration shall be paid to the party performing the services or doing the work, the hiring and retaining are complete cases.

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGS. In other words, it is not the offense—is not the offense complete if any person engages another to take part in a foreign quarrel so that a contract of hiring in the United States is not under the case law or considered necessary?

Mr. KETCH. I would agree with that, sir. My only reservation there would be "to take part in a foreign quarrel," the statute does have the requirement as a soldier in the armed forces and *Gayon v. McCarthy*, goes to the same point.

It cites at pages 177 and 178 of that opinion an opinion of the Attorney General concerning the statute in which it also discusses the right to retain and hire.

It supports this exactly the same as your research.

Mr. DINGS. What opinion was that?

Mr. KETCH. That was in *Gayon v. McCarthy*. They are quoting several opinions of the Attorney General, 367.

Mr. DINGS. Was that Attorney General Cushing?

Mr. KETCH. I believe so, sir, they do not identify the gentleman.

Mr. DINGS. We have the same—our research turned up the same case here, that there had been an opinion and Attorney General Caleb Cushing, volume VII of your opinions—

Mr. KETCH. That is it, sir. Glad we came to the same conclusion. Mr. DINGS. To go back to the *Wiborg* case, you cite this case after you have stated that this is generally not unlawful for an American citizen to go abroad with the intent of enlistment.

I believe in that case did not the court hold that there was a combining or organizing of effort, that is a concert of action that the statute would be triggered and going abroad with the intent to enlist would be a defense?

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir, that is why we raised it. In general, of course, the other problem for that is that it is very generally a factual situation as to how much has been done before the individual has left and what steps would encourage anyone else.

Mr. DINGS. In other words, had not the *Wiborg* case also clearly indicated that the military training and preparation of persons here to go abroad with the intent of enlisting in a foreign service would trigger the statute and was unlawful?

Mr. KETCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGS. In reference to page 653 of that case, as it is reported in volume 632, Supreme Court reports, let us take a look at the Nationality Act generally and the prohibition in 8 U.S.C. 1481 and 1483.

That provides that a person loses his U.S. nationality by entering or serving in the armed forces of another state unless prior to such

entry or service, such entry or service is specifically authorized in writing by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

You refer to the *Afroyim* case which held that a person could not be divested of his citizenship absent voluntary abandonment.

Mr. KETCH. The facts, as I am sure you are somewhat aware, are persuasively analogous. There the statute provided that if someone were to vote in a foreign election, that would constitute abandonment of citizenship. The Court held that the 14th amendment prohibited that type of statute and in fact, at page 262 of that opinion, stated the amendment can most reasonably be read as defining the citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.

Once acquired, this 14th amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, canceled or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States or any other Government unit. I think it would stand that it would require something more than the Congress or Executive providing that merely because you take a certain act, it can be inferred or presumed you have voluntarily relinquished citizenship.

We believe it would prohibit that application of those portions of the Nationality Act.

Mr. DINGS. Is that the definitive position of the Department or is that merely the current position based on that case?

Mr. KETCH. It is current, and I hope it is definitive.

Mr. DINGS. It should be recalled that the *Afroyim* case overruled a previous case.

Mr. KETCH. *Perez v. Brownell*.

Mr. DINGS. The *Afroyim* decision was by a divided court, 5 to 4 and only one of the judges on the majority is now in the court but two of the dissenting judges remain. Even given the changed composition of the court and the tendency toward more conservative ruling in other cases, should not persons going abroad to fight in a foreign service be aware of this provision and that it may be likely that it will be changed in some way?

Mr. KETCH. Perhaps there might be a possibility. I think I did say in my statement, perhaps I went too far in my response to your question, that the restrictions of the Nationality Act must be read in light of *Afroyim*.

I think there may be a possibility, certainly among other things to be considered, that more specific notice, more detailed information to citizens, et cetera, that perhaps you could reach the level where the act that is committed abroad does reach the level of voluntary denunciation of citizenship.

I would admit you would still have the problem if, even given all of that notice, that, if an individual said then, from the other country once he left this country, I am going to enter the armed forces of Great Britain, France or the Soviet Union, but I certainly do not intend to denounce my citizenship.

It seems to me the rather strong language of the statute, unless it were challenged by litigation, would prevent any action in that area.

At the moment, I would say it would be the position of the Department that is the appropriate interpretation of the 14th amendment.

Mr. DINGS. Are you saying it would not be wise for people going abroad to enlist to receive something in writing in advance from the

Secretary of State or Defense either an authorization or ruling from Justice that will not seek to impose a denationalization on membership in the courts?

Mr. KEUCH. Should they not be informed that we would not at this point seek to take such action? I think that is something I would have to consider in detail. I would like to respond to that letter, if I may. [The letter subsequently received from the Department of Justice follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., April 12, 1976.

Hon. CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request for additional information concerning the interpretation and legislative intent of 18 U.S.C. § 960. At the subcommittee's hearing on March 10, 1976, you raised the question as to the comprehensiveness of the statute in its relationship to the words, "any nation", used during my testimony. As you may recall, although the words "any nation" do not appear in the statute, in my response to your question, I concurred in your observation that the statute is in fact more comprehensive than the words "any nation", and stated that it was used in order to summarize the overall thrust of the statute.

In addition, you also questioned the language of the statute itself, inquiring whether or not the language of the statute, coupled with the commas after the words "foreign prince, or state," does not suggest that the clause "with whom the United States is at peace" only modifies the words "or of any colony, district or people."

We have again examined the legislative history of the statute, and have determined that it does not provide any specific answers to your question. It is our position that the intent of the statute is to prohibit military activities by private persons launched against all the entities named in the statute, with whom this country is at peace.

You also inquired whether the legislative history of the statute defined the word "peace". As I indicated, it does not. The legislative history of this statute is very limited; indeed, there is only the Senate Report. (See 60th Congress, 1st Session, 1907-08, No. 10, Part 1-2, Pg. 10.) Also, we have not found any case law that will provide the answers to either question. However, it is our position that the word "peace" means an absence of open hostilities.

Finally, as to your suggestion that the Departments of Justice or State advise persons leaving the country that enlistment in the armed forces of a foreign country might result in possible violations of law or loss of citizenship, we believe that each situation would have to be examined on its own facts. I am sure you can appreciate that because there are so many thousands of travelers and, consequently, so many factual variations under these circumstances, it would be impossible to issue a blanket warning applicable to each traveler. Further, it could be interpreted that the Government in such a case was acting as private counsel, which is beyond the scope of its authority. If a person has any doubts as to the legal consequences of his contemplated conduct, he should obtain the advice of a private attorney.

Sincerely,

ROBERT L. KEUCH,
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division.

Mr. DIGGS. You may respond to that and we will leave the record open for that purpose. Does minority counsel have any questions?

Mr. FOX. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. YARIS. May we include appropriate wording from the opinion by Attorney General Cushing for the record of the hearing?

Mr. KEUCH. I believe the relevant portions are set forth in *Whitely*, but if you would like the complete opinion, if you do not have it available, I can certainly provide it.

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. KEUCH. Thank you.

Mr. DIGGS. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee adjourned at 4:25 p.m. subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX 1

RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE ON OCTOBER 24, 1975 ON "SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE FOR ZAIRE"

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. The last line of questioning I wanted to pursue with you really has to do with Zaire and their relationship with Angola. I think the best place to start is simply to have Mr. Mulcahy describe for us, as he has done on a number of occasions, our policy with regard to Angola.

Obviously, there is a civil war there and some other problems, but for the record, what is our policy toward Angola?

Mr. MULCAHY. Mr. Chairman, I think the quickest and shortest way that I can summarize our present view of Angola and what we hope for would be to quote for you a short paragraph from the toast of Secretary Kissinger on September 24 at his dinner for the foreign ministers and representatives of the OAU (Organization for African Unity) in New York, where the Secretary said, and I quote, "But I want to say a precautionary word about Angola. Events in Angola have taken a distressing turn with widespread violence. We are most alarmed with the interference of extracontinental powers who do not wish Africa well and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence. We believe a fair and peaceful solution must be negotiated, giving all groups representing the Angolan people a fair share in its future."

Senator CLARK. So, in summary, it is fair to say that our policy is "hands off." We are not going to become involved in determining their fate?

Mr. MULCAHY. No, sir, we are not in a position to do that in any case. Senator CLARK. Good. Then I assume that it follows that the United States does not officially support Zaire's assistance to whomever they are assisting, the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola) over the last 10 years or so. It would not be our intent in providing this loan to in any way assist them, directly or indirectly, in Angola? Is that a fair assumption?

Mr. MULCAHY. I think that is a very good assumption, sir. I think that careful examination of the content of this package, which we are proposing, would make it quite clear that it would be harder to divert any of the contents of this package to non-Zairian purposes.

OTHER NATION'S INTERPRETATION OF AID PACKAGE'S INTENT

Senator CLARK. One of the things I think that concerns a great number of people is how the rest of the world will interpret this very substantial amount, I think clearly the largest amount we have ever given a country, and doing it in this case under the continuing resolution, which is a very rare and unusual way of operating. I wonder if we should not be very concerned whether other nations interpret this kind of assistance to Zaire to be used directly or indirectly for their heavy interest in the Angolan situation. Is the State Department concerned about that interpretation and that possible usage?

Mr. MULCAHY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we are concerned with the charges raised, and we hope—well, for example, by the mere fact that most of the funds involved in this package or the money involved in the package will ultimately never leave the United States, that there is no money going to change hands, for example, that we have commodities and we have transport equipment; we have fertilizer, agricultural machinery, and the like. I would find it very hard to see how anyone could advertise this or accuse us with coming up with a package which has any nefarious intent to it.

GUARANTEES AGAINST AID REPLACING AID TO LIBERATION FRONTS

Senator CLARK. What guarantee is there that the goods provided to Zaire will not replace goods Zaire has sent, let us say, to one of the liberation movements—food or commodities or the other things that we are shipping? What kind of guarantees do we have that that is not going to occur?

Mr. MURKIN. I think, sir, we have reason on the basis of its past excellent performance to place our trust in the International Monetary Fund arrangement and commission that will be there, and we will carefully scrutinize the entire Zairian economy, the controls of exports and imports, and the management of foreign exchange. The volume of Zaire's needs is so great that the amount we are providing will be really very responsive to a very small segment of Zaire's total needs.

Senator CLARK. I understand you to be saying then that you can give Congress your absolute assurance that none of this \$81,343,000 is going to be used by Zaire to assist directly or indirectly Zaire's involvement in Angola?

Mr. MURKIN. To the best of our ability and our ability to watch it, sir, we can give you that assurance.

DEVELOPMENT OF ISSUE OF ZAIRE REQUEST

Senator CLARK. Last, I would like to put in the record a series of letters between the Secretary of State, Senator Humphrey and myself which outline the general development of this issue with regards to the Zaire request, as well as the letter from Chairman Inouye, dated September 26, with regard to the request, a letter from Mr. Daniel Parker, a second letter dated October 15 from Senator Humphrey and myself with regard to this request, and another from Acting Secretary Robert Ingersoll, all having to do with the various requests.

[The information referred to follows:]

AUGUST 1, 1975.

Hon. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. SECRETARY: We have been briefed on the Administration's proposals to increase substantially the level of U.S. assistance to Zaire. Included, as you know, would be a Supporting Assistance program loan for \$20 million. We are further informed that the Administration proposes to proceed with this loan using section 113 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act of 1974 pending the submission of a request in the normal manner.

The initiation of a Supporting Assistance program in Zaire such as that described would, in our view, represent a significant departure from the existing U.S. assistance policy for Africa. We note, also, that the use of program loans is a practice which the Congress has sought to discourage. Therefore, while we appreciate the opportunity to engage in consultation which has been extended to us through Ambassador Vance, we believe that this proposal should not be implemented prior to Congress' consideration and approval through the regular authorization and appropriation process. In this connection, it is unfortunate that the Administration's representatives, who appeared before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance two weeks ago regarding the FY 1976 foreign assistance proposals, did not mention this major new program.

Given the fact that no precedent exists in last year's aid authorization for a program of this type or magnitude in Zaire, we believe that the use of section 113 would not be appropriate. We hope instead that the proposed program for Zaire will be submitted in September for consideration in the normal legislative process. We assure you of our cooperation in considering such a request at that time.

With best wishes,
Sincerely,

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance,
DICK CLARK,
Chairman, Subcommittee on African Affairs.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C., September 26, 1975.

Hon. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR HUBERT: Sheldon Vance and a delegation from the Department of State came this afternoon with reference to increased assistance to Zaire. I advised him in no uncertain terms that the Subcommittee would take no action until the objections raised in your letter of August 1, 1975 to Secretary Kissinger were satisfied.

Sincerely,

DANIEL K. INOUE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., October 15, 1975.

Hon. ROBERT S. INGERSOLL,
Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. INGERSOLL: I regret that the Sinal debate made it impossible for the Committee on Foreign Relations to hold the scheduled session to examine the Security Supporting Assistance request for Zaire. Given the urgency and importance which the Administration apparently attaches to this endeavor, we want you, nevertheless, to have our interim views.

In addition to the misgivings which we expressed in our August 1 letter to Secretary Kissinger, we now regard the increasing involvement of the Government of Zaire in the internal affairs of Angola as yet another reason for concern about your proposals. We have deep misgivings that the policies which the United States Government is pursuing in Zaire and Angola will further compound our relations with other African states and produce additional embarrassment to the United States, the Administration and those in Congress responsible for the oversight of the activities involved. In our view, a new, highly visible program of political and economic support for Zaire should not be undertaken without careful Congressional examination.

Sincerely,

DICK CLARK,
Chairman, Subcommittee on African Affairs,
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
Washington, D.C., October 15, 1975.

Hon. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HUMPHREY: I am enclosing a copy of the letter I have today sent to Senator Inouye, Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, notifying him of our intention to provide certain economic assistance for Zaire, in accordance with Section 113 of the Appropriations Act. As you know, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger consider the need for immediate assistance to Zaire an urgent one. We fully understand that Senate discussion of the Sinal proposal made it difficult for the Subcommittee on African Affairs to schedule a hearing until Friday, October 10 and then the absence of interested Senators on that date made cancellation necessary. I want to assure you that representatives of the Department of State and the Agency for International Development remain prepared to discuss the proposed assistance to Zaire with you when the Senate returns later this month.

We have proceeded with formal notification to the Appropriations Committee, in light of the fifteen-day waiting period required by Section 113, in order to minimize possible delay. It is not our intention to move to implement the program until there has been an opportunity to discuss it further with you. Sincerely yours,

DANIEL PARKER, *Administrator*.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 22, 1975.

Enclosure.

Hon. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR HUMPHREY: Thank you for your letter of October 15 expressing your view that our proposed Security Supporting Assistance program loan for Zaïre should not be undertaken without careful Congressional examination. As Mr. Parker informed you in his letter of October 15, we have proceeded with formal notification to the Appropriations Committee of our intention to authorize the loan using continuing resolution authority. We have done this, in view of the fifteen-day waiting period required by Section 113 of the appropriations act, in order to avoid any possible delay in meeting Zaïre's urgent need for assistance. At the same time, as Mr. Parker stated, it is not our intention to implement the loan until there has been an opportunity to discuss it further with members of the Congress.

I understand that the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has now scheduled a hearing on the proposed loan for October 24. We welcome this opportunity to discuss the questions you and your colleagues have about our proposed assistance to Zaïre. Sincerely,

ROBERT S. INGERSOLL,
Acting Secretary.

DOES IT REALLY MATTER WHAT CONGRESS DOES?

Senator CLARK. My last question, gentlemen, is, Does it really matter what the Congress does in this regard? Are you not going to go ahead with the loan whatever we decide, or are you going to abide by the decisions that are made by this subcommittee or the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee, or the Appropriations Committee? Are you going to go ahead with this anyway, or is it going to be subject to congressional approval?

Mr. MULCAHY. Sir, without your approval and the approval of Congress, we cannot go on the \$20 million Security Supporting Assistance loan. The other two segments of it, the Eximbank portion, and the CCC and Public Law 480 segments can, of course, be handled by executive branch action.

Senator CLARK. Is it your intention to go ahead with that \$40 million whatever our decisions or feelings may be?

Mr. MULCAHY. I cannot say, sir, that there has been a final decision on that within the executive branch of the Government. As you know, we hope to link the three of them, but I would like to impress upon you, sir, and the members of the committee, the overwhelming feeling of urgency that we have for doing something to help this good friend of ours.

APPENDIX 2

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN GERVASI

THE TACIT ALLIANCE—THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA IN ANGOLA

The Situation in Angola

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I have been asked to comment on three issues. The first is the problem of disaster relief in Angola today. The second is the role which South African military forces have played in the conflict there. And the last is the question of the U.S. role in that conflict, and especially U.S. military and other forms of co-operation with South Africa.

My principal concern, of course, is to be practical. I shall try to shed some light on these questions. And I shall try to make some suggestions which will, I hope, be useful in the work of the Subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, we confront today a rather bizarre situation. For there are some strange connections between the various topics we are discussing. Some would say that these topics are not at all related, that there is no connection between the problem of disaster relief in Angola and the role of the South African military in that country. Still less would there seem to be any

connection between the needs of Angolan people at this time and the policy of the United States Government. Yet the connections, however strange, are very much there.

The connections become apparent as soon as one looks at the problem of disaster relief. The people of Angola today face many of the problems faced by the people of Guatemala. It is said that 24,000 people have died in the earthquake and its aftermath in Guatemala. In Angola, according to press reports, more than 100,000 people have been killed in the fighting. Three or four times that number will have been wounded. A large percentage of those will be in need of medical care and rehabilitation. We know as well that tens of thousands have been left homeless in Guatemala. Many, many thousands have also been forced to leave their homes in Angola. In both countries there are shortages of food. In both countries essential services have been seriously disrupted.

Thus in certain important respects the situation facing the people in each country is the same. Both Guatemala and Angola have been struck by disaster. And indeed, if one is to make any comparison at all, it is clear that Angola has suffered more. Disaster there has affected far larger numbers of people and a much more extensive area.

The difference, of course, is that one country has been struck by a natural disaster, and the other has been struck by a man-

made one. This is why there is more than a casual connection between the first topic and the other two. In my view -- and I believe the evidence will sustain the argument -- the United States and South Africa are responsible for the present situation in Angola. They have been working in a tacit alliance in that country. Their objectives have been similar, and their policies have been complementary. Their policies have brought war to Angola and death, pain, grief and hardship to its people. I think this is a fact which we must face.

This is what makes our situation today so bizarre. In considering the problem of disaster relief in Angola, Members of the Legislative Branch are actually considering the handiwork of the Executive Branch, the results of the policy set in motion well over a year ago. One might say, of course, that this is an inevitable part of a life of checks and balances. In this case, however, things seem to have got very much out of balance before the checks began to work. And it is to be hoped that the Congress will study what happened and take measures to prevent the Executive embarking upon reckless, secret and unlawful wars in the future.

Angola, then, is badly in need of humanitarian assistance. It is a poor country. And it has passed through many months of war. The Angolan people are far from helpless. They have already shown great resilience and courage. They need help, however, and

the United States should do what it can to assist with disaster relief. It bears a particular responsibility for what has happened in Angola. I shall make some specific recommendations later.

The Change in United States Policy towards Southern Africa

We come now, Mr. Chairman, to a more difficult and controversial set of questions. There has been considerable discussion in recent weeks of United States involvement in the Angolan conflict. It is known that the U.S. played an important part in that conflict. Nonetheless, a great deal remains unclear. The extent of U.S. involvement is not yet really known. Nor is much known about the relationship of U.S. policy to that of South Africa. Was there significant co-operation between the United States and South Africa in Angola? Why did the United States become involved in Angola in the first place?

Almost nothing is known about the role of South Africa in the Angolan conflict. Yet South Africa actually mounted a full-scale invasion of Angola in October of last year. This is well known in Africa. Very little has been said about it in the Western press until recently. Thus the public, and to some extent the Congress, have been left in the dark. Most observers in our country have still to understand the real meaning of what happened in Angola. And, without information about South Africa's role, it is impossible to understand the real meaning of U.S. policy.

Thus a great many important questions remain to be clarified. A thorough investigation of the Angolan conflict is needed. Yet it will not be enough to dig up the facts alone. The facts are important. However, the problem is basically one of perspective. "The facts" about military and other kinds of co-operation with South Africa do not by themselves tell us all that we need to know. Neither is it enough to recount the details of South African military operations in Angola. The facts must be placed in context to be understood properly. We must try to see what has been happening in the broad sense of the phrase in order to know the meaning of the details.

I would therefore propose to sketch briefly at this point the essential facts of an important change in United States policy towards Southern Africa which took place some years ago when the Nixon Administration assumed office.

Mr. Chairman, in 1971 and 1972 the Subcommittee on Africa of the former House Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted a series of study missions to Africa. As Chairman of the Subcommittee at the time you wrote an overview of the findings of those study missions which helps to illuminate recent events. I think that your words in that overview provide the key to an understanding of our policy in Angola. You wrote at the time that:

"...the policy the United States has been pursuing can only be characterized as one of disaster."
"...recent U.S. actions with respect to the

liberation of the areas of Africa remaining under colonial and minority rule imply that the United States supports the maintenance of the status quo and the minority rule of Africa." (1)

There was substantial evidence even then to confirm that judgment. It is tragic that so few at the time could see the evidence for what it was. Already there were powerful forces at work in our country fashioning a policy which would support the preservation of apartheid, colonialism and minority rule in Southern Africa.

I think a number of us foresaw at the time that the pressures which were developing could carry us into an intervention on the side of Portugal, Rhodesia or South Africa. But we did not really see how far things had already gone in 1972. We did not know that a crucial decision had been made two years earlier, in 1970.

The crucial decision, of course, was made with the adoption of Option 2 of the now famous National Security Council study on Southern Africa. Details of the study and of the decision which followed became public in late 1974. (2) The National Security Council document was an analysis of U.S. interests in Southern Africa, of the developing confrontation there, and of the options for U.S. policy in the face of that confrontation. The study presented a view of the situation which almost forced policy-makers to choose some form of rapprochement with the white minority regimes. For its premise was that "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through

them." (3) Given that premise, the obvious choice was to help the minority regimes economically and politically in the hope that Africans might benefit from "peaceful change" within the system of minority rule. Yet the premise was totally unrealistic. And in the circumstances any such choice had to lead to other things.

The N.S.C. study on Southern Africa outlines several policy options for the U.S. Government. Most of these involved supportive commitments of one kind or another to the white-ruled states. They almost all implied an active, if discreet, policy of "stabilizing" the area by strengthening those states economically, diplomatically and militarily.

In early 1970, President Nixon decided, on the urging of the Assistant to the President for National Security, to adopt Option 2 of four options. This involved a relaxation of the general United States posture towards Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. The President's decision was seen by South Africa and its supporters as a substantial political victory in their campaign to gain international support for the status quo in Southern Africa. (4)

President Nixon's decision also led to a number of concrete steps which, in effect, carried us into a tacit alliance with the white states of the subcontinent. Option 2 called for the encouragement of trade with South Africa. It recommended an extension of Export-Import Bank facilities to Portugal and South Africa. It

called for the "liberal treatment" of equipment which came under the South African arms embargo, and in effect significantly loosened the embargo. It called for exchange programs, including military exchange programs, with South Africa. And it suggested the gradual relaxation of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

In short, Mr. Chairman, the choice of Option 2 set in motion a new policy, a policy by which the United States turned its back on the African peoples of Southern Africa and offered assistance to their self-appointed, racist rulers. The new policy was a statement that the United States Government opposed majority rule in Southern Africa, that it was more interested in the short-term "protection" of its interests by allying itself with those who already held the reins of power. In yet another flourish of sophomoric *realpolitik*, fundamental human rights were passed over in favor of immediately "useful" alliances.

What was worse, this policy laid the basis for future U.S. support of the white regimes in their confrontation with the liberation movements. By moving, at a time of gathering crisis, towards rapprochement with those regimes, the Nixon Administration began to create an American interest in the preservation of minority rule in Southern Africa. It tied us to the white-ruled states at a time when things were changing rapidly, indeed at a time when the military balance in that part of Africa was shifting against those states. Minority rule was well in control, but it

was also under siege. The new Nixon-Kissinger policy was therefore very risky. For it had three important consequences. First, it obviously helped to preserve minority rule in the short run. Secondly, and I think more importantly, it linked our interests to the fate of the white regimes. And lastly, precisely because of this, it almost guaranteed that we would help to counter any threat, real or unreal, to the security of those regimes in the future.

Thus the policy decision of 1976 led almost inevitably to the secret C.I.A. war in Angola in 1975.

I realize that this may seem far from obvious. The whole question of U.S. policy towards Southern Africa has been shrouded in secrecy since 1969. Almost nothing was known about our shift in policy before 1974. (5) So the public, and even Members of Congress, could say very little. The policy was never really discussed or debated.

Even today our policy towards Southern Africa remains in its essentials a secret. It is even suggested by official spokesmen that there has been no major change in policy, that Option 2 was never in fact chosen. However, I think it is important to be clear about the facts. Option 2 remains the basis of our policy towards Southern Africa, indeed many speak of Option 2 having "degenerated" into an even more open policy of support for the white regimes.

There is abundant evidence for the conclusion that our policy


is still on the course set in 1970. I will mention only one of the more recent bits of evidence. In a recent staff report on Southern Africa for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the author states clearly, in referring to the National Security Council document, that "Number Two is the one presently being followed out of the four in the spectrum." (6) Indeed, the author goes beyond that, indicating at another point that Option 2 seems the best policy for the United States. He argues that:

"South Africa is a highly civilized and enormously rich land. It has much to offer the world at large and the United States in particular and there exists a natural affinity to America on the part of both blacks and whites. Option 12 of the now famous NSC-19, despite the frankness of its wording, remains the best policy for the future, although it could be beefed up with harder-hitting persuasion." (7)

It is clear, then that at the time the decision to intervene in Angola was made, the policy described here was the operative policy of the Ford Administration. One must keep this in mind if one is to understand the actions taken by the U.S. Government in Angola after the collapse of the Portuguese African empire.

(At this point the rest of this testimony will be summarized orally. It is requested that the record be kept open for a further written submission.)

APPENDIX 3 DOD ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ANNOTATED



APPENDIX 4

LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS MADE BY SEAN GERVASI DURING FEBRUARY 26 HEARING

Department of State
Washington, D.C. April 5, 1976

The Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.
Chairman
Subcommittee on International Resources,
Food and Energy
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During your February 26 hearings on disaster assistance in Angola, Mr. Sean Gervasi, a consultant to the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia as well as a Professor of Economics at Brooklyn College, appeared before your committee and testified on various aspects of the situation in Angola and southern Africa. In the course of his testimony, he made a number of sweeping allegations regarding United States policy and activities, which misrepresent the facts and repeat long-standing unsupported rumors and insinuations. Lest these allegations be lent credence by our silence, I request that this letter be included in the transcript of the hearings of February 26.

Building on a false hypothesis, it is quite simple to construct a sinister structure of plots and evil associations. Since Mr. Gervasi appears to favor the use of force to bring about self-determination and majority rule in southern Africa and since he has little patience with those who favor a peaceful solution thus he seems to assume they must be in collusion with the Pretoria government. He proceeds from this perception to the simplistic conclusion that the United States and South Africa must therefore be collaborating since each of them has opposed the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola. While Mr. Gervasi may sincerely believe his accusations, he is quite wrong in this respect. There was no prior consultation or knowledge on the part of the United States of South Africa's intention to intervene in Angola. There

(156)

was no subsequent encouragement of such intervention. Nor was there any policy cooperation or coordination between our two countries. This Government was opposed to the South African intervention, made its views known and has in no way modified its policy toward South Africa. As you know, the arms embargo imposed in 1963 remains fully in effect.

To claim that the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola was to protect the Angolans from South Africa not only ignores the facts but can only encourage the sort of reckless intervention which produced war in Angola. South African intervention certainly aggravated existing tensions and led to an escalation of the ongoing Cuban effort. But the fact remains that the first Cuban troop ships departed Cuba in the first week of September 1975, only two or three weeks after South African forces had occupied the Cunene-dan complex near the Namibian border and six weeks before South African troops actually participated in the UNITA/FNLA strike force which drove up the Angolan coast. It is quite clear that this Cuban expeditionary force which left for Angola in early September could not have been conceived, planned, recruited, equipped and dispatched in the few weeks after South African forces occupied the Cunene works.

The South African intervention was particularly unfortunate because it provided the Soviets and Cubans an *ex post facto* excuse they needed to cover up the fact they had intervened, not in a national liberation struggle as they claimed, but in an internal African dispute between rival political factions, each with a valid claim to share in the government of Angola. Contrary to Mr. Gervasi's allegations, South Africa had nothing to do with the US decision to provide assistance to two of the three political movements. Our sole concern was to prevent the USSR from using its newly acquired global military reach to impose political parties of its choice upon countries thousands of miles from its shores.

As we have repeatedly stated, the United States is not opposed to the MPLA *per se*. We have never wavered in our belief, however, that, if left alone, the Angolans would have found an African solution to this African problem. It was to find such a solution and avoid a bloody struggle for power in Angola that the Alvor Accord was negotiated in January 1975 providing

for a transitional coalition government of the three parties. The Conciliation Commission appointed by the OAU was of the same persuasion in October 1975 when it urged governments not to recognize any single faction as the Government of Angola -- a policy to which this Government adheres. Mr. Gervasi spoke of the need for majority rule in southern Africa, but he does not appear to be supporting this same principle in Angola.

Mr. Gervasi asserts that prior to 1974, the United States was involved in military assistance to the Portuguese and South Africans. Such a statement is totally unfounded. The United States enforced an embargo against the shipment of any military equipment to the Portuguese for use in their African colonies since 1961 and conscientious efforts by the United States Government personnel in Angola and Mozambique failed to turn up any evidence whatsoever that United States weapons provided to the Portuguese after 1961 were utilized in Angola or Mozambique. The US arms embargo against South Africa, instituted in 1963, remains fully in effect. In fact, Mr. Gervasi, like others, stated, in connection with NSM 39 that the US had taken "a number of concrete steps" in southern Africa, including an extension of Export-Import Bank facilities to South Africa and a relaxation of the arms embargo. In fact, the restrictions on Bank facilities and the arms embargo remain unchanged since their initiations in 1964 and 1963 respectively.

A particularly disturbing allegation of Mr. Gervasi's is that "I know of a number of specific United States military and para-military kinds of involvement I believe which I can define only rather vaguely at this particular moment." The insinuation is that the Administration has been involved more deeply in Angola than it has stated to the appropriate Congressional committees and the public. The Administration made it clear that we conducted a covert operation in Angola in support of the UNITA and FNLA forces and that it entailed the provision of funds and arms. The appropriate Congressional committees were informed of the particulars of the operation as required by law. In regard to Mr. Gervasi's allegations, I wish to reiterate that no United States Government personnel were involved

directly or as advisers; no American pilots were used to transport material into Angola or to fly support aircraft over Angola; no United States Government owned aircraft were used to fly supplies into Angola and there was no alert of US Navy vessels to proceed to Angolan waters.

The Administration was particularly surprised, however, by the statement by Mr. Gervasi in which he appeared to advocate and condone a Cuban/MPLA invasion of Namibia:

"It should be noted, Mr. Chairman, who on earth is going to fault them in international law. What they would be doing if some situation arose in which MPLA forces went across the Namibian border would be pushing an illegal occupation force out of a country which protests that occupation force and whose people protest that occupation force and who want to be free. That would be an interesting problem in international law I think and not one in which it could easily be said that whoever did this was committing aggression."

That such a statement could be made by a consultant to the United Nations is highly disturbing. The United Nations was conceived as an organization which would conciliate differences and prevent nations from resolving their conflicts through war. Mr. Gervasi's views bear an unfortunate resemblance to the Soviet doctrine of "just and unjust wars" and to Soviet justification for whatever it chooses to call a "national liberation" struggle. We consider Namibia to be under United Nations' jurisdiction despite the illegal South African occupation. Should force be used in Namibia legally it could only come about by an action of the United Nations, not through a unilateral decision of one or more of its members. To condone the illegal use of force by one United Nations member to redress a wrong committed by another UN member is a dangerous doctrine and a particularly surprising one from a person who serves the organization devoted to the maintenance of world peace.

Sincerely,

Robert J. McCloskey
Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

APPENDIX 5

STATEMENT BY GULF OIL ON GULF'S OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA

Because of the rapidly evolving political and military situation in Angola following that country's accession to independence on November 11, 1975, Gulf Oil Corporation representatives were in frequent contact with U. S. State Department officials, either in person or by telephone. Gulf's President, Mr. James E. Lee, reviewed the situation with Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Edward W. Mulcahy, on December 15. The State Department warned Gulf of the deteriorating situation in that country, the upsurge of fighting, the intervention of foreign forces, and the danger to Gulf personnel of remaining in Angola, and advised prompt evacuation of all Gulf personnel. For some time, border warfare and civil war had made it virtually impossible for Gulf to move the personnel, food, supplies and equipment necessary to maintain operations in Cabinda. As a result, Gulf suspended operations and withdrew its personnel on December 20, 1975. On December 22, Gulf announced that it was placing the sums due for taxes and royalties in a special interest-bearing account for the benefit of the State of Angola, since conflicting demands for the payment of these funds from contending factions in Angola would place it in an impossible position.

Subsequent contacts with the State Department were concerned with the evolution of the situation in Angola, both domestically and internationally. The State Department informed Gulf of the results of the Summit Meeting of the Organization of African Unity on Angola and repeated its previous advice against making payment of tax and royalty to any one of the contending groups, since none had yet established itself as the legitimate government of Angola. Both the domestic and diplomatic situation evolved steadily in favor of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA), culminating in the formal recognition of the latter by the Organization of African Unity. The State Department conferred on several occasions with Gulf representatives on this evolution and, after some explanation by Gulf of its position, indicated that it no longer opposed Gulf's negotiation with the Luanda regime.

With the evolution of the situation described above, the Government of Nigeria offered its assistance in developing discussions between Gulf Oil Corporation and the Luanda regime. Gulf agreed to send representatives to Lagos, Nigeria to talk with Angolan and Nigerian officials, the latter acting as intermediaries, concerning the unresolved issues posed by Gulf's forced temporary withdrawal from Angola. At the talks held in Lagos on January 19-21, the Angolan representatives informed Gulf that a new relationship would be required, but no conclusions were reached and the entire matter was referred to Gulf's Board of Directors, which met in Pittsburgh

(100)

on February 10, 1976. Following that meeting, Gulf informed the Nigerian Government that it was then in a position to negotiate a new relationship with Angola, looking to a resumption of operations there, and requested the Nigerian Government's assistance in arranging a meeting for that purpose.

On February 24, Gulf informed both the Nigerian Government and the Angolan Government in Luanda of its willingness to release the funds, as well as the accrued interest, held in a special account, representing accumulated tax and royalty payments due to Angola as of that date, without pre-conditions. Nigeria made the necessary arrangements for a further meeting, and on March 5, Gulf representatives met with Nigerian and Angolan representatives in Lagos to discuss the arrangements for payment and a new relationship. These talks were positive and productive and led to the announcement on March 9 of Gulf's release of the funds mentioned above to the Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

Arrangements for Gulf's return to Angola were carried over to another meeting held in Luanda at the end of March, following which it was decided, at the request of the Angolan Government, to resume operations under existing terms. Gulf is presently involved in the complicated task of restoring production and has had good success to date, currently producing more than 70,000 barrels per day with further increases expected shortly.

Before Gulf suspended production in December 1975, its total employees in Angola numbered 116, with 17 expatriates and 79 Angolans and Portuguese (about two-thirds Angolan and the rest Portuguese). At present, Gulf has only a handful of Gulf expatriates in Angola and a small number of expatriate contract personnel. Most of the Angolan and Portuguese employees remained on Gulf's payroll during the suspension and are presently engaged in the work of restoring production.

Gulf has had a good beginning with the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, which reflects, in part, the cooperative relationships that local Gulf personnel had with Angolans in the past. The talks held in Lagos and Luanda were positive. Gulf was invited to resume operations under the existing concession terms with the understanding that it would agree to review those terms with the PRA after six months, and Gulf accepted on that basis. Although it would be premature to speculate on the eventual outcome of future negotiations, they were begun on a mutually satisfactory note, and Gulf is optimistic it can work out an arrangement satisfactory to both sides.

May 11, 1976

APPENDIX 6

REPORT OF LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ON "AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATING TO SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA, BY MOSES PERRY, FEBRUARY 24, 1976"

AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATING TO SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA

The report presents an international law analysis of the following questions:

- (1) What is the legality of South Africa's claim of a right to protect its economic interest in the Cuanene Dam, pursuant to a South African-Portuguese treaty?
- (2) Whether the doctrine of "hot pursuit" applies to South African forces chasing the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) into Angola?

South Africa's Claim of a Right to Protect its Economic Interest in the Cuanene Dam

The legality of South Africa's claim of a right to protect its economic interest in the Cuanene Dam, pursuant to a South African-Portuguese treaty would seem to be contingent upon two factors: (1) the nature and character of the South African-Portuguese Agreement and (2) the position of the present Government in Angola with respect to its willingness to assume the treaty obligations of Portugal, the predecessor colonial Government.

A brief review of the principles of State succession under international law is appropriate as background.

(162)

The essential issue in the law of State succession is, to what extent does a newly independent State become "heir" to the treaty obligations of its predecessor colonial Government?

Historically, there are two theories regarding this question. The theory of "universal succession" holds that the successor State inherits all the treaties, debts and contracts of its predecessor.^{1/} The "clean slate" theory, on the other hand, holds that new, or successor States do not, as a matter of international law, inherit any of the rights or obligations of the predecessor State, with the exception of "localized", "real" or "dispositive" treaties,^{2/} as distinguished from "personal" treaties.^{3/} Neither theory appears to accord with present State practice; and the practice since World War II has been neither consistent nor coherent.^{3/}

Nevertheless, at least two policies seem to be paramount:

"First, most new states (with the exception of Israel, the Philippines, South Korea, Upper Volta, and Algeria) have not applied the 'clean slate' doctrine in all its rigidity. They have sought to avoid sudden, complete, and automatic discontinuity in treaty relations that application of the 'clean slate' would entail."

^{1/}Wolfgang Friedman, *International Law (Cases and Materials)*. West Publishing Co. (St. Paul, Minn. 1959) p. 431.

^{2/}A "localized" or "dispositive" treaty is one which imposes on the territory of a State restrictions of a continuing and permanent character. Illustrations include boundary treaties, treaties creating "international servitudes" such as transit rights, rights with respect to rivers, etc.

^{3/}*Ibid.* p. 432.

^{3/}*Ibid.* p. 439.

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^{3/}*Ibid.* p. 432.

^{3/}*Ibid.* p. 439.

theory would have caused. Second, most new states have not expressly rejected the "clean slate" doctrine, and have not adhered to any other general rule, such as one of "universal" succession. They have tended, on the other hand, to adopt techniques which would give them the freedom to pick and choose the treaty rights and obligations they wish to retain.^{4/}

One of the important findings of the Committee on State Succession to Treaties and other Government Obligations (set up by the International Law Association in 1962) is that "few States are prepared to contend that no treaties survive independence... most treaties survive independence, but with the exception of boundary and river treaties, almost all of these are easily got rid of, if politically inconvenient, by utilization of denunciation clauses or by negotiation".

In addition, the Committee on State Succession found that the new States continuously avoided commitment with respect to the treaties of the former colonial power and preferred to deal with such treaties on a case by case basis.

These conclusions are particularly important as they are the result of examining the practice of about fifty States which emerged as successor States by decolonization after World War II.

The legality of South Africa's claim of a right to protect its economic interest in the Cunene Dam is now considered against the background of the above-stated general principles regarding State succession.

^{4/}*Ibid.*, p. 439.

The South African-Portuguese bilateral treaty entered into on January 21, 1969 regarding the initial stages of the development of the Cunene Dam is properly characterized as a "real" or "dispositive" treaty.^{5/} The legal consequence of this characterization is that, as a general rule of international law, the rights and duties which Portugal assumed under the treaty with South Africa now devolve upon the successor State.^{6/} Angola. With respect to bilateral treaties, however, this rule does not apply.^{7/} Therefore, since the South African-Portuguese treaty is clearly bilateral in nature, then it would appear that Angola, as a successor State, is not legally bound to assume the obligations of its predecessor colonial power with respect to the Cunene Dam project.

It is instructive to consider the practice of some African States regarding the question of State succession, and, in particular, the practice established by Zambia and Tanzania, which have assumed positions followed by other African States.

"When Tanzania became independent, it did not wish to compromise its position in respect to one or two sensitive questions by signing a

^{5/}See p. 2 for definition of real or dispositive treaty.

^{6/}Poulsen, *Succession in International Law*, p. 55.

^{7/}A.P. Lester, "State Succession to Treaties," p. 303 (1963); D.P. O'Connell, *State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law*, p. 32 (1967).

devolution agreement with the United Kingdom, and chose instead to make a declaration embodying what is known as the "Nyerere doctrine". Prime Minister Nyerere stated that for a period of two years Tanzania would continue to apply British treaties, which would be examined and the other parties would be notified of the treaties which Tanzania wished to continue. At the expiration of the two-year period, all treaties not confirmed would be deemed to have lapsed, save those succeeded to by virtue of customary international law.^{8/} "Those [treaties] succeeded to by virtue of customary international law", refers to multilateral treaties, which, as a general rule, seem to devolve upon the successor State.^{9/} It will be recalled that the South African-Portuguese treaty is bilateral in nature and, by law, does not devolve upon the successor State.^{10/}

Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Burundi, Lesotho, and Botswana have adopted the Tanzanian practice, with minor variations.^{11/}

Zambia, on the other hand, has followed a different practice:

"On September 15, 1964, the Cabinet of Zambia agreed that treaty rights and obligations of Northern Rhodesia would be 'inherited' by Zambia upon independence, with the proviso that subsequently the implications of

8/O'Connell, *State Succession*, p. 116.

9/Poulsen, p. 39.

10/*Ibid.* Of course a sovereign, independent State is always free to assume obligations on its own, even if not mandated by law.

11/Friedmann, p. 437.

each treaty should be fully examined. After independence, Zambia decided not to sign a devolution agreement with the United Kingdom, and also not to follow the precedent of Tanzania. Instead, it would allow the question to be governed by customary international law.^{12/}

The Zambian practice has been adopted and followed by Guyana (June 30, 1966), Barbados (February, 1967) and Mauritius.^{13/}

The above selective consideration of State practice, therefore, would seem to confirm the earlier suggestion that newly independent States tend to adopt techniques which give them freedom to pick and choose the treaty rights and obligations they wish to retain. The above consideration of State practice would also seem to confirm the conclusion reached by the Committee on State Succession that, essentially, newly independent States approach treaties entered into by their predecessor colonial powers on a case by case basis.

It follows from the above analysis, then, that ultimately the question of the legality of South Africa's claim must turn on the question whether the present Government in Angola chooses to assume to obligations of its predecessor with respect to the Cunene Dam. The Government of Angola

12/O'Connell, p. 115.

13/Friedman, p. 437.

would arguably be entirely free, under international law, to renounce or to reaffirm the Chinese Treaty. Notwithstanding whatever position the Angolan Government eventually assumes regarding the treaty, it is clear that the presence of South African troops on the territory of a sovereign, independent State, even to protect ostensible economic rights created pursuant to treaty, contravenes the fundamental rule under international law that a State is sole authority over its territory. Briefly, Law of Nations, p. 142 (4th ed. 1948)

Application of the Doctrine of Hot Pursuit

The right of hot pursuit in international law is a right which may find its expression on the land, sea and air domain.^{15/} It has the general function of rendering effective, under certain conditions, the administration of the justice of a State which has suffered a wrong following an unlawful crossing of its land, sea or air frontiers by aliens, or following a violation of its laws, in the event of the offenders having fled beyond the borders of that State.^{16/}

The question addressed here is whether the doctrine of hot pursuit applies to South African forces chasing or pursuing South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas into Angola. South Africa's claim to a right of hot pursuit, with respect to the Namibian/Angolan frontier, must be considered in the light of Security Council

^{15/}Nicholas M. Foulanzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law (1969) p. 346.

^{16/}Ibid.

Resolution 276 as well as the International Court of Justice's holding in connection with South Africa's presence in Namibia.

Pursuant to the U.N. Charter, the Security Council, on January 30, 1970, adopted Security Council Resolution 276 in which the Council declared that "the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal".^{17/}

On July 29, 1970 the Security Council submitted the following question to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion under Art. 96(1) of the U.N. Charter:

What are the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)? S.C. Res. 284, 24 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 4 (1970).

The International Court of Justice advised that:

"States members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia." [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16, 58.

It would appear, therefore, that since the World Court has already declared South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal, then, a fortiori, South Africa's claim of a right to protect the borders of Namibia and to engage in "hot pursuit" pursuant to that claim, would also be illegal.

^{17/}25 U.N. SCOR, 1529 meeting 1 (1970).

However, apart from the holding of the World Court, the legality of South Africa's claim might be considered under the general principles of international law.

The existence of the right of hot pursuit as a rule of positive international law can be established only in the international law of the sea since the right of hot pursuit in this field developed through customary practice and was restated or codified in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas.^{18/} The status of the right of hot pursuit in the international law of the air is that of a customary rule in the making.^{19/} On the other hand, hot pursuit on land possesses no status as a customary rule of international law and is simply based on the explicit consent of the States concerned, on the ground in most cases of reciprocity and under strict and specific conditions.^{20/}

Under general principles of international law, therefore, it would appear that the legality of South Africa's claim of a right to hot pursuit into Angola, depends on the existence or non-existence of a treaty with Angola expressly providing for hot pursuit on a basis of reciprocity and under specified conditions.

Since the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), recognised, as of this writing, by at least 79 States as the Government of Angola, has continuously demanded the withdrawal of South African troops

18/ 450 U.N.T.S. 82; T.I.A.S. No. 5200, (1958).

19/ Poulantzas, p. 347.

20/ Poulantzas, 347.

from Angolan territory, it can be forcefully argued that South Africa's claim of a right to hot pursuit is against the express consent, as required under international law, of the state of Angola. Hence, the claim appears therefore to be substantially without foundation.

Moses L. Perry, Jr.
Moses L. Perry, Jr.,
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
February 25, 1976

APPENDIX 7

LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN DIGGS TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE REQUESTING A WITNESS TO TESTIFY AT MARCH 10 HEARING

February 12, 1976

Hon. Robert McCloskey
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations
Department of State
Room 7261
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing with respect to my request for a ranking Departmental official who is knowledgeable about the U.S. intervention in Angola, future U.S. policy/planning with respect to Angola, and the global context of the U.S. Angola policy as it may relate to overall policy towards Africa as well as to other geographical/functional areas and considerations.

Regarding your letter of February 11, stating that it would not be convenient for the Ambassador to South Africa or the Defense Attache at Pretoria to appear at the February 19 hearing, I am assuming that the Department's witness(es) will be able to respond to all questions we would have ordinarily addressed to the Ambassador and Defense Attache on contacts and exchange of information between the U.S. and South Africa on Angola.

With respect to my request for all evidence, telegrams, letters, and telephone conversations on the question of South African withdrawal, I would like to review all such information prior to the February 19 hearing so that I can make a judgment as to whatever further inquiries may be necessary.

As you know, the key question of overall US policy toward Angola is critical to any effort to analyze US disaster relief, in order that the latter not be counteracted or negated by any US support, direct or indirect, to any of the parties fighting in Angola. I would, therefore, like to restate, as indicated in the subcommittee staff's February 2 conversation with the Department, the areas of concern for the Department's witness to address: 1) the present

173

status of US support/assistance, direct or indirect, to or for the benefit of any parties fighting in Angola; 2) an assessment of the involvement of other countries, direct or indirect, in Angola, in particular, the intervention of South Africa and US efforts to attain a South African withdrawal from Angola; 3) the current political and economic situation in Angola, as well as an analysis of the impact of the war on civilians; and 4) an update on the situation with respect to Angolan refugees and US disaster assistance efforts subsequent to the Subcommittee's November 3 hearing.

The February 19 hearing entitled "Disaster Assistance in Angola," will be held at 3 p.m. in Room 2200, Rayburn Building.

Looking forward to the Department's testimony, I am

Sincerely,

Charles C. Diggs
Chairman
Subcommittee on International
Resources, Food and Energy

APPENDIX 8

RESPONSES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN DIGGS ON JANUARY 13, 1976

1. Q: Please verify: quote the CIA is using USAF starlifters to fly weapons and supplies into Zaire to bolster anti-Communist forces.
A: The U.S. Air Force is flying U.S. supplies into Zaire in C-141 aircraft.
2. Q: What pressures did the department or any other U.S. agency use to force Gulf to withdraw its personnel from Angola and suspend operations? On what specific basis did you feel that Gulf personnel and property would have been jeopardized and operations continued under the circumstances?
A: The Department reminded Gulf of the appeals it had made for all Americans to leave Angola and urged the company to comply in the interest of employee safety. Given the civil war situation and the absence of official American presence to protect U.S. interests. We also advised Gulf that it would be unwise for the company to make royalty and tax payments to one faction in a civil war situation, suggesting that it should wait until an Angolan government was duly constituted.
3. Q: Is the December 28 article by New York Times columnist Kaufmann true that there were reportedly 1,000 Cubans guarding Gulf until the suspension?
A: Cuban troops are stationed in Cabinda, but we have no confirmation of the New York Times report that 1,000 Cubans were guarding Gulf installations until the suspension.
4. Q: What is the status of Texaco's promising exploration rights for offshore regions of Angola? Has Texaco withdrawn from Angola and was USG instrumental in that decision?
A: Texaco suspended drilling operations off Angola's coast before independence. The U.S. government was not consulted. Texaco still retains its exploration rights and plans to resume operations at a later date.

(174)

5. Q: What is the status of Diamang, a company owned by Portuguese, U.S. and S. African interests: is it continuing to pay royalties to MPLA? Has there been any attempt by USG to influence the suspension of paying said royalties to MPLA?
A: As far as we know, Diamang is cooperating with the MPLA government. U.S. participation in Diamang is very small. The USG has not approached the company about its royalty payments.
6. Q: What is the status of investigations re: recruiting American citizens for military service in Angola in violation of Title 18 and other related provisions of the U.S. code? What is the status of investigations of those actually serving under such circumstances? Please verify the AP story dated December 16 that according to US intelligence reports USSR has sent or agreed to send at least \$400 million worth of MIG jets, tanks, and other military equipment to some ten black African countries in the past two years, namely, to Somalia, Angola, Nigeria, Congo/S, Uganda, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, Equatorial Guinea, and the CAR.
A: Re: recruiting--the Justice Department has asked the FBI to investigate this matter and work has begun. To date, no evidence has turned up of any Americans serving in Angola.
AP story--The information available to U.S. indicates that the USSR provided Angola with \$200 million worth of military support in 1975 alone. Agreements and deliveries to nine other black African countries during 1974 and 1975 are estimated at \$200 million.
7. Q: Is USG still attempting to obtain intervention of France, Belgium, UK, West Germany, any other European powers or Japan to pick up the slack in military assistance to FNLA and UNITA anticipated when current funds are expended and provided the House concurs in the Senate cut-off action?
A: Any aid which other nations may be providing to the FNLA/Unita forces is on their own initiative for their own policy reasons.
8. Q: Has the program been developed by AID to authorize use of grant funds for new projects in the human rights area? Please advise re: nature of programming.
A: We assume code is referring to humanitarian assistance. AID has budgeted \$3 million in FY 1977 for Angola for relief and rehabilitation programs.

9. Q: How can the Department continue to deny having initiated or having had any consultations with South Africa in view of the fact that we have a diplomatic mission there and also a defense? What kind of communication has the Defense had with DOD and/or State on South African and/or U.S. involvement in Angola? Show cause why AMS Bowdler and the Defense should not be recalled to Washington for indefinite consultation.

A: We can deny the charge because we have had no consultations with the SAC on Angola. The fact that we have an embassy and a defense attaché in South Africa has nothing to do with the matter. We have scrupulously avoided any consultation with the SAC, since it is clearly one aim of the SAC to use the present conflict to obtain international support. We see no need to bring back our ambassador and defense attaché for indefinite consultations.

10. Q: Africa wireless file No. 3 dated Jan. 6, on page 9, refers to the President "backing a report by the United States Intelligence Committee which questions U.S. motives in the \$100,000 payment" for aid to Holden Roberto. Is this still true, and what is the explanation?

A: This refers to the Pike Committee and an agreement between the legislative and executive branches on clearance of documents prior to release to the public.

11. Q: Upon what basis is "FS material not for publication"?

A: Some of the material is unconfirmed, hence the cautionary note.

12. Q: Will you confirm the report in the Newweek Magazine that South Africa has been using American C-141 aircraft to bring supplies into Angola?

A: This allegation in Newweek is not true.

13. Q: What is the nature and results of Anglo-American consultations on the Indian Ocean which are reported to be held twice a year? What is the status of our developing and expanding Diego Garcia in view of the Senate Action suspending the operation?

A: (a) The last meeting was held in November, 1975. As is always the case, there was no agenda and no decisions were taken. The purpose of the meetings is to compare notes on the situation in the Indian Ocean.
(b) The HSG is going ahead with previously approved plans through the use of prior year funds.

14. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

15. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

16. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

17. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

18. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

19. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

20. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

21. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

22. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

23. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

24. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

25. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

26. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

27. Q: Please comment on Sen. Weicker's remarks that the posting of U.S. materials provided FULA was deliberately low. For example, a .45 caliber pistol was listed at \$5.00. This would seem to suggest that DFC contributions if properly added actually amount to a great deal more than admitted.

A: Sen. Weicker's statement not true.

APPENDIX 9

TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE ON ANGOLA ISSUED BY CHAIRMAN DIGGS FROM
ADDIS ABABA ON JANUARY 11, 1976

American intrusion in the Angola conflict is the biggest blunder in the history of its relations with Africa and may be the most serious foreign policy miscalculation it has ever made. Were it not for the awesome reverence accorded to Secretary of State Kissinger, this Angola misadventure may have forced his resignation. Regrettably President Ford has blindly followed Kissinger's folly. The error of allowing U.S. policy to converge with that of white supremacist South Africa was compounded by the covert nature of the operation, and further exacerbated by the revelation that the United States has no vital interests in Angola. But the United States intervene to hold back the expansion of progressive African majority-ruled states southward toward the Cape under the guise of meeting a Soviet challenge?

Washington officials refuse to adjust to political and economic realities of the seventies. Despite the coup in Portugal, the independence of Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, the British unilateral abrogation of the South African Simonstown Agreement, the French reassessment of its military sales policy with South Africa, and the inevitable decline of the strategic importance of the Cape route with the reopening of the Suez Canal, the administration apparently still bases its Southern African policy on the reactionary support, despite public pronouncements for racist minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia.

The tragedy of United States Angolan policy is that this fiasco was not inevitable. Appropriate recommendations were coming from U.S. Embassies in the field and from within the African Bureau of the State Department, but once again African specialists were circumvented by the Secretary's imperious attitude and precivily toward viewing conflicts in terms of exercises in East-West one-upmanship. If Brazil, a military power known for its conservative policies located less than four hours from Angola and the West African Coastline can recognize the MPLA regime, reflecting no great concern over a Soviet threat, surely the challenge to American security interests in that area is vastly overrated.

American Angola policy is particularly troublesome to Black Americans. As an American I am concerned about the U.S. supporting a reactionary faction in what could be a protracted war, but as a Black American I find it unacceptable for the United States and the Soviet Union to shed African blood in their war by proxy, and that two super powers should arm Africans to kill other Africans.

As an American I oppose U.S. military assistance for a war in which it has no vital interests, yet as a Black American I regret that the U.S. has not lived up to its noble tradition as the first new nation to win a war of independence, that has continually espoused self determination for all people, but has allowed the Soviet Union to become identified as the principal supporter of African liberation.

As an American I would deplore Soviet intervention, but as a Black American I unalterably condemn the South African invasion and occupation of Southern Angola as a dangerous precedent threatening the territorial sovereignty of all African nations in the area.

The outcome of the OAU summit will have profound implications for the African Continent and international peace and stability. I am confident that African wisdom and solidarity will enable the Chiefs of State and Governments to reach an appropriate solution which will call for:

1. A withdrawal of South Africa and other intervening external powers;
2. A cease-fire; and
3. A political settlement among dissident factions.

(178)

Finally, I want to reaffirm my support for the cessation of further U.S. military and related assistance to parties in Angola and the Congressional Black Caucus' nine-point program for a new American Angolan policy announced December 17, 1975. Upon my return to the United States, I will recommend that the Congressional Black Caucus convene a summit of Black American leaders to review the Administration's African policy and to form the nucleus of a lobby of Blacks and their supporters in America for a more progressive African policy. As we move into this Presidential Election year, Africa will become a factor in U.S. Domestic Politics.

Finally, in an effort to consolidate its interest in the Black world, I want to announce that the Congressional Black Caucus will meet with top Caribbean Government Officials during the first quarter of the year to examine foreign policy questions of mutual interest. U.S. African policy will be high in the Agenda.

APPENDIX 10

TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS ON DECEMBER 17, 1975, ENTITLED "CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS DEMANDS END TO UNITED STATES ANGOLA INTERVENTION"

The Congressional Black Caucus, concerned with the serious threat to international peace posed by the escalating civil war in Angola, deplores the intervention of non-Angolan powers in that conflict. The United States involvement is particularly disturbing. For, not only is it a covert operation, but it is contrary to the position of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) opposing all foreign intervention. It aligns the United States on the same side with the White minority regime of South Africa, and in so doing, compounds the harm to U.S. relations with independent, majority-ruled Africa, created by U.S. refusal to support majority-rule in South Africa. Moreover, it is based on the false "domino theory" assumption that the U.S. must intervene to counter a so-called Soviet challenge.

Most recently, there have repeated reports from unimpeachable sources that the U.S. has secretly sent millions of dollars worth of military equipment and supplies for use in Angola, and that American personnel are serving as advisors to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)-National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) coalition. So far, funds for these covert activities have come from special contingency accounts which are expected to be depleted in less than two months. The Congressional Black Caucus, concerned that the U.S. move expeditiously to end its intervention, serves notice that it will strongly oppose any request for additional financing of this operation.

Once again, we are faced with an example of executive distortions and secrecy. The Executive has attempted to keep the facts of U.S. involvement in Angola from the American public and, indeed, from the majority of Members of Congress. Secretary of State Kissinger spoke of a policy of non-intervention at a time when the U.S. had already instituted its covert support of FNLA/UNITA.

The United States should have learned important lessons from Viet Nam. A nationalist movement that has fought for independence for years and that has been aided in that struggle by the Soviet Union, rarely accepts Soviet domination when victory is achieved. Therefore, it is specious to argue that the United States intervened in Angola to meet a "Soviet challenge".

The domino theory does not apply to Africa. While the Soviet Union, in contrast to the United States, has traditionally supported liberation movements in Algeria, Southern Africa, and Guinea-Bissau, as well as certain independent African states, there is no Soviet satellite on the African continent.

U.S. intervention may in fact create the situation the Administration hopes to prevent. American involvement risks raising the cost of winning and increasing MPLA's (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) reliance upon the Kremlin, thereby reducing MPLA's flexibility to pursue an independent policy after the war. In any event, a protracted struggle hardens positions on both sides and makes a government of national unity more difficult to achieve.

The Congressional Black Caucus also condemns any efforts to recruit Americans to serve as "mercenaries" in Angola. U.S. law provides that any American citizen enlisting in the armed forces of another country runs the risk of losing his U.S. citizenship, and of being liable to criminal prosecution.

The Congressional Black Caucus is particularly alarmed by the special implications of South Africa's intervention in Angola. The incursions of this White minority, racist regime in an independent African country profoundly heightens the gravity of the situation and sets a serious precedent which could endanger the territorial integrity of other African states.

(186)

Most importantly, the U.S. alignment on the same side as South Africa in what the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Patrick Moynihan, terms a "convergence in policy" may, over the long run, have serious adverse consequences for U.S. political and economic relations with independent, majority-ruled Africa.

Since the independence of Angola, on November 11, seventy-three percent of all direct American investment in Africa south of the Sahara, and three-fourths of South Africa's invasion of Angola, under the pretext of protecting its holdings in the Ruacana hydroelectric project in southern Angola, has had two major purposes: (1) to aid anti-MPLA forces with supplies and with troops and/or mercenaries who have penetrated hundreds of miles into Angola, thereby preventing what it surely perceives as a "hostile" force from gaining power; and (2) to capture SWAPO (the liberation movement in neighboring Namibia, illegally occupied by South Africa) guerrillas, thus attempting to eliminate such of the opposition forces in that territory. Such activities clearly illustrate the serious threat to international peace which South Africa poses in its last-ditch efforts to maintain its own survival.

Equally worrisome are reports of South Africa's secret project to complete, by early 1976, an army/air force base at Grootfontein in Namibia, not far from the Angolan border. Such a base would clearly be invaluable to South Africa's attempts to insulate itself from "hostile" forces in Namibia and Angola. In view of these developments, the Congressional Black Caucus calls on the U.S. Government to take the following actions:

- (1) cease immediately all military-related assistance, direct or indirect, to any parties fighting in Angola, and withdraw its request for financing of additional military and related assistance;
- (2) urge a ceasefire among all parties concerned;
- (3) use its good offices to reach an agreement among all non-Angolan powers involved, directly or indirectly, that they will end their intervention;
- (4) urge the Angolan factions to find an immediate, political solution;
- (5) urge all countries to await the results of the forthcoming meetings of the OAU for further guidelines with respect to Angola;
- (6) commit the U.S. to substantial economic and rehabilitation assistance to whatever Angolan government is recognized by the OAU;
- (7) make it clear to the South African Government, as we have to the Soviet Union, that its intervention is a threat to international peace;
- (8) emphasize to the Soviet Union that American public reaction to its intervention in Angola is bound to affect support for its future economic relations with the U.S.; and
- (9) report to the Congress on the implementation of these recommendations and keep all interested Members of Congress fully advised with respect to U.S. policy and involvement in Angola.

APPENDIX 11

ARTICLE BY CHAIRMAN DINGS WRITTEN ESPECIALLY FOR THE BLACK PRESS ENTITLED "WHY U.S. MUST STAY OUT OF ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR"

I am strongly opposed to further U.S. intervention, direct or indirect, in the Angolan civil war for the following reasons:

(1) In allying itself on the same side as South Africa, the U.S. risks even greater harm to its relations with independent, majority-ruled Africa.

(2) It places the U.S. along with other external interveners, in opposition to the policy of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that there should be no foreign intervention in Angola.

(3) It is based on the same, false cold-war assumptions which led us into an escalating Vietnam involvement, that the Soviet Union, in supporting one of the movements, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), presents a "challenge" which the U.S. must counter.

(and)

(4) The covert nature of the U.S. involvement has made it very difficult for the American public and for most members of Congress to be informed as to the extent of U.S. intervention.

The most disturbing element is the escalating intervention of South Africa in Angola, and the United States' alignment on the same side as this White, minority regime. By assisting the same two movements, National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), as South Africa, the U.S., which is seen as generally supportive of South Africa, becomes militarily involved in defense of South African interests and, indeed, quite possibly, of South Africa itself.

South Africa, in its last-ditch efforts to maintain its own survival, is determined to prevent what it surely perceives as a "hostile" movement (MPLA) from gaining power in Angola, and to eliminate the opposition forces in neighboring Namibia by capturing SWAPO (the liberation movement in Namibia, illegally occupied by South Africa) guerrillas in Angola. These activities, carried out under the pretext of protecting South African holdings in the Ruacana hydroelectric project in southern Angola, serve to illustrate the serious threat to international peace which South Africa poses.

The U.S. posture on the same side as South Africa cannot help but further harm U.S. relations with the independent, majority-ruled African states, in which 73% of all direct American investment in Africa south of the Sahara and three-fourths of its trade now occurs.

It is further alarming that the U.S. has repeatedly attacked the intervention of the Soviet Union as a threat to peace, but has been silent on South Africa—the only intervening power reported to be actually occupying portions of Angolan territory!

The Administration has apparently failed to give ample consideration to the likely domestic implications of its involvement in an African war on the side of South Africa. The American public, in particular, the Black community, will not sit idly by as the Administration attempts militarily to involve this country in support of the interests of the White, minority regime in South Africa.

The Administration has also failed to learn the important lessons of the Vietnam experience. A nationalist movement that has fought for independence for years and that has been aided in that struggle by the Soviet Union, in this case, MPLA, rarely accepts Soviet domination when victory is achieved. Despite a long history of support for liberation movements in Africa, there are no Soviet satellites on the continent. Therefore, it is specious to argue that the U.S. intervened in Angola to meet a "Soviet challenge." Moreover, in view of reports that

(182)

larger Soviet shipments to MPLA may have begun only after a U.S. decision significantly to increase its involvement last summer, serious questions must be raised about the basic rationale of U.S. policy that the U.S. intervened only in response to the Soviet Union.

The Senate of the United States cannot be too strongly commended for its strong vote on December 19 to bar funds in the Defense Appropriations Bill for use in the Angolan civil war. The House of Representatives will consider the same matter when it reconvenes next session. It is a priority concern that the American people convey their views on U.S. involvement in Angola to their Congressmen before the new session begins on January 19th.

It is also important that the Administration be made aware of the public's concern with respect to U.S. Angola policy. Accordingly, I would like to reiterate some of the key suggestions made by the Congressional Black Caucus on this issue. These recommendations include the following actions by the U.S. Government:

- (1) Cease immediately all military-related assistance, direct or indirect, to any parties fighting in Angola, and withdraw its request for financing of additional military and related assistance;
- (2) Urge a cease-fire among all parties concerned;
- (3) Use its good offices to reach an agreement among all non-Angolan powers involved, directly or indirectly, that they will end their intervention;
- (4) Urge the Angolan factions to find an immediate, political solution;
- (5) Urge all countries to wait the results of the forthcoming meetings of the OAU for further guidelines with respect to Angola;
- (6) Commit the United States to substantial economic and rehabilitation assistance to whatever Angolan government is recognized by the OAU;
- (7) Make it clear to the South African Government, as we have to the Soviet Union, that its intervention is a threat to international peace;
- (8) Emphasize to the Soviet Union that American public reaction to its intervention in Angola is bound to affect support for its future economic relations with the United States; and
- (9) Report to the Congress on the implication of these recommendations and keep all interested Members of Congress fully advised with respect to U.S. policy and involvement in Angola.

APPENDIX 12

RELEVANT NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

(From the Washington Post, August 23, 1975)

LISBON SAYS IT CAN'T CONTROL ANGOLA STRIFE

Portugal indicated yesterday that it had little hope of bringing the situation in its embattled colony of Angola under control.

In a letter to the U.N. Security Council, Portugal's foreign minister said that "it is impossible to eliminate the risk of a further deterioration of the situation" in Angola, where rival nationalist factions have set on each other in a struggle for control of the country after its independence, scheduled for Nov. 11.

One of the groups, the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, charged yesterday that the United States and neighboring Zaire and South Africa were arming its rival organizations.

A Popular Movement communique said that American Skymaster transports were airlifting arms from U.S. bases in West Germany to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, which is backed by Zaire. The National Front and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola have forged an alliance vowing to oust the Popular Movement from control of Luanda, the Angolan capital.

The Popular Movement statement went on to say that South African troops had entered southern Angola on the pretext of guarding the hydroelectric dam project on the Cunene River.

In Kinshasa, Zaire's capital, a spokesman for the National Union faction said that Soviet navy vessels had fired missiles in support of Popular Movement forces fighting the other two groups at the port city of Lobito.

Meanwhile, a spokesman in New York for First National City Bank confirmed that the manager of a partly owned subsidiary in Luanda had been detained by authorities there.

The manager, Allan Williams, was reportedly taken from a plane which was to ferry refugees from Luanda to Windhoek in Namibia (Southwest Africa).

A Luanda newspaper said that his detention followed his refusal to hand over keys to the bank, Banco Inter Unido, in compliance with a demand by former Finance Minister Sayd Mingas. Mingas was a Popular Movement member of the now-defunct interim Cabinet that was to guide Angola until its independence.

The First National City spokesman said that Williams was free to leave the colony and planned to go today.

An official of the National Union in Lusaka, Zambia, said his group was shopping for arms "anywhere" with which to battle the Popular Movement troops. He accused the Popular Movement of building up its arsenal of Soviet weapons while the transitional government was in power.

(From the Washington Post, October 18, 1975)

MISSING AMERICANS

LUANDA, ANGOLA—Two Americans are believed to have been seized by African liberation fighters in Angola, U.S. consular officials said.

One was identified as John Scott Robinson, 30, a representative of Ranger Air, an air charter company, who was believed taken in Luanda last month by rebels. The other, believed to have been seized Thursday, was not identified.

(184)

(From the New York Times, Sept. 25, 1975)

UNITED STATES, SOVIET, CHINA REPORTED AIDING PORTUGAL, ANGOLA

(By Leslie H. Gelb)

WASHINGTON, September 24.—Millions of dollars are being poured covertly into Portugal and Angola by East and West, according to four official sources in Washington. The funneling of the funds is part of the continuing struggle for control of the Mediterranean and for influence and raw materials in Central Africa.

United States money for the Portuguese Socialist party and other parties is being funneled by the Central Intelligence Agency through West European Socialist parties and labor unions, the sources said. The C.I.A. involvement, the sources said, amounted to several million dollars a month over the last several months.

It is also reliably reported that the Soviet Union and its East European allies have poured \$50-million to \$100-million into Portugal since April, 1974, and hundreds of tons of military equipment into Angola since March alone.

CHINESE IN ZAIRE

The sources also said that about 200 Chinese military advisers were operating from bases in Zaire to help at least one of the two liberation fronts being supported by Washington.

Until the spring, most of the Western aid to anti-Communist forces in Portugal was being given secretly by the West German Social Democratic party and the Belgian Socialist party without any American involvement.

The sources said that the funds earmarked for two anti-Soviet liberation fronts in Angola had been dispersed mainly through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. In order to maintain good relations with Mr. Mobutu, the State Department has been seeking to arrange a refinancing of hundreds of millions of dollars in Zaire's short-term debts and to increase American aid to Zaire to about \$80-million this year, from about \$20 million.

In Angola and Portugal, the sources estimated, Soviet aid is far more than American aid, at least in the case of Angola, has included several direct shipments of arms.

It is reliably said that the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, East Germany and others have transferred the bulk of the funds going to the Portuguese Communist party through a bank in Lisbon and a bank in Zurich.

SOVIET AID OUTLINED

The following details were reliably supplied on Soviet aid to its supporters in Angola: In March, several Soviet planes landed in the Congo Republic, Zaire's neighbor, with arms and equipment that were then shipped to Angola; in April, about 100 tons of arms were delivered in southern Angola by chartered aircraft; in April, two Yugoslav vessels unloaded arms in Luanda, the capital of Angola; in May and June, four Soviet merchant ships unloaded vehicles, machine guns, bazookas, rifles and ammunition, off Angola, and two East German and one Algerian vessel delivered similar materials.

The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is reported close to controlling Angola, which is scheduled to become independent Nov. 11. In Portugal, the anti-Communist situation stabilized somewhat last week with the installation of a Government including members of the Socialist party.

The Washington sources said that C.I.A. operations in both countries had been approved by President Ford and were being carried out, as prescribed by law, with the knowledge of several congressional committees.

Both sides, first Moscow then Washington, were filling the coffers of their supporters in Portugal at the very time when President Ford and the Soviet party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, were signing a pledge in Helsinki, Finland, not to interfere in the internal affairs of other European nations.

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KISSINGER VOICES ALARM

Secretary of State Kissinger, speaking to representatives of African countries last night and answering Soviet charges of Western involvement in Portugal, said: "We are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence."

The C.I.A. cash-funneling operations to Portugal were said to have revived dormant but traditional connections between the agency and anti-Communist West European socialist and labor movements. And the operation in Angola, the sources said, led to the reactivation of Holden Roberto, head of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the man chosen in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy and the C.I.A. to forge a link between the United States and the indigenous groups that were expected to drive Portugal from Angola one day.

Two of the forces stressed that all odds now favored victory by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement in Angola, unless the United States and China rushed huge transfusions of aid, which is considered highly unlikely.

As described by these sources, the main purpose for the covert American effort in Angola was to underline the Administration's support for President Mobutu, the man on whom Secretary of State Kissinger is banking to oppose Moscow's interests in Africa and to further Washington's interests in various international forums.

The funds going to Portugal from the United States and Western Europe were said to be aimed at keeping non-Communist parties intact, in the streets, and in the business of competing with the Communists for the support of military leaders and soldiers.

One source said: "The President almost blew the whole Portugal thing last week in his interview with The Chicago Sun-Times. But nobody picked him up."

This was a reference to Mr. Ford's reply to a question about the absence of C.I.A. involvement in Portugal. He noted "our strong stand" along with NATO allies against a Communist government in Lisbon, then said: "I don't think the situation required us to have a major C.I.A. involvement, which we have not had."

The source was pointing to the fact that Mr. Ford was not denying that the C.I.A. had an involvement.

The sources maintained that William E. Colby the director of the agency, had notified members of six Congressional subcommittees several months ago of the covert operations, and that no serious objections had been raised. Mr. Colby gave the notifications after the operations were already under way, as he is permitted to do under the law.

An amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 stipulated that no funds could be spent by or on behalf of the C.I.A. for covert operations "unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services committees, and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on International Relations."

In each case, the full committee delegated the duty of overseeing the C.I.A. to a subcommittee. With a few exceptions, the members of these subcommittees are regarded as conservative.

The sources either did not know or would not state when the covert operations began. But two of the sources indicated that the funds going to Portugal predated an interview given by Mr. Ford to U.S. News & World Report early last month when he talked of the virtual impossibility of C.I.A. involvement in Lisbon.

FORD VOICES REGRETS

Speaking of aid going "quietly" from Moscow and Western Europe to warring factions in Portugal, he said:

"I think it's very tragic that, because of the C.I.A. investigation and all the limitations placed on us in the area of covert operation, we aren't able to participate with other Western European countries."

"The American people shouldn't handicap themselves from meeting the challenge, as we were handicapped in South Vietnam and as we are handicapped in trying to be a participant in Portugal."

One of the sources said that Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger made the decision some time after they went to Brussels for a NATO meeting in late May. It was after consultations with heads of state there, the source continued, that they saw how strongly the West European leaders felt about maintaining a non-Communist Portugal. The source then explained: "We wanted to show them that we would stand with them on this one, and also more money was needed."

Another source said that the West Europeans were already "giving plenty" and would have given more, but "it's just that we can't keep our hands out of anything."

Two of the sources said that West European trade unions that they would not identify were smuggling small arms and ammunition to the Portuguese Socialists. The Portuguese Communists, they said, had been previously armed by Moscow.

The decision to begin covertly financing these anti-Communist forces marked the latest step in a long process of reversing policy toward post-Salazar Portugal. For almost a year following the death of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, the administration's policy was to lament privately but say nothing publicly about the leftward trend among the Portuguese military leaders. The theory was that more harm than good would come of any American involvement.

IN KEEPING WITH PAST POLICY

But the recent decision to take a strong anti-Communist stand in Portugal, including covert financing, was very much in keeping with the history of American policy toward the countries on the northern rim of the Mediterranean.

Beginning with the Communist-inspired instability in Greece and Turkey after World War II, and running through the threat of a Communist role in the Italian government in the early nineteen-sixties, the C.I.A. has been active in this region.

Much the same holds true for Africa, particularly beginning with Moscow's attempt to gain a foothold in Zaïre, which was previously the Belgian Congo. From the time Patrice Lumumba was ousted, through the short career of Moïse Tshombe, until General Mobutu came to power, a number of authoritative sources related, the C.I.A. has maintained its largest African station in Zaïre.

At about the same time, in the early sixties, the sources said, President Kennedy determined that Portugal, an American ally in NATO, could not sustain control over her African colonies indefinitely and that contact must be made with future revolutionary leaders. In 1962, on the advice of the C.I.A. among others, Mr. Roberto, the brother-in-law of General Mobutu, was selected as a future leader for Angola.

ROBERTO "DEACTIVATED"

The sources said that from 1962 to about 1969, the C.I.A. supplied Mr. Roberto with money and arms, but to little avail. At that point, they said he was deactivated and put on "retainer."

Mr. Roberto was reactivated this spring, according to the sources, at about the time it became clear that the then Communist-leaning government in Portugal ordered its armed forces in Angola to give active support to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola headed by Agostino Neto.

But the sources said that C.I.A. operatives and American diplomats judged that United States support should also be thrown behind Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

It could not be learned whether Chinese and American officials had ever discussed or ought to coordinate their efforts against Mr. Neto. What was learned was that American funds were being used to buy arms for both Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi, and that the Chinese were providing military advisors for Mr. Roberto and perhaps for Mr. Savimbi as well.

It could not be learned whether any C.I.A. operatives were also acting as military advisers.

CABINDA A KEY FACTOR

At stakes in Angola, besides the enlargement of Soviet influence, is a region deemed rich in copper, industrial diamonds and oil. Of particular interest to the United States and to President Mobutu, the sources said, is Cabinda, an oil-rich area bordering on Zaïre and separated from Angola by the Congo River. There, the sources related, the Gulf Oil Corporation continues to pump over 100,000

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barrels a day. The sources said that the Administration believed that Mr. Mobutu would like to annex Cabinda in the likely event of a Communist take-over in Angola.

All the sources said, that it was Zaïre that was of primary concern to the Administration. It is believed that Mr. Kissinger is about to select Sheldon B. Vance, a former Ambassador to Zaïre and a close friend of Mr. Mobutu, to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He would replace Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary. Mr. Davis was in charge of Deane R. Hinton, the ambassador who was ordered out of Zaïre some months ago amid charges by President Mobutu that the C.I.A. had designs on the President's life.

It was Mr. Vance, two of the sources said, who this summer began to contact Zaïre's many creditors in the United States and elsewhere to see if the millions in debts that were soon to come due could be refinanced. It could not be learned whether Mr. Vance had completed this task or had succeeded.

In the meantime, the State Department has approached several Congressmen with a view toward increasing American aid to about \$15-million. This year, Zaïre was to receive about \$20-million, but the State Department is now aiming for \$60-million. This would consist of \$20-million in development aid, \$20-million in Export-Import Bank loans, and \$20-million in Food for Peace credit. Several officials said that so far, Congressional response had been decidedly negative.

(From the Washington Post, Oct. 25, 1975)

U.S. PLANS TO BOOST ARMS AID TO ZAIRE

(By David B. Ottaway)

The Ford administration is about to propose to Congress a \$19 million military assistance program for Zaïre in addition to a \$60 million emergency financial aid package already under consideration for the economically distressed Central African nation, according to congressional sources.

State Department officials would neither confirm nor deny the report of what would amount to a more than fivefold increase in the present level of U.S. military aid to Zaïre. One official said the program was the outgrowth of a long-standing Zaïrian request for more American military assistance.

The military aid request coincides with growing Zaïrian involvement in the civil war in neighboring Angola. Two of the three warring nationalist movements are known to be receiving arms and other war supplies from Zaïre.

There have also been press reports that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been funneling money through Zaïre to these same anti-Communist groups, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).

This raises the question whether all or part of the \$19 million in military assistance for Zaïre under administration consideration is earmarked for the two Angolan groups.

Among the items the United States is said to be prepared to provide to Zaïre is the M-16 rifle, which is ideally suited to the needs of these two Angolan nationalist groups in their current battle against the Soviet-supplied Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

Thousands of tons of Eastern and Western arms are pouring into Angola for the three rival nationalist movements fighting to establish control over as much territory as possible before the Portuguese colony's scheduled independence on Nov. 11.

State Department sources said this week that four more ships loaded with about 10,000 tons of Soviet arms arrived at a small port south of the Angolan capital of Luanda in early October for the Popular Movement.

These sources said that between 200 and 400 Cubans were also aboard the ships but that it was not clear whether they had remained in Angola as military advisers to the Popular Movement.

The leftist Popular Movement has repeatedly charged that hundreds of Zaïrian army officers and soldiers as well as dozens of Portuguese "mercenaries" are fighting alongside the troops of the Zaïre- and Chinese-backed National Front.

Zaïrian President Gen. Sese Seko Mobutu has long supported the National Front, whose president, Holden Roberto, is his brother-in-law and whose headquarters were for years in the Zaïrian capital of Kinshasa.

Recently, Mobutu has also started arming UNITA and is reported to have used his American-provided transport planes to send arms to Silva Porto in southern Angola where UNITA has its main base of support.

Meanwhile, a delegation of the Popular Movement visiting Washington, D.C., this week charged that the CIA is sending black American veterans of Vietnam to Angola to fight for the National Front.

The Movement delegation's leader, Saydi Mingas, said that National Front leader Holden Roberto also has several black Americans serving as members of his personal bodyguard. Mingas indicated that his own group is trying to capture one or more of these "mercenaries" to prove their charges of CIA involvement in Angola.

Mingas also attacked the \$60 million economic assistance program proposed by the Ford administration for Zaïre, saying that food purchased abroad under it would be used at least partly to feed Zaïre-supported National Front troops and the population under their control in northern Angola.

The Popular Movement official, finance minister in the provisional government ruling Angola until independence, said relations between his group and the Gulf Oil Co. of Pittsburgh are "very good."

Gulf is the major oil producer and foreign exchange earner in Angola and has been accused of supporting a secessionist movement in the enclave of Cabinda, site of its off-shore oil operations.

Mingas said troops of the Popular Movement were stationed all around Gulf installations in Cabinda to protect them from any attack by soldiers of rival Angolan groups or from an "invasion from Zaïre."

APPENDIX 13

REPORT ON A SEMINAR BETWEEN A GROUP OF AMERICANS AND AN OFFICIAL DELEGATION FROM THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, HELD IN HAVANA, CUBA, FEBRUARY 26-29, 1976

(By Robert S. Browne)

On February 13th, I received a call from the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, inviting me to participate in a seminar which the Cuban government would host in Havana at the request of the Angolan government (MPLA). After some changes in dates and itinerary I was instructed to report to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on February 23rd, where my travel to Havana would be arranged, and I was told that I would be deposited in Kingston, Jamaica on March 2nd. All expenses between Mexico City and Kingston would be picked up by the Cuban government.

It is not clear as to who was responsible for selecting the persons to make this trip, nor why I was chosen. I have not been particularly active in Angolan support efforts although I did have some brief contact with both MPLA and UNITA people in New York City during 1975. In any case, I was pleased to accept the invitation, both because of the opportunity it afforded to meet with Angolan officials and because of the opportunity to see the Cuban experiment. I was also delighted to have a chance to visit Mexico City and Jamaica, the latter for the first time).

On arriving at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on the morning of the 23rd, I learned that the American delegation would consist of

(190)

26 persons, of whom four were members of the black working press (including two from the Bilalian News, formerly Muhammad Speaks). The other 22 were persons from a variety of organizations--labor unions, religious organizations, advocacy groups of various types. Most of these groups were somewhat left of center and perhaps six or seven of the persons would probably classify themselves as Marxists-Leninists. Racially, the group contained 12 blacks (plus four black press representatives) 8 whites, and 2 Spanish surname persons (one Puerto Rican and one Chicano).

There were some difficulties with transportation but by Wednesday the entire group had reached Havana and on Thursday (February 26th) the seminar began. The Angolan delegation consisted of three persons who had arrived in Havana only hours before our delegation. They represented three distinct branches of the new Angolan ruling forces: Commander Dibala, representing the Military; Ms. Olga Lima, Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Pedro Zinga Baptista of the Foreign Relations section of the Party (The Party refers to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, which was the faction which won the brief Angolan civil war, with Soviet and Cuban assistance, defeating the U.S. and South African backed factions).

The delegation also came from three different regions of their vast country. Commander Dibala and Ms. Lima both spoke good English, but the delegation spoke in Portuguese during the formal sessions. The Cuban's provided excellent meeting facilities for us, including a

team to do simultaneous translation, so there were few problems of communication. We also had ample opportunity to socialize with the Angolan delegation between sessions, and they arranged for most of us to have at least one meal with them in small groups of six (3 Angolans and 3 Americans). Some of us also went night clubbing with the Angolans. (Yes, Cuba sports a number of quite elaborate night clubs, of which I visited only one, but on three occasions! All drinks were paid for by the government. We merely had to produce the visitor's card with which each of us was provided).

The seminar began by the Angolans requesting that each American make a brief descriptive presentation about himself, his organization, and his interest in Africa or in Angola. This used up the entire first day and extended into the second, after which the Angolans made a presentation and responded to a host of questions which our delegation raised. This filled out the second day, which concluded with the Angolans indicating a few specific things which we might do to assist them. On the third day we did not hold a formal meeting, but on the fourth day (the Americans having met amongst themselves to discuss the specific requests) we held a final meeting with the Angolans and responded to their requests. The principal requests were to assist them in attaining U.S. recognition and in obtaining visas to permit an Angolan delegation to visit the U.S.; to help dispel some of the myths about the Angolan situation; to broaden support in America for the Angolan government; to help avert any effort by Washington to boycott Angola or to offer military aid to anti government forces; and to seek support in the U.S. for immediate needs such as pharmaceuticals,

medically trained personnel, fertilizers and tractors.

In a short summary such as this it is possible to provide only a few highlights of the discussions and of one's impressions. Perhaps one of the most striking revelations for me was the remarkable character of the Angolan delegation, and especially of the two who spoke English. They were highly sophisticated, extremely well informed about events around the world, extremely businesslike, and exuded genuine warmth and humor. It was hard to believe that they had come directly from a war-torn arena in which they were highly placed and responsible functionaries.

Their assessment of the Angolan situation and their responses to our queries were candid and non evasive. They indicated that the entire seminar was "on the record" and that we could publicize it in any way we cared to. They felt that the struggle for control of their country was pretty well behind them. (Recognition by Zaire came during the seminar) They felt that the prospects of significant guerilla warfare were very slight because of the absence of a suitable sanctuary. (For guerillas to wage warfare from South African-dominated Namibia would destroy their credibility and they predicted that neither Zaire nor Zambia was likely to offer sanctuary for fear that Angola could retaliate by harboring opposition forces to both of those regimes). They indicated that they felt South African troops would leave Angola very shortly and without force. But if force is necessary the Angolans are prepared to request the aid of Cuban troops if they need them. Their most ambivalent response was on the matter of liberating Namibia and I assume this was due either to its being a state secret or its

being a yet unresolved issue within the Angolan hierarchy. They said Angola could not and would not liberate Namibia; only the Namibians could do that. However, SWAPO can count on Angolan support. The Angolans do not believe in exporting revolution but they hope that they can create a society which others will wish to emulate.

They described with some detail why they felt the FVLA and the UNITA groups to be self-seeking organizations without a genuine commitment to an independent Angola. These groups were ready to give Angola over to foreigners, including South Africans, just to achieve their own selfish goals. The leadership of these groups must be punished as criminals, but this does not apply to most of their followers, who were innocently misled. Indeed, many of them are already busy helping to rebuild their country. The Angolans also indicated to us that the plan of the opposition groups and their South African allies had been to sweep North and seize Luanda by November 11th (independence day) and that the plan had come within a hair's breadth of succeeding. The Cuban intervention was crucial in stemming this South African expansionism.

They expressed their feeling that the Angolan struggle, and especially the MPLA, was poorly understood in the U.S. Indeed, that was the reason that they had desired to meet with some Americans who might assist them in telling the Angolan story and in otherwise aiding the new Angolan government. They were especially interested in meeting with black Americans. (although they did not mention Roy Innis, one felt that his activities may have helped to spark this call for a meeting) They indicated that to hold the meeting in Angola would have

been too expensive, and since they felt it unlikely that they could obtain U.S. visas, they had asked Cuba to host the meeting.

They read a telegram received from Congressman Biggs in which he indicated that previous commitments had prevented his attending but that he wished the meeting well. They expressed great interest in obtaining U.S. recognition for their regime and hoped that we could help move that along. Angola is to follow a policy of non-alignment in foreign affairs and will be socialist in its domestic structure, although not rigidly so. Agriculture is to be the No. 1 priority, followed by health and education.

With regard to the fact that Kenneth Kaunda had been opposed to MPLA, the delegation felt that he had just made a mistake. They felt that he had supported UNITA because it controlled the railway over which Zambia's copper must travel to the sea and also because he felt that UNITA would win, at least in that region. As for China's failure to support MPLA, which was clearly the only one of the groups with a strong anti-imperialist orientation, the Angolans have no satisfactory answer other than that the bitterness between the USSR and China leads these two giants to always take opposing sides on issues.

The foregoing are the highlights of the seminar. The American delegation was harmonious and well-behaved at all times. The black press appeared to be quite thorough. I was personally quite inspired by the experience and indicated to the Angolan delegation that I would personally undertake to be as helpful as possible with their national development plans if a formal request were communicated to me along those lines. Angola is destined to be one of the most important countries

in Africa and they appear to be interested in a close association with American blacks (although they are not very racially oriented, in general). I am of the opinion that cultivation of such a relationship demands a high priority. It is my personal belief that a meaningful association with the Third World offers one of the few promising avenues for further improvement of the status of blacks in America. In addition, there are genuine opportunities for rendering service to the Angolans (and to the other ex-Portuguese territories) at this time and it behooves us all that some blacks should afford this matter serious attention.

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Unfortunately, there proved to be little opportunity to explore the Cuban experiment in these few days we had. The welcome and hospitality which the Cubans provided us was gracious beyond belief. They attempted to anticipate our every need, and plenty of translators were always available to service our requests. We seemed to have complete freedom to go as we pleased and those of the delegation who knew people to look up could do so without hinderance. A great shortage of taxis inhibited travel somewhat, but with patience, most folks got around the town satisfactorily.

Perhaps the most striking difference from the U.S. was the absence of crime. Women walk the streets of Havana at any hour without fear. The people are friendly and seem to be enjoying life. Cat on a Hot Tin Roof and the Call of the Wild were two of the American movies playing at Cinemas near our hotel and lines were long at both theatres, as

as well as at other theatres with films from other countries. Bars and night clubs abound. Very few police are in evidence anywhere. At a boxing match we attended, a number of soldiers were scattered throughout the audience but it was rare to see them on the street. The ballet "folkloric" which we attended one night was a beautifully costumed extravaganza based on a Shango legend from Africa and was excellently choreographed to infectious Afro-Caribbean rhythms. Both these events were well attended. The boxing match, like all sports events, had no admission fee. At the ballet, over half the seats had been distributed free to workers with the balance being sold at a very modest price. The Cubans sitting in front of us at the ballet spontaneously shared their candy with us and like many Cubans, were eager to try out their English with us.

The Angolans had given us several MPLA buttons and the Cubans stopped us on the streets, in the hotel lobbies, and other public places and asked us for them. They seemed to be quite familiar with the Angolan war and with Cuba's role in it, and they were apparently quite proud of this participation. They usually assumed we were Canadians until we told them otherwise, but they displayed no visible surprise on learning that we were from the States. Many of them began to tell us of a friend or relative in New York, California, or elsewhere (Rarely in Miami, however).

The most notable negative factor was the scanty nature of the Cuban press, which consists mainly of uncritical reporting of the activities of the government, of the Cuban Communist Party, and of

other Communist parties around the world. In conversation also, there was only praise for the government and its leadership. It seemed genuine but was such a departure from my norm that I find it hard to accept. My major regret was that my visit was much too short to permit me to acquire a real grasp of how Cuba functions. Presumably, persons with views antagonistic to the government's either leave the country or are otherwise silenced, thus producing this homogenized flavor within the body politic. In any case, any intimidation which may exist is not in evidence and the visitor discovers a nation of vibrant, enthusiastic and optimistic people who are proud of what they are achieving in the way of social justice in Cuba, who are committed to national as opposed to individual advancement, and who are pleased to show to others what they are attempting to do.

APPENDIX 14

REPORT OF THE HAVANA SEMINAR, FEBRUARY 26-29, 1976

(By George M. Houser)

ABOUT THE SEMINAR

This seminar was initiated by the MPLA. The MPLA requested the Cuban Government to act as host. The MPLA felt that it was important to make some contacts with American organizations generally sympathetic to their struggle in Angola and with the American black press. There were 36 Americans who attended the seminar. Attached to this report is the list of participants and the representatives of the MPLA. Obviously the Americans invited represented a fairly broad spectrum politically and ideologically. The Cuban Government did not inject itself into the discussions at all. There was a Cuban observer from OSPAAAL (The Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America). At no point did the Cuban representative speak in the seminar. The seminar was conducted by Commandante Dibala who headed the MPLA delegation. He made an opening speech of perhaps 15 or 20 minutes and then requested that each organizational representative speak for a few minutes explaining the purpose and the function of their particular organization. Following this the Angolan delegation opened the seminar for all kinds of questions. The bulk of the time then was given over to the MPLA delegates answering questions which were raised. The concluding two sessions of the seminar were devoted to a discussion just among the Americans about follow-up. The conclusions reached will be summarized in this report.

Of course a very important added element of the seminar was its venue in Cuba. There was very little time to see much of Cuba other than some museums, housing developments, a school, etc., in the Havana area. There was some opportunity to talk with Cuban officials about developments in their country. However the results of these discussions and observations would be subject for another report.

The discussions in the seminar were carried on in English and Portuguese with simultaneous translations through the earphone system and with Cuban translators. Two members of the American group representing Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans, spoke in Spanish except in private conversation. Two members of the MPLA delegation spoke good English, but during the seminar spoke only in Portuguese.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION

I shall not attempt to give a lengthy report of the substantive discussion. Rather I shall only put in capsule form things that were said under various subjects touched upon.

(1) About the MPLA

The MPLA is not a political party, but it is a peoples movement. It does not represent one ideology, but many. It has a general socialist orientation, but one which is attuned to the particular situation that exists in Angola. The basic work in the community by the MPLA is done through local MPLA committees. These are organized in all communities and probably will grow rapidly as the MPLA expands the area of its influence and control.

Historically the MPLA has had both a minimum and a maximum program. Under the minimum program the nationalist objective of independence had to be accepted and the necessity of struggle (including armed struggle) against Portuguese domination. The maximum program outlined more in depth what the MPLA hoped to build in the future. All tendencies were represented in the MPLA from Communist and socialist to liberal and church-oriented people.

(199)

The principal priorities of the MPLA at this point are: (a) The development of the agricultural potential of the country. The MPLA recognizes Angola as primarily a country of peasants. The emphasis will be on collective agricultural pursuits with adjustment being made to the realities which exist in various sections of the country. Part of the country, it was explained, has been dominated by a capitalist economy and there will not be any attempt to quickly and rigidly impose a socialist approach. (b) The second priority is the development of health and medical facilities of the country. (c) The third priority is education and cultural development.

(2) *Relations with other countries*

The MPLA will follow a policy of non-alignment. It wants to establish relations with all countries under the principle of non-interference and reciprocity. This includes relations with the United States. The MPLA delegation made quite clear that they would like to be recognized by the United States. The MPLA delegation said, "We believe that the interest in having relations must be bilateral, and mutual, and therefore if the present government of the United States is not interested in acknowledging the Republic of Angola and to establish relations, we don't want to beg this kind of acknowledgement and this type of relation." (Any direct quotes here are based on the Cuban translation from the Portuguese into English through an earphone system.)

On relations with Zaire, the delegation commented that they share a 2000 kilometer border. The Benguela Railroad is important to Zaire as an outlet to the sea. Good relations cannot be established with Zaire until it ceases its support for puppet groups.

Zambia was put in a different category. Dibalala observed that Zambia had given aid to the MPLA during the struggle against Portugal. Zambia also had given some assistance to UNITA, but the MPLA was certain that recognition would come and that good relations would again be established.

On the question of a possible invasion of Cabinda by Zaire, Dibalala commented that he did not think this was a danger anymore. He said that the Zaire army had suffered enough in the fighting in Angola and would not enter into any military adventure against territory of the Peoples Republic of Angola.

Speaking of Zambia and Zaire, the MPLA delegation said that they are not going to attempt to export their revolution to other countries. They said that neither their Angola army nor their Cuban friends would invade any other country. "We will not allow our territory to serve as a base for foreign invasion of other countries," Dibalala said.

(3) *Relations with Portugal and the Portuguese people*

The MPLA delegation made a real distinction between relations with the Portuguese people and the Portuguese Government. "The relations existing between Angolans and Portuguese people are very close", Dibalala said. "The common cultural interest is great and even the experience of a common struggle against fascism. Many Angolans had the privilege of going to Portugal to study and to spend important periods from adolescence to adulthood in which they were able to find great understanding on the part of the progressive youth of that country. Even in Angola there were Portuguese who had a correct attitude towards the people. They participated in the Angolan revolutionary process."

On the other hand the MPLA delegation was critical of the posture of the present government of Portugal during the decolonization process. They were critical of the government for putting the three movements on an equal footing. They were critical because Portugal allowed the regular army of Zaire and of South Africa to invade their territory. They even had some Portuguese troops in Angola when these invasions took place. "The day of independence arrived, November 11th, and the Portuguese authorities took their suitcases out of the country without transferring the power to the legitimate authorities there. Evidently our relations with this government, with this regime existing in Portugal, cannot in fact be very friendly nor fraternal. But it is evident that relations between governments have nothing to do with the feelings existing between two peoples."

Many Portuguese people who left the country are now applying to come back. Dibalala said that they are going to study these cases very carefully and they will not accept people back if there is anything in their record indicating they previously were involved in actions against the people.

(4) *Relations with South Africa*

The MPLA delegation spoke at some length about the possible confrontation with South African troops in southern Angola near the Cuanene River hydro-electric project. They said that they thought South Africa would be intelligent enough not to leave their troops in Angola. They said they would be willing to enter into discussions with South Africa through intermediaries, that is third parties such as France, Holland or England. They said that they would not allow a South African military force to remain in Angola and would remove it by force if necessary. They said that if they had need of Cuban troops or of aid from other friendly countries, they would not hesitate to ask for it and they felt sure that the help would be forthcoming. South Africa has been condemned not only in Angola but also by the OAU and even the United Nations. They commented that "Cuba has been close to us as no other country."

(5) *The liberation struggle in Namibia*

The MPLA delegation spoke of their solidarity with SWAPO. But they went on to say: "We consider revolutions are not exported and therefore we are not going to export our revolution." They spoke of the fact that examples are followed and that perhaps their Angolan experience could serve as an example to Namibians or other peoples who are engaged in a liberation struggle. Dibalala said, "We Angolans are not the ones who will go to Namibia to liberate Namibia. The independence of Namibia will not be correct or complete if the people themselves will not die for that independence."

(6) *Mercenaries*

The MPLA referred to the public information available about agencies in England, Belgium, Germany and in the United States recruiting mercenaries to fight in Angola. They indicated they did not understand how anyone could agree to fight only for money. Also they did not understand why some governments allowed this sort of activity to take place. Dibalala said that frequently they faced white mercenaries in battles in Angola. Mercenaries were captured and also identifications were taken from the bodies of white mercenaries. The majority of them, he said, did not have any identification card. The only ones that did were Europeans. He indicated that they had no concrete evidence of either white or black mercenaries from the United States in Angola.

(7) *Guerrilla warfare against the MPLA government*

The delegation said that they did not believe guerrilla warfare could be carried on successfully against their government by UNITA and the FNLA. They pointed out that successful guerrilla warfare demands massive support on the part of the people. They must be supported by food for example. They did not think this would be forthcoming. Also they said that a successful guerrilla movement demands rearguard support. They felt this was only conceivable from Namibia, that is from South Africa. But they felt that the people of Angola would not support guerrilla warfare that was dependent on racism of South Africa. They were convinced that neither Zambia nor Zaire would lend themselves to this kind of rearguard support. Furthermore they pointed out that there was no record of successful guerrilla activity against an independent government, even in a neo-colonial one, in Africa. As examples they mentioned the failure of efforts led by such movements as Union of the Populations of Cameroun and various Lumumbist movements in Zaire.

(8) *Foreign interests*

MPLA had never had any difficulty, we were told, as far as the diamond mines in Lunda province (in northeast Angola) were concerned. This area was always under MPLA control. Most technicians left because of the war and this curtailed the activity of some of the mines and some of them were closed. Likewise the MPLA had always controlled Cabinda. Actually the MPLA had defended Gulf facilities at times. During the recent internal struggle, the MPLA had had two contacts with Gulf officials. The Gulf officials indicated that it was not their decision but pressure from the State Department that caused them to stop paying taxes and royalties. Other companies have offered to come in and take over the facilities, we were told. The Government of Angola will demand new agreements with Gulf because it was the Gulf Oil Company and not the United States Government that violated the agreements which had existed.

(9) UNITA and FNLA

The leaders of UNITA and FNLA are looked upon as criminals. But those Angolans who were ordinary members or supporters are put in an entirely different category. They will participate in the process of national reconstruction. The MPLA has no intention of putting thousands of people in prison. Those who are in UNITA and FNLA will play their part in building the new nation.

(10) Women

The principle of absolute equality is essential. The MPLA does not look upon this as "granting" women anything. The women knew what they wanted and organized for it. They participated in the liberation struggle. The women are liberating themselves. Their liberation is not a gift from the government.

(11) Foreign aid

The MPLA delegation made clear that they are going to need foreign assistance, both financial and technical. "We don't have the know-how and so it must come from abroad." There is a large team of Cuban doctors working in Angola now for instance. Another large group was arriving soon from Yugoslavia. There are also doctors from Algeria and two Brazilian doctors. Djalma said, "I am absolutely convinced that we are going to receive aid from technicians from all over the world. These technicians will take the place of many Portuguese who have left. The Angolan Government might be open to U.S. Government aid, but certainly not unless there is recognition."

Angola will also welcome non-government aid from friendly organizations. They would seek advice from their friends abroad about the advisability of any particular non-governmental person who applied to come to Angola to be of assistance. They would not want any persons to come who would in any way interfere in Angolan matters.

(12) Coffee

Coffee has been the main export crop of Angola (surpassed by oil only recently). It brings a great amount of currency into the country. The main coffee growing area in the north was greatly affected by military confrontations because this area was for a long time under FNLA control. The coffee crop could not be handled properly because of the military and political situation in the country. Therefore a great part of the coffee was not picked. This will affect not only this year's coffee production but also next year's. The delegation indicated that the FNLA and also Zaire troops had stolen some of the coffee and taken it to Kinshasa.

(13) MPLA visits to the United States and American visits to Angola

The delegation said that they were in agreement about sending a delegation to the United States to tour the country and to explain to the people of the United States what the MPLA is. They also indicated that they would like particularly to have a delegation from the black press in the United States visit Angola. Other visits can be arranged at the proper time.

AGREEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES

The American representatives participating in the seminar did not attempt to form a new organization. Nevertheless there were some agreements reached about what should be done in the United States. The main points were:

(1) Efforts should be made to urge the United States Government to recognize the Peoples Republic of Angola.

(2) We should do as much as possible to support national reconstruction. This includes supporting medical, educational, agricultural projects, etc.

(3) We should try to dispel incorrect information about Angola and the MPLA.

(4) We should oppose any economic pressure which the U.S. Government puts upon Angola.

(5) On practical procedures it was agreed that we should (a) explore possibilities of a national conference dealing primarily with the Angolan situation and (b) invite an MPLA delegation to visit the United States, meeting important segments of organizations and people here with a speaking schedule.

PARTICIPANTS OF THE HAVANA SEMINAR (FEBRUARY 26-29, 1976)

MPLA

Commandante Djalma—a member of the Central Committee and Political Commissar of the Eastern Front
Sra. Olga Lima—Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Relations
Pedro Zinga Baptista—from the Department of Foreign Relations of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED AT THE SEMINAR

1. Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workers of North America (AFL-CIO)
2. American Committee on Africa
3. American Friends Service Committee
4. Black Economic Research Center
5. CASA—General Brotherhood of Workers
6. Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (NYC)
7. Coalition for a New Foreign Policy
8. MPLA Solidarity Committee
9. National Anti-Imperialist Solidarity Movement for African Liberation
10. National Conference of Black Lawyers
11. National Council of Churches (Africa Office)
12. Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno
13. Prairie Fire Organizing Committee
14. Third World Coalition/Southwest Workers Federation
15. U.S. Out of Angola Committee and Chicago Committee for Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea
16. Venceremos Brigade
17. Washington Office on Africa
18. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
19. Youth Against War & Fascism

MEMBERS OF THE PRESS REPRESENTED

1. Afro-American Newspapers (Baltimore Afro-American)
 2. Bilalian News (two journalists attended)
 3. Black Scholar
 4. Freedomways Magazine
 5. San Francisco Sun Reporter
- One free-lance journalist also attended.

APPENDIX 15

TELEGRAM SENT BY CHAIRMAN DIGGS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CONCERNING THE REVOCATION OF EXPORT LICENSES FOR TWO BOEING 737 AIRCRAFT AND RESPONSES BY BOTH AGENCIES

(Text of Telegram)

Date: FEBRUARY 9, 1976.

To: Hon. Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce and Hon. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State.

Request Department by COB, Wednesday, February 11, to: (1) Show cause why U.S. Government should continue to bar exportation of two Boeing 737s paid for by the Angolan airline TAAAG, and refuse export licenses for air traffic control equipment systems as reported in New York Times February 7th; (2) explain legal basis for above action; (3) further request assessment of extent to which this embargo could cause any violation of contractual obligations.

(Signed) CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.

RESPONSE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C., February 13, 1976.

Hon. CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. DIGGS: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your telegram of February 9, in which you ask the Department for information about the revocation of export licenses for two Boeing 737 aircraft destined for Angola, and about equipment for the installation of an air traffic control system in Angola.

With respect to the aircraft, the Department of Commerce approved export licenses for the two planes in June 1975. In November, the Department of State asked Commerce to suspend the licenses for the following reasons:

1. After the purchase of the aircraft, civil war broke out in Angola among the three liberation movements and the transitional government was dissolved.

2. After independence on November 11, 1975, two rival governments were proclaimed and neither had gained control of the country.

3. If the aircraft were sent to Angola, they would end up in the hands of the rival governments, which the State Department believed would be contrary to U.S. interests.

The planes can be easily converted to military use for the carrying of troops and arms and we could not permit their departure from the United States knowing they would be diverted to military purposes, as has all of TAAAG's current fleet. At no time did the U.S. Government plan permanently to deny the planes to TAAAG; we have authorized the Angolan crews to train at Boeing facilities in order to be ready to fly the craft home at such time as the politico-military situation has been resolved.

The Department of Commerce revoked the export licenses under the authority granted by the Export Administration Act of 1969. Boeing's contract with TAAAG contains a *force majeure* clause hence the company is not in violation of its obligations.

A number of export licenses were issued for equipment for the air traffic control system now under construction in Angola. Boeing has sent technicians

(204)

to Angola in the past and plans to send others in the immediate future. The first phase of the system will not become operational before July 1976. Additionally, you should be aware that the Department of Commerce in January returned without action some applications for equipment related to the ATC system and advised the exporters to reapply in two months. The State Department approved the action, basing itself on the unsettled conditions arising from the civil war in Angola. Here again, the intent is not to deny the applications, but to ensure that U.S. equipment is not diverted to illicit purposes.

I trust the foregoing information will serve your needs. If not, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM E. SCHAUFFEL, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs.

RESPONSE BY DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C., March 19, 1975.

Hon. CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. DIGGS: I refer to your telegram of February 9, 1976, in which you ask for information regarding the revocation of export licenses for two Boeing 737 aircraft, and equipment for an air traffic control system, all destined for Angola.

All export licenses and other authorizations to export or reexport which are issued by the Department of Commerce's Office of Export Administration are subject to revision, suspension, or revocation without notice. If circumstances necessitate, the Office of Export Administration may stop a shipment or an export transaction at any stage of its progress. Section 370.3(b) of the Export Administration Regulations explicitly provides for this contingency.

The export license involving the cited Boeings was originally issued in June of 1975. In November, with the onset of the civil war in Angola, the Department of State asked Commerce to suspend this license on foreign policy grounds, including the possibility that the aircraft would fall into the hands of one of the rival groups and would be utilized in the then-ongoing civil war in Angola. Accordingly, the license was revoked on November 19, 1975. As you may be aware, Section 3(2)(B) of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended, states that it is the policy of the United States to use export controls to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfill the international responsibilities. These aircraft could have been converted to military uses; i.e., the carriage of troops and military material. Recently, however, the State Department concluded that foreign policy considerations had changed in light of the winding down of the civil war in Angola. In view of this, the Department approved a new license for these planes on March 3.

The Department of Commerce did not deny the applications for licenses to ship air traffic control equipment to Angola. Upon the advice of the Department of State, with the suggestion that they be resubmitted in about two months, two of State, with the suggestion that they be resubmitted without action during applications involving such material were returned without action during January. The basis for this action was explained as "foreign policy considerations arising out of unsettled civil war conditions now prevailing in Angola. These applications have been resubmitted, and the licenses are expected to be issued shortly.

Whether the U.S. Government licensing action could cause any violation of contractual obligations is a matter that must be resolved between the exporter and the purchaser. We would note, however, that exporters seasoned in the problems of international trade often include "force majeure" clauses in their contracts, or otherwise condition performance on the availability of an export license.

Thank you for writing.
Sincerely,

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON.

APPENDIX 16

MEMORANDUM WRITTEN TO HON. JOHN V. TUNNEY, MEMBER U.S. SENATE, CONCERNING ANGOLA

To: Senator John V. Tunney.
From: Mark Moran, Legislative Assistant on Foreign Policy.
Re: Angola.
Date: January 27, 1976.

From the moment I stepped off the plane in Luanda, I began hearing about the memorandum. It quite obviously had greatly disturbed the senior members of the Angolan Government. It was conveyed and discussed at the highest levels of the MPLA as an indication of the official American position.

In December, a top MPLA official flew to the U.S. for private discussions with Boeing officials on the status of the two Boeing 737s that MPLA bought but which Boeing could not deliver because of State Department objections. After the talks he returned to New York, pending his return to Angola without having achieved any success in freeing up the planes. On the 10th of December he was called by the Chairman of the Board of Boeing Mr. T. A. Wilson, who had flown to Washington immediately after speaking with this Angolan official. Mr. Wilson asked that the Angolan rep. fly immediately to Washington to receive an "important message from the U.S. Government to be conveyed to the highest levels of the MPLA government."

On the morning of December 11th he was met at National Airport by Mr. Robert Hostlander of the Department of State and attached to the American Embassy in Lisbon, but who had returned to Washington for consultations. Mr. Hostlander conducted the Angolan official to the Mayflower Hotel and urged that he wait for the message. Later that day, Mr. Wilson called to say that he had an urgent message to convey from "high authorities in the American government" and asked to meet with the Angolan. The two met shortly thereafter in the Angolan's room at the Mayflower.

Mr. Wilson said he was instructed to say that the message he carried "represented not only the view of the Department of State but that of the Administration as well" and that it dealt not only with Boeing but the entire Angolan problem. Mr. Wilson said that it was the desire of the Department of State that the message be conveyed to the "highest levels of government" in Angola.

Mr. Wilson then proceeded to read the memorandum, which was not printed on official stationery and which bore no official American markings. When the Angolan official asked that he be allowed to convey the paper to his government, Mr. Wilson replied that the State Department had instructed him not to release that paper itself, but he did agree to allow it to be copied verbatim. With Mr. Wilson present, the memo was transcribed in the exact form in which it had been presented.

The Angolan official concerned described his reaction as "shock" at the tenor of such an official memo and said that it appeared to be an ultimatum. He immediately returned to Luanda where he conveyed the memo directly to President Agostino Neto. He described Neto's reaction as surprise and anger and a very definite feeling that the United States had completely misread the position of his government. I was told the memo was then widely distributed among the MPLA cabinet where the reactions were said to be similar to those of the President.

(206)

MEMORANDUM

DECEMBER 11, 1975, 11:30 a.m.

(Delivered to MPLA by Boeing official)

The United States Government cannot stand idly by in the fact of the Soviet power play in Angola. The United States is unwilling to condone an Angolan regime under Soviet control.

If the MPLA is willing to work for a political solution and compromise with its nationalist rivals, the United States is willing to back a peaceful settlement.

The MPLA would do well to heed advice that no government can plan reconstruction in post-war Angola without American and Western help. No government can obtain the technological and financial resources to stimulate economic development without official American consent.

In fact the United States would be quite responsive and helpful to a coalition government that was not dependent on the Soviet Union.

The United States Government is prepared to consider further the supply of Boeing aircraft to Angola depending on the course of events in Angola. This message should be given to the Luanda authorities. As anyone should be aware, access to sophisticated technology is a privilege. The case of Boeing is just one, but a good example of the advantage of having access to American technology.