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CONTENTS

FOREWORD

Mr. Pat M. Holt, chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spent the period from June 29 to July 8 in Cuba. On July 26, the Committee considered his report in executive session and ordered it printed for the information of the Senate and of the public generally.

The reasons for Mr. Holt's trip to Cuba are fully set forth in the correspondence, which is also published herein, between the Committee and the Department of State with reference to validation of his passport.

I wish to take this opportunity to express the Committee's appreciation to the Government of Cuba for giving Mr. Holt a visa and to the many officials of that Government, especially President Dorticós and Prime Minister Castro, for receiving him so cordially while he was in Cuba.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Committee or any member thereof.

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

NOVEMBER 16, 1973.

HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: From time to time in the past, I have raised with your two predecessors the matter of validating for travel to Cuba the passport of Mr. Pat M. Holt, professional staff member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I now renew the request in the hope of eliciting an affirmative response.

Assuming that the Cuban Government would be willing to issue a visa to Mr. Holt, it is my thought now, as it has been in the past, that he would spend perhaps two or three weeks in Cuba and report his findings in confidence to the Committee on Foreign Relations. He would, of course, take care to make clear that his mission was purely one of fact-finding on behalf of the legislative branch and that he in no way represented the executive branch. If you prefer, he would gladly use a regular, instead of an official, passport.

The Committee regularly finds the reports of its staff of great value. Such a report from Cuba would meet a particular need, because there is so little other reporting from that country.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman.*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, December 7, 1973.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of November 16 concerning the validation of Pat Holt's passport for travel to Cuba.

Our general opposition to travel by Americans to Cuba, with certain exceptions as set forth by regulation (22 CFR 51.73), reflects our continuing assessment that it is important to our national interest and the security of the hemisphere to seek the isolation of Cuba in cooperation with other American Republics.

Nonetheless, while there has been no change in the Department's policy to discourage travel to Cuba, we recognize the importance which you place upon Pat's trip and reluctantly agree to validate his passport for this travel.

I appreciate your statement of Mr. Holt's intention to make clear that the trip would in no way represent the Executive Branch. We would appreciate his making appropriate public statements to that effect if his travel were to become publicly known. If asked, the Department will reiterate our policy with regard to Cuba.

Best regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

CUBA

SUMMARY

Assuming the continuation of massive assistance from the Soviet Union and of high world commodity prices, the Cubans are on the verge of making their system work.

According to Cuban figures, they already have the highest per capita gross national product in Latin America, with the possible exception of Venezuela.

Shortages in Cuba are more an inconvenience than a hardship, reminiscent of the situation in the United States during World War II. Such goods as are available are rationed strictly and to all appearances equitably, at least as far as necessities are concerned.

The Cuban Government is devoting more attention to political organization. Cubans generally are incredibly organized—and has started a process looking to the election of a pyramidal structure of local, provincial, and national popular assemblies.

This is probably a measure of the growing self-confidence of the Revolution. The politics and economy of Cuba are controlled by a curious mixture of carrot stick and exhortation. The policy of no material incentives for workers has been abandoned, and a system of productivity norms has been substituted for it.

Although their economic prospects are improving, Cubans take a modest view of their development future. They shun a consumer-oriented society, but they take great pride in their accomplishments in the field of social services, particularly health and education.

One senses in Cuba a growing self-confidence, in part because of the Revolution's accomplishments, in part because of its growing acceptance in Latin America and the world generally.

Trade with Latin America, Europe, and Japan is increasing.

Cubans will make no move to improve their relations with the United States until the economic boycott, which they call a blockade, is lifted. My impression is that they would nonetheless welcome initiatives from the United States.

Recommendations are made for a re-examination of U.S. policy toward Cuba and especially of sundry statutory provisions relating to Cuba and to third countries trading with Cuba.

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I

With the help of massive assistance from the Soviet Union and high world commodity prices, the Cubans are on the verge of making their system work—that is to say, of constructing a socialist show case in the Western Hemisphere.

37-196—74——2

The base for this is still fragile and could be shattered at any time by a Russian decision to cut off the flow of rubles or by a drop in commodity (especially sugar) prices. Neither appears likely in the near future. It must be as difficult for the Russians to see light at the end of the tunnel in Cuba as it is for the Americans in Vietnam, but after something on the order of 3 billion rubles down the drain, they are at last beginning to get results from their current investment. Further, although the course of Russian-Cuban relations has not always run smoothly, there do not appear to be any large outstanding current issues. The Russian presence in Cuba is unobtrusive.

Cubans are extraordinarily close-mouthed about their economic relations with the Soviet Union and, for that matter, about economic statistics in general.

They put their gross national product in 1973 at 10,380,000,000 pesos in 1965 prices. This works out to 15,088,000,000 U.S. dollars in 1973 terms—or approximately $1,587 per capita, by far the highest in Latin America with the possible exception of Venezuela where everything is distorted by oil.

A good deal is distorted in Cuba by the peculiarities of socialist accounting, but even if these figures are exaggerated by a factor of two or three, they are still impressive. And, indeed, when divided by two, they are supported by impressionistic observations of the Cuban standard of living over a period of 10 days of travel in both urban and rural parts of the island.

The big change, as related both by Cubans and by foreign observers, began in 1970 which by general agreement represents the low point of revolutionary Cuba. Prior to that time, there had been a good deal of floundering around and a good many false starts with respect both to economics and politics. There had been the romanticism of Ché Guevara which came to a bloody end in the jungles of Bolivia in 1967 and which in its hey day not only envisaged guerrilla warfare throughout Latin America but also preached the elimination of material incentives for the labor force at home. There had been vacillations between whether to concentrate on the production of sugar, or on industrialization, or on a balanced economy somewhere in between.

In the late 1960's, the sugar school of thought was ascendant, and a goal was set for the production of 10 million tons of sugar in the crop year 1969–70—an unheard of figure—and of 20 million tons in 1980. The 1970 crop amounted to 8.5 million tons, a record though short of the goal. But the effort which went into the 1970 harvest diverted enormous resources from other sectors of the economy and left the country in a shambles. There was a serious drop in non-sugar production, in part because investment in sugar—to rehabilitate old mills and to import machinery—had been increased at the expense of other sectors, and in part because labor had been diverted to sugar. The Cuban Government at this time was also confronted with a worsening problem of discipline in the labor force, characterized by growing absenteeism and attributable in major part to the policy of eliminating material incentives. As one Cuban put it, the Government had relied too much on patriotism and revolutionary ardor to motivate workers. The workers, he said, had been willing to die for their country at the time of the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis, "but it's hard to be a hero every day."

All of this provided the basis for what was apparently a profound re-examination of both economic and political policies by the Cuban Government. The result has been a series of steps. More attention has been given to political organization. Pay is being tied to production through the introduction of a system roughly equivalent to piece work. At the end of 1972 the Soviet Union agreed to postpone repayment of the Cuban debt to the period 1986–2000 and to furnish new credits of 300 million rubles to cover the deficit in the Cuban balance of payments in 1973–75. With the return of Peronistas to power in Argentina in 1973, important new credits ($600 million) were forthcoming from that source. Trade with Western Europe and Japan has expanded.

According to Cuban figures, total exports in 1973 amounted to 2,193,000,000 pesos and total imports were 2,080,000,000 pesos. Cubans say their trade with non-socialist countries shows a favorable balance; with socialist countries other than the Soviet Union, it is in equilibrium; only with the Soviet Union is it in deficit.

There are still shortages in Cuba, but they are more an inconvenience than a hardship, and are somewhat reminiscent of the situation in the United States during World War II. People generally look dowdy. In part, this is the result of a fierce tropical climate, but in part it is the result of an inadequate supply of rather shoddy clothing. The chorus girls at the Tropicana Night Club all wear mended stockings, but they still put on a lavish show. Havana is a shabby city, in part because the Government has followed a deliberate policy of making most of its investment in the hitherto neglected countryside.

There is no good basis on which to compare prices, but they seem roughly the same as in the United States, perhaps somewhat less, though generally for lower quality goods. Wages are lower than in the United States, but so are rents (a good many people live rent-free), and health care, except for drugs, is free. The norm for cane-cutters yields them 4.50 pesos a day; longshoremen in the port of Santiago make 163 pesos a month; workers in a prefabricated housing factory make 127 pesos. (One pesos equals roughly US$1.20.)

With the exception of some luxury items such as perfume and cosmetics, such goods as are available are rationed strictly and to all appearances equitably, at least so far as necessities are concerned.

Durable consumer goods are arriving from the Soviet Union—the television set in my hotel room (with all the instructions in Russian except for the two English words "off" and "on"); a washing machine (also with the dials lettered in Russian) which I saw in a department store; refrigerators; sewing machines. The refrigerator was priced at 660 pesos. To buy it, or other hard goods, one has to be referred by his union—or, if not a member of a union, by some other mass organization such as the Committees for Defense of the Revolution—on the basis, so it is said, of need. One can imagine, however, that a union's perception of need is influenced by a worker's productivity and revolutionary zeal.

This illustrates the curious blend of carrot, stick and exhortation, with emphasis on the first and last, by which the politics of Cuba is controlled and the economy driven forward. It is not so much that bad things happen to you if you are a bad revolutionary (though if you are a counter-revolutionary, very bad things happen) as it is that

good things happen if you are a good revolutionary. Some of these good things are psychological analogues taken from the Boy Scouts. Take the matter of work incentives, for example. Some of these are economic—if you produce more than the norm established for your job, you get a bonus; if you produce less, your pay is docked. But some are psychological. If you consistently exceed the norm and also meet a list of other requirements mainly having to do with community or revolutionary activities but also including such things as getting an annual physical exam, you get the *Bandera de Moncada* (the Moncada Flag, named for the barracks in Santiago against which Castro made an unsuccessful attack in 1953) and become an *Héroe Nacional de Trabajo* (National Labor Hero).

Similar awards—somewhat analogous to Boy Scout merit badges—are given for accomplishments as members of the Committees for Defense of the Revolution. These Committees are the most pervasive organization in Cuba; nearly everybody is a member. The CDRs were organized in 1960 literally to defend the Revolution at a time when it felt insecure and threatened by counter-revolutionaries at home and militant exiles abroad, not to mention the United States. The principal function of the CDRs in their early days was to spy on people and to combat counter-revolutionary activities. There is still a certain amount of this, but as the Revolution has consolidated its position, the CDRs have taken on a variety of other functions, many of them socially useful. They act as a kind of ombudsman or intermediary between the people and the mammoth Cuban bureaucracy. They see to it that children are vaccinated. They collect waste materials for recycling—to a value last year of 100 million pesos. They organize the parents of school children (parents of good children get diplomas, too) and act as truant officers. They are responsible for contingency plans in the case of natural disasters, such as hurricanes. Thus in some respects, they are the kind of community development organization which the Peace Corps and AID have tried to stimulate, with very modest success, in other parts of Latin America.

All of this is accompanied by a heavy, unrelenting propaganda and pressure for ideological and social conformity. To paraphrase Sam Rayburn, if you go along, you get along.

The CDRs, along with other mass organizations such as labor unions, also serve to give people generally a sense of participation in the government and in the decision-making process. The government currently has underway, for example, a project to revise the *Código de la Familia*, or the law covering marriage, divorce, and domestic relations generally. Millions of copies of the government's proposed draft were circulated. Local CDRs, local units of the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC, after its Spanish initials), and other groups have been meeting to discuss it article by article.

I attended a meeting of a neighborhood CDR which was going through this process for the third night in a row. There were about 30 or 35 people, more women than men, in the courtyard of an apartment house. They concluded by approving the draft with three suggested amendments. These had to do principally with related provisions in the draft to the effect that if a woman gave birth within 300 days after a divorce, her former husband would be presumed to be the father of the child. The women particularly did not like this, and a

secretary duly noted their objections. The chairman then called for a show of hands on approving the draft as a whole, with amendments. He declared it approved unanimously. The secretary reminded him he had not counted; so he took the vote again and declared it approved 28 to 0.

Leaders of the CDRs invest a great deal of time and effort in these activities; several of them said they worked 28 to 30 hours a week in these extracurricular endeavors. This has to be measured, in both social and human terms, against what they would be doing otherwise. Judged by the standards of Latin America generally, they would probably not be doing very much and they would probably be bored. The CDRs and the other mass organizations of Cuba—which is by far the most organized country this observer has ever seen—provide a use for leisure time. A part of this use is constructive by anybody's definition. A part of it is dreary ideological indoctrination. But most of it is more personally fulfilling to the people who do it than having a vacuum of empty time to fill.

One of the results of the greater attention to political organization is an electoral process, still in its very early stages. This is planned to result eventually in a pyramidal structure of *Organos del Poder Popular* (Organs of Popular Power). The Province of Matanzas, just to the east of Havana, was the scene of a dry run the last Sunday in June and the first Sunday in July. Earlier, in May, the process had started with *Asambleas de Vecinos* (literally, Assemblies of Neighbors) corresponding roughly to precinct meetings in the United States. The first thing these Assemblies did was to elect a chairman. They then recessed while the chairmen received a crash course in how the electoral process was supposed to work. Upon reconvening, each Assembly nominated candidates to be delegates from their *circunscripción*. (The *circunscripción* is the smallest political subdivision in Cuba with an average voting age population in Matanzas of not quite 4,000.) There had to be at least two candidates, and in most instances there were more. In one polling place I visited there were 13. Province-wide, 43 per cent of the candidates nominated were members of the Communist Party. The proportion elected was unknown as of the time I left Cuba. Few candidates received a majority in the first election, and run-offs were held between the top two candidates the following Sunday.

The elections of June 30 and July 7 were to choose one delegate from each *circunscripción*. These will form 11 Municipal Assemblies. Each of these will elect delegates to Regional Assemblies which in turn will elect delegates to a Provincial Assembly. It is contemplated that eventually the Provincial Assemblies will elect delegates to a National Assembly. At each successive level, the members of the executive committee (chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, and two members) will be ex officio members of the Assembly at the next higher level, and the chairman and vice-chairman will be paid, full-time delegates.

It is contemplated that elections in the other provinces will be held at the end of 1975 or the beginning of 1976.

The functions of these assemblies will be two-fold. First, they will take over many local or provincial administrative functions. As things now stand in Cuba, *everything* is run from Havana; and since there is only negligible private enterprise in Cuba, "everything" is to be taken

in its literal meaning—the corner cigarette shop, the barber shop, the movie theater, local bus service, etc. In this sense, the Assemblies will function somewhat like a Cabinet in a parliamentary system; certain members will be in charge of various activities. The Assemblies are thus an important move toward decentralization.

Second, the Assemblies will have a policy-making, or legislative, function. As explained by high-ranking Cubans, at the national level the Cabinet itself will be responsible to the National Assembly; it will be elected by the Assembly and can be fired by the Assembly, though its members will not necessarily be members of the Assembly. The Assemblies are thus also an important move toward institutionalization of the Revolution.

The Cuban Government seems to have become increasingly preoccupied with this problem of institutionalization and with the absence of a solid constitutional base. Theoretically the Constitution of 1940, heavily amended, is in effect, but it is regarded as inadequate and a new document can be expected in a few years, though its shape cannot now be foreseen.

The creation of these Assemblies is the most striking of several manifestations of growing self-confidence on the part of Cubans generally. The Government would hardly embark on this course if it were not reasonably sure of the direction the Assemblies would take and of its ability to keep the Assemblies within the bounds of Revolutionary doctrine.

In the thinking of Cubans who are planning the process, control not only of the Assemblies but of public policy generally is to be exercised by the Communist Party. The relationship of the Party to the Government and to the evolving political process generally is one of the most interesting and puzzling aspects of the Cuban scene.

As explained by several Cubans intimately involved in the question, the Party is—or will be, when the process is finished—the ultimate authority in the country, though it will apparently be extralegal, a kind of "brooding omnipresence in the sky," as someone said of the English common law. The Party will exercise this authority through the moral force and militancy of its members rather than through its numbers. The Party now has less than 200,000 members, and its leaders do not want it to grow beyond that figure.

It is not easy to become a member. One has to be proposed by his mass organization—his labor union, or his CDR, for example—and then be accepted by the Party itself after a searching background investigation and review of the candidate's revolutionary works and doctrinal soundness. Once you are a member, and particularly if you become a party official, you acquire instant prestige and perquisites.

The Party's function, it is emphasized, is not to involve itself in administrative matters but to set broad lines of policy. The Spanish word which is used most often to describe this function is *dirigir*—to direct. And the emphasis which is placed on the Party's duty to abstain from involving itself in administrative matters leads one to suspect that the Party occasionally has some difficulty in resisting the temptation to do so.

At the upper levels, of course, the same individuals are likely to be officials of the Party and officials of the Government. It is not

always easy for an outsider to tell which hat a given individual is wearing at a given time, but the distinction seems clear enough to the Cubans and probably is not very important anyway.

One hears a great deal in Cuba about "democracy" and "democratic processes." The Cubans make a point of the fact that every program or policy is thoroughly discussed and approved by the people concerned before it is put into effect. The example of the *Código de la Familia* has been cited.

Another example is the establishment of productivity norms for the labor force. These are fixed by technicians in the Ministry of Labor on the basis of a detailed study of each work position and are then discussed and approved by the workers concerned. In case of disagreement, which rarely happens, there is a complicated system of appeals ending in the highest level of the government. The system of norms, like piece rates in the United States, has the potential of becoming an instrument for exploitation of labor in that the norm can be constantly raised to hold down wages. However, one imagines its being sold to workers on the basis of the argument that "so-and-so is goofing off and getting the same wage you are, and that's not fair to you." There is also a problem, as yet not totally resolved, of measuring productivity in the professions and service trades. One can establish a norm for musicians, for example, on the basis of how many concerts they play, but this does not deal with the question of whether they play well or poorly. The Cubans meet this question, at least in part, by taking into consideration the number of requests for the appearance of a given artist, and they have in any case put an upper limit of 600 pesos a month on the earnings of an individual artist.

Cubans present all of the public discussion of these matters as evidence that public policy is made by the masses and flows from the bottom up. This contradicts what is said about the role of the Communist Party, but the contradiction is a good deal more apparent to foreigners than to Cubans.

In any event, as one highly placed Cuban put it, until a decision is made, there can be totally free discussion; once a decision is made, everybody has to support it, whether he agrees or not. And the "totally free" discussion always has to be within the bounds of revolutionary doctrine.

II

Cubans take a modest view of their economic prospects and a particular pride in what has been accomplished in Cuba by Cubans in the provision of social services, especially in health and education, and in the redistribution of wealth and income.

With respect to economic development, they emphasize, perhaps in exaggerated form and perhaps as a means of concealing or rationalizing their dependence on the Russians, that Cuba is basically a poor island. They do not anticipate—on the contrary, they want to avoid—a consumer-oriented society. "It is not necessary," one of them said, "that everybody has 18 shirts." What is necessary is that everybody has enough shirts, and this is on the verge of being achieved. Nor is it necessary or desirable, in the Cuban view, that Havana develop a traffic problem. It is the only capital I know, other than Brasilia, without such a problem. The Cubans are now in a position to import

more cars—mainly Fiats—but they are going to limit the number and see that they go only to people who need them in their work.

With respect to social services, there are still poor people in Cuba, and there are not any really rich ones. Upper level Communist Party functionaries and government officials live well, but that is a consequence of the perquisites of office and not of income or wealth. Housing is a particular problem, and there are bad slums; but one does not see in Cuba the extent of poverty and malnutrition which one sees elsewhere in Latin America.

Great attention is given to children; Cubans generally shower even more tender loving care on children than other Latin Americans—which is a great deal. One is repeatedly told that the infant mortality rate has been reduced to 27 per 1,000 and in the city of Havana to 20 per thousand, levels comparable to the United States.

Children, like everybody else in Cuba, are organized for almost all of their waking hours. From the moment of their birth, those of them fortunate enough to live near a new polyclinic have meticulous health records kept of their various innoculations, growth in weight and height, and childhood illnesses. For those whose mothers work, there are a growing number (not yet enough) of day care centers. Beginning at the pre-school age of about four, there are kindergarten programs and the little ones can, if their parents are good revolutionaries, become members of the *Pioneros*, the youngest of the various youth movements in Cuba. During their elementary school days, summer recreation (and indoctrination) programs are organized. One of the records kept by elementary schools is how well they sing revolutionary songs. When they reach high school, there is a combined work-study program, and the good ones can then go on to a university and the Union of Communist Youth (UJC, after the Spanish initials). The dropouts go into the National Labor Army (ENT, after the Spanish initials) where presumably they are impressed by the advantages of collaborating with the Revolutionary establishment.

I visited two new rural schools (one primary and one secondary) and one old one. The new ones were quite impressive—lacking in some laboratory equipment, but with youngsters who were well-scrubbed, well-dressed, well-fed, and well-spoken, not in the least self-conscious. The old one was as grim a place as one can find in Latin America—20 students ranging in age from 6 to 16 in a single room. The teacher lived in three filthy rooms at one end of the building, with his wife and three children, two dogs, a television set, and a million flies.

I also visited a rural polyclinic, a *posto medico* (the smallest health care unit), and a *guardia de ancianos* (or old folks' home). The polyclinic had five doctors, a dentist and a dental technician, 14 nurses, and 104 workers—groundkeepers, cleaning people, cooks, etc. It had 16 beds, of which half were for maternity cases. Fifteen babies are born there a month—out of a population of 9,600—and no babies are delivered at home. The staff sees 1,200 patients a month, many of them pregnant women or well babies for routine checkups and shots.

The *posto medico* was more primitive, consisting of three small rooms—an examining room, a modestly stocked pharmacy, and a modestly equipped laboratory. But it had a doctor in attendance on Saturday morning (my visit was unexpected), and by noon he had seen 17 patients.

The *guardia de ancianos* had an average resident population of about 100—pitiful cases, as are all cases of helplessness and advanced senility. They lived dormitory style in surroundings which would have been clean if anybody had bothered to put up screens to keep out the flies. Residents were furnished food, clothing, and health care, and there was a communal television set.

The doctors to staff these operations are recent medical school graduates who are obligated to serve two years in the country, as a substitute for internship, before they return to Havana to take up a postgraduate specialty. The doctor in charge was a most attractive young woman who could not have been much more than 25 and who exuded an air of calm efficiency and self-confidence. When she is through running the polyclinic she intends to specialize in pediatrics.

Judging from the Cuban birthrate (200,000 a year out of a population of 9.5 million, up from 6 million at the time of the Revolution), pediatrics is a field with a great future. Cubans generally seem uncertain as to whether or not they should be worried about their population growth. Questions about this to different Cubans get different answers—no doubt an indication that the party line has not yet been established. But whatever the party line, the polyclinic dispenses IUDs and general birth control advice (though not the Pill). Top government officials deny that Cuba's population growth is a current problem, though they recognize that it is going to become one because of the social costs of providing food, clothing, housing, education, and medical care for 200,000 additional non-productive people a year. They seem not yet quite sure what to do about it. A good guess would seem to be, when they decide that time has come, a massive campaign of public discussion kicked off by a three-hour speech by Fidel inundating everybody with a flood of statistics and improvised rationalization of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

In all of my being shown schools, health centers, factories (one which was a gift of the Russians to make prefabricated housing), I was struck with a disturbing sense of *deja vu*. Finally, it dawned on me that these tours and briefings were not so much different from countless others I have received from American Embassy country teams, AID missions, and Milgroups. The pattern was the same: about four times as many people as necessary assembled to conduct the briefing or to escort me through a project. If the Cubans were trying to brainwash me, their efforts were no greater (and hopefully no more successful) than those of sundry officials of the U.S. Government in other times and places. The principal difference was that in this instance I was escorted by Cubans who said the Revolution did this, or the Russians did this for us, and not by foreigners who said we are trying to persuade these people to do thus-and-so.

III

Mention was made earlier of the growing self-confidence in Cuba. There seems to be a feeling that the worst is past. Times are better, and promise to get better yet. Cubans have survived the efforts of the United States and of anti-revolutionary exiles to overthrow the Revolution. There is a feeling of greater security.

There is also a feeling that Revolutionary Cuba's place in the Hemisphere and in the world is steadily becoming more firmly established. Cuba's relations with the rest of Latin America, both diplomatic and commercial, are expanding. The expansion of diplomatic relations received a setback with the overthrow of the Allende Government in Chile last year, but this is viewed as temporary. Furthermore, relations are good with a number of countries where formal diplomatic ties do not exist, though such ties are expected. Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, and even Costa Rica are mentioned in this category. President Echeverria of Mexico has now taken up the cry to lift the U.S. economic boycott, which Cubans call the blockade.

Trade with Latin America, Europe, and Japan is increasing. An impressive Argentine industrial fair opened in Havana the first week in July, and 300 Argentine businessmen were expected in Cuba selling a wide range of products from farm machinery to electronics to consumer durables—and including Argentine-made General Motors cars and trucks. The Economic Planning Board is acquiring a computerized data system from Olivetti in Italy.

In discussing relations with the United States, Cubans emphasize what they call the blockade in much the same way that the North Vietnamese once emphasized the bombing. This is a matter of principle with them, and lifting the blockade is the *sine qua non* of a change in Cuban policy toward the United States. In this connection, it should be noted that Cuban policy toward Latin America—one of the aspects of U.S.-Cuban relations that is always mentioned by the State Department—has changed long since. Cuban support of revolutionary or insurgency movements elsewhere in Latin America has been at a minimal—one might even say trivial—level for years in other than an ideological sense. Cuban policy now recognizes that there is more than one road—or in some cases trail, as one Cuban put it—to economic development. The Cubans have been particularly impressed by the military government in Peru.

Cubans recognize that their Revolution is changing, but they caution a visitor against expecting changes in two fundamental respects. Cuba is not going to become a Yugoslavia, they say—and the visitor makes a mental note of certainly not while Cuba is dependent on the Soviet Union to the tune of $550 to $600 million a year. Nor is Cuba going to abandon what Cubans call international solidarity with the masses. As an example, they cite Cuban support of the 200-mile limit at the Caracas Conference on the Law of the Sea because this is the position of their underdeveloped brothers in Ecuador and Peru and despite the fact that this puts them on the same side as what they call the fascist government of Chile—currently the number one Cuban *bête noire*—and even though it is against Cuba's own narrow self-interests as a fishing nation. (Most of Cuba's fishing is done not in waters nearby but off the coasts of South America and Africa.)

Prior to going to Cuba, I had thought that the U.S. economic boycott was more symbolic than practical. It seemed to me that even if all U.S. trade restrictions were lifted, very little trade with Cuba would result; because: (1) Cuban trade had been so completely re-oriented to the Soviet Union; (2) with the development of new sources of

U.S. sugar imports, there was very little in Cuba that the U.S. would want to buy other than perhaps a little rum and some cigars; and (3) Cuba could not afford to buy very much in the United States.

I was not in Cuba very long before I changed my mind. The Western Europeans and the other Latin Americans are sufficiently in evidence in Cuba to make it worthwhile for American firms to compete directly for some of this business. (Cubans whom I met casually in the hotel elevators or in the street frequently asked if I were Canadian or German; revelation of my true nationality produced surprise but no hostility.)

Further, although the boycott is symbolic to Cubans, it is more than that. They frankly admit that it has hurt them, particularly with respect to spare parts. They are proud of the fact that they have been able to circumvent it by developing other sources of supply, but this has not been done without some difficulty, a difficulty compounded by the fact that countries trading with Cuba are ineligible for American aid and that ships and aircraft calling at Cuba cannot call at the United States.

Although no Cuban said so explicitly, I have the clear impression that Cubans would welcome better relations with the United States. They were obviously very pleased by my visit and went out of their way to be helpful. Any initiative in improving relations, however, will have to come from the United States, and no substantial change can be expected without lifting the boycott.

It is my conclusion that the Cubans are correct when they say, as one did, that the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba has been a failure. If this is so, then it follows that a new policy should be devised.

A reexamination of existing policy with this end in view is called for by Section 14 of the State Department-USIA Authorization Bill as passed by the Senate May 20, 1974. Such a reexamination should include a review of sundry statutory provisions relating to Cuba, not only the so-called Cuba resolution of 1962 but also the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, mainly found in Section 620, relating to Cuba and to third countries trading with Cuba. (This by no means implies that there should be a United States aid program in Cuba; quite the contrary.)

Pending the formulation of a new policy, there are some modest steps which might be recommended to the Executive Branch. One would be the relaxation of travel restrictions on Americans desiring to go to Cuba. Another would be relaxation of restrictions on the movement within the United States of Cuban diplomats at the United Nations. These people are now confined to the City of New York, which is certainly a form of cruel and unusual punishment. It is hard to see how national security would be jeopardized if they were permitted to visit Philadelphia, Washington, or Kansas City.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that Cubans are extraordinarily proud and sensitive. It is my impression that they will respond to United States initiatives, but only if those initiatives respect Cuban dignity and sovereignty.

O

CUBAN REALITIES: MAY 1975

A

REPORT

BY

SENATOR GEORGE S. McGOVERN

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

AUGUST 1975

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A REPORT

BY

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(II)

CONTENTS

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., July 21, 1975.

HON. JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Capitol Office S–116, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the rules of the Committee, I am herewith filing a report on my recent trip to Cuba.

As you know, I made this trip in connection with the Committee's continuing interest in exploring the question of U.S. relations with Cuba. Mr. Bob Dockery of the Committee staff accompanied me and provided counsel on each of the issues we encountered.

Though my stay in Havana was brief, I believe it made a significant contribution to the normalization process. In the course of my visit Prime Minister Castro made several further gestures of accommodation to the American people and to American policy in the Western Hemisphere. As a result of both discussions and observations in Cuba, I returned with a reinforced impression that whatever may have been the case in the past, Cuba now places first priority on internal development and external détente.

I believe Cuba's gestures warrant and require a positive response from Washington. If the Executive Branch fails to follow up, as it did in the aftermath of the 1973 hijacking agreement, then Congress should pursue its own initiatives to bring the embargo against Cuba to an end.

In this regard, Mr. Chairman, you are to be commended for your own continuing efforts to bring about a change in U.S. policy. Your leadership on this issue has been most encouraging.

Finally, I want to thank you and the Committee staff for the assistance I received in making the arrangements for this effort and in making the trip itself a success. And I want to take special note of the helpful cooperation of the Department of State and the Department of Defense. In light of past efforts to discourage all travel to Cuba, I regard the constructive attitude of the Department of State in this case as evidence of at least a growing receptivity to consider the views we have been trying to advance.

Sincerely,

GEORGE MCGOVERN.

I. Recommendations

At the earliest possible moment, I believe the United States should end its trade embargo against Cuba, and explicitly acknowledge an interest in establishing normal diplomatic relations with the government of Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

My convictions on this score were reinforced during a trip to Cuba this May on behalf of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The primary reasons for a change of policy relate to America, not Cuba.

Normal trade and diplomacy with the United States will doubtless have only limited impact on the Cuban system and on that nation's influence beyond its shores. American trade can be important to the Cuban economy, but it cannot be decisive, given the available alternatives.

After the recent history of bitter hostility, some might argue that an American reversal now would confer legitimacy on the Cuban Government. But Mr. Castro does not need us to establish his credentials. His authority will continue whether we accept it or not.

So the fundamental need for a new policy toward Cuba lies not in what it will say about Cuba, but in what it will say—both to ourselves and to the world—about the United States.

If détente with the Soviet Union and China has displaced the rigid anti-Communism of the 1950s and 1960s, continuing hostility toward Cuba suggests that U. S. foreign policy is at least inconsistent and bewildering. Our persistent effort to isolate Cuba diplomatically and commercially is not only a failure; it undermines confidence in our common sense and reliability. That alone warrants a new policy. It is an anachronism unworthy of a great power to bargain with major communist nations, while we embargo a small island which poses no real threat.

In a major address on U.S. policy in Latin America, delivered in Houston last March, Secretary of State Kissinger indicated that our decisions toward Cuba will be "heavily influenced" by that country's external policies. He stated:

> Fundamental change cannot come unless Cuba demonstrates a readiness to assume the mutuality of obligation and regard upon which a new relationship must be founded.

But it does not appear that our policy has, in fact, been shaped by those standards.

Over the years, our main objection to Cuba's international conduct has been its supposed policy of "exporting" revolution. The supposition of such a policy was based on Castro's early decision to make Cuba

a training ground and launching site for insurgencies elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. After the Bay of Pigs and the disclosure of CIA assassination plots against Mr. Castro, American self-righteousness on this score sounds a bit strained. In any event, whether as a result of past failure, Soviet dispassion, or a Cuban change of heart, the Cubans ceased treating revolution as an exportable commodity some years ago. Today, Cuba's external posture—and the explicit commitment of the new Cuban draft Constitution—is to maintain normal relations with all countries that respect Cuban sovereignty, notwithstanding political and economic differences. Shortly after my visit to Cuba, Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, in an interview in London, made the shift still more explicit, declaring that Cuba's policy is to support progressive governments, not to subvert those it sees as oppressive.

Neither the United States nor Cuba has lost conviction about the merits of their respective systems. But in recent years, both nations have become more attentive to questions of national sovereignty and international law. Both here and there, this is a trend to be welcomed.

And as negative signals have been muted, positive ones have been sent.

From the Cuban point of view the anti-hijacking understanding of 1973 was a major gesture, going well beyond "mutuality of obligation." Indeed, it was a case in which the Castro government helped resolve a grave international danger without demanding anything of substance in return.

That step was followed in February of 1974, at the end of a visit to Cuba by Soviet First Secretary Breshney, by a joint Soviet-Cuban communique reaffirming the principles of détente and coexistence. Cuba has initiated the normalization of relations with other Western Hemisphere governments—including some once listed as targets of Cuban-inspired subversion. Prime Minister Castro has been accessible and cordial to American visitors including, before my trip, Foreign Relations Committee Chief of Staff Pat M. Holt, Senator Javits and Senator Pell, and members of Senator Kennedy's staff. Since my return the Cuban government has responded favorably to the request I delivered on behalf of Chairman Sparkman that arrangements be made to return a $2 million ransom paid by Southern Airways in 1972. The Cubans had previously linked this case to broader questions by writing a check for repayment on a Cuban bank account in New York which, like all Cuban assets in this country, has been frozen since 1960, and by offering payment in nickel, which would be prohibited by the embargo. By now offering direct payment through other means, Cuba has yielded these debating points.

In response to a letter which I delivered for Senator Brooke, the Prime Minister agreed readily to permit the parents of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis Tiant to visit the United States. Mr. Castro expressed strong interest in the concept of baseball and other sports exchanges.

Through this range of contact and activity, I believe the Cuban leadership has clearly signaled an interest in improved relations.

Secretary Kissinger also said in Houston:

> We see no virtue in perpetual antagonism between the United States and Cuba . . . we are prepared to move in a new direction if Cuba will.

I submit that Cuba has. I hope we will.

State Department officials suggest that there have been American gestures. They cite in particular the approval in 1974 of licenses for exports to Cuba by Canadian and Argentinian subsidiaries of American firms. Those steps were useful, although one suspects that Cuba was hardly consulted—that they were taken largely out of deference to Argentine and Canadian feelings. In both countries a denial would have been perceived as American interference in their internal affairs.

While of course I would not profess to represent official American policy, I did suggest in Cuba that these steps had significance, and also that our government's agreement to previous trips, and its very helpful cooperation with my own journey, demonstrated an open and promising attitude in the Executive Branch. I noted that in response to a recommendation from Senator Pell and Senator Javits, the Administration had also relaxed somewhat the restrictions on travel by members of Cuba's delegation to the United Nations.

But these small gestures have served their purpose. They have broken the ice. The time has come to move to the next stage.

It is proper to establish mutuality of obligation as a principle of normal international relations. But if we insist upon it for others, we must also demonstrate that we believe in it for ourselves. In the case of Cuba, that requires as an obvious precondition elimination of the trade embargo.

The official American position is that we have been bound as a member to respect the ban on trade with Cuba which was adopted in 1964 by the Organization of American States. In this regard two things are worth noting: (1) the United States imposed its own sanctions prior to any OAS decision, and (2) ten members of the OAS have been talking and trading freely with Cuba despite the embargo. Moreover, Prime Minister Castro indicated for the first time during my visit that a beginning could be made if we simply permitted trade in food and medicines, commodities not restricted by the OAS. There was not timely response to that signal. The United States has wasted an opportunity to take an important initiative toward bilateral relations prior to the OAS decision in Costa Rica, to permit members to exercise freedom of choice on the issue.

With considerable logic, the Cubans argue that the embargo has been a nonmutual act of hostility—an unwarranted and unprovoked attempt to exclude Cuba from international trade. There is, of course, no Cuban embargo against the United States. There is nothing comparable at all.

Prime Minister Castro reiterated to me his government's willingness to discuss legitimate differences, including the question of compensation for property that was expropriated when he took power. But, as he put it, the Cubans ". . . can't bargain with a knife at our throats."

The knife of the embargo also pains the hand that holds it. It is a needless division between the United States and many Latin American nations; it denies employment and earnings to American workers; it deprives American consumers lower-priced Cuban sugar and other commodities. For our own sake more than for Cuba's the embargo should be set aside so that we may move toward a rational settlement of the Cuban-American antagonism.

A new policy will not remake Cuba in the American image. Cuba is a one-party Communist state. Its leaders deny many of the libertarian values we wish for others and demand for ourselves. On many international and philosophical questions Cuba may oppose the American view.

But boycotting Cuba will not resolve the historic debate between Karl Marx and John Locke any more than did ignoring China for 25 years. We have social systems which are different, but so be it; our ideologies are at odds, but that does not preclude trade and dialogue. The relevant fact is that an American response can signal to Cuba, and also to the world, that we appreciate common sense and mutual respect. It can demonstrate that we have enough confidence in our own system to compete fairly and deal forthrightly with others. It can declare our determination to look beyond obsolete quarrels, in search of cooperation with all nations on the common problems—food, pollution, population, energy, and the arms race—which know no ideology and threaten every society.

II. Impressions of Cuba

"One swallow does not a summer make." Nor does a three day visit to Cuba give a comprehensive view. But it is possible to learn certain things and to offer some useful impressions.

I visited a dramatically changed nation. Americans recall pre-revolutionary Cuba vaguely—as an exotic vacation resort, a watering-hole for mobsters, prostitutes and gamblers, a dictatorship which welcomed easy American money, a privileged ruling class, impoverished rural workers and flocks of beggars on the streets of Havana.

The revolution worked an immediate transformation. But there has been another transformation since then—one which may explain in part why the Castro government is now so obviously prepared to deal on a constructive basis with the United States.

In the early 1960s Castro's revolution had reason to be profoundly suspicious and fearful of the United States. The Bay of Pigs invasion fueled those fears—and they were reinforced by the conviction among Cuban officials that they were the targets of continual CIA assassination attempts and harassment. The embargo and the hemispheric isolation of Cuba represented an undeclared war against a small and nearby nation. We used to speak of a "Communist threat ninety miles from our shores." Cubans perceived a far more real American threat at the same distance, but with far more powerful means to carry it out, indeed enough to destroy them.

This vulnerability partially explains Cuba's fierce anti-Americanism in the last decade, its determination to create some allies in this hemisphere and its haste—notwithstanding the revolution's profession of independence—to take all the help it could obtain from the Soviet Union or anywhere else.

Today what is most readily apparent in Cuba is that the pervasive fear of the 1960s has abated. It has been replaced by a sustaining self-confidence and pride; despite the threat from the North, Cubans say and their attitudes seem to imply, that the revolution is secure and its goals can be sought in relative safety.

Over time Cuban leadership has come to believe the pledge against future invasions which the United States gave in settlement of the 1962 missile crisis. In this time of détente, the Soviet Union probably has provided a tempering influence. Cuban officials now believe that CIA operations to overthrow the regime or assassinate its leaders have been ended. They feel free, therefore, to invite diplomatic contacts with the United States, which they have done. They have been forced to vest their energies and resources in internal development. And this they have done with a nearly single-minded concentration.

One or two of the newsmen who accompanied me on the trip referred to my Cuban agenda (a copy is appended) as a "showcase tour." It should not be surprising that the Cubans sought to show us their best. It is not our own practice to take foreign visitors to our most over-crowded prisons, our most vandalized schools, or our worst slums. In fact our schedule followed the general outlines I had requested in advance. We saw what we had requested. There is no way on a brief visit to make certain of everything which has been done or to measure all the differences between aspiration and accomplishment. Rather I wanted to see significant accomplishments, to form some idea of the spirit of the nation, its objectives, and its general direction—and beyond all this I wanted to visit with Fidel Castro.

Aside from political discussions, my primary interest was in agriculture. It is a primary interest of Cuba, too. Accordingly, after a brief reception at the airport, we spent our first evening in a comprehensive briefing at the Agricultural Ministry.

A drum roll of statistics, typically with 1959 as the base year, was sounded to demonstrate the agricultural "triumphs of the revolution." In 1959 one percent of the people owned 50 percent of the land. Now 70 percent is owned by the state—or, as the Cubans would put it, the people collectively—and the rest is in plots of 67 hectares or less (1 hectare equals 2.47 acres). In 1959 there were 8,400 tractors in the country. Now there are more than 50,000. Each statistic—land under irrigation, crop output, annual egg production (overall and per hen), milk and calf production—claimed similar gains.

The obvious progress which has occurred reflects huge state investments in agriculture, which is a national priority and a personal interest of Prime Minister Castro. He exhibited far more than a layman's knowledge when, on the second full day of our visit, he led us on a tour of a research project in which holsteins and zebus are being cross-bred to develop a milk cow which will produce well in a tropical climate. The shelves in his office are lined with technical works on farming. His expertise would impress any American farmer or rancher.

Agricultural development is the determining variable of a comprehensive national planning and economic reorganization program. Soil is tested and rainfall is analyzed to determine scientifically which crops should be cultivated where. Then transportation, processing plants, housing, even whole communities are structured to serve the agricultural sector. Quite literally, Cuban society is being redesigned from the ground up.

But I suspect that agriculture will also remain an unresolved problem for Cuba. When we were there the country was in its twenty-

seventh month of a drought which has caused sharp cutbacks of production goals. Beyond that, I think the collective system will prove deficient on structural grounds—that over the long run it will exhibit the same basic limitations of a system dominated by massive private monopolies. Though the Cubans will not easily accept this reality—indeed, they regard such criticism and its implications as "counter-revolutionary"—a system of smaller, family-operated units would probably make more sense. In fact, despite incentives such as low-cost housing and free health care and education, a substantial number of small farmers still refuse to sell their holdings to the state. There were even occasional guarded admissions that these private family farms are comparatively more productive than the collectives.

Other economic sectors are experiencing similar if less intense development. We toured Cuba's one steel mill which, with technical and financial assistance from the Soviet Union, is being expanded to raise output toward self-sufficiency in steel. Scrap collected in Cuba is supplemented with raw materials from the Soviet Union. The mill looks, sounds and smells like steel mills in the United States—down to the posters urging safety on the job.

The oil wells along the coastline represent an attempt for self-sufficiency in a different sector. This venture has been unsuccessful so far. A few pumps were operating, but most of them were idle because cost of operation exceeds the value of expected production. Cuban technicians believe there is oil offshore, but lack the equipment to drill there. Consequently most of Cuba's petroleum supplies are imported.

To pay for these imports and others, Cuba has moved effectively to improve its balance of trade. Exports, especially sugar and nickel, are increasing. The Cubans are seeking, and to a noticeable extent securing, a sizeable share of Caribbean tourism. Canadian tourists, for example, are surprisingly numerous.

There is no unemployment in Cuba; on the contrary, labor shortages are a chronic problem. Prime Minister Castro has promised many times to end the backbreaking labor of cutting sugar cane. That promise has not yet been fulfilled, but mechanization is well underway.

The lowest rate of pay in Cuba is 85 pesos a month, approximately $102.00. The highest is 570 pesos, or $674.00. But health care, education, transportation, and other basic services are free. Inflation is nearly non-existent because rationing instead of price increases reconciles shortages and consumer demand. Rent is low, set with some adjustments at an average 10 percent of earnings. Most families have more than one breadwinner. So, our guides told us, while no Cubans live luxuriously, all can live decently. Beyond dispute, the standard of living for the average Cuban family has improved sharply since 1959, and at an accelerated pace in recent years.

There was no effort to convince us that there is progress on every front. But any visitor to Cuba will find progress in many areas, and a carefully cultivated popular sense of involvement in each success.

Cuban directions in social services—health, education, and housing—were especially intriguing.

According to members of our party who had seen it before, the large psychiatric hospital in Havana has been dramatically transformed since the Batista regime. It would probably compare favorably with first rate psychiatric facilities in the United States. Before the revolu-

tion, it was simply a dreary storage compound for the mentally disturbed. Today it is an active therapy center, with patient care based on the same work ethic that guides Cuban society as a whole. Most patients are employed—making shoes, building furniture and toys, braiding rope, painting, maintaining the grounds, even guarding the gates. The therapy also attempts to minimize the distinctions between the patients and the rest of society. They are paid for their work, and since health care is free they can use their earnings to help support their families.

We next toured a large, modern technical school where individual labor was an integral part of the training process. Our host, Minister of Education Jose Fernandez, explained that each pupil spends three hours a day outside the classroom and on a job. In the school itself we saw a small assembly line turning out radios. Elementary students tend gardens. Every student who can work does something.

I found it interesting that Cubans attribute this work-study ethic not to Marxist ideology but to the philosophy of Jose Marti, the leader of Cuba's struggle for independence from Spain. They also draw from his principles, as well as from current government policy, the abiding conviction that education is a precondition to national growth and social justice. They say they will spare no expense or effort in providing each student with the most learning he can absorb, so that he may realize his maximum potential, for himself and for the nation.

In housing, the first priority is the construction of new apartment complexes near collective farms, sugar refineries, cigar factories, or other workplaces. In effect these are "new towns," self-contained communities with schools, day care centers, grocery stores, local transportation, motion picture theaters, and baseball parks. For example, East of Havana, the Alamar housing project which we visited will eventually house 415,000 people. About 50,000 live there now. We toured a grocery store in the project. Shoppers had few choices, but the store was well stocked with staples. As one member of our party observed, "baby food, yes; Screaming Yellow Zonkers, no." Our next stop was a day-care center, which was of particular interest to my wife Eleanor. Our visit was shortened because the television cameras frightened the children. But after the reporters left, Eleanor remained for as long as time would permit. As one with broad experience in the area of early childhood development, she concluded that the East of Havana center was advanced and sensitively conducted.

The apartment buildings in the complex were generally five or six stories high and constructed of prefabricated concrete slabs. There was some variety in design and much in color. Throughout Cuba, housing is under construction by some 29,000 members of so-called "mini-brigades," composed of units of thirty-two members each selected by their fellow workers for a leave of absence from their regular jobs. One project, for example, is being constructed by employees of the foreign service.

Cuban progress is not a vindication of the Communist system as such. That progress has been founded on massive infusions of aid and concessional trade arrangements from the Soviet Union. It has been spurred by a windfall rise in world sugar prices. And the Cuban people have had to pay a heavy price—there is a floor under every

individual's income, but there is also a ceiling on individual initiative and aspiration; there is freedom from poverty, at least relative to the past, but there are also restrictions on intellectual and political freedom.

Yet on balance, the vast majority of Cubans probably would choose what they have now over what they had before. Prime Minister Castro exercises unquestioned authority. But we also saw abundant evidence that he is genuinely popular. He took power by force, but he seems to sustain it at least partly by the appeal of personality and quality of performance. The last Cuban dictatorship was not at all benevolent. It was widely feared and hated. This one is obviously different.

The difference is underscored by the fact that paintings and sculptures in Cuba pay tribute to Jose Marti, to Lenin, or to Che Guevara, while a likeness of Fidel Castro is rarely seen. When people perceive their leader as a national hero there is no need for him to proclaim it.

Cuba also demonstrates that broad political changes do not necessarily displace cultures. In fact, no apparent effort has been made to impose cultural changes, even where aspects of Cuban society evolved over long years of contact with the United States.

In sports, baseball is not only the national pastime; it is close to a national passion. The players are not professionals; instead they are released from their regular jobs during the season. But after watching a few innings of a championship game, I came away convinced that they could give our major league teams a good run for their money. We saw Prime Minister Castro for the first time later on that same evening, and during our conversation an aide came in to tell him that his Oriente province team had lost to Havana by one run in the thirteenth inning. His expression displayed the disappointment of a truly committed fan.

Cuban music sounds familiar. Old standards have been combined with new praises of the revolution. We heard excellent musical performances from both the patients at the psychiatric institute and students at the technical school. A loudspeaker in the courtyard at the steel mill played nonstop music—both Cuban and some fairly recent American tunes. The walls of the charming restaurant El Bodeguito del Medio in old Havana are covered with clippings and autographs recalling the presence of American celebrities including Ernest Hemingway, Dorothy Kilgallen and Errol Flynn. The restaurant also features some of the best guitar music I have ever heard, from the same musicians who were playing there when Fidel Castro was fighting in the Sierra Maestra mountains.

This self-proclaimed proletarian country also retains a taste for elegance. The mixture was exemplified by Ramon Castro, the Prime Minister's brother who lives in a trailer and runs agricultural programs in the Picadura Valley. He greeted us in a workshirt with rolled-up sleeves, his cheeks burned red from hours in the sun. But he was our gracious host at a beautiful government protocol house overlooking the valley, where waiters served, in crystal and fine china, a delicious meal of lobster, chicken, and Chilean wine—left over, we were assured, from the days of Allende. Another long luncheon, hosted by Education Minister Jose Fernandez, was served at Las Ruinas, a magnificent public restaurant with stained glass windows, which encloses the carefully maintained ruins of an old fortress. We were told

that the prices were within reach of most Cubans, but only for special family occasions.

So much of what we experienced in Cuba was familiar. We were driven in small Argentine-made Fords, and we saw Cubans in pre-1960 American cars with tail-fins and chrome. We talked with writers and intellectuals who idolized Ernest Hemingway. Cubans dress much like Americans and obviously according to individual taste. Sports clothes and mini-skirts abound.

The guides who were assigned to accompany us on formal visits to Cuban institutions also proved to be exceptional guides to the informal aspects of the Cuban spirit. We came to know best a small group of relatively young people who work with Prime Minister Castro on questions concerning the United States. They were talented, competent, and committed. They were also warm and relaxed. Within a few hours of our arrival, they and members of my family and my staff were exchanging life stories, arguing social philosophy, and swapping jokes. My family and I and members of our staff developed a genuine affection and admiration for them.

Obviously, Cuba subscribes to some principles we cannot accept. Yet in more than geography, Cuba remains close to the United States. Cuba in 1975 appears to be advancing economically and maturing politically. From a position of internal strength, Cuba's leaders feel sufficiently secure to move away from the hostility of an earlier time toward peaceful relations with the United States and Latin American nations.

In the beginning the embargo inflicted grave wounds on the Cuban economy. But it also gave the Castro government a cause to rally the Cuban people and left it with no choice except dependence on another outside power. Today the embargo makes far less difference on both counts. For Cuba it is no longer as harmful economically, as helpful politically, or as important internationally.

Cuba's foreign policy has moderated not because of our hostility, but in spite of it. Now, despite bitter but fading hostilities on both sides, older human ties and the dictates of common sense are reasserting themselves.

The two countries do not necessarily need each other. But if they are honest, both will admit that they are interested in each other and could benefit from friendly relations. Neighbors may go separate ways. But at least they ought to communicate.

III. Conversations With Fidel Castro

It is sometimes hard to remember that Fidel Castro does not—indeed, he could not—rule Cuba alone. He is surrounded by a number of exceptional people. The tall, athletic Education Minister, Jose Fernandez, speaks with contagious enthusiasm about both the practice and the philosophy of education in Cuba. In 1961 he was the tactical commander of Cuba's forces at the Bay of Pigs. Dr. Bernave Ordaz at the Psychiatric Institute is also a man of independent force. Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the Vice Prime Minister, combines gentility and obvious brilliance. Jesus Montane Oropesa who met us at the Havana air terminal was with Fidel in the Oriente mountains.

We were just finishing a dinner hosted by Dr. Rodriguez and Foreign Minister Raul Roa at one of Havana's protocol houses—one of them former homes of wealthy Cubans now maintained for entertaining foreign guests. It was our second evening in Cuba. We had come to the country hoping to see the Prime Minister and assuming that we would, but without any specific arrangements in advance. I had been troubled by indications that he would probably not see us until Thursday evening, which would have meant only a short talk or a possible delay in our departure.

The conversation with Dr. Rodriguez had turned to the possibility of an American major league baseball team playing in Cuba, a hemispheric version of ping-pong diplomacy. At about 11:00 p.m. an aide came in and spoke privately to our host. Dr. Rodriguez abruptly pushed his chair back from the table and announced that the Prime Minister had stopped by to pay his respects and was waiting to see us. We immediately adjourned to the patio for coffee.

The reality of Fidel Castro matches the popular image. He was, as always, dressed in freshly pressed, well tailored military fatigues. Well built and youthful in appearance at the age of 48; hair and beard still black. An air of confidence and poise, but a perpetually inquisitive expression. All in all a compelling, charismatic presence.

As the conversation started, I discovered another side of his personality. Mr. Castro is shy, soft-spoken, and sensitive. He arranges his thoughts and chooses his words carefully. He quickly grasps each nuance of meaning, and responds knowledgeably and at length to questions on virtually any subject.

This first meeting was only to get acquainted.

"You served during the war?" he asked.

"Yes, as a bomber pilot making raids from Italy against the Nazis."

"How long did it take for one of those raids?"

"Sometimes twelve or thirteen hours. Our raids were directed against oilfields, factories, railroad centers and other strategic targets. They were high risk missions. I lost many close friends."

Castro observed that the experience must have helped to motivate my efforts against the Vietnam War and for international peace. He spoke of the 1972 campaign, expressing keen interest in the reform movement within the Democratic party and in the political activism of American youth. His questions revealed that he is well-informed and watches American politics very closely.

We did not discuss the substantive issues of Cuban-American relations in this first talk, although I did raise the point that one way to move toward better relations would be an exchange of baseball teams.

"That has already been suggested," he said.

We learned that over time there have been a number of discussions about the possibility of an American team playing in Cuba. Subsequently the Cuban sports ministry presented a memorandum which outlined past discussions with Americans who have been interested in the project. The U.S. State Department would have to validate passports, and Castro told us that this had been the obstacle.

I also gave the Cuban leader a letter I had brought with me from Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, which urged him to permit the parents of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis Tiant to travel to the United States to see their son in a major league game.

"That should be no problem," Castro said. "We will look into this matter and give you a definite answer."

After an hour Castro said we would meet again the next day, though he offered no details about time or place. I urged him to meet also with members of the American press who had come with us. He said there were too many for individual interviews, so I suggested a press conference. He answered that he would consider it.

Like the first encounter, our second meeting came as a surprise. We had driven fifty miles southeast of Havana for a late lunch with the Prime Minister's brother, Ramon. When we were ready to leave, the cars seemed to be missing. Our guides, who were in on the secret, feigned impatience with the drivers for making us wait.

After a few minutes, the serenity of the hilltop was broken by the rumble of Russian-made jeeps rounding the corner of the driveway. They came to a halt directly in front of us. Castro was in the lead jeep. He greeted his brother and exchanged pleasantries with the group; then he invited Eleanor and me to tour the valley.

"Before you answer," he cautioned, "I want you to know that I'm going to drive."

He put on his glasses with mock gravity, and off we went down the hillside in a motorized caravan, followed by the missing cars which had reappeared on cue. At the bottom of the hill, buses carrying the press corps joined us.

We toured the valley for the next three and a half hours, stopping briefly at an experimental dairy farm, a cattle ranch, and a scenic overlook. It occurred to me that someone on the Castro staff had a press secretary's eye for "photo opportunities" and "media events." Cuban officials are not practiced at dealing with a free press, but they know the value of publicity.

The Prime Minister supplied a running commentary on the progress of his favorite agricultural research projects. Castro also spoke with admiration of American agriculture, and of the need for rural development throughout the world.

"The United States is critical in the development of agriculture worldwide. You have the greatest farm output in the world and you can help guide the development of other countries."

We discussed a number of subjects on the long drive back to Havana. I told him of speculation in the United States that Cuban agents may have been involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. He responded in disbelief. "We had troubles with the Kennedy Administration. But it is monstrous even to contemplate that we would murder the head of state of any nation—to say nothing of being so foolish as to incur the wrath of a great power like the United States." Then he added: "Before that man Oswald killed President Kennedy he tried to get a visa at our embassy in Mexico City to visit Cuba. His application was refused. I have often thought that if we had admitted him, many people might have blamed us for what he did."

At the same time he told me, as Mr. Rodriguez had before, that they were aware of the CIA efforts to assassinate them—as many as a hundred attempts, they said, although not all were attributed to the CIA.

Apparently he has no real fear of such plots now. Prime Minister Castro moves easily among the Cuban people. At my suggestion we

stopped at a village ice cream stand, which began turning out cones as quickly as possible for our party and for the children who clustered around. The Prime Minister attempted to pay, but a local official insisted that we were guests of the community.

Castro talked and joked with the people who gathered quickly when our caravan arrived. His security men made no attempt to block off the crowd; in fact, they seemed to stay closer to the jeeps and the radios than to the Prime Minister. We went inside an apartment building, and one of the families we met insisted that Eleanor stay for refreshments—where we finally found her after everyone else had boarded the vehicles and was waiting to leave.

On the way back we stopped at a rum factory on the outskirts of Havana. Castro led us into one of the large steel buildings containing endless racks of rum in wooden kegs. Waiters appeared and offered samples. It was a strong variety of which no one could take more than a taste.

Castro delivered us at the hotel at 8:30 p.m. He had scheduled a press conference for an hour later, and would see us again at 10:30 for more substantive discussions.

The Prime Minister greeted us immediately after his session with the reporters and escorted us into his office. Through the American press, Castro had delivered a message to the U.S. Government, and another to the American people. He had refined his position on the embargo in an effort to be more accommodating to the American posture. Pending the complete removal of the embargo, discussions with the United States could move ahead if we would only lift our effective ban on trade in food and medicine. To the American people he extended in English ". . . a wish of friendship. I understand it is not easy, because we belong to different worlds. But we are neighbors. In one way or another we ought to live in peace."

We were seated around an oblong table in the Prime Minister's office. Before taking up the direct questions of relations between the United States and Cuba, we heard his views on other international concerns—particularly the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

On the Middle East, I described the outlines of a possible settlement which I had proposed after a trip to that area earlier this year—the full recognition of Israel in exchange for Israel's return to its 1967 borders, with practical modifications, and recognition of Palestinian self-determination. Castro felt that such a formula would bring peace, and that the Israelis—who are "wise people"—might be ready to accept it. He added: "The Arabs dislike the step-by-step approach, the so-called Kissinger formula. It tends to divide them."

He told us that he expected no "blood bath" in South Vietnam:

> The Vietnam conflict was primarily a struggle for independence against foreign domination. When the foreigners left, the fighting ceased. I don't believe the PRG realized how quickly the end would come. What happens next depends a great deal on U.S. policy. If the United States sponsors and supports subversive activities against the new government, then the situation could change. The reunification of North and South will take a few years. Vietnam will not be a typical socialist state. They will be mindful of public opinion in the United States and around the world.

I mentioned the reports of executions and forced relocations in Cambodia. Castro said he was "not sure" about Cambodia: "We don't have any news; don't know the source of that report. Cambodia had more of the characteristics of a civil war, with more bitterness among the Cambodians themselves. It may be a different matter than Vietnam."

I moved the discussion to Cuban-American issues by saying that I would not waste my time defending the embargo; Castro already knew of my opposition to it, and so did the United States Government. Instead, I suggested that we should concentrate on steps which might help improve relations between the two countries. At the same time I made it clear that I had no authority to negotiate on behalf of the United States—that I had come to listen and learn in the hope that I could make some contribution to the normalization process.

Chairman Sparkman of the Foreign Relations Committee had given me a letter to the Cuban Government on behalf of a small Atlanta-based airline—Southern Airways—which had been unable to secure repayment of a $2 million ransom which hijackers had taken with them to Cuba. I argued that it would be a strong gesture of good will if Cuba would arrange for repayment. The Prime Minister said he was very impressed with the reasoning in Senator Sparkman's letter and that he was ". . . personally inclined to respond positively; but more for you than for the United States Government. We don't want to appear in the role of begging."

To Castro this has become an important distinction. He feels Cuba has gone "the extra mile" to accommodate the United States, but that there has not been meaningful reciprocation. Any additional steps would have to be justified not as further gestures to the United States Government, but as courtesies to individual Americans who favor a change in American policy. His view was summed up in a discussion of the hijacking agreement:

> We took honest, rational and constructive action. But we didn't link it to our internal interests. Then the other party, the United States, did not take any important steps to help us. It would have been much more tactical to link the treaty to the blockade. Now we are a little bit skeptical of the good will of the United States Government. Maybe sometimes we react with a little pride. We could resist the blockade for another fifteen years. But nobody would profit from that.

I noted that games in Cuba between American and Cuban baseball or basketball teams could fall into a people-to-people, rather than intergovernmental, category. By this time, in response to my raising the issue the night before, he had reviewed the previous private American initiatives. Once again he welcomed the idea, and assured us that ballplayers would receive a warm greeting.

"People here respect American athletes," he said. "And in a political sense, they know that if U.S. athletes are not treated well, the country loses."

After my return from Cuba, I wrote to Secretary of State Kissinger to explore the current State Department position on this question. A copy of my letter and his response are appended to this report. I have had further discussions with Assistant Secretary William Rogers, and I am hopeful that appropriate visa arrangements can be worked out.

Prime Minister Castro and I also discussed the situation of eight American prisoners in Cuba, who have been of particular concern to the United States Government. While I could not judge individual cases, I argued that the prisoners had been confined in Cuba for a long time, and that it would advance the prospects of normalization if they were released. I said that this magnanimous, unilateral step would demonstrate not weakness but strength—the strength to forgive enemies. He wanted to know how many I thought he should release.

"All of them?" he asked.

"That would be the strongest gesture."

He laughed.

"But then what would I do when Senator Kennedy comes?"

Castro recalled that Cuba had once offered to exchange four of these prisoners for the four Puerto Ricans who were convicted of a shooting incident in the gallery of the House of Representatives during the Truman Administration. For reasons which he did not make clear, that proposal had made no progress.

Then at 12:15 a.m., he looked at his watch and suggested that we have dinner.

We drove from the Palace to a house in the Havana suburbs. But instead of going in we were led around back to a basketball court. Next to the court, a lamb was being barbecued whole over an open pit, with a large chicken thrown in for good measure. As Castro explained, the dinner was Algerian in origin.

"They prepared it for me during one of my visits there. I believe you have a lot of sheep in South Dakota, so I thought this would be appropriate."

Still on a skewer, the lamb was carried to a table. Castro explained: "The tradition is to eat it with your fingers. Use just one hand, to keep the other free for wine. I suggest you start about here." It was a delicious and relaxed meal, although Castro remarked that because he had kept us too long at the palace the lamb was slightly overcooked.

I wondered why the nagging issue of our naval base at Guantanamo had not been mentioned at any time during our visit, by Castro or any other official. For many years the Cubans had cited the base and the embargo as the essential barriers to normal relations with the United States, yet no one had even spoken the word "Guantanamo" to us. During dinner, I decided to raise it myself.

"If you ask the average Cuban," Castro replied, "he will probably tell you that a foreign nation should not have a military base on our soil. But I will tell you that it is a secondary issue, a secondary issue. We are not pressing that matter now."

He did not suggest that he has come to accept the base. Rather in his mind it is an issue which can be resolved at a later time. Since the possibility that Guantanamo could become a Soviet base is a major concern of American strategists, one answer might be a neutralization arrangement under which no major power would use the facility for military purposes.

We also discussed Castro's view of the 1962 missile crisis.

"I would have taken a harder line than Khrushchev. I was furious when he compromised. But Khrushchev was older and wiser. I realize in retrospect that he reached the proper settlement with Kennedy. If my position had prevailed, there might have been a terrible war. I was wrong."

At 2:30 a.m. we ended our dinner and went off for a late drive through downtown Havana. Castro said crime is no longer a problem, and he noted the absence of uniformed policemen. He is proud that the crime syndicates are gone and that gambling and prostitution have ended. Shortly after 3 a.m. we were back at the hotel.

Altogether Prime Minister Castro had given us nine hours of his time—a major gesture in itself. I doubt that an American President has often been so accessible to a foreign visitor, especially one of lesser official status.

Mr. Castro leaves mingled impressions. It is, for example, abundantly clear that he will not yield to American pressure. It can only be counterproductive. Based on their own assessment of the current situation, the authorities in Cuba have decided to seek détente with the United States. That is a major policy decision. A conciliatory response can bring improved relations between our two countries and contribute to the long-term security of the Western Hemisphere; a continued hard line can only perpetuate needless hostility.

Fidel Castro is walking a narrow line. Just hours after my departure, he spoke at a celebration of the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II. This time the visiting delegation was made up of high officials from the Soviet Union. Castro denounced "Yankee imperialism," and lavished praise on the role of the Soviet Union—in World War II and since—as the world's principal guardian against fascism and the defender of global peace. Mr. Castro plainly will not risk the loss of Soviet support in order to court the United States.

But I take as most revealing of all the answers he gave during our discussions his response—his admission of error—on the Cuban missile crisis. For he was reflecting not only on a single event, but was pointing to his own growing maturity and capacity for reasoned discourse.

When Castro began the Cuban revolution he was in his twenties. At the time of the missile crisis in 1962, he was 35. Today he is 48. I think the years and the challenges of national leadership have matured Fidel Castro just as they have matured his revolution. Now, even if his rhetoric is still sometimes hard to accept, he is leading his nation in tempered, more responsible ways. He is shaping the convictions of his countrymen and the policy of his country toward progress at home and détente abroad. Despite the rhetoric, that is the reality of Cuba in 1975.

APPENDIX 1

ITINERARY

MONDAY, MAY 5

12:45 p.m.—Departed Capitol for Andrews Air Force Base.
1:30 p.m.—Departed Andrews Air Force Base.
3:40 p.m.—Arrived Homestead Air Force Base, Miami, Fla.
4:00 p.m.—Departed Homestead Air Force Base.
5:30 p.m.—Arrived José Martí International Airport, Havana, Cuba. Received by Jesus Montane Oropesa, close adviser of Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Brief reception at the Diplomatic Quarters at the airport, including discussion of scheduled events.
6:30 p.m.—Tour of National Agrarian Reform Institute offices with a detailed briefing on Cuban agriculture. Accompanied by Cuban officials: Daniel Solana Pinera, Vice President, National Agrarian Reform Institute; Adolfo Cesio Recio, Director General of Foreign Relations, National Agrarian Reform Institute; Angel Estrada Acosta, Director General of Economics, National Agrarian Reform Institute; Jlidio Sabatier Aeanda, Director of Planning, National Agrarian Reform Institute; and Pablo Romero, Director, Regional Planning Institute.
9:00 p.m.—Checked in at the Hotel Riviera, downtown Havana.
10:30 p.m.—Informal dinner at the El Bodequito del Medio Restaurant.
12:30 p.m.—Returned to the Hotel Riviera.

TUESDAY, MAY 6

9:00 a.m.—Tour of Havana's psychiatric hospital given by Dr. Bernave Ordaz, Director of the hospital, and Dr. Pedro Azcuy, Assistant Vice Minister of Public Health.
11:15 a.m.—Tour of V. I. Lenin Vocational School in suburbs of Havana by Jose Ramon Fernandez Alvarez, Minister of Education.
1:30 p.m.—Lunch at Las Ruinas Restaurant, given by Jose Ramon Fernández Alvarez.
4:00 p.m.—Returned to the Hotel Riviera.
6:00 p.m.—Courtesy call on Ambassador Schnyder, Swiss Embassy.
7:30 p.m.—Returned to the Hotel Riviera.
8:30 p.m.—Went to Estadio Latino Americano and watched two innings of championship baseball game between teams representing Havana and Oriente.

ITINERARY—Continued

9:30 p.m.—Arrived at one of the Cuban Government diplomatic residences for dinner with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez Rodríguez, Vice Prime Minister of Foreign Relations; Raul Roa, Foreign Minister; and Jesus Montane Oropesa, an adviser.
11:15 p.m.—Prime Minister Fidel Castro arrived following dinner.
12:30 a.m.—Returned to the Hotel Riviera.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 7

8:30 a.m.—Press conference with Senator McGovern.
9:30 a.m.—Tour of Alamar Housing Project, including visits to a day-care center and a supermarket.
12:00 p.m.—Tour of the "José Martí" steel mill, Cotorro, Havana, Cuba, accompanied by the following officials: Juan Sánchez Utrera, Business Manager; Francisco Díaz Tarajano, Director, Economic Department; Alfredo Uguet Bohorques, Vice Director of Production; and Danilo Michel, Technical Director.
2:45 p.m.—Lunch with Ramon Castro, who directs the agriculture and livestock program for the area, at "Protocol House", Valle de la Picadura.
4:45 p.m.—Tour of Picadura Valley conducted by Prime Minister Fidel Castro with brief stops at a dairy farm and cattle breeding ranch. Stop also made at the town of Nuevo Jibacao.
7:30 p.m.—Brief tour of Ronera Santa Cruz, a rum factory on the outskirts of Havana.
8:30 p.m.—Returned to the Hotel Riviera.
9:30 p.m.—Press conference with Prime Minister Fidel Castro.
10:30 p.m.—Private meeting with Prime Minister Castro.
12:15 a.m.—Dinner with Prime Minister Castro at one of the Cuban Government's diplomatic residences in Havana.
3:00 a.m.—Returned to the Hotel Riviera.

THURSDAY, MAY 8

9:00 a.m.—Press conference with Senator McGovern.
11:15 a.m.—Tour of the Museo de la Revolution.
12:45 p.m.—Meeting with students at Havana University.
2:15 p.m.—Returned to the Hotel Riviera.
4:00 p.m.—Departed Hotel Riviera.
5:15 p.m.—Departed Jose Marti International Airport.
6:45 p.m.—Departed Homestead Air Force Base.
8:50 p.m.—Arrived Andrews Air Force Base.

ITINERARY—Continued

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APPENDIX 2

CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING BASEBALL EXCHANGE

MAY 13, 1975.

Hon. HENRY KISSINGER,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During my trip to Cuba last week I discussed at some length with Prime Minister Castro the idea of American baseball and basketball teams playing Cuban teams. As you know, both countries are exceptionally enthusiastic about these two sports. I believe such an exchange, beginning with games in Havana, could be a very useful, if informal, step toward improved relations.

Prime Minister Castro and other Cuban officials were very receptive to the idea. They told me that from their point of view there would be no obstacles, so long as suitable arrangements could be made in the United States.

Before it can be pursued further, it seems to me that it is necessary to have some assurance that trips to Havana by American teams would be permitted by the Department of State. Therefore, I would very much appreciate your advice on whether the Department would assist in this endeavor, at least to the extent of validating passports for travel to Cuba. Given schedules of teams in the United States, it seems to me that it would be possible to have a major college basketball team play in Cuba in the near future, and that perhaps the baseball exchange could take place later in the summer.

With appreciation for your assistance, I am

Sincerely,

GEORGE MCGOVERN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., May 29, 1975.

Hon. GEORGE MCGOVERN,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MCGOVERN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your May 13 letter about basketball and baseball exchanges with Cuba. We greatly appreciate your interest in this matter and our ideas on the types of exchanges of athletic teams that could be organized.

As you may know, we have not wholly excluded athletic exchanges with Cuba in the past. We have validated passports for American athletes and granted visas to Cuban athletes when failure to do so would prejudice their Olympic standings.

There are some aspects in the whole question of exchanges of professional level baseball players and college level basketball players which are complicated by our overall policy toward Cuba.

We would appreciate it if you or someone on your staff got in touch with Bill Rogers and his people regarding specific exchange possibilities should the occasion arise.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

BOX 46, PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING BOOK,
RON NESSEN PAPERS, FORD LIBRARY

[FEB. 26, 1976]

CUBA

Q. What are the prospects for improvement in our relations with Cuba in view of its intervention in the Angola conflict?

A. Cuba's unjustified involvement in the domestic affairs of other nations, such as their encouragement of the Independence movement in Puerto Rico and, particularly, their massive military troup involvement in the Angola conflict thousands of miles from Havana, is simply incompatible with lessening tensions and improving relations. The Cubans have sent over 10,000 troops to Angola, involving themselves in what should be purely an internal Angolan matter.

I flatly rule out the possibility of any improvement in relations between ourselves and Cuba under these circumstances.

BOX 3, RICHARD CHENEY FILES, WHITE OPERATIONS, WHITE HOUSE STAFF FILES, FORD LIBRARY

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I-21303/76

23 Mar 1976

LF MR Case No. 87-13
Document No. 8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: US Policies with Respect to Possible Cuban Military Intervention in Rhodesia and Namibia -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S/NFD) The attached ISA paper analyzes possible US responses to further Cuban/Soviet interventions in Southern Africa in broad political, economic, and military terms. It focuses on three general classifications of US options: minimal involvement, use of coercive measures, and positive engagement on behalf of black majority interests. The paper has a pro and con format to illustrate how the various ranges of options would impact on US relations with the Soviet Union in the global context, and with Latin America and Africa in their regional contexts. The dichotomies associated with US simultaneous condemnation of Cuban/Soviet intervention and the white governing regimes of the target states, as well as the diverse ways US responses would impact upon the global and regional contexts, are highlighted throughout the paper.

(S/NFD) In the wake of the Dallas speech, I think the WSAG principals ought to clarify, at least among themselves, what is meant by "The United States cannot acquiesce indefinitely in the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in distant lands for the purpose of pressure and to determine the political evolution by force of arms."

(S/NFD) To square the circle of opposing Soviet/Cuban military involvement in the prime targets of Rhodesia and Namibia, while not supporting the white minority regimes of those countries, demands careful calculation. The problem falls into three policy arenas - US-Soviet relations, US-African relations, and US-Latin American relations. If we are not to oppose Cuban adventures in Africa by military means there, effective retaliation rests in US-Soviet relations and in the Hemisphere.

(S/NFD) The Cubans, however, must be kept uncertain of our method of retaliation. They are not in the perfect position either:

- The Cubans must retain full Soviet support for any future African adventures and would be sensitive to being abandoned if the cost on other tables is too high for the Soviets; and

- The Cubans have a large investment to consolidate in Angola. Having won the country for the militarily weak MPLA, the Cubans could not

soon, with any assurance of MPLA survival, drastically draw down their carefully picked black forces there.

(S/NFD) Dr. Kissinger has begun to build public and congressional concern over the Cuban expeditionary force. In addition, there is a greatly increased concern in Western Europe. The widespread public ignorance that underpinned the "no more Vietnams" votes on the Hill against Angolan aid in December is gradually being dissipated. The policy options outlined in Alternative B ("coercive measures") of the attached paper most closely resemble the de facto US policy which Dr. Kissinger has in train.

(S/NFD) I think at the WSAG meeting you should:

- Emphasize the broader policy considerations.

- Underline the US-USSR focus for discussion of US policy on Southern Africa.

- Recommend that official public statements on these issues be restrained and strictly keyed to the policy approach finally decided upon.

Harry Bergold

HARRY E. BERGOLD
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Attachment a/s

~~SECRET~~ .NOFORN

US Policies with Respect to Possible Cuban Military Intervention in Rhodesia and Namibia

NLF Case No. 87-13
Document No. 9

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

- Cubans may intervene in other Southern African regions following their success in Angola.

- South Africa, although it will be affected by events in Rhodesia, is not the immediate concern for US policy responses. The South Africa case is not nearly so urgent, and the military situation is quite different.

  -- The South Africans are capable of defending themselves against any likely near term threats.

  -- The South African Government is more prone than the Smith regime to accept political solutions as evidenced by their policy of entente.

  -- The US reaction to intervention in Rhodesia, of course, will tend to circumbscribe its policy toward South Africa.

- Without Soviet support, Cuba could exacerbate existing regional instabilities, but it probably could not be a decisive force in the near future.

- USG has publically stated that it will not tolerate additional Soviet/Cuban interventions in Africa.

- USG has also publically concurred, however, with the UN position that the Government of Rhodesia and the South African governing of Namibia are "illegal."

  -- At the same time, by virtue of the Byrd Amendment, the US continues to import strategically important materials such as chromium from Rhodesia.

- US actions to prevent further Cuban interventions, or responses to them if they occur, will affect:

  -- US-Soviet relations (the global context)
  -- US-Latin American relations
  -- US-African relations

- US coercive responses against Cuban/Soviet encroachments in Rhodesia or Namibia would be widely perceived domestically and internationally as support for illegal racist regimes no matter how the USG tries to couch its policy.

Box 3, Kissinger Office Files, White House Operations, White House Staff Files, Gerald Ford Library

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

- US responses to negate Cuban/Soviet intervention in Rhodesia or Namibia would not be construed as helping a Third World country preserve its independence from an outsider's hegemonic interests because of the unique character of the "illegal," white minority regimes.

- The vast majority of Latin American countries would support US actions against Cuban interventions in the Western Hemisphere; they would condemn US responses to counter Cuba in Southern Africa.

- US-Latin American relations would be adversely affected by any US unilateral action against Cuba in this hemisphere in response to an extra-regional Cuban action. Not only would a unilateral US response negate the new spirit of cooperation, consultation, and mutual respect, but the Latin Americans might consider the US regional activities to be more hostile than Cuba's actions outside the hemisphere.

II. POLICY GUIDELINES

US-USSR (Kissinger, 2/3/76)

U.S. seeks, regardless of Soviet intentions, to serve peace through a systematic resistance to pressure and conciliatory responses to moderate behavior. U.S. policies are designed to:

- Prevent the use of Soviet power for unilateral advantage and political expanisonism to the detriment of the U.S.

- Enable U.S. allies and friends to live with a sense of security by maintaining an equilibrium of force.

[redacted]

- Advance the process of building an international order of cooperation and progress.

U.S.-Latin American (Kissinger, 3/4/76)

USG pledged that its hemispheric relations would:

- Respond to the development needs of Latin America.

- Support regional efforts to organize for cooperation and integration to include modernizing the inter-American system.

- Negotiate our differences based on mutual respect and sovereign equality.

- Maintain the U.S. commitment to mutual security against any who would undermine our common effort, threaten a nation's independence, or export violence and terror.

U.S.-African (Dept. of State Jan 76)

U.S. major concerns in the region are:

- That Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the economic order, an economic partner with a growing stake in the international order;

- That self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread to all of Africa;

- That the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict.

III. BROAD POLICY APPROACHES

A. Minimal Involvement. This approach would constitute some changes of our current policy in that the US, through statements and actions, would attempt to divorce the Cuban/Soviet threat against Rhodesia and Namibia from other US interests. Accordingly, we would make no further public or private statements implying US intent to seek to limit Cuban activity in that area. We would adopt the position that we continue to be irrevocably opposed to the concept of white minority rule; that we continue to consider the Rhodesian government and South Africa's governing of Namibia to be illegal; that we deplore Cuban and Soviet cynicism in using and encouraging violence to seek to achieve the kind of change which the people of Africa should be allowed to achieve on their own terms; that Soviet involvement in the matter risks working against resolution of other outstanding issues between us; that, categorically, the nations of this Hemisphere including, of course, the US will not tolerate Cuban interventionist activities in this hemisphere--where Treaty and other commitments apply.

PRO

- Minimizes US losses from its "no win" position on the Southern Africa-Black Africa issue.

- Does not tie our hands with respect to future threats to South Africa proper.

- Clarifies our policy with respect to Cuban activity in the Hemisphere.

- Restricts issue to Southern African context; by diminishing the importance of the issue to the US global position it minimizes adverse US-USSR and other international implications in situations where US is in the weaker position.

- Would recognize reality of the limited extent of our leverage on Smith regime and on African and other states directly involved.

- If Cuban/Soviet military activity increases, level of Congressional/public concern, as well as third world concern, would be raised and prospects for Cuba/Soviet expansion against legitimate governments in other areas could be set back.

- Reaffirms US commitment to principles of majority rule and self-determination, and sets positive tone with respect to our long-term relations with Africa.

- Rules out, in advance, possibility of US being expected to intervene there; thus relieving US of pitfalls of either "half-way," probably ineffective measures, or requirement to use degree of force which would almost certainly be unacceptable to US Congress, and could be stopped by War Powers Act.

- Suggests to African and other observers that we generally will not intervene on that continent.

- Would not raise doubts among most Latin American countries as to the reliability of US commitments within the Hemisphere.

CON

- Rules out, in advance, possibility of US being expected to intervene, thus permitting Cuban and Soviet freedom of action which could be detrimental to our posture vis-a-vis the Soviets and supportive of both Soviet and Cuban images as significant international actors.

- Suggests to African and other observers that we generally will not intervene on that continent.

- Would deprive us of opportunity to attempt to bring our influence to bear on course of events in Rhodesia and Namibia.

- Would convince black Africans that we had decided against involvement anywhere in Southern Africa.

- Incurs setback to credibility of President and Secrertary of State.

- Could encourage Cuban/Soviet military activitity against Rhodesia and in Namibia at level sufficient to bring black guerilla leadership to power in one or both cases.

- Could raise doubts among some Latin American countries (Haiti especially) that US would default on Hemispheric commitments if challenged, given U.S. apparent reluctance to carry out its public statements with respect to the Cubans in Africa.

B. Coercive Measures Against Cuba and/or USSR

This approach is premised on the view that US inaction in the face of Cuban and Soviet aggressiveness in Africa would be costly to our international posture, and particularly to our posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. "Coercive" refers not just to military actions, but to economic, political and diplomatic pressures designed to affect the behavior of the Cubans and/or Soviets. In consideration of this approach, it is essential to recognize that should some combination of measures be tried and fail, the US probably would be put in a more difficult position than had those measures not been undertaken at all.

Within the USG there is a widespread feeling that measures in the areas of diplomatic and economic pressure would not be effective against the Soviets. [redacted] It is believed that military measures against the Cubans could be effective and could be undertaken at acceptable, military risk, i.e., the Soviets would not become militarily involved.* One of the strongest arguments for isolating the problem to a Cuban-US framework would be that there we could be virtually assured of being able to step up our coercion until it became effective. A major argument against that proposition is, of course, that there is very little chance that the Executive Branch could gain sufficient domestic, international, and Congressional support for military measures against Cuba.

The greatest problem for decision makers is posed by the requirement to assess to which non-military measures, if any, the Soviets would respond as we desired. There is a significant risk, irrespective of the other pros and cons of various US approaches, that the degree of coercion we would have to exercise against the Soviets to induce a change in their policy would be so great as to jeopardize issues which are of more importance to us. Examples are such measures as cancelling the grain deal or cooling (or additional cooling) of our posture in SALT. The above difficulty relates to our estimate of the Soviet stakes. That estimate bears, of course, on basic answers to our own policy questions. How much should we do? Against whom should we do it? Should we start something we cannot finish?

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

The measures which follow are illustrative.

Soviet Union

Public condemnation

Economic and trade constraints (cancel wheat deal)

Diplomatic pressures (cancel meetings; public expressions of hostility)

Private threats

Private actions which could remain private, or at least not be publicly related to the Southern Africa question (in SALT, MBFR, CSCE; troop/submarine movements)

Cuba

Escalate public condemnation

Explict threats to prevent their further military activity

Organization of international economic pressures

Organization of Hemispheric political and economic pressures

Range of military measures [redacted]

PRO

- Conforms to implications of current US policy statements.
- Increases the credibility of our international posture with respect to US reliability.
- Discourages further Cuban and/or Soviet actions of this type elsewhere.
- Deters, if sufficient measures taken, further Cuban military activity in Africa.
- Demonstrates to the Soviets, even if measures not fully effective, that US will take positive actions against Soviet support of [redacted] aggression and attempts to expand its influence in Africa.
- Privately, considerable Latin American relief because of our strong stand.

CON

- Raises stakes for US, risking our being placed in position of

  -- ineffectively opposing Cuban/Soviet activities;

  -- effectively opposing them with considerable political cost and some military risk;

  -- in either case, aligning ourselves, de facto, against black African interests.

- US coercive actions against the Soviet Union which are designed to limit Cuban actions in Rhodesia may be dysfunctional in the global context due to the illegitimate nature of the Smith regime. To the extent that the US raises the stakes with the Soviets, it is at a propoganda disadvantage worldwide for attributing, in effect, great importance to the survival of white racist regimes.

C. Positive Engagement on Behalf of Black Majority Interests.

This approach accepts the proposition proffered by the international community (to include Cuba and the Soviet Union) that the Rhodesian Government should be quickly changed to reflect black majority rule. It differs from the Cuban/Soviet alternatives in that it condemns violent means. The US would actively engage in political and economic measures to try to coerce the Smith regime to give way quickly to a legitimately chosen government. The USG would then assert that it is on the proper side in Southern Africa and using the right methods, whereas Cuba and the Soviet Union were fostering an unnecessary resort to violence. This approach would seek to prempt any overt Cuban/Soviet encroachments in Rhodesia by putting those countries at a propaganda disadvantage. The African states would be faced with non-violent US alternatives or the violent approaches of Cuba and the Soviet Union. This approach assumes that it is quite possible that a number of African states, as well as most of the non-Communist world, would condemn Cuban and Soviet interventions if they thought that the US was prepared vigorously to seek an early, peaceful settlement to the problem.

PRO

- This is the only approach which places the US clearly on the popular side of the Southern Africa - Black Africa issue.

- Rather than minimize US losses from a "no win" position, if successful this approach would result in US gains and Cuban/Soviet losses.

- Keeps the problem in a regional context by focusing on the end of changing the Rhodesian regime, thereby somewhat negating potential US losses in the global context even if the policy should fail.

- If carried out early and forcefully, the US is less likely to be accused of failing to honor its public commitments to halt Cuban/Soviet interventions.

- Reaffirms US commitment to principles of majority rule and self-determination and sets positive tone with respect to our long-term relations with Africa.

- Cuban/Soviet actions would be considered more hostile than the US approach, as the US would be urging the use of non-violent means.

- Vast majority of Latin American states would applaud the US course of action while condemning the means advocated by Cuba.

- Would minimize charges from US allies that USG is not prepared to honor its commitments.

CON

- May constitute too little, too late and involve US in situation where we could bring little significant influence to bear.

- Constitutes less forceful response than approach #2 to broad Soviet challenge in Africa.

- To some extent puts US at odds with South Africa, further endangering that government's position vis-a-vis its black majority and black Africa states.

- In effect leaves further initiative to Cuba and Soviets with respect to their own activities in Africa.

- If the US approach is unsuccessful in changing the Rhodesian regime, USG would face the dilemma of accepting the Cuban/Soviet alternatives, supporting the Smith regime against the Cubans, or taking more coercive action against the Soviet Union and/or Cuba.

IV. Conclusions

- The issue of Cuban military activity in Rhodesia and Namibia is primarily a US-Soviet issue which has implications for (1) the US-Soviet relationship in all its ramifications and (2) the global posture of the United States.

- The racial overtones associated with the issue are important for our African policy but in the last analysis, secondary.

- The US response to Cuban military activity in Rhodesia and Namibia can be made elsewhere either in US-Soviet relations or in the Hemisphere.

- Latin American support for coordinated US action against Cuban military activity in this Hemisphere would be forthcoming. Latin America would not support US action to prevent further Cuban military activity in Africa.

- Our policy toward Rhodesia and Namibia can be largely divorced from that toward South Africa proper. The problem of South Africa is not immediate and the military situation there is not comparable.

V. Recommendations

- That you emphasize the broader considerations at the WSAG Meeting on Wednesday.

- That you underline the US-USSR focus for discussion of any US policy with respect to Southern Africa.

- That you recommend that official public statements on these issues be restrained and strictly keyed to the policy approach finally decided upon.

Box 7, C07, WHCF, Ford Library

C07

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 6, 1976

Mr. Edward A. Hawley
Executive Editor
Africa Today
c/o The Center for International
Race Relations
University of Denver
Denver, Colorado 80210

Dear Mr. Hawley:

The President has asked that I respond to your letter of May 19, 1976 urging the U.S. not to block the MPLA's admission to the UN and to recognize the MPLA as the government of Angola.

We decided to veto the Angolan application for membership in the United Nations because of our doubts that Angola presently meets the requirements for membership set forth in the Charter. We had hoped that the assurances of a withdrawal of Cuban troops would be implemented and allow us to judge the MPLA's application in a different light. However, we have no reliable evidence indicating a net Cuban withdrawal is taking place. We therefore sought to encourage the MPLA to delay this application until evidence of a withdrawal began to accumulate, if, indeed, such a withdrawal is taking place. Despite widespread support for such a delay among the African delegations, the authorities in Luanda decided to push for a vote at this moment.

We still hope to normalize our relations with Angola once the Cuban combat forces are withdrawn from that country. We have no particular disagreement with the MPLA, per se, and have put no obstacles in the way of the operation of U.S. companies, such as Gulf or Boeing, in Angola. However, we believe that Angolans should not be dependent on the presence of a foreign army which was employed to impose the MPLA in power.

We do not consider the status of the Cuban troops in Angola analogous to that of the U.S. forces stationed abroad. All U.S. forces stationed in foreign lands are there pursuant

to treaties or agreements concluded with sovereign governments. They are there to help assure the common sovereign defense. The first Cuban combat forces, however, entered Angola more than a month before that country received its independence from Portugal on November 11. They came at the invitation of one of three liberation movements, not at the request of a government. It cannot be claimed that Cuban troops are in Angola to protect Cuban security and the present role of the Cuban forces appears to be to assist the MPLA in imposing its authority over the two-thirds of the population which resisted that domination. The presence of foreign combat forces in Africa represents a danger for the continent and is inconsistent with the non-aligned status which the MPLA professes as its policy.

Our pledge of $12.5 million for Mozambique to help offset that country's tremendous costs of imposing sanctions against Rhodesia is meant to be material evidence of our commitment to peaceful attainment of majority rule by the Rhodesian people. We are presently negotiating with the Mozambicans on the modalities of utilizing our aid.

We are presently examining how we can most expeditiously achieve the repeal of the Byrd amendment, and we hope our efforts will succeed this year.

Sincerely,

William E. Schaufele, Jr.

Box 122, Ron Nessen Papers, Ford Library

August 4, 1976

US POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Q: What is the current US policy toward Cuba?

A: The Cuban involvement in the domestic affairs of other nations, such as their attempt to interfere in the US relationship with ~~encouragement of the independance movement in~~ Puerto Rico, and, in particular, their massive involvement in the Angolan conflict, is unacceptable. The President has said that, under the present circumstances he would rule out ~~the possibility of~~ any improvement in relations between the U.S. and Cuba.

BOX 8, WHITE HOUSE STAFF – WHITE HOUSE OPERATIONS, CHENEY FILES, FORD PAPERS, FORD LIBRARY

ISSUE: Cuba

Administration Position:

The President stated on February 28, 1976:

> "When you look at the fact that he (Castro) took the initiative to try and upset the problems in Puerto Rico, when he took aggressive action in Africa some 4,000 or 5,000 miles from Cuba where he sent 12,000 mercenary forces, I see nothing but an aggressive, anti-freedom movement and so, under Fidel Castro, unless there is a 180 degree turn, I can't imagine any change . . ."
>
> Presidential Documents
> Vol. 12, No. 10, p. 312

The President stated on July 29, 1976:

> "My administration will continue a policy of friendship toward the people, and I underline the people, of Cuba. But, I add very emphatically, we will not accept intervention by the Fidel Castro regime in the affairs of other countries. We will not accept the counsel of those who would give in to Fidel Castro."
>
> Presidential Documents
> Vol. 12, No. 31, p. 1225

Recent Cuban intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations such as their attempt to interfere in the US relationship with Puerto Rico and their massive involvement in the Angola conflict, is unacceptable and precludes any improvement in relations between the United States and Cuba at this time.

Administration Action:

While we acceded to persistent Latin American demands within the Organization of American States that each government be free to deter mine and follow its own policy with respect to relations with Cuba, the administration nonetheless has maintained the US bilateral prohibition against trade with Cuba. The President and administration officials have made clear that no improvement in US relations with Cuba is possible as long as Cuba pursues such interventionist policies.

NSC 8/6/76

BOX 122, ROW NESSEN PAPERS, FORD LIBRARY

October 15, 1976

CUBA HIJACKING AGREEMENT AND RELATED MATTERS

Q: When was the agreement made with Cuba?

A: February 15, 1973 (by exchange of notes~~with the Czech Embassy~~).

Q: What did it cover?

A: The hijacking of aircraft or vessels and other offenses.

Q: What were the salient features?

A: Hijackers were to be returned or they were to be tried by the country holding them.

Q: Did this, indeed, inhibit hijacking?

A: We believe so, for both parties, along with intensified security measures; for example, for the US, since 1973, there have been no commercial aircraft hijackings to Cuba. There have been only one light plane and one boat hijacked to Cuba. Before 1973, a total of 86 US-registered planes had been hijacked.

Q: Have people been tried and jailed under the agreement?

A: In June 1974, two Americans, Patricia and Clifford McRay, commandeered a small boat to Cuba. In 1976 they were sentenced by the Cuban authorities to 1 and 3 years, respectively, for illegal entry into Cuba.

CUBAN INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Q: You and Secretary Kissinger have both said that we will not permit further Cuban intervention in situations such as Angola and that possible US actions are under consideration. What measures are you prepared to take to prevent such interventions from occurring and what would you do if there should be further interventions?

A: As I have said before, Cuban intervention in the internal affairs of other countries is simply unacceptable. Our response to any such situations would be tailored to the specific circumstances. I do not believe it would be wise to speculate on the specific character our actions might take other than to reiterate that we would respond firmly and promptly.

Q: Are you considering a military response?

A: I do not intend to speculate on the specific character of what actions we might take in hypothetical situations.

Q: Is the US considering going to the Organization of American States to request reimposition of multilateral economic and political sanctions against Cuba in light of Cuban involvement in Angola?

A: I have already said that it simply is not useful to speculate on hypothetical situations.

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 4, 1977

BACKGROUND MATERIAL:
VISIT OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH TO CUBA: August 8-11, 1977

To Havana: (August 8):

Depart Washington at 12:00 noon Eastern Daylight Time (Andrews Air Force Base).

(Bus Transportation to Andrews will depart from the Dirksen Senate Office Building, First and C Streets, N.E., at 11:00 A.M.).

Arrive Havana at approximately 2:45 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time.

Return From Havana (August 11):

Depart Havana at 12:30 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time.

Arrive Andrews Air Force Base approximately 3:15 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time.

(Bus transportation from Andrews to the Dirksen Senate Office Building will be provided).

Official Members Of The Delegation:

Senator Frank Church, D-Idaho, Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mrs. Frank Church (Bethine).

Mr. Mark E. Moran, Foreign Policy Assistant to Senator Church

Mr. Norville Jones, Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. Cleve Corlett, Press Secretary to Senator Frank Church.

Mr. Pedro Sanjuan, Interpreter, detailed from the State Department.

VISAS:

Visas for members of the official party and for members of the press will be issued at Havana airport.

CHURCH PAPERS, BSU

Officials With Whom the Delegation has Requested Meetings:

President Fidel Castro

Mr. Carlos Rafael Rodrigues

The Minister of Foreign Affairs - Mr. Isidoro Malmierca

Mr. Raul Castro

Ms. Vilma Espin of the Cuban Women's Federation (Mrs. Church)

Ms. Maria Acevedo of the Cuban Federation (Mrs. Church)

Any other individuals with whom the Cuban Government would wish the delegation to meet.

Places of Interest Which the Delegation has Mentioned: (Suggestions)

The Hemingway Museum

Hospitals

Schools

Housing Units

Sugar Cane Plantation

Bay of Pigs

Cuban Ballet

Any other places of interest which the Cuban Government might feel appropriate.

The Senator has expressed a particular interest in discussing the status of Americans in Cuban prisons as well as the possibility of the reunification of divided families. Other issues of concern include Angola in particular and Africa in general, the question of Cuban support for Puerto Rican independence, human rights, outstanding financial claims between the United States and Cuba, the embargo, the International Sugar Agreement, the question of the activities of anti-Cuban Revolutionary Government groups and the re-instatement of the Anti-Hijacking Convention - as well as, of course, the overall issue of normalization of relations between the two countries. Any other issues in which the Government of Cuba is interested.

MEMBERS OF THE PRESS ACCOMPANYING SENATOR CHURCH

1. The Washington Post:
   Karen DeYoung, currently stationed in Buenos Aires, Latin American Correspondent of the Post.

2. The New York Times:
   Hans (John) Nordheimer, Miami, Caribbean Correspondent of the Times.

3. The Associated Press:
   Dick Pyle, Washington, Special AP Correspondent.

4. United Press International:
   Juan J. Walte, Washington, Diplomatic Correspondent for UPI.

5. The Los Angeles Times:
   Rudy Abramson, Washington, Washington Correspondent for the Los Angeles Times.

6. The Boston Globe:
   Tom Oliphant, Washington, Washington Correspondent for the Globe.

7. Time Magazine:
   ~~Jerry Hannifin, Washington, Latin American Correspondent for Time.~~

8. Camera 5 Photo Agency:
   David R. Frazier, Boise, Idaho, on special assignment for Time Magazine.

9. National Broadcasting Company:
   Linda Ellerbee, Washington, Special NBC Correspondent.
   Elizabeth Ann Freeman, Miami, Field Producer.
   Jan Porembski, Miami, Cameraman-technician.
   Jose Valle, Miami, Soundman-technician.
   Tony Halik, Mexico City (a Mexican national), technician.

10. Knight-Ridder Newspapers:
    Marie Ridder, Washington, Washington Correspondent for Knight-Ridder.

SPECIAL NOTE TO THE PRESS:

The Cuban Government has been requested to accommodate members of the press seeking interviews with Cuban Government officials and to provide such assistance as may be needed by the press party.

Cost of Trip: The Air Force will bill news organizations for first-class accommodations, plus $1. Estimated cost: about $350. The press will be responsible for their own accommodations in Cuba.

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NEWS RELEASE FROM: Fx0 Cuba Trip

Frank Church
U.S. Senator, Idaho

Offices:
Washington: 202/224-6142
Boise: 208/384-1700
Pocatello: 208/232-4650
Moscow: 208/882-1368

CHURCH CUBA VISIT SET TO BEGIN AUGUST 8; SUGAR, AMERICAN PRISONERS AMONG ITEMS ON AGENDA FOR TALKS WITH FIDEL CASTRO

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

WASHINGTON, August 4 -- Senator Frank Church announced today that his visit to Cuba will begin next Monday, August 8, and that he will return to Washington on Thursday, August 11.

Church is going to Cuba at the invitation of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, and high on his agenda for the talks he will have with the Cuban leader is the subject of an International Sugar Agreement to stabilize world sugar prices, which have a direct bearing on the price received by Idaho growers.

And, added Church, he will raise with Castro the fate of American political prisoners still held in Cuban jails, as well as the status of about 750 American citizens who have been prevented from leaving Cuba. Many of these are Americans holding dual citizenship who have been prevented from joining relatives in the United States, or American citizens who have been prevented from leaving Cuba with their families.

Church will fly to Cuba aboard an Air Force plane. As a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he is the highest ranking American official to visit Cuba under the Castro regime, and it is the first time the Cubans have allowed an American Air Force plane to land in Havana.

Accompanying Church will be several representatives of the national news media, including Associated Press and United Press International, Time Magazine, the National Broadcasting Company, The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and The Boston Globe.

On the subject of sugar, Church explained that while the United States does not import Cuban sugar, its production influences the world sugar market, which in turn is the main factor in determining the domestic price received by U.S. growers.

"At the present time, U.S. growers receive less than 10 cents a pound for sugar -- far below the cost of production. This is a direct result of the dumping on the American market of foreign, subsidized sugar," Church said.

Church is currently the sponsor of legislation to establish mandatory price supports for sugar, which would ease the immediate crisis faced by the U.S. industry. A modified version of Church's bill--setting minimum price

MORE

supports at 52½ per cent of parity--was approved this morning by a Senate-House Conference Committee as part of the pending Farm Bill for 1977.

"This bill is seen as an interim step for giving relief to U.S. sugar growers," Church said, "pending negotiation of a satisfactory international agreemment."

Talks on such an agreement, aimed at holding sugar prices in the world market above production costs, are presently underway in London, where representatives of both Cuba and the United States are participating.

"This is one of the main topics I plan to discuss with Castro," the Idaho Senator said.

Church is Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, which has jurisdiction over international commodity agreements.

In addition, Church said another topic he will raise is the status of Americans living in Cuba who have expressed a desire to leave either with their families, or to be reunited with them.

"Improvement in relations with Cuba is a two-way street. The fate of Americans in Cuba, including political prisoners, obviously has a bearing on improvement in relations, and I intend to stress this in my talks with Castro," Church said.

Also on the agenda is the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

Church has conferred with President Carter about the visit, and also with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's National Security Adviser, and with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. It was Vance who directed that an Air Force plane be made available for the trip.

Upon his return, Church said he would brief Administration officials on his talks with Castro, and also plans a report to the Foreign Relations Committee.

#####

For Further Information:

Cleve Corlett: 202/224-6142

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 12, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President

FROM: Senator Church

SUBJECT: Visit to Cuba

President Castro asked me to pass on to you the following messages:

1. He understands that the process of normalizing relations between Cuba and the United States has to be slow and that "a spectacular thing can't be done over night." He expects to continue to work in the direction of normalization.

2. He recognizes that the Panama Canal problem is of number one priority to President Carter in this part of the world and that the President "can't do both at once."

3. He is pleased at what the President has done so far.

4. He said that it is difficult for Cuba to find ways to show its own good faith. For example, he said Cuba has no surveillance plane operations that it can stop in response to President Carter's actions. If the embargo were lifted, they could not respond because they have never imposed an embargo on the United States. He hopes the President will realize his difficulty in responding to gestures from the United States.

5. He repeatedly said that the number one world problem, as he saw it, was furthering detente between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. He said that he has never been asked by the Soviets to talk to others about such problems but feels it very important to try to convey the Soviet view of such problems.

6. Castro wanted you to know that Cuban involvement in Africa had no anti-American purpose and that he preferred to send doctors, not troops. He views the purpose of the Cubans there as giving stability to the government of Angola. They sent forces in after Angola had been invaded by South African forces. He cannot believe that South Africa, which has always been so cautious on such matters, would have sent forces without the complicity of Kissinger. He suspects the French want to get control of the Gulf oil facilities. He implied that once the French threat has been removed from the area and Namibia has achieved its independence thus removing another threat of involvement by South Africa, that would then permit the withdrawal of all Cuban forces. He believes his purpose is not inconsistent with the objectives in Africa of the Carter Administration.

   He stressed that the Soviets had not sought Cuban intervention in Africa and Cuba was in no way acting as a proxy for the Russians.

7. On terrorism, he said that he felt that President Carter was a religious and moral man of good will and thought that he was doing what he could to bring about an end to terrorist activities. He appreciated being informed of possible terrorist activities when the U. S. learned about them and felt that such cooperation was in the interest of both countries.

Recommendations for Action:

1. Look for opportunities to further cultural, sports, educational and scientific exchanges with Cuba. There are many mutual interests that could be pursued through such exchanges.

2. Allow a Cuban press office to be established in the U. S. (Prensa Latina) in exchange for the opening of U. S. press offices in Cuba.

3. Relax the restriction on financial transactions with Cuba. For example, a tourist cannot now pay for his hotel bill in

Havana with a U. S. check since Cuba cannot cash the check.

4. Consider the possibility of meeting with Castro at the United Nations General Assembly meeting this fall.

5. Expand anti-terrorist activities.

6. Look for ways to cooperate on controlling the international drug traffic.

7. Explore ways to ease the embargo on trade.

[FRANK CHURCH TRIP TO CUBA, 1977]

PLACES VISITED

Monday

Dinner at La Torre restaurant hosted by Raúl Roa, former Former Minister, now Vice President of the National Assembly and member of the State Council.

Tuesday

1. Met with education officials:
   1-Dr. Max Figueroa, Director of the Institute of Teacher Training Sciences.
   2-Dr. Oscar García, Vice Minister of Higher Education.
2. Went on walking tour of old Havana
3. Lunch hosted by above education officials at the "La Bodeguita Del Medio" Restaurant.
4. 4:30p.m. - 5:45p.m. -- Private meeting with President Castro at the Presidential office building.
5. 5:45 - 6:15 -- Castro and Senator met with press.
6. Went with President Castro on a riding tour of Havana suburbs (by jeep) ended by visit to Ernest Hemingway house.
7. 10-11p.m. -- Discussion with Castro at Riviera Hotel.
8. 11:45 -- met with press.

Wednesday

1. Left hotel 9a.m. by jeep.
2. Stopped briefly at José Martí Pioneer Camp after driving through Alamar suburb -- new housing development to East of Havana.
3. Stopped at Santa María del Mar beach.
4. Stopped at rum distillery -- Havana Club.
5. Stopped briefly at the "Jibacoa Comunidades" -- cooperative farming development.
6. Stopped at "Picadura" Valley Granja -- run by Ramón Castro.
7. Lunch at the "Empresa Pecuaria Genética de Matanzas" -- boarding high school.

8. Visited 190,000 acre citrus farm being built by secondary school students -- "Plan Especial de Jagüey".

9. Visited Bay of Pigs -- toured museum there.

10. 8:15p.m. -- left by boat "Aguarama" for President Castro's private island. Dinner on board boat after arrival. Overnight at guest house on island. Substantive talks with Castro periodically throughout day and in evening.

Thursday

1. Breakfast aboard boat at mooring.

2. 9a.m. -- left by another boat for snorkling areas in keys.

3. Lunch aboard the President's boat -- which had been brought to the snorkling area.

4. 2:45p.m. -- left by helicopter from small uninhabited key for Havana.

5. Arrive Riviera Hotel -- 3:25 p.m.

6. 4p.m. -- Left for airport.

7. 4:35 -- Press conference at airport.

8. 5:15 -- departed Havana.

CUBA: NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB75030

AUTHOR:

Sklar, Barry A.

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

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MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM

DATE ORIGINATED 2/01/74
DATE UPDATED 05/17/77

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 426-5700

Foreign Relations Authorization. House rejected an amendment (by Rep. Edwards) which would have denied funds for the purpose of negotiating a resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Introduced May 4, 1977.

HEARINGS

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Cuba and the Caribbean. Hearings, 91st Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 247 p.
Hearings held July 8-10, 13, 20, 27, 31, Aug. 3, 1970.

----- Hijacking accord between the United States and Cuba. Hearings, 93d Congress, 1st session. Feb. 20, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973.

----- Soviet naval activities in Cuba. Hearings, 91st., 92., 93 Congresses. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
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U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. Alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders. An interim report, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Nov. 20, 1975.

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OTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

N/A

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

05/12/77 -- The House approved (288-119) an amendment to the foreign aid bill (H.R. 6714) which barred aid or trade with Cuba and Vietnam. The provision countered the action taken May 10 in the Senate. The bill, however, contained a provision which allows food aid to countries which trade with Cuba and Vietnam.

05/11/77 -- The State Department confirmed that 27 U.S. citizens are being held in Cuban prisons. In a letter to Senator Jesse Helms, Assistant Secretary of State Douglas Bennett stated that eight are "political prisoners," serving 20-30 year sentences. The others are serving under criminal charges. Bennett estimated that there are between 10,000 and 15,000 political prisoners in Cuba.

05/10/77 -- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted (10-6) to partially lift the embargo against Cuba permitting the export of food, agricultural supplies, and medicines. This amendment to the State Department Authorization bill (S. 1190) was a modification of an earlier amendment proposed by Senator McGovern which would have permitted two way trade between the United States and Cuba in food and medicines. Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Culver Gleysteen stated that the Department of State neither supported nor approved the original McGovern amendment. He made clear that State did not favor allowing Cuban sugar into the U.S. market without receiving equivalent concessions from the Cubans.

05/05/77 -- U/N. Ambassador Andrew Young said he informally met with the Cuban delegate to the meeting of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America in Guatemala City and was extended an invitation to visit Cuba.

05/04/77 -- The Cuban news agency Prensa Latina reported that a Cuban basketball team will tour South Dakota later this year.

-- The House of Representatives voted down (47-103) an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act

for FY78 (H.R. 6689) which would have prevented funds from being used for the negotiation of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

05/02/77 -- Jack Anderson reported that President Carter secretly ordered an end to SR-71 reconnaissance flights over Cuba shortly after taking office.

04/29/77 -- State Department officials confirmed that two U.S. diplomats, part of the team in Havana which negotiated the fishing and maritime agreements, remained in Cuba to interview Americans being held in Cuban prisons. Twenty-four Americans, some of them holding dual citizenship are reported to be in jail.

04/28/77 -- On announcing the signing of the maritime and fishing agreements, Assistant Secretary of State Todman predicted "constant improvement" in future U.S.-Cuban relations. Todman disclosed in his news conference that in Havana he discussed a broad range of issues with Cuban Foreign Minister Isidro Malmierca. Based on these discussions, Todman said that "the changes are good" for steady improvement of relations on a step-by-step basis. Cuba, Todman indicated, is likely to take some positive steps on its own to improve relations.

04/27/77 -- In Havana, the United States and Cuba signed agreements on fishing rights and maritime boundaries. The joint statement said, "A governing international fisheries agreement on Cuba's participation in fisheries within the 200-mile zone of the United States and another agreement on a preliminary boundary between the 200-mile zones arising from the laws passed by both parties were concluded." Details of the agreements are to be published later.

04/25/77 -- High-ranking U.S. officials met with Cuban officials in Havana for the first time in 16 years in a step toward the normalization of relations. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman headed the seven-member delegation ostensibly to continue the fishing and maritime talks begun in New York in March. The State Department announcement of the meeting said, "The governments of the United States of America and Cuba initiated today in Havana the second round of negotiations on matters concerning fisheries and maritime boundaries which arise from the laws passed by both countries."

04/22/77 -- Cuban officals granted permission for the resumption of cruise line service between a U.S. port and Havana since the break in relations. The action cleared the way for the liner Daphne of the Carras Shipping Company to leave New Orleans on May 15 and to drop anchor in Havana on May 17 with some of America's leading jazz musicians on board. The jazz musicians will give a performance at Havana's National Theater. Beginning January 1978, the Daphne will call regularly in Havana

in a series of one-week cruises from New Orleans.

-- The Associated Press reported that the U.S.-Cuban maritime talks will be resumed shortly in Havana with Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, heading the delegation.

-- The Associated Press reported that the Carter Administration is considering the posting of U.S. diplomats in Cuba for the first time since the break in relations in 1961. The opening of "interest secions" with U.S. diplomats in the Swiss Embassy in Havana and Cuban diplomats in the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington would significantly move both naticns toward normalization.

04/21/77 -- A Gallup Poll on relations with Cuba reveals that a majority of the U.S. public feels that diplomatic relations with Cuba should be reestablished. According to the latest poll, 53% feel that the U.S. should formally reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba. About one third of the public is opposed to the move.

04/20/77 -- Fidel Castro told the 52 visiting Minnesota businessmen that the U.S. trade embargo was morally unjustified and a "measure of force" whose end would "make the solution of all other problems" easier. Castro said that Cuba wanted to buy food and industrial technology from the United States and sell sugar. He reacted positively to the recent U.S. actions on Cuba dealing with travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens. A Cuban official earlier told the businessmen that U.S. trade with Cuba could total $1.5 billion within one to two years after the embargo is lifted. The group from Minnesota, representing 48 companies, is the largest U.S. trade delegation to visit Cuba since the imposition of the embargo.

04/19/77 -- President Carter told Senators McGovern and Abourezk that he would not oppose efforts to partially lift the embargo on Cuba to allow the export of food and medicine. McGovern said that the President, "made clear to us that he would not oppose any action" to lift the embargo as it applies to food and medicine. The Senators met with the President after their recent trip to Cuba.

04/17/77 -- The semi-official Egyptian Middle East News Agency reported that 200 Cuban commandos have arrived in Ethiopia to train the Ethiopian Army in guerrilla warfare. The Washington Post reported from Addis Ababa that the reports could not be confirmed.

04/15/77 -- President Carter told a group of visiting editors that he agreed with the statement of UN Ambassador Andrew Young that the Cubans stabilized the situation in Angola. On the question of Cuban withdrawal from Angola as a precondition for normalizing relations, the President said, "I would rather not say that before we ever had normal relations with Cuba they would have to withdraw

every Cuban from other nations on earth. We don't do it.... But the withdrawal of Cuban troops is a dominant factor in Angola and other places around Africa.... I would rather not be pinned down so specifically on it. But the attitude of Cuba to withdraw its unwarranted intrusion into the affairs of Africa and other nations would be a prerequisite for normalization, yes."

04/14/77 -- In his address before the Organization of American States in which he outlined his administration's policy toward Latin America, President Carter spoke of Cuba as one of the "problems that plague us from the past which we must work to resolve." The President said, "We believe the normal conduct of international affairs, and particularly the negoatiations of differences, require communication with all countries in the world. To these ends, we are seeking to determine whether relations with Cuba can be improved on a measured and reciprocal basis."

04/11/77 -- In his press conference after his return from Cuba, Senator McGovern said that during a 4-hour meeting, Fidel Castro indicated that "Cuba will not consider agreeing to an extension [of the anti-hijacking agreement] until the U.S. ends its economic embargo on Cuba." The Senator related that Castro "made clear that even if the agreement does expire, Cuba will continue to cooperate with the U.S. on hijacking, just as it has been. McGovern felt that a partial lifting of the embargo might be interpreted by the Cubans as a concrete step and therefore announced he would introduce an amendment to the State Department authorization bill allowing for the two-way trade in food and medicine. McGovern revealed that Castro had agreed to accept a team of U.S. all-stars after the current baseball season and agreed to send a Cuban basketball team to play in the United States next fall. McGovern said that Castro was favorable to his suggestion that a student exchange be affected between the U.S. and Cuba.

04/10/77 -- In a telephone interview from Havana, Rep. Les Aspin said that he came away from a meeting with Defense Minister Raul Castro with the impression that a partial lifting of the embargo "might be enough to get the general discussion going."

04/09/77 -- UPI reported that a senior State Department official indicated that the Carter Administration wants to expand the fishing talks with Cuba to include discussions on political prisoners, the status of U.S. citizens in Cuba, and Cuban international policy. The official said that the U.S. "is prepared to continue the dialogue" with Cuba and will contact the Cubans to continue the talks. He said, however, that the United States is not considering lifting the trade embargo.

04/08/77 -- A communique issued after the departure of President Castro

frcm Moscow said that the Cuban leader and Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev resolved to do everything they could for promoting the interaction of the international Communist and national-liberation movements." The leaders prcmised support for the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America but they did not specify a course of action.

-- According to the Chicago Tribune, Raul Castro said there can be no normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States until the U.S. pulls its approximately 2,500 servicemen out of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay.

4/07/77 -- President Idi Amin said there were no Cuban military advisers in Uganda but he intends to bring some Cubans in shortly tc work in the sugar industry.

-- Senator McGovern said that during the meeting, Raul Castro complained about overflights by the SR-71 reccnnaissance plane which the Cuban said began on Sept. 24, 1974 and continued on 16 other occasions until Jan. 11, 1977. Raul noted that no overflights had taken place since President Carter tcok office.

-- Raul Castro, Cuban Minister of Defense, saw the visit of the South Dakota basketball team as an important step toward normal relations with the United States and said, "The war has ended and now we are reconstructing the bridge brick by brick, 90 miles from Key West tc Varadero. It takes a long time. At the end of the bridge we can shake hands, without winners or losers." He made these remarks during a meeting with Senators McGovern and Abourezk and Rep. Les Aspin. Raul Castro also said that no Cuban troops are involved in the invasion of Zaire and that there were no Cuban troops in Uganda. He also said that an unspecified number of Cuban troops were being removed from Angola but that civilian assistance was being increased.

)4/05/77 -- During a dinner in his honor in Moscow, Fidel Castro said "The leaders of imperialist countries are now talking with amazing hypocrisy about human rights. Clearly, they are first and foremost worried about the bourgeois right to exploit man, to preserve the class system and social inequalities."

-- Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev said that the African nations were shown by the Castro and Pdogorny visits that the Soviet Union and Cuba are "friends who can be counted on."

04/04/77 -- Fidel Castro arrived in Moscow two hours after President Pcdgorny returned frcm his African trip. The visit was described as unofficial and reportedly hastily arranged.

-- Zaire broke diplomatic relations with Cuba charging "irrefutable evidence" of Cuba's involvement in the Katangan invasion of Shaba Province. A communique from

Zaire's official news agency said a Cuban diplomat was caught with documents demonstrating Cuba's collusion in the invasion. (Relations between Cuba and Zaire had been strained for the past 18 months because of Cuba's support for the MPLA and Zaire's support for a pro-Western faction in Angola.)

04/01/77 -- The President of the Southwest African People's Organization, in an interview with South African reporters, said that President Castro promisted to assist the group in its attempt to seize power in Namibia. Sam Nujoma, who met with Castro in Angola along with other nationalist leaders said that the Cuban president "promised to continue to support SWAPO in and out" of Namibia "with material assistance and he did the same for other liberation movements in southern Africa."

03/30/77 -- The State Department reported "substantial progress" toward an agreement with Cuba on fishing rights and maritime boundaries. The first round of negotiations was concluded on March 29 and the communique issued said the talks would be resumed "in the near future." The communique added, "The delegations of both governments hope, as a result of the progress of the negotiations, to reach a satisfactory resolution of these issues." Department spokesman Frederick Z. Brown said that the New York meeting was devoted entirely to the fishing issue, but he reiterated the Administration's desire for talks with Cuba on the anti-hijacking agreement.

03/29/77 -- The New York Times reported that the United States and Cuba conducted high level talks on the normalization of relations from late 1974 until late 1975, covering the entire range of issues between the two countries, according to Administration officials speaking publicly for the first time. These secret talks were conducted at Washington's National Airport, Kennedy airport in New York, and at the Hotel Pierre in New York. The U.S. officials involved were William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Laurence S. Eagleburger, executive assistant to Secretary of State Kissinger. The objective of the talks, begun at the initiation of Secretary Kissinger, was to clarify the issues and explore means for resolving them. The talks were begun when Eagleburger called the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in November 1974 and then worked out the details at the airport in New York. Rogers was brought into the discussions in February 1975 and participated in four meetings. Rogers said (on Mar. 28, 1977) that both sides indicated the issues to be resolved and agreed to remove some of the "threshold issues" through a series of planned gestures. (See chronology below for the moves made by both sides in the new context.) Rogers final meeting with a Cuban representative was in the coffee shop at National

Airport in late November, at the height of the fighting in Angola. Rogers said he made clear U.S. opposition to Cuban military involvement in Angola but did not close the option for further talks. He said that in addition he broadened the idea of visits between exiles and families in Cuba, an issue the Cubans hinted at before the meeting. Rogers said no response was ever made.

03/25/77 -- In a press conference, President Carter said, "We have no hard evidence, or any evidence...that the Cubans or Angolan troops have crossed the border into Zaire."

-- The U.S. Government lifted the ban on the spending of U.S. dollars in Cuba. Under the new Treasury Department regulation, Americans can bring $100 worth of Cuban goods for personal use into the United States once every six months. The trade embargo still prohibits U.S. firms from doing business in Cuba.

03/24/77 -- Representatives of the United States and Cuba held face-to-face talks on fishing rights and maritime boundaries in New York, in the first formal and publicly acknowledged meeting between the two nations since the severance of relations in January 1961. Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Vice Foreign Minister Pelegrin Torres headed the delegations. The establishment of the 200 mile fishing zone by each country set the stage for the talks because of the overlap of 200,000 square miles of fishing territory at issue.

03/23/77 -- President Fidel Castro arrived in Angola to an emotional welcome news agencies reported. In Luanda he referred to the significant role of Cuban troops.

03/21/77 -- At a new conference upon leaving Tanzania for Mozambique, Fidel Castro said there was "not a single Cuban involved" in the arming or training of the invading force in Zaire. Castro also indicated that there were limits to Cuban involvement in the nationalist struggles in southern Africa. According to the government-owned newspaper Castro said, "It is not Cuba's intention to send soldiers to free any part of southern Africa. Independence is never delivered from abroad. The people concerned must fight for their independence."

-- Castro left Tanzania from Zambia and Mozambique before the arrival of Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, beginning a two week visit to Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Somalia.

03/20/77 -- During his visit to Tanzania, President Castro told President Nyerere that although Cuba wanted to help, it would not be able to increase its assistance because Cuban resources were occupied in Angola.

03/19/77 -- A joint communique issued 3 days after Castro's visit to Ethiopia, called on "progressive forces" in the Red Sea region to coordinate their struggle. (Since early March, President Castro has visited Libya, South Yemen, Somalia, and Ethiopia. It has been speculated that Castro's shuttling between Ethiopia and Somalia, traditional enemies with Marxist regimes, is an attempt to promote a federation of Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and the French Territory of Afars and Issas, soon to become independent. Moderate Arab states have been conducting a campaign to draw Somalia and South Yemen from Soviet influence.)

-- During a tour of Shaba Province, Zaire President Mobutu dismissed denials by Fidel Castro that Cuban troops were involved in the invasion. Mobutu said the invaders "are in fact led by Cubans" and were using "the same sophisticated Soviet weapons" used by Cuban forces in Angola.

03/18/77 -- The United States dropped restrictions for Americans traveling to Cuba.

03/16/77 -- Secretary of State Vance told the House International Relations Committee that the United States and Cuba are now "in direct contact" on negotiations that could lead toward normal relations. Vance said direct talks are now possible on a fishing agreement, on renegotiation of the anti-hijacking treaty due to end April 15, and other issues.

-- Secretary Vance said that U.S. intelligence had "no hard information" to show that Cubans or other foreign elements are involved in the invasion from Angola of Zaire's mineral rich Shaba province. The Government of Zaire had charged that Cubans were leading the invading military force.

03/12/77 -- A Cuban sports official said that the invitation to the New York Yankees to play a series of games in Cuba this spring has been withdrawn. The official said that baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn was responsible for the withdrawal because of Kuhn's insistence that a team of U.S. all-stars play in Cuba, rather than the Yankees.

-- The International Rescue Committee, in a statement, urged that efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, include a call for amnesty for political prisoners in Cuba. The group said that estimates of the number of political prisoners in Cuba ranged from 5,000, the figure according to the group, given by Fidel Castro, and 50,000. It said many have been held for more than 10 years and some for as long as 16. The statement cited examples of mistreatment of prisoners.

03/11/77 -- During a press conference in Plains, President Carter

said that he would be willing to end U.S. animosity toward Cuba if the Government of Fidel Castro would ensure the human rights of its people. "The main thing that concerns me about Cuba is the human rights question -- political prisoners and so forth."

03/09/77 -- President Carter, in his press conference, announced that the restrictions on travel to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North Korea are being lifted. The statement was made in the context of the President's commitment to freedom of movement for U.S. citizens which is related to his Administration's policy on human rights.

03/07/77 -- The Department of State, responding to a question by baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, said that there would be no objection to a major league team playing an exhibition game in Cuba. The New York Yankees had expressed interest and Fidel Castro had earlier proposed the idea.

03/05/77 -- The Washington Post reported that the Department of State has given permission for a group of college basketball players from South Dakota to travel to Cuba. The waiver of the 16-year-old travel restriction was made at the request of Senator James Abourezk. In his press conference the day before, Secretary of State Vance said that the travel restrictions were being "restudied."

03/04/77 -- Secretary of State Vance, at a press conference, proposed that the United States and Cuba enter into discussions on the wide range of issues between the two countries without preconditions. He said that President Carter, in a statement last month, did not intend to imply there were conditions in order for U.S.-Cuba talks to begin. Vance also said that he thought exchanges of athletic teams would be "constructive." The Secretary said that the United States has sent word to Cuba that the United States would like to discuss the fishing issue "promptly." On Cuban military presence in Uganda, the Secretary said that the U.S. had "no hard evidence" of large numbers but said he could not rule out the presence of a "few."

02/27/77 -- Citing reports from Kenya, the Washington Post reported that a Cuban military delegation had arrived in Uganda to assess Uganda's military needs. In a Los Angeles Times report from Kenya on Mar. 3, it was reported that Cuban military advisers had been entering Uganda in the past month to help train the Ugandan Army and prop up the economy. This activity follows an official visit made to Uganda in late January by a Cuban military delegation headed by Cuban Deputy Defense Minister General Francisco Cabrera to commemorate the sixth anniversary of Amin's government. Kampala radio said that during a courtesy call by Cabrera to bid farewell, Amin said that he would like to see Cuba helping Uganda in the military field. Amin also said that Uganda would soon open an embassy in Havana. Cabrera replied that Cuba intended to strengthen cooperation and collaboration with Uganda

in cultural, technical, and other fields.

02/23/77 -- The Christian Science Monitor, citing "Western intelligence sources" reported that Cuba maintains 3,000 or more soldiers in at least six African nations in addition to Angola; Somalia -- 1,500 serving as military advisers in engineering, running military hospitals, and advising guerrillas. They are not engaged in combat; Mozambique -- 1,200 involved in training guerrillas for Rhodesian operations. No evidence of involvement in Rhodesia itself; Congo -- 1,000 are thought to be serving in this former staging area for the Angola operation. Some of the troops have served in Angola; Guinea -- estimates of 300 serving as palace guard for President Sekou Toure and as advisers to the Army; Guinea-Bissau -- estimates of 300 remaining in this former transshipment point for the Angola operation. The Cubans assist in the arrival of occasional Cuban transports and advise the local police; Equatorial Guinea -- estimates of 200 advisers remaining in a former staging area for the Angola operation.

02/16/77 -- Although expressing optimism regarding the prospects for a normalization of relations with Cuba, President Carter, in response to a question posed at the Department of Agriculture, indicated that he would not inaugurate talks with Cuba until certain conditions were met. He said, "I would very much like to see the Cubans remove their soldiers from Angola..." and added, "We've received information from indirect sources that Castro and Cuba have promised to remove those troops...and that would be a step toward full normalization of relationships with Angola. The same thing applies ultimately to the restoration of normal relationships with Cuba." The President continued, "If I can be convinced that Cuba wants to remove their aggravating influence from other countries in this hemisphere, will not participate in violence in nations across the oceans, will recommit the former relationship that existed in Cuba toward human rights -- then I would be willing to move toward normalizing relations with Cuba as well."

02/15/77 -- Upon returning from a 5-day visit to Cuba, during which he met with Fidel Castro, Rep. Jonathan Bingham said that "there is a good opportunity" now for normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. He cited areas of cooperation on which Castro told him the United States and Cuba could move ahead immediately: fisheries talks, sports and cultural exchanges, and joint efforts to curb the spread of sugar cane blight. Bingham felt that discussion could be held on these areas without any preconditions.

Bingham said that Cuban officials told him that the number of troops in Angola had been reduced by one

half since last spring. (At the high point of involvement, the number of troops was estimated to be about 20,000.) The Cubans indicated to Bingham that the troops would remain in Angola for some time and would leave only when asked to do so by the Neto government. The Congressman also said that in order for full scale negotiations to begin with Cuba, the United States would have to lift the trade embargo. He saw the lifting on the ban on food and medicines as a possible start. He said also that Castro wants the United States to relax its curbs on Americans visiting Cuba. However, Bingham added that Castro and other Cuban officials indicated that the continuation of the 1973 anti-highjacking agreement was contingent upon U.S. crackdown on anti-Castro terrorism and can be discussed only after the trade embargo is lifted.

02/15/76 -- In response to a question after his address before the National Press Club, Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo said that he was happy with the prospects of normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba. "There seems to be goodwill on the part of both nations to solve this situation." He offered the good offices of Mexico but said he thought it would not be necessary. White House press secretary Jody Powell said that Lopez and President Carter talked about the possibility of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba among other issues.

02/13/77 -- During a press conference in Plains, President Carter said the human rights issue was the key element in relations between the United States and Cuba. He expressed the hope that recent statements by Fidel Castro on relations with the United States "can be followed up by mutual efforts to alleviate tensions and reduce animositites."

02/13/77 -- The New York Times reported that during the spring and summer of 1975, the Castro government had begun secret-high level talks with the Ford Administration on U.S.-Cuban issues, with a view toward negotiating diplomatic relations. The article stated that Secretary Kissinger and senior aides held lengthy discussions with a special Cuban envoy in Washington on the various problem areas. The talks were broken off after it was reported that Cuban troops were in Angola, according to the article.

02/09/77 -- In an interview with news correspondent Bill Moyers, a portion of which was shown on CBS Evening News, Fidel Castro said he thought that is was possible to normalize relations between Cuba and the United States and that he would be glad to talk with Carter. He said he believed Carter was a man with a "sense of morals" who may bring an end to the years of hostility between the United States and Cuba. Castro also said that trade would be the best way to normalize relations.

02/07/77 -- In answer to a reporter's question, a State Department spokesman said that the provision banning travel to certain countries, including Cuba is "being reviewed" and that the issue could be resolved before March 15.

02/04/77 -- The Department of State announced that in a message conveyed through the Swiss Government two weeks before, Cuba had notified the United States that it wanted to discuss the new U.S. law which established the 200-mile fishing zone. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act will come into force on March 1. The U.S. already signed agreements under the law with Bulgaria, China, East Germany, South Korea, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union, which stipulate conditions under which these nations will be permitted to fish inside the limit.

02/03/77 -- The United States Government raised the possibility of direct talks with the Cuban Government over the anti-hijacking agreement and other issues. In a statement approved by Secretary of State Vance, Department spokesman Frederick Brown said that "there have been no new developments since the Cubans announced their intention to terminate the anti-hijacking agreement," but, he continued, "this is something we hope to be able to discuss with the Cubans. He later added, "There's a whole range of issues we would want to discuss." In a later interview with the Associated Press and United Press International, Vance said it would be "constructive" for the two Governments to discuss other major issues. He mentioned Cuba's "exporting" revolution and continued presence in Angola. Vance added that the Administration had not yet decided how to approach Cuba and that "no direct indication" that Castro was ready for talks had been received.

02/02/77 -- According to a press release of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriquez said in a BBC-TV interview that Cuba is willing to discuss all issues with the United States, from the problem of the Guantanamo Naval base to the cessation of aggression and sabotage. He cautioned that this did not imply that Cuba is renouncing its political and ideological positions. He also said that Cuban troops were sent to Angola at the request of a government and not a liberation movement. He said that the Cuban Army will not become directly involved in wars of liberation. He also stated that there are no political prisoners in Cuba because people are detained for their actions and not for their ideas.

01/31/77 -- In answer to a question on relations with Cuba at his press conference, Secretary of State Vance expressed a hope that the United States "could begin the process of moving toward normalization" with Cuba. "I don't want to set any pre-conditions at this point..."

He added, "the presence of any outside forces is not helpful to a peaceful solution," in Angola, but "I think that this is a matter that should be settled by the Africans themselves." Kissinger had stressed the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a condition for normalizing relations with the United States.

01/27/77 -- In a written response to questions posed by Senator Case at the January 11 confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Vance stated that, "...the release of Mr. Huber Matos would help the process of normalization of relations with Cuba. The Cuban Government holds a number of other political prisoners including some American citizens. The release of these political prisoners as a gesture of goodwill and as a humanitarian act would be one indication that Cuba is seriously interested in starting a dialogue with the United States."

01/25/77 -- In a TV interview with CBS newsman Dan Rather, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young said that "...the Cubans bring a certain stability and order to Angola..." He also stated that he believed the United States could negotiate a withdrawal of Cuban troops from southern Africa. On February 2, a State Department spokesman said, "Neither Ambassador Young nor the Secretary of States condones the presence of Cuban troops in Angola."

01/24/77 -- In a letter to Fidel Castro, thirty members of the House of Representatives asked the Cuban President to give serious consideration to releasing Huber Matos, held prisoner since 1959. Matos, then military commander of Camaguey Province, was sentenced to prison for counter-revolutionary activities after he publicly denounced the leftist path of the Castro government. The congressional letter also expressed the hope that "international conditions will allow for a lessening of tensions between our two governments."

01/12/77 -- The Canadian Government expelled five Cubans, including three diplomats, after a Montreal newspaper reported that Cuba was recruiting undercover agents to go to southern Africa and was training them in Canada. The Cuban Foreign Ministry defended its actions claiming "the normal right to know by whom and how its nationals are being attacked."

-- The Hearst newspapers reported that President-elect Carter is considering a relaxation of the trade embargo against Cuba. Citing "senior foreign policy advisers," the newspapers said Carter could act within 100 days after his inauguration and would consult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee.

01/11/77 -- The New York Times reported that during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State designate Vance said that the trade embargo against Cuba had been ineffective. According

to the published official hearing record, however, Vance is reported as saying, "I think the boycott has been obviously in effect." Vance also said, "I think if Cuba is willing to live within the international system, then we ought to seek ways to find whether we can eliminate the impediments which exist between us and try to move toward normalization."

01/09/77 -- Newsday reported that anti-Castro terrorists, with at least the tacit support of the CIA, introduced African swine flu fever virus into Cuba in the spring of 1971. The Cuban Government was forced to slaughter 500,000 pigs six weeks after the outbreak of the disease to prevent a nationwide epidemic. There were no human deaths involved in the outbreak. A U.S. intelligence source told Newsday that he was given the virus in a sealed container at Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone and turned it over to anti-Castro agents who transported it to Cuba by sea. In a speech, on July 26, 1971, Fidel Castro referred to the epidemic and speculated that it could have resulted from enemy activity.

01/08/77 -- Senator Richard Stone (D. Fla.) said he would ask for more Federal involvement in the investigation of the assassinations which have plauged the Miami exile community. Stone was reacting to the recent killing of the former president of the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association, friends of whom blamed the killing on followers of Fidel Castro.

01/01/77 -- A White House spokesman commenting on President Ford's recommendation of statehood for Puerto Rico said that the President's action "might be interpreted as an indication to Cuba's Fidel Castro that we value Puerto Rico and won't allow any tampering there." Radio Havana called Ford a "frantic annexationist."

12/21/76 -- Generally negative reaction in the Miami exile community to the Linowitz Commission's recommendations on Cuba was reported by the Miami Herald and the Miami News. Alfredo Duran, chairman of the Democratic Party in Florida and a Bay of Pigs veteran, stated that re-establishing relations with Cuba "would be a tremendous mistake at this point." Other political leaders such as Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre, a member of the Democratic National Hispanic Committee, indicated that the recommendations of the Linowitz Commission were those of an independent group, inferring that they are not represented as Carter Administration policies.

12/20/76 -- The second report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, headed by former OAS Ambassador Sol Linowitz, urged the Carter Administration to "actively explore opportunities early in its term..." to resolve the issue of relations with Cuba. The report recommended that the Administration "take the initiative in launching a sequence of reciprocal actions...." It recommended that the Administration give assurances that it would prevent terrorist actions against Cuba and speculated that

this would prevent the abrogation of the anti-hijacking agreement. Furthermore, the Commission recommended that the embargo on food and medicines be lifted and that the United States enter into negotiations with Cuba on the other issues in dispute, as long as Cuba gives assurances that it would make an appropriate public response such as the release of U.S. prisoners, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and respect for the principle of non-intervention and self-determination with respect to Puerto Rico.

12/04/76 -- Raul Castro, Minister of Armed Forces, said that Cuba will be watching the Carter Administration for signs that "hostility and aggression against our fatherland are terminated."

12/02/76 -- Representative Charles Diggs, completing a fact-finding tour of southern Africa said that he supported the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Speaking in Lesotho Diggs said, "They are training the indigenous armed forces, working in hospitals and doing many other things."

11/22/76 -- The Washington Post reported that since last month, a Federal grand jury in Miami has been asking Miami exiles about their connection with international incidents such as the February shelling of a Soviet freighter near Cuba, the April attack on two fishing boats in the same area and the murder of a chauffeur in an attempted kidnapping of the Cuban consul in Merida, Mexico, in July.

-- The United States abstained in the Security Council vote and Angola's application to become the 146th member of the United Nations was approved. (In the vote in June, before the Republican convention, the U.S. vetoed Angola's application because of the presence of Cuban troops. On Nov. 16, Secretary Kissinger estimated that 12,000-13,000 Cuban troops were in Angola involved in mop-up operations against anti-government factions. In June, U.S. officials estimated that there were 15,000 Cuban troops in Angola.)

11/17/76 -- Nicaragua accused Cuba of training and infiltrating Nicaraguan leftists into the country to conduct a guerrilla war against the Somoza government. The Washington Star reported (Nov. 20) that the Nicaraguan government claimed that the National Guard had killed eight Cuban-backed terrorists in battles in the past two weeks. (Recently, Castro charged that Nicaragua was a base for Cuban exile extremists involved in the sabotage of the Cubana airliner.)

11/15/76 -- The New York Times reported that a meeting took place in July in the Dominican Republic during which Cuban exile action groups, meeting with Orlando Bosch, declared a policy of attacking Cuban targets internationally as well as within Cuba, but took a stand against terrorism within the United States. (Earlier in Venezuela, six persons, including Cuban exiles Bosch, Hernan Ricardo, Freddy Lugo

[the latter two alleged to have planted the bomb], and Luis Posada Carriles, a former high ranking official in the Venezuelan secret police, were indicted on charges of sabotage in connection with the crash of the Cubana plane.)

11/12/76 -- In the wake of the crash of the Cubana airliner, the Cuban government declined to send scholars to an upcoming conference on "Cuba in World Affairs," at the University of Pittsburgh. The State Department earlier had indicated that the Cubans would be permitted to attend. In Mar. 1975, the Department of State reversed an earlier decision to permit five Cuban scholars to attend the Latin American Studies Association meeting in Atlanta.

10/20/76 -- According to a New York Times News Service report, Venezuelan and U.S. authorities believe that a group of anti-Castro Cuban exiles have plotted a "vast" number of terrorist actions against Cuban diplomatic and commercial installations in seven countries in the Western Hemisphere. The article reported that Venezuelan and Cuban officials said that two of the Cuban exiles under arrest in connection with recent bombings had ties with the CIA. A Venezuelan official said that one of those arrested, a former chief of operations of the Venezuelan secret police, had been given "technical training by the CIA."

10/18/76 -- According to a report in the Christian Science Monitor, Cuba has been steadily withdrawing its troops from Angola in recent weeks. As many as 3,000 may have left since August 1. (There is no indication if this represents a reduction or rotation of troops.)

10/16/76 -- During a press conference in Kansas City, Democratic Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter said, "I don't see any immediate prospect for the normalization of relationships with Cuba. And I don't advocate that as a goal of our country in the foreseeable future.."

10/15/76 -- In a speech delivered before a massive gathering in Havana, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro charged the CIA with direct responsibility for the crash of a Cubana airliner on October 6, and said that he was notifying the U.S. Government that Cuba was abrogating the U.S.-Cuban hijacking accord of 1973. All 73 passengers and crew, mostly Cuban, were killed after an explosion forced the plane down in the sea off Barbados. The plane was enroute to Kingston and Havana.

-- Castro related Cuban exile terrorist activity of the past several months to involvement with the CIA, citing Venezuelan sources as well as a Cuban who has acted as a double agent for the past 10 years. He spoke of the various exile organizations

that comprise the United Revolutionary Organizations Command (CORU) and said "These groups not only act freely and with impunity from United States territory, but through CORU, their main heads are closely linked to CIA activities against Cuba." Castro ascribed the terrorist activity to U.S. resentment of Cuban policy in Africa.

-- With specific reference to the hijacking agreement, the Cuban Premier stated, "Strictly adhering to the agreement and preceeding to notifications of its denunciation today . . . , said agreement will have validity only up to April 15, 1977, and we will not again sign any such agreement with the United States until the terrorist campaign . . . is definitely terminated and there is a definitive end to United States acts of hostility and aggression against Cuba." However, toward the conclusion of his speech, Castro said, "Cuba is even ready to discuss with the United States, whichever government is elected in November, a solution to these problems."

-- At a Boston press conference, Secretary Kissinger said, "I can state categorically that no official of the U.S. government, no one paid by the American government, no one in contact with the American government has had anything to do" with the airplane sabotage. He earlier said, "We will hold the government of Cuba strictly accountable for any encouragement of hijacking and any encouragement of terrorism that may flow from its renunciation of the treaty."

-- The Venezuelan Government announced the arrests of Cuban exile leaders, including Orlando Bosch, head of CORU, who is wanted in the United States for parole violation stemming from terrorist activity in 1968, in connection with the airline crash. U.S. authorities have requested the extradition of Bosch in connection with the investigation of the assassination of former Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. Orlando Letelier.

-- On October 16, U.S. authorities said they had established a link between Cuban exiles suspected of having caused the explosion of the plane and an incident on July 9, in which a bomb exploded in a Cubana plane in Kingston.

09/30/76 -- In the section of his speech before the UN General Assembly devoted to U.S.-Soviet relations, Secretary Kissinger said, "We have been disturbed by the continuing accumulation of armaments and by recent instances of military intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts on distant continents . . . . These efforts only foster tensions; they cannot be reconciled with the policy of improving relations." With specific reference to Africa, the Secretary said, "The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's

hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination. It will inevitably be resisted."

09/07/76 -- The UN Special Committee on colonialism deferred action on a Cuban-sponsored resolution on the status of Puerto Rico until the meeting scheduled for next fall.

08/15/76 -- The Republican Party Platform adopted the following on Cuba: ". . . We condemn attempts by the Cuban dictatorship to intervene in the affairs of other nations;. . . We shall continue to share the aspirations of the Cuban people to regain their liberty. We insist that decent and humane conditions be maintained in the treatment of political prisoners in the Cuban jails, and we seek arrangements to allow international entities, such as the International Red Cross, to investigate. . . ."

08/08/76 -- Reuter reported that the opposition to the Manley government in Jamaica has charged that many Cubans in Jamaica under a technological exchange agreement between the two countries are Communist agents. Cuban engineers, teachers, doctors and farmers are working on various projects in Jamaica.

07/26/76 -- In his speech commemorating the 23rd anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, Premier Castro said that Cuban troops and arms will remain in Angola to protect that country from future invasions and to help it along the road to development. Visiting Angolan president Agostinho Neto also spoke. Castro and Neto concluded a series of economic and technical agreements, which call for Cuba to provide doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, as well as experts in internal distribution, fishing, and information.

07/11/76 -- The Baltimore Sun reported that according to the BBC, between 20,000 and 25,000 Cuban troops are still in Angola.

07/03/76 -- The Associated Press reported that U.S. intelligence sources have received reports that several thousand Cuban troops may be transferred from Angola to the Congo Republic. It was speculated that Raul Castro's visit to Brazzaville last month was to discuss the redeployment. (The Congolese Foreign Ministry, on July 20, denied the reports.) The reports also indicated that Raul, in his visit to Luanda, discussed Fidel Castro's decision to reduce Cuban military presence in Angola.

07/01/76 -- The Washington Star reported that Spanish workers in the port of Mariel, near Havana, said that up to 1,000 troops have returned from Angola. U.S. sources contend that Cuban troops coming from Angola are part of a rotation process rather than withdrawal.

06/26/76 -- On his arrival in San Juan for an economic summit meeting, President Ford said that those who might attempt to interfere in the United States' "freely determined relations should know such an act will be considered as intervention in the domestic affairs of Puerto Rico and the United States." Not mentioning Cuba by name, Ford said, "It will be an unfriendly

act which will be resisted by appropriate means."

06/23/76 -- The United States vetoed Angola's application for U.N. membership because of the "continuing presence and apparent influence of Cuban troops" in that country.

-- In issuing the final findings of its investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence raised the possibility that the assassination might have been a retaliation by Fidel Castro. Mentioned were inferences by the Cuban premier that those in the United States who aid terrorist plans against Cuban leaders would not be safe.

06/18/76 -- The Democratic Party Platform Committee adopted the following on U.S. relations with Cuba: "Relations with Cuba can only be normalized if Cuba refrains from interference in the internal affairs of the United States, and releases all U.S. citizens currently detained in Cuban prisons and labor camps for political reasons. We can move towards such relations if Cuba abandons its provocative international actions and policies."

06/11/76 -- At a news conference in Mexico City, Secretary Kissinger said there is no "conclusive confirmation" that Cuba is withdrawing its troops from Angola. He added that the United States had been prepared to explore the normalization of relations with Cuba, . . . but the introduction of large military contingents in Angola has created a very serious situation in our relationship . . . . The pre-condition for any improvement in our relations with Cuba is the total withdrawal of all organized military units from Angola. Responding to a question on Cuba's activity in the Caribbean, Secretary Kissinger said, I'd like to make the distinction between diplomatic activity and military activity. We would oppose military infiltration and we have seen no evidence of Cuban military units in the Western Hemisphere.

06/03/76 -- At the U.N. Conference on Human Settlement in Vancouver, Cuban Construction Minister Levi Farah-Balmaseda announced that a nuclear reactor will be built near the city of Cienfuegos with Soviet assistance. It will be Cuba's first nuclear power plant.

05/24/76 -- Cuban troops are being withdrawn from Angola at a systematic weekly rate which will "drastically" reduce Cuban forces in the African nation by the end of the year, according to the contents of a letter from Cuban Premier Fidel Castro to Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and passed on to visiting Secretary of State Kissinger. According to Swedish sources, the letter indicated that Cuba was withdrawing troops at the rate of 200 per week. In the letter, Castro wrote that he had no intention of sending troops elsewhere, either in Africa or Latin America. It had been rumored for weeks that the decision to remove Cuban troops was imminent. It was reported that Kissinger regarded the news as a positive development but said that "A partial withdrawal does not meet our requirements...." Earlier (May 12) the Washington

Star reported that a high-ranking U.S. official at the U.N. told Angolan representatives that the United States would have to veto the application for U.N. membership unless there were signs that the Cuban troops would be withdrawn.

05/20/76 -- Cuban Deputy Premier Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, responding to questions at the Japan Press Club in Tokyo, said that Cuba had no intention of sending troops to assist black nationalist forces in Rhodesia, as it did in Angola. Rodriguez made the distinction between the two cases reiterating that Cuban troops were in Angola at the request of the legitimate government. Rodriguez said Cuban troops would be withdrawn when the Government requested it. Commenting on relations with the United States, Rodriguez said, "We may have thus to wait until the presidential election is over. But we can be patient."

05/19/76 -- In a speech before the National Press Club, Governor Rafael Hernandez-Colon of Puerto Rico charged that Cuba was training and aiding terrorists to overthrow the government of Puerto Rico. He said there was a clear tie between the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and Cuba. A high-ranking Ford Administration official, according to an article in the New York Times, said that Cuban support for the Puerto Rican Independence movement is "confined largely to rhetoric and providing free vacations for the leaders."

05/12/76 -- The New York Times reported that the Presidents of Venezuela and Colombia feel that Cuban action in Angola was deplorable but it had not altered their policy of seeking a normalization of relations between Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere. Venezuelan President Lopez Michelsen said he accepts in good faith the statement by Fidel Castro, published last week in Bohemia, a Caracas magazine, that speculation on Cuba's use of military force in the Hemisphere was "absurd".

04/22/76 -- On the eve of his departure for Africa, Secretary Kissinger told reporters, "There is no possibility of continuing any discussions with Cuba about normalizing of relations as long as Cuban military forces are stationed in Africa and as long as Cuba continues the attacks on America and American policy in Puerto Rico and elsewhere. Unless there is a substantial change in Cuban attitudes, the process of improving relations can be considered suspended."

04/19/76 -- In a speech commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Cuban victory over U.S.-backed exile forces at the Bay of Pigs, Prime Minister Fidel Castro threatened to call off the anti-hijacking agreement with the United States if U.S.-based Cuban refugee groups continued attacks against Cuban fishing boats. Castro also called President Ford a "vulgar liar"

for allegedly concealing from the American people that South African troops invaded Angola before Cuban troops were sent to help the MPLA. He also said that Ford was lying when he said that the Soviet Union was responsible for the Cuban presence. Castro said, "The Soviet Union never requested that a single Cuban soldier be sent to Angola."

04/10/76 -- In a letter of protest sent to the United States the Government of Cuba charged that an attack on two Cuban fishing boats, on April 8, in which one man was killed, was inspired by "threats against Cuba by the highest authorities in the United States government." Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Cuban-exile Front for the National Liberation of Cuba and Brigade 2506. On April 20, White House and Department of State officials said that Cuba was informed on April 16 that the United States was was trying to learn the identity of raiders who attacked the Cuban fishing boats and was taking steps "to deter further such attacks."

04/08/76 -- The leader of Trinidad and Tobago's ruling People's National Movement has demanded an apology from the U.S. Ambassador to that country for his recent attacks on Cuba. Selwyn Richardson said that statements made by the Ambassador concerning possible actions against Cuba if it continued its assistance to African peoples is an insult to the sovereignty of Trinidad and Tobago.

04/06/76 -- The Journal of Commerce reported that the Multinational Caribbean Shipping Line - NAMUCAR is now in operation with Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Cuba as founding members and Honduras as a more recent member. NAMUCAR's objectives are to increase trade throughout the region and to reduce maritime shipping costs.

04/05/76 -- According to the New York Times News Service, "qualified" intelligence sources reported that Cuban military forces were joining Soviet military elements in the Red Sea-Persian Gulf area as part of a general buildup of strength. British sources reported that 650 Cubans have been flown into Somalia where there are believed to be already 2,500 Soviet military advisers and air and naval equipment. Also reported were 60 to 70 Cuban pilots and missile technicians in the country. Cuban pilots and advisers are reported to be training pilots in Southern Yemen and guerrillas in Oman.

04/01/76 -- According to a Panamanian official, apprehensions about the renewed militancy of Cuba caused the cancellation of a conference of Latin American leaders scheduled for June in Panama. The chiefs of state of all Latin American countries had been expected to attend the 150th anniversary of the Amphictyonic Congress held in Panama in 1826. Both Castro of Cuba and

Pinochet of Chile indicated they would attend. The communique which reported the cancellation said that a meeting was not propitious "due to the political conditions that currently exist."

03/25/76 -- A Pentagon spokesman confirmed that a formal review is being made of possible military action that the United States might take against Cuba. A DOD spokesman said "The Joint Chiefs of Staff are participating in a National Security Council review of possible action which might be taken with regard to Cuba." He declined to say what types of action were contemplated. The day before, in a meeting with some Members of Congress, President Ford repeated warnings to Cuba similar to those expressed by Administration officials recently.

03/25/76 -- Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Kissinger said that U.S. contingency plans against Cuba are designed to warn the Soviet and Cuban Governments that further intervention in Africa could have "serious consequences." Kissinger related that a review of contingency plans with regard to Cuba does not indicate that we are in a crisis situation, but said "We do want Cuba and the Soviet Union to understand it's a matter of deep gravity."

03/23/76 -- At a news conference in Atlanta, Secretary Kissinger refused to rule out the possibility of U.S. military action against Cuba in the event that the warnings issued by the Ford Administration were disregarded. Pressed by reporters for specifics of U.S. action against Cuba, Kissinger said, "...it's impossible for any senior official to put out ahead of time all the things the United States will or won't do and all the circumstances that may arise. We have pointed out the dangers to Cuba. We are serious about what I have said." When asked specifically about an invasion of Cuba, Kissinger said he did not want to discuss "any specific measures," adding, "You should not draw any conclusions for or against...."

03/22/76 -- In a major policy address in Dallas, Secretary Kissinger warned Cuba that the United States was capable of "forthright and decisive action" if Cuba intervenes further in Africa. He said, "The United States cannot acquiesce indefinitely in the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in distant lands for the purpose of pressure and to determine the political evolution by force of arms." The Washington Star (March 23) reported that it was told by an offical close to the administration decision making process that if the Cubans became involved in new actions in Africa, any U.S. response would be against Cuba itself, not in Africa. Some observers speculated that the most likely possibility would be a blockade similar to the action taken during the 1962 missile crisis.

03/17/76 -- The State Department refused to issue visas to a

delegation of Cuban filmmakers who planned to attend the Los Angeles Film Exposition (Filmex) because "the time is not propitious" for their visit, according to a State Department official. In November, the State Department said that it would "recommend that our consul general in Mexico City issue the visas," according to a Filmex official. Indications are that the decision was made at the highest levels in the Department according to the report in the Los Angeles Times. At the end of the month, the Department of State refused to issue visas to a group of scholars scheduled to attend the national meeting of the Latin American Studies Association in Atlanta.

-- According to an article by James Reston in the New York Times, the Ford Administration sent a private communication to Fidel Castro last autumn offering to meet privately with high-level Cuban officials at the United Nations to discuss the possibility of normalization of relations. Reston noted that the communication was never answered. David Binder, in the New York Times, Apr. 25, 1976, reported that Kissinger and Castro exchanged private messages about beginning actual negotiations.

03/06/76 -- During a news conference in Atlanta, Secretary Kissinger In response to questions about the position of the United States regarding the possibility that Cuban forces might aid the black guerrilla forces opposing the Government of Rhodesia, Secretary Kissinger, in a press conference in Atlanta, said that the United States "will not accept any further Cuban military adventures" in other parts of the would. Earlier, it was reported that, according to intelligence sources, Cuban troops and Soviet T-34 tanks had landed at the Moazambique port of Beira. Rhodesian Defense Minister Pieter Van der Byl said Rhodesia had no evidence of any Cuban or Soviet "presence of any significance in Mozambique," the base of operations of guerrillas opposing the Smith government.

03/04/76 -- Secretary of State Kissinger, in testimony before the House International Relations Committee, cautioned Cuba about further moves in Africa and warned that U.S. actions cannot be deduced by the U.S. performance in Angola. He said, "...we cannot accept intervention by the Cubans in the Western Hemisphere or any other state."

03/01/76 -- The U.N. High Commissioner for Namibia said that he does not think that the United Nations would interfere if Cuban or other foreign troops helped guerrillas in that territory to fight South African rule, which is in violation of U.N. principles.

02/28/76 -- President Ford, during a campaign trip for the Florida primary election, branded Fidel Castro "an international outlaw" who commited a "flagrant act of aggression" by

sending troops to Angola. In his Miami speech before an audience largely composed of Cuban refugees, Ford said, "My administration will have nothing to do with the Cuba of Fidel Castro." He stated, "It is a regime of aggression, and I solemnly warn Fidel Castro against any temptation to armed intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Let his regime, or any like-minded government be assured that the United States would take appropriate action."

02/24/76 -- In statements made at a luncheon in San Jose, Costa Rica, on the last day of his tour through six Latin American countries, Secretary of State Kissinger sought to assure Central American governments that the United States would not permit Cuban military intervention in the Hemisphere. Referring to Cuban action in Angola, Kissinger said, "Expeditionary forces may still be sent across the oceans to intervene in, and impose their will upon, the domestic affairs of other countries. The United States will not tolerate a challenge to the solemn treaty principle of non-intervention in this hemisphere.

-- In a dispatch from Havana, the London Times reported that "officials in Havana" when asked if Cuban support for Namibia "meant engaging in a full-scale war with South Africa," replied that "Cuba would do whatever must be done to support the Namibians." The article quoted the officials as saying that Cuba has "no intention of invading African states for political reasons, but would continue to provide aid for its sister peoples on the continent of Africa in their armed struggle against colonialism and for national liberation."

02/23/76 -- Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelson, with Secretary of State Kissinger sitting at his side, declined to condemn Cuban military intervention in Angola and said that his government would soon reorganize the MPLA government. (Colombia would be joining Brazil and Peru in recognizing the Cuban-supported government in Angola.)

02/21/76 -- The Washington Post reported that more than a dozen U.S. organizations, most of them black, had been invited to Cuba for briefings on Cuban foreign policy and the civil war in Angola.

-- According to the Washington Post, MPLA leaders have been reported as saying that they would ask Cuban and Soviet troops to leave Angola once the civil war was over.

-- At a press conference in Brasilia, Secretary of State Kissinger sought to play down the importance Cuba has been given by some to his Latin American trip. Reiterating that his trip was not intended to line up support against Cuba, Kissinger said that he did not want to turn U.S. hemispheric policy into "an obsession with a small Caribbean country." He said, "If there is any specific concern with Cuba, and the United States feels that action is called for, we will undoubtedly discuss this matter with interested Latin states..."

02/18/76 -- The Associated Press reported that the MPLA has decided to withdraw Cuban troops from further combat in order to avert a clash with South African forced holding a defense line 21 miles inside Angola.

02/17/76 -- During his visit to Venezuela, Secretary Kissinger said that the United States will not accept a repetition of the Cuban intervention in Angola. He said the United States "cannot be indifferent" to what he later called "an unacceptable mode of behavior." Kissinger said, "I am convinced that once the American people understand that Cuba asserts the right to intervene militarily in other parts of the world, we will not stand idly by." The statements on Cuba were in response to questions; Kissinger emphasized that the United States is not asking any government to take specific action now. He said that Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez raised the Cuban issue and they saw the issue pretty much alike.

02/10/76 -- The Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as the sole government of the former Portuguese colony. A correspondent for the London Times reported that with the rout of the pro-Western UNITA in southern Angola, a direct confrontation with the South African army seemed imminent.

-- At a White House breakfast meeting with reporters, President Ford, when asked what Cuba had to do to earn its way back into "our good graces," said "Right now there isn't a possibility--it's zero--of any improvement in relations with Cuba."

02/09/76 -- Huambo, the South central Angolan capital of the Western-backed forces, fell under assault by Popular Movement and Cuban troops. Military experts in Lusaka said Cuban soldiers had been used almost exclusively in the offensives on the Southern front.

02/05/76 -- According to the New York Times, knowledgeable sources say that Secretary of State Kissinger privately has concluded that Cuba is again in the business of "exporting revolution" on its own initiative, this time to Angola, to the Sahara, and perhaps elsewhere outside the hemisphere. The article stated that Kissinger said that he had rejected the theory held. until recently, by most of the Administration's specialists on Cuba that Fidel Castro has been forced by Soviet pressure to send the troops.

-- United Press International reported that according to diplomatic sources in Havana, military intervention in Angola has caused more complaining against the Cuban Government than any issue in recent years. According to the article, complaints have been voiced at Communist Party meetings, and some militia reserves have balked at being recruited for service in Angola. A dilpomat is reported to have said that according to one rumor, a ship docked in Havana in December carrying 450 dead and wounded.

02/04/76 -- Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau told his Parliament that while in Cuba he advised Cuban Prime Minister Castro to pull Cuban troops out of Angola, calling Cuban invclvement in the civil war there "A serious mistake."

02/02/76 -- Time magazine reported that Cuban-led MPLA forces delivered devastating blows in the past week to FNLA troops in the north and to UNITA forces in the south as they got closer to the UNITA capital of Huambo. The article reported that the troops of Robertc Holden's FNLA were virtually defeated.

01/29/76 -- Secretary Kissinger, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, said that the Soviet and Cuban effort in Angola "is a willful, direct assault upon the recent constructive trend in U.S.-Soviet relations and our efforts to improve relations with Cuba... . To those who have acted so recklessly must be made to see that their conduct is unacceptable." Kissinger said that the 11,000 Cuban ccmbat troops in Angola are doing almost all the fighting.

01/28/76 -- According to an article in the Christian Science Monitor, Cuban intervention in Angola is causing concern in Venezuela and throughout the Caribbean. Top Venezuelan officials privately said that Cuban action "is a grave act" and that it threatens relations with Cuba. One Venezuelan official expressed the fear that if Cuba can take military action so far from home, it can do it anywhere in the Caribbean. The article asserted that similar concern was expressed by officials in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, all of which have relations with Cuba.

01/27/76 -- In an appeal for House support of aid to pro-Western factions in Angola, President Ford, in a letter to Speaker Carl Albert, wrote, "The U.S. cannot accept as a principle of international conduct that Cuban troops and Soviet arms can be used for a blatant intervention in local conflicts, in areas thousands of miles from Cuba and the Soviet Union, and where neither can claim an historical national interest." He said "...it would make Cuba the mercenaries of upheaval everywhere." The President said that in addition to the 10,000 Cuban troops, from March to December 1975, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided almost $200 million in weapons and other military aid to the Communist faction.

01/22/76 -- According to the Washington Star, the Cuban military is involved in eight African countries: People's Republic of the Congc (Brazzaville), the major staging area for the Angcla operation, 1,000; Tanzania, 500; Equatorial Guinea, 500; Republic of Guinea, 300 (60 of whom have been identified as military); Somalia, 50; Guinea-Bissau, 20-25; and Sierra Leone, 20-25. For the most part, they are invclved in training.

01/21/76 -- U.S. officials said that Soviet aircraft have been flying Cuban troops into Angola at the rate of 200 per day for the

past two weeks bringing the total Cuban contingent up to 10,500.

01/19/76 -- Newsweek magazine reported that the Russians are providing long-range Ilyushin-62 jets to fly Cuban troops to Angola. The magazine said 3,000 to 6,000 Cubans may be en route to join the estimated 9,000 there.

-- The Washington Post reported that the =Chicago Daily News= quoted sources in Cuba as saying that all Cuban soldiers in Angola are volunteers from a pool of crack troops selected for overseas duty. The paper quoted Minister of Defense Raul Castro as saying "...we have an obligation to join with all people of the world who are struggling against Yankee imperialism."

01/17/76 -- The Washington Post reported that U.S. officials estimate that Cuba has 9,500 troops in Angola with another 1,000 en route.

01/15/76 -- At his press conference, Castro said, "It is not that Cuba should reject the ideal of improving relations with the United States--we are in favor of peace, of the policy of detente, of coexistence between states with different social systems--what we do not accept are humiliating conditions--the absurd price which the United States apparently would have us pay for an improvement in relations."

-- Premier Castro, speaking to Cuban and foreign journalists at a press conference in the Havana airport after the departure of Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos, declared publicly for the first time that Cuban soldiers were fighting in Angola. He said that no Cuban fighting unit had gone to Angola prior to the South African intervention of Oct. 23, 1975. He declared that Cuban soldiers would continue to fight as long as their help was wanted by the MPLA. He said that Cuba had supported revolutionary movements in Africa for more than 10 years.

01/11/76 -- According to a New York Times report, Cuba's Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, had indicated in an informal talk with U.S. newsmen that South African intervention in Angola on October 23 was the reason for Cuban involvement.

01/09/76 -- Osmani Cienfuegos, member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, arrived in Addis Ababa as the chief of a six-man Cuban delegation. Cienfuego said they had come for talks with Ethiopian leaders.

01/08/76 -- A four-man Cuban delegation, headed by Cuba's permanent representative at the UN, Ricardo Alarcon, arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Cuban delegation's arrival coincided with the arrival of African leaders for a special Organization of African Unity meeting on Angola.

01/08/76 -- The Washington Post reported that Rep. Charles W. Whalen, Jr.,

a member of the House International Relations Committee, felt that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro had changed course. Whalen spoke with Castro in Havana in July and was told that Cuba wanted relations with the United States.

01/02/76 -- The United States Government has warned other countries that it objects to any nation's allowing Cuban planes to use their airfields or airspace in connection with Cuba's intervention in Angola. The Washington Post reported on January 4 that Guyana had banned Angola-bound Cuban troop planes following a U.S. request. Previously, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago ceased to permit refueling stops for Cuban planes bound for Angola.

01/01/76 -- The Washington Post reported that foreign intelligence sources in South Africa said that Cuban forces fighting alongside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola have more than doubled in the past month and now number about 7,500.

12/23/75 -- In response to a question regarding Cuban involvement in Angola, Secretary Kissinger, at a news conference, said "We will not continue the process of normalization of relations until Cuban forces return to Cuba."

12/22/75 -- At the close of the First Party Congress, Premier Castro declared that Cuba would not renounce its policies in support of revolutionary movements in Angola and Puerto Rico for the sake of relations with the United States. He said "At that price, there shall never be any relations with the United States." Castro acknowledged that economic relations with the United States "would be useful for our country, but these relations shall never be established if it is on the basis of the renunciation of one atom of our principles."

-- Premier Fidel Castro, in an address before a million people expressing support for the decisions of the First Party Congress in the Plaza de la Revolution, demanded an apology from President Ford for the assassination attempts by the CIA. Castro made the statement in the context of his reaction to Ford's comment which related Cuba's Angolan involvement to a halt in efforts toward reconciliation with Cuba on the part of the United States. In his speech, Castro said, "We don't need them for anything." He stated, "What Ford has to do is ask pardon of the government of Cuba for the dozens of crimes against the directors of all revolutions that the CIA has committed over many years." Regarding Angola, Castro said, "We have to establish our principles, and our ideology. With our own blood we defend--we will defend Angola and we will defend Africa."

12/21/75 -- A foreign policy document of the First Party Congress declared that Cuba "is willing to discuss the normalization of relations with the United States, something which will also contribute to a necessary international detente."

12/20/75 -- President Ford in a surprise press conference declared that Cuban involvement in Angola had seriously affected U.S. policy

toward conciliation with the Castro government. The President stated, "I want it on the record, and as forceful as I can say, that the effort of the Cuban government to get Puerto Rico free and clear of the United States and to involve itself in Angola ends any efforts at all as far as I am concerned to have friendlier relations." Ford continued, "The action of the Cuban government in sending combat forces to Angola destroys any opportunity for improvement in relations with the United States. They have made a choice which in effect, and I mean it very literally, has precluded any improvement of relations with Cuba." The White House estimated that there are 4,000-6,000 troops fighting in Angola. The President made his statement a day after the Senate, by a 54 to 22 vote, blocked any further funds for CIA aid to U.S.-supported factions in Angola.

12/18/75 -- At the opening of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Fidel Castro declared that the Cuban army had "shed blood more than once in other countries threatened by imperialist aggression and had helped organize the armed forces and militia of other progressive countries." He also accused the CIA of organizing "dozens of attempts against the lives of the leaders of the Cuban revolution."

12/12/75 -- An article in the New York Times reported that a high-ranking official said there was evidence that Cuba now had "close to 5,000 men in Angola."

12/11/75 -- A dispatch in the Washington Post from Zaire reported that Western intelligence reports say that around 3000 Cubans and 400 Soviets are serving as advisers, tank and armored car crews, pilots, and occasionally as front line combatants with the Popular Movement.

12/08/75 -- According to an article in U.S. News and World Report, the Cuban military is active in eight African countries and two in the Middle East. The article reported that according to conservative estimates, there are 5,000 soldiers in the ten countries, with a combat role being assumed in Angola only. The magazine asserted that officials believe the Cuban troops are in the countries at the initiative of the Soviets.

11/27/75 -- Jack Anderson reported that an investigator, in testimony before a closed session of the Senate Internal Security Committee, charged that Cuban-trained revolutionaries are active in undermining Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States.

11/26/75 -- In a press conference in Detroit, Secretary Kissinger said that a proposed trip to Cuba by major league baseball players had been "iminent at one point" but "is not imminent now." U.S. officials disclosed later that Cuba's involvement in Angola, its demands for Puerto Rican independence, and the Cuban vote in the United Nations equating Zionism with racism were factors in this decision, according to news reports.

11/24/75 -- An article in Sports Illustrated reported that an agreement to send a group of U.S. baseball players to Cuba in the Spring of 1976 was reached at an October meeting in Mexico City between two independent television producers, baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn, and Cuban sports officials.

11/24/75 -- The Department of Commerce further eased trade restrictions on Cuba by issuing a new regulation which permits Western Hemisphere nations to sell goods to Cuba provided they contain less than 20 percent by value of U.S.-made parts or materials. The Commerce Department announced that the new terms comply with the July 29 OAS resolution on Cuba.

11/24/75 -- In a speech before the Economic Club of Detroit, Secretary of State Kissinger declared that Cuban involvement in Angola is damaging U.S. policy of conciliation toward the Castro Government. Mr. Kissinger said, "nor can we ignore the thousands of Cubans sent into an African conflict. In recent months the United States has demonstrated, by deed as well as word, its readiness to improve relations with Cuba. We have cooperated with steps to ease the Inter-American boycott against Cuba, and to restore a more normal relationship between the nations of the Americas and Cuba. But let there be no illusions: A policy of conciliation will not survive Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate."

11/22/75 -- Representative Jonathan Bingham announced he has dropped "for the foreseeable future" efforts to lift the U.S. embargo against Cuba. Bingham cited a recent "pattern of disruptive and interventionist activities in various parts of the world," by the Cuban Government. He cited Cuba's "leading role in promoting" a UN resolution labeling Zionism a form of racism, its "direct military intervention" in Angola, and military training and support for Syria. In the past months, Bingham has held hearings on his bill to clear the way for renewal of trade relations with Cuba.

11/20/75 -- U.S. officials said that Cuba has sent 3,000 fighting men and advisers to Angola in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The New York Times (11/24/75) reported that Soviet-supplied 122-mm ground to ground rockets, which have a range of 12 miles and have been the most important weapon keeping advancing armies of the National Front away from Luanda, are said to be fired by Cubans.

11/20/75 -- Nearly one third of the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence detailed eight separate plots against the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro conceived by CIA officials in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. According to the report, there was no clear indication that the plots, which involved various U.S. underworld figures, Cuban exiles, and CIA agents, had been made known to U.S. Government officials outside the CIA.

11/13/75 -- In a clash in the UN's Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, Cuban delegate Miguel Alfonso charged that the United States lacked the credibility to pass judgment on human rights situations in other countries. He was responding to an American move urging all governments to free political prisoners. U.S. delegate Clarence Mitchell charged that Castro had conceded that Cuba had political prisoners and cited an Amnesty International report which cited Castro speaking in 1967 of 20,000 political prisoners.

11/12/75 -- United Press International, citing Popular Movement political sources, reported that about 1,200 Cuban troops had disembarked in Luanda's harbor to aid the Popular Movement. The sources said that the total number of Cubans aiding the Soviet-backed movement is now about 2,800.

11/11/75 -- In a press conference, Secretary Kissinger said that "in recent months Cuba has taken some actions...that have given us some pause." He cited Cuban support of Puerto Rican independence and activity in Angola. He added, "The United States is, in principle, prepared to improve relations on a basis of reciprocity."

11/06/75 -- The New York Times reported according to East European sources, that 200 Cuban soldiers arrived last month in Angola and are fighting alongside forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. (An editorial in The Nation said the Cubans first entered Angola in September. According to an article in the Times of London (Jan. 8, 1976) a captured Cuban soldier said he arrived with a group in August.)

11/05/75 -- Secretary of State Kissinger told the House International Relations Committee, for the first time, that Cuba as well as the Soviet Union was supplying aid to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

10/24/75 -- The Washington Star reported that the Ford Administration had decided to "freeze" normalization of relations with Cuba until after the 1976 elections to avoid criticism from conservatives and Cuban exiles.

10/19/75 -- The U.S. Department of Commerce released a study on commercial relations with Cuba which found that "the adverse effect of the [U.S.] embargo on Cuba has lessened" and the "unilateral continuation of the Cuban embargo becomes a bit more costly to the U.S. though that economic cost is still relatively small."

09/29/75 -- Premier Castro declared that Cuba was prepared to remain "economically blockaded" by the United States indefinitely rather than give up her campaign for Puerto Rican independence. In his speech commemorating the 15th Anniversary of the establishment of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, Castro said "There can never be a betterment of relations with Cuba if it is based on the renunciation of our fundamental

principles.

09/23/75 -- Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William D. Rogers reaffirmed the United States' willingness "tc improve our relations with Cuba," "to enter into a dialoque with Cuba." He stressed, however, that "the dialoque must be on a basis of reciprocity. The resolution of the problems between us will not be easy and will not be furthered by calculated offense to the other party." This last statement was interpreted as a reference to Cuba's support for Puerto Rican independence, a policy which Secretary of State Kissinger recently characterized as a a stumbling block tc normalization, as "an unfriendly act and an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs cf the United States."

08/23/75 -- The Coast Guard announced that a Cuban fishing vessel seized 55 miles east of Cape Cod on August 17, for taking lobster illegally cn the continental shelf, will be freed because the U.S. Government had decided not to press charges.

08/21/75 -- The United States relaxed the embargo on Cuba by lifting certain aspects of the ban. In a briefing tc reporters, a State Department spokesman listed the specific policy changes. The U.S. Government will grant licenses for trade with Cuba to U.S. subsidiaries trading in foreign-made goods--U.S. regulations pertaining to exporting strategic goods, technology, and American-made components will still apply; no longer will the U.S. Government prohibit aid to nations permitting their ships or aircraft to carry goods to or from Cuba; the U.S. Government will take steps to modify regulations which deny docking and refueling privileges for ships engaged in trade with Cuba; Congress will be asked to change legislation which prohibits nations trading with Cuba from receiving food assistance under P.L. 480.

White House press Secretary Ron Nessen said that the action "doesn't really relate to bilateral relations with Cuba," explaining the action in terms of the decision taken by the OAS in Costa Rica last month. Nessen reiterated that the U.S. desired no "permanent antagonism" with Cuba and that "any change in our bilateral relations with Cuba will depend on Cuba's attitude."

In Havana, Premier Castro welcomed the U.S. decision to lift certain trade restrictions as a "positive gesture" but still regarded the embargo on direct trade as "a dagger at our throat." In an apparent change of previous policy, Castro asserted that there can be "negotiation on how to negotiate." Previously he had held that the trade embargo would have to be ended before any negotiations could take place, although during the McGovern visit, the Cuban leader stated that he would consider negotiations if the ban were lifted cn food and medicines. In response to Castro's suggestion of possible negotiations, State Department spokesman Robert Funseth reiterated the U.S. position that

"we're prepared to move on a reciprocal basis with Cuba. We have emphasized that the most useful way would be through private negotiations."

The parents of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis Tiant arrived in Boston, after receiving permission from the Cuban Government to travel to the United States. Permission for exit from Cuba to see their son was requested by Senator McGovern on behalf of Senator Brooke, during McGovern's meeting with Premier Castro in May.

08/20/75 -- The United Nations Decolonization Committee decided not to act on a Cuban-sponsored resolution that would give strong support to the Puerto Rican independence movement.

08/11/75 -- President Ford applauded Cuba's decision to return the ransom money to Southern Airways but declined to say whether the action would affect U.S. policy.

08/09/75 -- The Cuban Government returned to the airline the nearly $2 million in ransom money taken from hijackers of a Southern Airways plane in 1972, after a series of exchanges of communication between Premier Fidel Castro and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Sparkman. During a press conference (August 11), Senator Sparkman said the action was "very solid evidence that the Cuban Government is genuinely interested in pursuing a policy of improved relations with the United States." Sparkman also asked the Ford Administration to respond in kind by immediately, lifting all trade restrictions on Cuba covering food and medicine, and eventually other commodities. "It is our turn to act," Sparkman said. The return of the money was interpreted as another move by Castro to demonstrate his desire to improve relations with the United States.

07/30/75 -- A State Department spokesman declared that the United States is prepared to open "serious discussions" with Cuba on a normalization of relations. He added that the United States welcomed the OAS action which permits member States to establish trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba. The spokesman felt that it removed a "contentious issue" from Inter-American relations.

07/29/75 -- The United States, in contrast with its previous policy, voted along with 15 other OAS nations to end the 11-year-old diplomatic and economic sanctions on Cuba. Voting in favor of the Mexican-proposed "freedom of action" resolution were: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Haiti, Bolivia, Guatemala, and the United States. Voting against were: Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Brazil and Nicaragua abstained. With the passage of the resolution each OAS nation is free to decide the type of relationship it desires to have with Cuba. It is expected that Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras will resume

To: File

From: Ira Nordlicht

Re: Conversation with Ramon Sanchez Parodi, Counsellor, Cuban Interest Section, and Teofilo Acosta, First Secretary, Cuban Interest Section

Date: Thursday, February 16, 1978

Present from Senator Church's staff: Ira Nordlicht
Cleve Corlett

Perhaps the most significant points made during the conversation center around Cuban activities in Africa. They wished to emphasize that Cuba's activities in Africa had been of a long-standing nature, starting from as early as approximately 1963. Cuba was committed to majority rule in Africa and to the recognition of the territorial boundaries drawn between countries. Further, it felt that it should come to the aid of a weaker country subject to the territorial designs of the stronger one.

As a result, on Angola was invaded from Zaire and from (Namibia) southwest Africa. Angola sought Cuban aid and Cuba sent troops to prevent foreign takeover over a prime city and therefore control of the electoral process. Sanchez indicated that Cuba was indeed winding down its involvement in Angola and indicated that during the height of its involvement it had some 50,000 or so personnel there, while now it might only have something like 23,000 or 24,000. I couldn't fully assess whether he was just giving exemplary numbers or numbers that were approximately accurate.

Activity in the Horn of Africa was similar. There intent on designs for a greater Somalia that would encompass Ethiopia, as well

as other countries, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and Ethiopia sought Cuban aid to repel the attack. Cuban aid was provided and Cubans are still there. No reason, other than the general philosophical one mentioned above, was given for intervention.

As a general rule, Cuban aid throughout Africa consists primarily of primary care, doctors and primary level teachers. This, coincidentally, dovetails with Cuba's lessening need for these types of professionals as her level of education and the general populace increases and need for specialists supersedes that of generalists in medicine.

The point was made that Cuba's African activities were having an adverse impact on her image in the United States and probably delaying normalization of relations. The Cubans responded that press accounts of Cuban activity in Africa were terribly exaggerated and they thought that Carter was getting incorrect information, largely from Brzezinski. They also felt relations were an inevitability, and they had plenty of time and could wait. The Russians buy their sugar at approximately $.30 per pound, while the present market price vacillates between $.07 to $.11. Further, they sell them oil at 60% of the world market price. There is no pressure for them to do anything vis-a-vis the United States.

February 20, 1978
Memorandum: To Files
From: Cleve Corlett (CC [OF SENATOR CHURCH'S STAFF)
Subject: Meeting with representatives of the Cuban Interests Section, Czech Embassy, February 16, 1978

On February 16, 1978, Ira Nordlicht and I accepted an invitation to meet for cocktails with Teofilo Acosta, First Secretary of the Cuban Interests Section, at his office. When we arrived, Acosta was joined by Ramon Sanchez Parodi, Counselor of the Cuban mission here, and because of the weather, we remained in Sanchez' office for the meeting, which lasted from approximately 4:10 p.m. until 6:20 p.m.

After initial light conversation, the meeting turned first to the subject of the Panama Canal treaties. The Cubans were both very well informed of the debate currently in progress in the Senate, and also anxious for our views on how the debate would go and what chances we saw for ratification of the treaties. We told them that the vote would undoubtedly be close, that at least a dozen Senators remained undecided, and that the most reliable media reports showed the opponents with 30 or 31 votes against. Both Sanchez and Acosta were interested in the hard-core opposition to the treaty, and asked if we felt sentiment was going their way. We pointed out that the more people seemed to know about the treaties, the more likely people were to support them, and that if the amendments incorporating the language of the Carter-Torrijos statement of October 14 were approved, then the chances improved that the treaties would be approved. Other than agreement from the Cubans that the treaties were extremely important to the success of Carter's foreign policy, neither Sanchez nor Acosta offered substantive comments for or against the objectives of the treaties.

The bulk of the conversation concerned Cuban involvement in Africa. Sanchez delivered himself of a lengthy monologue tracing the history of Cuban involvement in Africa back to Algeria in the early 1960's just after Algerian independence from France. Sanchez appeared quite bitter about selective "leaks" of U.S. intelligence on Cuban involvement in both Angola and Ethiopia, and the way this information has been distorted in the American press.

The basic thrust of Sanchez argument is that Cuba had long-standing ties to the Neto faction of the Angolan independence movement, and that Cuba had willingly given aid to Neto after the departure of the Portuguese to protect his movement from invasion from FNLA and UNITA forces directed from Zaire and Southwest Africa (Namibia).

Sanchez' argument was that there has been a considerable reduction in Cuban personnel in Angola which has been masked by distorted U.S. intelligence accounts selectively leaked to the American press. Sanchez used slightly varying figures at different points in the conversation. At one point, when asked, he said he did not know how many Cubans remain in Angola. But at another point, he said that if there were once "50,000" Cubans in Angola, and there were now "20,000," then that was a significant reduction which should be recognized by Washington. At another point he

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THER POINTS RAISED:

-- Normalization of relations with the United States is inevitable, and a matter of time, but is being hindered by those in the United States who wish to preserve the status quo. Sanchez took pains to point out that the "very special relationship" Cuba has with the Soviet Union -- and especially the willingness of the Soviets to sell oil to Cuba at 60 per cent of the world price while buying sugar at 30 cents a pound (approximately 450 per cent of the world price) -- means that time is on Cuba's side.

--"We are running out of gestures," Sanchez repeated several times, stating that "we don't have very many Americans to release any more." The implication is that the ball is now in Washington's court when it comes to steps toward normalizing relations.

--The Cubans in Washington were surprised that there had not been as much antagonism as expected from Cuban exiles in the United States. Indeed, Sanchez insisted that the Interests Section gets scores of inquiries from Cubans in the United States looking for help concerning families in Cuba, and that "a majority" of the Cuban community in the United States favors normalization of relations. Those who oppose normalization in the Cuban exile community, Sanchez insisted, are only a "hard core."

--The President has shown more willingness than his predecessors to improve relations, but Sanchez insisted others -- including Brzezinski -- oppose normalization. "If we have to wait four more years or seven more years, we can wait."

INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPER

U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS

WILL THE BREAK MEND WELL?

By

Lieutenant Colonel William B. Amend, USA

31 March 1978

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Washington, D.C. 20319

TABLE OF CONTENTS