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UNITED STATES-ANGOLAN RELATIONS

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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
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UNITED STATES-ANGOLAN RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 25, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Diggs. The subcommittee will come to order.

Last week we held a hearing on contemporary Mozambique, one of the five former Portuguese territories in Africa. Today, we shall examine U.S. relations with Angola, which are under intensive review at this time in the executive branch of our Government.

Angola has had a very troubled history, both during and since its transition to independence. And having visited that country before independence and having been one of the few Americans who have been received by the Neto Government since independence, I can certainly attest to that status.

Angola shares with Mozambique many characteristics of underdevelopment, largely as a result of colonial neglect and four centuries of involvement in the slave trade.

One of our purposes in holding these hearings is to put Angola into a proper context and to get a fuller and more accurate understanding of Angola as opposed to the continuing distortions in the media that simply refer to that nation as a Marxist state without any other references.

Despite the fact that the first private secondary school was opened in that country in 1614, in 1975, before independence, less than 15 percent of the primary school students in Angola continued on to secondary school; less than 10 percent of the students at the University of Angola were either black or mulatto; and less than 10 percent of the black population was considered literate. So much for the benevolence of former Portuguese rule.

In the same year, 1975, 90 percent of the black population was engaged in subsistence farming. And just a decade or so ago, one-third of all Angolan children could be expected to die either at birth or in infancy. And forced labor was not abolished until 1961.

There is, however, at least one significant factor which differentiates Angola from Mozambique in terms of its march to independence. In Mozambique, Frelimo, the primary political party, was able to unify the Mozambican people. In Angola, on the other hand, there were three different major movements based upon three different ethnic groups which struggled against Portuguese rule, and which were at one time or another supported by one or more foreign powers.

The results, as we all know, were tragic. While the MPLA, the group governing Angola today, proclaimed independence for that country on November 11, 1975, it still apparently does not have control over the entire country despite the reported presence of thousands of Cuban troops.

The involvement of our own Government in the events of 1975 is now, for the most part, a matter of historical record, however, there is evidence that that record is not complete in terms of current U.S. involvement. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons that the Assistant Secretary for Africa is not going to be here this morning is that sensitivities have been so heightened and evidence of rather peculiar behind-the-scenes activities so strong, that he did not feel he was in a position to respond to certain obvious questions this morning.

Mr. BONKER. Will the chairman yield?

Mr. DIGGS. I will yield.

Mr. BONKER. I think it is unfortunate that Mr. Moose is not before the committee because this is a sensitive time. We ought to have an opportunity to ask questions of administration witnesses as to their current thinking concerning recommitment to actions within Angola.

I wonder if the chairman would see fit to invite the State Department to appear some time shortly so that we have a better understanding of where the administration is headed with respect to surreptitiously supported factions within that country. As you know, Mr. Chairman, this committee has been very active in support of the Clark amendment which could prevent directly or indirectly U.S. supplies that would find their way into Angola. There has been considerable confusion in pronouncements from the administration on this question.

Therefore I hope we can schedule a hearing sometime within the next few days so we may hear from the administration.

Mr. DIGGS. This is our intention. As a matter of fact, in my discussions early this morning with Mr. Moose, it became obvious to me that we ought to have the Secretary of State testify before the full committee. In view of certain things that have occurred without the involvement of Assistant Secretary Moose, we may need to go right to the highest level, and it is therefore our intention to ask the chairman of the full committee to call Secretary Vance.

Mr. BONKER. Perhaps we could suggest that Mr. Turner appear before the committee as well.

Mr. DIGGS. That is a point well taken.

Mr. WHALEY. Does Mr. Vance know what Admiral Turner is doing?

Mr. DIGGS. I am not even sure that the admiral's classmate in the White House knows exactly what he is doing.

Mr. WHALEY. He professes not to, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DIGGS. With the support of the subcommittee on both sides of the aisle, the Chair will proceed to arrange such a hearing.

As I pointed out, the involvement of our own Government is a matter of record; less so is the involvement of the Republic of South Africa, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Zaire, and other nations.

We hope to focus attention upon that involvement during the course of this and other hearings.

I think it is also instructive to point out that despite the fact that in 1976 our trade with Angola totaled some \$300 million, and that,

in addition, Gulf Oil is the single largest revenue producer for the Government of Angola, we still do not have diplomatic relations with that government.

I might add, parenthetically, that Gulf Oil provides some 80 percent of the revenue of that government, and the contract is being renegotiated. There is reason to believe that following the renegotiation of that contract that Angola will be even a larger beneficiary of that American enterprise. Angola is a nation which is rich in oil—particularly, but not exclusively in Cabinda—in diamonds and in iron ore, and it is the world's fourth largest producer of coffee.

Angola occupies a strategic position in southern Africa. It is north of Namibia where there is conflict, and south and west of Zaire and Zambia where some of the richest copper veins are located. All of these areas could benefit from Angola's transportation network.

Recent events in the Shaba Province in Zaire have again raised questions about our involvement with Angola. It would seem that some in the administration would have our Government reinstitute covert operations in Angola as if we had learned no lessons from 1975.

I recall that it was John Marcum, considered one of this country's leading experts on Angola, who urged that we learn some lessons from this experience and define our interest in Africa not simply in terms of the presence or absence of Soviet intervention, but rather to base our African policies on African realities. Further, he stressed that continued adherence to a confrontational mode can only increase the likelihood that Angola might go in another ideological direction.

So we open these hearings with a great deal of anticipation, and we welcome the presence of two gentlemen who without question, possess ample credentials to enlighten us on the matters before the subcommittee today.

We are first going to call upon Prof. Gerald Bender from the Department of Political Science, University of California at San Diego. Before you present your testimony, Dr. Bender, would you, for the record, give us a summary of your background.

STATEMENT OF GERALD J. BENDER, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Mr. BENDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have been working on Angolan related matters now for about a dozen years. I have traveled to Angola three different times spending over a year altogether in the country the first time in the late 1960's and twice since independence. I have traveled about 7,000 miles from one end to the other, visiting all but, I think, two of the provinces.

I have written a book about Angola published this year called *Angola Under the Portuguese*. I have also written about a dozen academic articles; and many newspaper articles about Angola. Among them I have a long study of Kissinger's policy in Angola and in another couple of weeks, I have the lead article out in *Foreign Policy* entitled "Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties."

Mr. Chairman, whereas my testimony is principally focused on the concerns that dominate the news in Washington right now, namely, the repeal of the Clark amendment, et cetera, since I have recently been there and traveled in the country, I would be more than happy

to answer questions by any members of the subcommittee concerning what is going on inside Angola. This may be an important area of inquiry particularly in light of one of the statements in your opening remarks concerning the lies and distortions that one finds in the press. As one who has recently been in Angola, I am horrified almost every day when I pick up the paper and see something written about Angola.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is with an uncomfortable sense of déjà vu that I sit before your committee today to discuss American policy toward Angola. Three years ago I sat before another congressional committee, headed by Senator Dick Clark, and expressed my concern that the United States might be covertly intervening in the Angolan civil war—we all learned much later that the CIA had indeed begun covert intervention over 6 months prior to my testimony. I also warned, as strongly as I could, that such intervention would be disastrous for our foreign policy objectives, both in Africa and globally. This was June 16, 1975. One month later, July 18, President Ford approved the 40-Committee's decision to vastly escalate American activity in that war. Some 2 weeks later John Stockwell, whom I am happy to see with us today, was named to head the CIA's Angolan task force. But it was a full 6 months before the Ford administration admitted publicly that the United States was intervening in the Angolan conflict. Within weeks of that public disclosure, Congress cut off the CIA's funds and, in the words of Senator Clark, "saved Kissinger from himself." Not surprisingly, in a relatively short time this wise decision by Congress was followed by the end of the civil war in Angola.

My sense of déjà vu today is, I believe, a natural reaction to the increasing reports that senior members of the Carter administration, in their attempt to formulate a policy response to the growing Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa, are considering covert destabilizing activities in Angola. Recently, administration officials have been complaining that the important congressional restrictions of the Clark amendment of 1975 and the Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974 are preventing them from effectively challenging the Cubans and Soviets in Africa. Specifically, both President Carter and his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, are questioning if these restrictions are still applicable today against covert intervention in Angola. Since the Clark amendment only restricts covert assistance in Angola, any attempt by this administration to repeal it is ipso facto an admission that it intends to undertake covert military actions against the Angolan Government led by Dr. Agostinho Neto.

Congress should not be confused about our national interest in Africa by a single-minded preoccupation with the Cuban presence in that continent; nor should Congress surrender its proper constitutional role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Only last week a senior Defense Department official noted in a briefing that "we clearly have not found the solution * * * to the problem of foreign military adventures by the Cubans." Given this situation it is natural that the "covert intervention" option would surface as one possible way to counter what are perceived as American losses in Africa. In light of these facts, Congress must exercise its responsibility to monitor and sanction the covert activities of our Government. This is not the time to surrender hard-won powers over this important

area of policy. Instead it is a time to show once again the wisdom and courage displayed by Members of Congress during the Angolan civil war.

Responsible committees in the House and Senate should immediately begin their own review of congressional restrictions on covert policy to determine which, if any, still apply. Simultaneously, Dr. Brzezinski, relevant CIA officials, and others should be called to testify about their intentions and activities in this area. Hopefully, Congress will be able to elicit enough information from these witnesses to determine: (1) Whether we are now covertly intervening in Angola or in other countries in this region; (2) If not, whether it is presently being contemplated; (3) What would be the objective of any covert intervention; and (4) Whether it will accomplish its purpose—presumably to reduce the Cuban and Soviet presence in Africa.

The importance of determining now the means, goals, and anticipated ramifications of covert intervention in Angola is only too apparent to those who have read John Stockwell's "In Search of Enemies." One of the most important messages in this book is that our covert intervention in Angola produced precisely the opposite effect from what was intended. The first Cubans did not arrive in Angola until more than 6 months after the United States began covert activities against the MPLA, whom the Cubans had been assisting for 12 years. In the early summer of 1975, when John Stockwell became chief of the CIA's Angolan task force and the Ford administration decided to greatly increase the magnitude of U.S. intervention, there were only 260 Cubans in Angola. At that time the MPLA dominated 12 of the 16 provinces in the country. Hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of lives later we see that the MPLA still dominates most of Angola, but there are now approximately 20,000 Cubans in the country. In addition, the Angolan Government is considerably indebted to the Soviet Union for the massive material help it rendered when the MPLA was threatened with defeat by "our side" which consisted of South African and Zairian regular troops and an assortment of mercenaries, in addition to the FNLA and UNITA. Whatever else our policy may have accomplished in Angola, one clear effect was to legitimize the Cuban presence there in the eyes of most countries, including some of our closest allies in Europe and Africa.

I would hope that when Congress probes any actual or proposed covert activities in Angola, or in other parts of central or southern Africa, it will insist on clear assurances that the activity is likely to produce its intended effect—rather than a boomerang effect, as on the previous occasion. Thanks to John Stockwell we now know what goal the administration actually pursued during the 1975 covert Angolan operations. Since it was thought that Congress would never authorize military assistance on the scale required to "win" in Angola, and that a program of the required size could not be hidden from a skeptical public, the CIA adopted a no-win policy—one that aimed to harass the Soviets so as to prevent them from gaining a "cheap victory."

As the administration hoped, the Soviets eventually did ship hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons to Angola until their side prevailed! How many Angolans died in the course of this cross-side fire sponsored by superpowers in their land? Apart from escalating the human carnage, what did this policy accomplish that could be justified from the standpoint of our national interests? It led the

MPLA to increase its dependence on Cuba, and it seriously tarnished the American image in Africa because we ended up on the same side as the white minority regime of South Africa. Clearly this could not have been the intended purpose, although it was an inevitable outcome as many in the Congress, State Department, and even the CIA itself had predicted. Clearly the Congress must now reinforce its pledge to the American people, made in the Clark amendment, that it will not allow the administration to commit such costly and tragic mistakes again.

To anyone who is familiar with Angola today, it is obvious that any covert operation aimed at completely dislodging the Cubans and Soviets will not succeed. What is the alternative? Is the Congress prepared to vote in favor of an overt operation? Would the American public accept such an operation, which would require the dispatch of American and/or South African troops to challenge the MPLA and Cuban armies? Alternatively, the goal of any covert operation would have to be limited once again to a no-win policy of harassment. In other words, we would have to resort to the old cold-war game of "let's make it tough on the Soviets and Cubans by aiding their enemies." Many Vietnamese, Cambodians, Kurds, and Angolans (to note only a few examples) have lost their lives in this dangerous and cynical game without producing the result intended by American policymakers.

Another no-win policy would merely increase the justification for Soviet and Cuban intervention; it would also sacrifice many more African lives. How long will we continue to sacrifice Angolan lives in order to harass the Soviets? Is it any wonder that Africans perceive a Eurocentric and white racial perspective in our policy? I fear that this perspective survives in the present administration.

To better appreciate just how profoundly a Eurocentric and even racist attitude affected U.S. conduct during the war in Angola, we need go no further than the CIA's (and Kissinger's) incredible expectation that most of Africa would accept the entry of white South African troops into the war but resent the multiracial Cuban troops. This naive attitude persisted long after it had been denounced by the Nigerian Government.

All too often the merits of covert intervention, such as that being contemplated or carried out in Angola today, are discussed only in relation to their global implications that is, "making it tough on the Soviets." Far too little attention is given to the character of the movements we support or to the human lives that may be risked. I would like to consider this aspect of the question briefly.

Most American policy failures in Angola can be traced to the profound ignorance of the country's political realities. We can not now explore the political history of Angola in any detail. However, a few basic realities should be understood by those who are involved in the formulation of policy.

To be sure, Angola, like many other countries, is riven by ethnic, racial, regional, class and ideological divisions. Ethnic and racial divisions are the most volatile, while regional and ideological schisms are the least divisive at the present time. Most of these divisions find expression in the three contending movements: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the

Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Furthermore, they tend to overlap and reinforce each other. The only observation I wish to make at this point is that American (or any other foreign) support given to any movement for ideological reasons is bound to have racial, ethnic and economic repercussions.

For example, it is well known that one opposition group, supported by France, Zaire and Gabon; namely the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), endangers the operations of the Gulf Oil Corp. in the country. FLEC considers Gulf to be its number one enemy after the MPLA. A FLEC victory could mean the end of American access to the oil fields in Angola to the advantage of the competing French companies. Any American policymaker who advocates the extension of aid to FLEC ought to consider the economic consequences of such action.

Although the United States has supported the FNLA in Angola for 17 years, it is virtually impossible to find an American official, scholar or journalist, who is familiar with that party, who will testify positively about its organization or leadership. After a debate with a senior State Department official at the end of the Angolan civil war, I asked him why the United States ever bet on the FNLA. He replied, "I'll be damned if I know; I have never seen a single report or memo which suggests that the FNLA has any organization, solid leaders, or an ideology which we could count on." Even foreign leaders who have supported Holden Roberto, such as General Mobutu, agree with that assessment. When asked by a visiting U.S. Senator if he thought Roberto would make a good leader for Angola, Mobutu replied, "Hell no!" This view of the FNLA leadership is also shared by UNITA, which briefly established an alliance with the FNLA during the civil war. During their 1977 party congress, UNITA cadres voted never again to collaborate with the FNLA. Finally, for any who may doubt these assessments, I highly recommend the sections in John Stockwell's book on the FNLA, based on his personal experiences with the movement and its leader in 1975-76.

If our pro-FNLA policy had been successful and if the FNLA had come to power in Angola, one might well wonder about the security of white, mestizos and indeed non-Bakongo people. In my personal judgment there would be little room for whites or mestizos in the permanent establishment of the Angolan Government or economy under the FNLA. By contrast the policy of the MPLA is strictly nonracial.

As for UNITA, this is a more complicated subject which I have discussed at some length in two recent publications, which I would like to submit for your record as appendices to my testimony. At this point I will comment on one aspect of the UNITA issue, namely race. UNITA's policies towards whites and mestizos should concern Americans who advocate covert assistance for this party. There is no way of predicting how Savimbi's "black power" attitude toward the influence of whites and mestizos in Angola would manifest itself were he to gain power, but the prospect does frighten most whites in Luanda. Of even greater concern would be a UNITA led by someone other than Jonas Savimbi himself. Leadership in UNITA (unlike the MPLA) is highly personalistic and it is doubtful that anyone other

than Savimbi would have the authority to prevent a slaughter of whites and mestizos such as that which occurred in early 1976 when UNITA soldiers retreated in the face of the MPLA and Cuban blitzkrieg.

What about the MPLA? While most Americans think of the Soviet and Cuban support in connection with the MPLA, the ruling party of Angola stands for considerably more than its commitment to Marxism-Leninism. For example, President Neto is a Marxist but he is also the only Angolan leader who has consistently supported a policy of multiracialism for Angola. Moreover, since independence Neto has actually implemented this policy at great political cost to himself. The best hope for an Angola free from black or white racism today rests with Agostinho Neto. Therefore, any program or effort to destabilize the Neto regime could very likely result in the destabilization of multiracialism in Angola. In view of what just happened to whites of Kolwezi, our Government should not irresponsibly ignore the fate of the approximately 150,000 mestizos and whites who live in Angola. Too many Angolans have already died for other people's causes; how many more must be sacrificed in the future?

If we succumb to the growing hysteria produced by the Soviet and Cuban presence in Africa, we are likely to commit another colossal blunder in Angola. At the end of the Angolan civil war, President Ford accused the Congress of losing its head; but many, including John Stockwell, have shown that it was the Ford administration which lost its head over Angola. I fear that this administration is about to repeat that mistake. Once again Congress must see to it that the administration does not lead this Nation down yet another dark tunnel at the end of which there is not even a flicker of light.

The most serious indication that this administration is drifting from the course of reason in Africa is its reaction to the recent invasion of Shaba by the former Katangese gendarmes. Our first reaction to this invasion was to blame the Cubans, indeed, to accept Mobutu's claim that Cuban troops were among the invaders. For good measure, a State Department spokesman declared that Cuban troops in Shaba can not be ruled out given the "evidence the Cubans are getting more brazen about these things." Since no justification could be found for this claim, the administration based its response on the supposition, which may be true in part, that the invaders were armed and trained by Cubans. But what great difference does it make if Cuban or some other outside force armed and trained the Katangese? After all, Lt. Col. Mingistu Haile Mariam, head of the Ethiopian Dergue, was trained in the United States with American weapons, Idi Amin was trained in Israel, and on and on it goes.

The Katangese attack on Shaba marks the sixth chapter in the remarkable saga of these hapless soldiers who have fought for no less than five causes in the last decade and a half. Initially trained by white mercenaries they fought for their fellow Luanda leader, Moise Tshombe, in the early 1960's when he tried to secede from the Congo. They have been armed and trained by a variety of Western sources including the Belgians, French and Portuguese. In fact, in Angola they fought on the side of the Portuguese against the MPLA for almost 10 years! In other words, if one insists on defining movements in Africa by the source of their arms and training, the Katangese present an amazingly wide selection to choose from.

A knee-jerk response to events in Africa involving Soviet and Cuban arms and training can be dangerous and self-defeating. The Katangese are not the only group in Angola presently receiving Soviet arms and Cuban training. The same is true of the South-West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) which is waging a guerrilla war against South Africa in Namibia, and of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). If we pursue the same logic and policy toward SWAPO and ZAPU which we have just employed toward the Katangese, we should immediately airlift supplies to Ian Smith in Rhodesia and John Vorster in South Africa. After all, are not each of these leaders "engaged in combat against Soviet armed, Cuban trained guerrillas based in Angola?" Is this what the National Security Council and the President have in mind? It is important to find out now, and the only way the American public can find out is if our representatives stiffen their backs and insist on answers to these and other questions.

Events surrounding the Shaba invasion also underscore another gross contradiction between our policy toward Zaire, and a policy of covertly intervening in Angola against the Neto regime. There is another grave flaw in our policy which could well raise up to haunt us. We justified our assistance to Mobutu on the ground that the territorial integrity of our ally, Zaire, is threatened. If we now join South Africa in trying to destabilize the Neto regime, would not the Soviet Union and Cuba be similarly justified in expanding their assistance to Angola to protect the territorial integrity of their ally? We can not have it both ways. The closer the United States moves toward cooperating with South Africa's campaign to destabilize the Neto regime, the more Cubans and Soviets will be seen in Africa. And viewed as a legitimate presence by virtually all African leaders.

For the last 3 years, Ford, Kissinger, Colby, Moynihan, and now Brzezinski have viewed Angola as the testing ground of the American will to stand up to the Soviets and Cubans in Africa. I believe that as narrow and myopic as this view appears, if Angola must be a test, then let us put our best foot forward. If we are truly involved in a zero-sum competition with the Soviets and Cubans in Angola, why not compete in areas where we perform best, e.g. technological assistance, instead of in areas where we seem to do the worst, such as fighting covert wars on the side of unpopular leaders like Pinochet and Roberto, which we later come to regret. Our Angolan policy in 1975-76 was a tragic but clear example of the futility of choosing the violent option over the peaceful alternative. What evidence is there that the violent option will produce any better results today than it did in 1975? On the contrary, I am convinced that if the Congress does not restrain the administration's apparent desire to intervene covertly in Angola, we will see more Soviets and Cubans than ever before and once again suffer an unnecessary setback in Africa.

If the Carter administration does not have the wisdom to compete peacefully against the Soviets in Angola, then the Congress should at least prevent the President and his National Security Adviser from opting for further senseless, counterproductive violence and bloodshed. The best policy which we could pursue toward Angola today is

The CIA followed next in July 1974 with covert payments to the FNLA. These payments in \$10,000 and \$25,000 increments were more than would normally be paid to purchase information. They were intended to buy the CIA a favored position with Holden Roberto, the head of the FNLA. The CIA's flagrant lack of security in Kinshasa insured that its association with the FNLA would become widely known.

In August 1974 the Soviet Union announced its support of the MPLA and in September began to deliver a trickle of arms to the MPLA. On January 15, 1975, the three liberation movements agreed to compete peacefully in elections which would be held in October of the same year. A week later the U.S. National Security Council approved a CIA request to deliver \$300,000 to Roberto to finance his campaign in Angola. This was done despite the fact that it was widely known that the FNLA had the largest army of the three movements and that its history was the bloodiest and the least cooperative, of the three movements.

With the encouragement of the CIA and Zairian President Mobutu, the FNLA moved its armies into Angola. In February 1975 they attacked the MPLA forces repeatedly, and the fate of Angola was sealed in blood.

In March 1975, the Soviet Union, responding to the FNLA's military initiative, which it understood was supported by the Chinese and encouraged by the CIA, began a substantial airlift of arms to the MPLA. In June the hostilities intensified and the MPLA evicted the FNLA and Unita from the capital, Luanda.

In July 1975 the National Security Council responded to CIA option papers and approved a \$14 million covert paramilitary operation in Angola. The CIA options paper stated that any Soviet program in Angola would not likely exceed a cost of \$40 million.

The United States publicly supported an embargo against the shipment of arms into Angola but significantly refused to work through the appropriate world peacekeeping organizations, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, or bilaterally with the Soviet Union or Cuba, to reduce hostilities. To all appearances Henry Kissinger and the CIA wanted a military confrontation with the Soviet Union in Angola. Kissinger's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Nathaniel Davis, resigned his position in protest of this policy. This operation is fully detailed in several chapters; specifically chapters 2 and 3 of my book entitled, "In Search of Enemies" published by W. W. Norton this year.

The third CIA covert action which affects the current crisis in Shaba is operation mongoose war against Cuba in the early 1960's. The CIA vigorously attacked the island with Cuban exile fighters, attempted to destabilize its economy, and attempted to assassinate its leader, Fidel Castro. This aggression left Castro implacably hostile to the CIA.

During the summer of 1975 there were approximately 260 Cubans advising the MPLA in Angola. The FNLA was advised by Zairian commandos and supported by Zairian light armor. The fighting was a seesaw of escalation with the initiative changing hands as each side introduced increasing amounts of arms and foreign troops. In mid-September Mobutu, with CIA encouragement, sent his 7th and 4th

Commando battalions into combat in northern Angola. Shortly thereafter the Vietnam Heroica delivered 700 Cuban troops, regular army units, to Porto Amboim, south of Luanda. About 8 weeks later, the South Africans blitzed southern Angola with an armored column. The Cuban responded with a massive air lift called Carlota which delivered at least 15,000 troops. The Soviet Union provided these troops with modern arms, including T-54 and T-54 tanks, light aircraft, long-range artillery, rockets, and eventually Mig 21 jet aircraft.

The covert nature of the CIA program limited its budget to \$31 million from the CIA contingency reserve fund and to ineffective World War II weapons. We gave our allies obsolete carbines while the MPLA got Kalashnikovs. We delivered obsolete mortars while the MPLA received rockets with twice the range. We could not introduce the modern equipment without disclosing the secret operation. And when the Soviet/Cuban program escalated into the hundreds of millions of dollars, we were unable to match it.

The CIA director and Mr. Kissinger were surely acutely aware that the American public would not tolerate such an operation 3 months after the humiliation of our evacuation of South Vietnam, so they lied about it. Even in secret briefings to Congress they dissembled. Director Colby and Secretary Kissinger testified to the Congress that no Americans were involved in the Angola conflict, that no American arms were being sent directly into Angola, that the CIA had no involvement with South Africa and that the CIA was not involved in the recruitment of mercenaries. Their testimonies were misleading on all of these points. CIA cable traffic and working group papers abundantly documented that Americans were advising and training inside Angola, that even our first plane loads of arms were intended for transit directly into Angola, that there was close collaboration and encouragement between the CIA and the South Africans, and that the CIA hired two mercenary groups to fight in Angola. The CIA also supported a third mercenary force, of British and Americans, briefing them in CIA safehouses in Kinshasa, flying them into Angola in CIA airplanes, and arming them with CIA weapons.

Only on the point of the activities of Americans inside Angola might Henry Kissinger not have known the full truth. The CIA called these men intelligence gatherers, deceiving the National Security Council about their true role. Director Colby, however, received copies of cables which mentioned training and advising inside Angola. The other three points, the delivery of American arms into Angola, the collaboration with South Africa and the recruitment of mercenaries, were done with full cognizance of the National Security Council of which Mr. Kissinger was the dominant member.

Mr. Kissinger and the CIA lied to the American people through public statements and false propaganda activities in the United States. The CIA funded and directed the activities of two teams of propagandists inside the United States and fed them false information to be used to influence the United Nations and the American people. It also placed false stories in American newspapers.

The Angola paramilitary intervention was highlighted by seven intelligence failures:

1. Failure to appreciate the strength and determination of the Angolan liberation movements. This is reported in the now famous NSSM 39.

2. Failure to anticipate the coup in Portugal in April 1974 and that country's loss of its determination to retain its African colonies.

3. Underestimation of the potential scope of the Soviet Angola program. The CIA's option paper of July 16, 1975, stated that the Soviet response would not likely exceed \$40 million. By February 1976, the Soviet program had topped \$400 million.

4. The CIA failed to foresee the Cuban response, that Cuba would introduce 15,000 regular army troops into the conflict.

5. The failure to foresee the decisive negative reaction of key African leaders to the presence of South African military on our side of the conflict.

6. The false intelligence from various CIA human intelligence sources that MIG jet aircraft were present in Angola in November 1975.

7. The failure of the CIA to provide adequate intelligence coverage of the war, of the politics of Angola, about the MPLA, and even about the CIA's own allies. The State Department's African Affairs Bureau complained in writing to Secretary Kissinger about this last deficiency.

It is now a matter of public record that the Congress blocked further escalation of our involvement in Angola by passage of the Tunney amendment, to the fiscal year 1976 Defense appropriations bill. This amendment was approved by the Senate on December 19, 1975, and by the House on January 29, 1976.

But for 2½ months after the passage of the Tunney amendment in the Senate, the CIA continued to support mercenaries fighting in Angola and to deliver arms to the FNLA and UNITA.

In July of 1975 the MPLA controlled Luanda and 12 of the 16 Angolan provinces. The United States mounted its covert operation to oppose them, ignoring repeated overtures from MPLA leaders and the advice of its consul general Tom Killoran in Luanda calling for cordial relations between the United States and the MPLA. The CIA program drove the MPLA into the Soviet-Cuban camp. In July 1975 there were no non-African armies on the African Continent and most prominent African statesmen would have objected to the introduction of any such armies.

By February 1976, the MPLA had effectively won the civil war and controlled all major cities, ports, and mineral and agricultural resources. But approximately 15,000 Cuban soldiers were now present, widely accepted by most African leaders because of their anger and frustration with the CIA's paramilitary intervention and its alliance with South Africa.

Now there are over 30,000 Cuban troops in Africa, in three major areas of conflict: Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. Their presence is accepted even by leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Not surprisingly, the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) is hostile to our interests in Zaire. In the past 18 months it has permitted two invasions of Zaire by the Katangese. At the same time the Zairian economy is further disrupted by the continued guerrilla warfare waged by UNITA forces which has ensured that the Benguela railroad cannot be reopened to carry Zaire's copper to Western markets, even if the PRA would permit.

And yet, appallingly, the Carter administration is pressing for a repeal of the Clark amendment so that it can resume covert military support to those UNITA forces. Such a policy will guarantee that a few years from now the southwestern flank of Africa and the Shaba Province of Zaire are still the scenes of bitter conflict.

How many times does the United States have to suffer the humiliating failure of duplicitous CIA covert operations before it learns that they don't work? When will we recognize the limitations of our power to manipulate the forces of nationalism and liberation in our Third World, and cease to cast ourselves in losing roles because of our mistrust of peoples' movements? As in Southeast Asia, our African work, and by a compulsive opposition to movements we label "radical" and then drive in the direction of the Soviet Union.

In 1975 the only role which the United States could have played in Angola in our own long-range interests was the statesman's role of noninvolvement in the conflict, pressing for a reduction of hostilities and welcoming the ultimate winner into the family of nations.

Today this is still the only role which will enable the United States to identify with the forces of the future in southern Africa and to share positively in that region's peaceful evolution and development.

Mr. Dugos. Thank you very much, Mr. Stockwell.

I want to thank both of you gentlemen for very provocative presentations that will obviously add immeasurably to these deliberations.

Let me yield to the ranking minority member, Mr. Whalen.

Mr. WHALEN. Professor Bender, I think you indicated that you recently visited Angola. What was your impression regarding the status of the economy there? Recent reports have indicated there has been considerable deterioration.

Mr. BENDER. I would say, having visited Angola in December 1976, January 1977 and comparing that with December 1977 and January 1978, there has been a remarkable recovery. This is not to say the economy is going well, but, for example, while it was true, last year, that markets were barren, that people were suffering from famine, and so forth, this does not seem to be the case now, at least that I was able to see.

I visited all the major markets in Luanda three or four times. I went to markets 900 miles outside of Luanda and saw food. I did not see the aspect of starving and so forth that some reports indicate is the case today. I just did not see that. I think the economy is in a difficult state, particularly in the agricultural sector and probably will remain so until the fighting in the central highlands subsides because after all the central highlands of Angola is the breadbasket of the country and that makes agricultural recovery problematic. I think there are also indications that the economic recovery is occurring; for example, in the areas of the iron ore mines down in the south in Cassinga.

When I was in Angola in January of this year, a group of about 20 Yugoslavian engineers went down there to see about opening it up, and I thought about that immediately when the South Africans invaded Cassinga because clearly their intention was not only to kill supporters of Swapo, but to delay the opening of the mine and to cause economic problems for the Neto regime.

Mr. WHALEN. Are the Cuban troops visible? What is their role? To what extent are they involved in the fighting?

Mr. BENDER. I do not know about the fighting because I did not go out on any operations, so I am really not in a good position to know about that. In the capital of Luanda, you see many, many Cubans, although you do not always know if they are civilians or soldiers.

I met some Cubans out in provinces outside of the Luanda and they were primarily engaged in training self-defense forces up in the north. I have reflected on that when I hear the administration's calls for Cuba to withdraw given the attacks on northern Angola from Zaïre.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Stockwell, there was a recent question and answer interview with Mr. Colby in the Washington Star. Mr. Colby denied the charges that he lied to Congress. Can you elaborate a little bit on the statement that you again made today in that respect?

Mr. STOCKWELL. Yes, certainly. I can report to you with absolute certainty what the CIA was in fact doing in Angola. I have also researched what is in the public record, statements from Senators about what they knew at different points in the program, and I have talked to several Senators and Members of the House, and have gotten reflections as to what they understood was happening. As I say in my report, I understand that the CIA did tell the Congress we had a paramilitary operation going into Angola.

The operation was described as follows: as we were sending arms to Kinshasa, primarily to replenish Mobutu's supplies or arms because he was stripping his armies as he sent his own weapons into Angola, we were not sending American arms directly into the country and that Americans were not involved in the conflict.

We were in fact sending arms into Angola. Our first plane loads of arms from the United States went into Angola. The 40-Committee were aware of what we were doing. There were working group papers which discussed the need for another supply of arms for Savimbi.

The *American Champion*, our ship, left Charleston, S.C., on August 29 and arrived in Matadi on October 7. Cables came in from Kinshasa saying the *American Champion* arms were being delivered into Angola at the rate of 10 tons a day. There were abundant indications of involvement.

I also understand that Colby told Members of the Congress that we were staying well away from the South Africans. In fact, our field collaboration with them up to the ranking of general officers was quite close. I did not see any document or hear of any conversation proving that, formally, at the government-to-government level, we invited South Africa to come into the conflict. But there were instances where CIA officers flew down to southern Angola and briefed South African generals in September about what we were doing. There are abundant cables from Kinshasa, Lusaka, and Pretoria which vigorously urged close collaboration with South Africa.

We gave permission to the Kinshasa station chief to make contact in Kinshasa with the South African boss representative there. Our arms were delivered to South Africans in Angola. They were off-loaded from CIA airplanes by South Africans and the South Africans distributed them.

We had planes which flew from the United States with arms. We were met in Kinshasa by South African military craft to take those arms into Angola. I could go on and on.

There was close collaboration. It was intentional. During the program, one of the chiefs of the South African service flew to Washington twice and conferred with the CIA Director and with the Chief of the African Division. I did not see a memo of conversation of what they said.

Mr. WHALEN. Was there collaboration between the CIA and the South African Intelligence Agency, BOSS?

Mr. STOCKWELL. Yes, sir, indeed. Early in the conflict we gave permission to the Pretoria station to brief them fully on our program and what we were doing. We required all stations in the area to inform Pretoria on their cable traffic so Pretoria would be fully informed of everything that went on. This was obviously intended as encouragement.

As I write almost as an anecdote, but a very serious one, in my book, the CIA wanted to send a shipload of arms to Windhoek, South-West Africa, for the South Africans to deliver into Angola. However, this shipload would have included 155 howitzer rounds. This is ammunition South Africa desperately needs which it cannot buy in the West. It is difficult to obtain. And they did not have 155 howitzer tubes in Angola. The ammunition in question was for use in South Africa. The only reason that we did not do it apparently was because we were stone-walled by Ambassador Mulcahey at the State Department who simply refused to permit it to happen.

Mr. WHALEN. Good for Ed.

One final question, Mr. Chairman. I was very disturbed, Mr. Stockwell, by press reports this morning to the effect Admiral Turner had gone to Senator Clark asking his quiet permission for further covert operations in Angola. I am disturbed first because it seems we are destined to repeat the mistakes of the past.

Second, I am disturbed because at least according to Mr. Powell, President Carter was not aware of this overtone. You are out of the Agency, of course, now, but is this possible, does the CIA undertake these initiatives without apprising the President of an initiative of this magnitude?

Mr. STOCKWELL. Yes, sir, indeed. And in my book, I do try to describe the CIA position and attitude toward the manipulation of Congress. I think Congressman Pike for very understandable reasons made a mistake in his assessment of the CIA that it was remarkably responsive to Presidential direction, that the President was involved in all of its major covert action programs or was aware of them and approved them.

The CIA has a mechanism it uses continuously for the most sensitive operations that it does not want to put in its cable traffic. We called it the back channel. It takes several forms. When the Congress or the Senate investigates past operations and manages to get all the files, which it usually does not, it still only has what the CIA permitted to be recorded in writing about that operation. Back channel communications are hand carried or verbal messages of which no record is made. The same mentality of deceit, politicking, and maneuvering to get support for the operations that the CIA wants to run, is prevalent in the CIA today.

Right now the CIA very much wants to go back into Angola on the side of Savimbi, to oppose Neto, and continue the destabilization of Angola. Yes; I find it quite plausible that they approached Senator Clark.

Mr. WHALEN. To summarize—I think what you said in your testimony is that in terms of Angola the CIA has failed in the intelligence area but acted as sort of a separate government; is that about correct?

Mr. STOCKWELL. I definitely have tried to illustrate the extent, influence, and impact of the CIA on our foreign policy. It is able to work in secrecy. It has a great deal more muscle in the field than we realize. For many years I myself discredited the stories of a "secret government," but now I am coming to a point of realizing the CIA can bring the United States, for example, into an alliance with South Africa with all of the discredit that that brings on our country, without the approval of the Congress or even the State Department.

Mr. WHALEN. I better leave on that.

Mr. DASK. The gentleman from Washington.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Stockwell, as one who led the effort on the House side to cut off covert aid to factions in Angola, I am equally distressed that there are still some in the administration who are contemplating renewed action along these lines. If you recall, the Clark amendment was directed at prohibiting indirect covert aid to UNITA and FLNA forces within the country. In fact, we were first made aware of Zaire's complicity because of rather large increases in military assistance to that country. In fact, from 1975, our aid to Zaire jumped from \$3 million to \$17 million, and we could not figure out what Mobutu was doing with all that money.

Obviously, Mobutu is still incapable of shoring up his defense in the Shaba Province. And we learned subsequently that this aid was going to Holden Roberto and others in Angola.

You point out, or at least Mr. Bender did, that at the outset, there were only 270 some Cubans in Angola. As the war escalated, Neto and the MPLA were driven more closely to the Russians and Cubans. As a result, Angola ended up with 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola.

I thought Congress' finest hour was the cut-off of military assistance to competing factions in Angola, yet apparently there are some within the administration who want to recommit the United States to supporting UNITA forces in Angola.

I would like to hear from you as to what your scenario is should this thinking prevail. I might mention, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Turner is consulting with members of the Senate in exploring repeal of the Clark amendment or various forms of assistance, at least we are coming a little way, because in the past they never could have consulted with Congress on such a matter. The CIA just moved ahead with their own programs. But if we were to provide direct or indirect military assistance to Savimbi, what would happen? Would you see Savimbi being well enough supplied he could prevail, he could overthrow the Neto government? Or would you see a prolonging of the fighting, an escalation of the war at a time when Neto is leaning West? He definitely wants to establish ties with the United States. He is considered a benevolent and moderate leader. Would we not drive him even further into the hands of the Russians if we were to escalate the fighting there?

Mr. STOCKWELL. Absolutely on that latter point, I was literally upset to watch the trend which the Carter administration is taking in Africa now. It seems to me that this country, with all of its strength and imagination and resources, can have some justification for its policies toward Africa other than opposing Cuba.

And yet this is what is happening right now. I was pleased to notice a year ago that President Carter was working towards better relations with Cuba, and then he became angry and frustrated that Castro has

his armies in various places in Africa. There is nothing we can do about that. We are not going to go in with divisions of Marines and wage a major war, at least I certainly hope not. There is no leverage that we have on Castro to get him out. We are faced with the situation now where if we want to get our African policies on the same level and join up with the forces of the future in southern Africa, we do have to bite the bullet a little bit.

We had a policy that was dominated in that area, influenced by bungled CIA covert operations for 15 years now. African people have scars to show and they are angry about it. And somehow we have to rise above the pettiness of opposing the Cubans wherever they are and establish a policy towards the countries themselves and the African peoples in those countries and work with them even if they also choose to work with Cuba.

I do not see why that makes it so intolerable for us to meet with them. We shake hands with the Soviets, Chinese, and other people. There simply has to be a better way to do it.

Mr. BONKER. I think you are absolutely right. We need a comprehensive policy. We do not have a policy today in Africa. We always seem to be reacting to events and circumstances. We always seem to be backing the wrong people for the wrong reasons. I think Holden Roberto is a good example.

But what is happening in the United States today is made clear by a Washington Post article this morning, "U.S. Seen Powerless to Contain Cuba in Third World." What is going to happen from this point on is a growing consciousness in this country about the expanding Russian and Cuban presence in Africa, and what the United States should do about it. We are seen as powerless in the Horn of Africa, Angola, and now in Zaire. We are in an awful dilemma in southern Africa. Yet until we can develop a policy that is going to establish some parameters, set some limits on our involvement, we are always going to be on the defensive. I am wondering, Mr. Bender—

Mr. BENDER. Could I comment briefly, just to underscore one of your points? When I was there this last time, I had long conversations with a number of Cabinet Ministers, Deputy Ministers, high officials in the Angolan military, and party and almost every one of them asked me about the logic of our Government's policy. The message is how are they to decrease their dependence on the Soviet Union without American recognition? "We need to have open relations with you, in order to do this. Instead, you stand and scream at us about our relations with the Soviet Union, but don't do anything positive about it. On the contrary, you drive us further and further toward the Soviets." Almost every Angolan will tell you about that. I frankly never had an answer for them. I wish our policy would clarify that at some point.

Mr. STOCKWELL. It is significant that Americans and Angolans were attracted to each other, at least at the outset of this war. The American people they have been exposed to reacted to them more humanely than the Portuguese did. The hostility that has occurred between the two countries now and between the two peoples are a result of this 1975 thing.

Mr. BONKER. I suppose if we are going to see Africa merely in terms of East-West confrontation, it represents one set of policies. If we are going to see Africa in a larger perspective, then it is going to

represent another set of decisions. Every time I see Henry Kissinger, we talk about Angola, and his statement always is, we should draw the line. He saw Angola merely as a testing point for East-West relations. If the National Security Council is going to prevail on administration policy, then we are on a perilous course of confrontation. We simply need a rule of thumb somewhere in the continent. Should Cuba export its revolution outside the boundaries where she is an invited associate, we would at least provide some guarantee or protections of those who are loyal to the West. Nobody in this Congress has been more of a critic of Motuba than I have with his ostentatious lifestyle, his corrupt government and army and mismanagement of the economy. Yet I am disturbed by what is happening in the Shaba Province, because once you start the unraveling of those borders in Africa, there are going to be horrendous problems.

If we are unwilling to commit our military resources, there will be no containment of Soviet influence in that continent.

I would like to ask just one question, Mr. Stockwell. Since you were involved with the CIA at a very early stage, you know how U.S. policy evolved in a situation like we have in Angola. When the Portuguese left, there were essentially three factions.

As you noted in your statement, we started at a very early stage to back the FNLA more than we did UNITA. Why the FNLA? I understood that Holden Roberto was a CIA informant as far back as 12 to 15 years ago and that there were some ties and some relationships out of which grew this movement, the FNLA, with guarantees of U.S. backing. Regardless of the merits the capability or the benevolence of the leaders, we end up backing what universally is now seen as a worse person and worse faction. Had Kissinger prevailed in supplying covert aid, we would be in a civil war in Angola today which would be parallel to what your involvement was in Vietnam, backing the wrong person.

Can you explain how those ties are developed and how we end up backing a guy like Roberto?

Mr. STOCKWELL. Yes, sir, I noted that point when Dr. Bender noted that no one understands how the U.S. Government was on the side of the FNLA. The history of the relationship was that the CIA met with Roberto and gave him cash in the early sixties, fairly regularly for a certain period of time.

Mr. BONKER. For information?

Mr. STOCKWELL. Roberto would be very unhappy with us for saying he was a CIA spy informant. He was a leader of his faction of the Angolan people. He was arrogant and strongwilled. He is intelligent, I would say, but limited in his capacity to lead. No, he would look on his relationship with CIA as a collaboration. He was traveling to the United Nations, four or five times to America, to get influence and support for his movement. His purpose was to free his country from Portugal.

The CIA support, as I understand the history of that relationship, and I believe this is correct, was interrupted at the time that Portugal successfully reversed President Kennedy's policies toward Angola by waving the Azores Bases agreement at us, and we backed away from African liberation movements and supported Portugal, sold her NATO arms which she used to bomb the Angolan people.

However, the CIA station chief in Kinshasa would meet with Roberto regularly over the years, off and on. Each new station chief would meet him and establish contact even when there was no funding. This is why the U.S. Government went to war on the side of Roberto. He was our ancient friend. I mean the CIA's ancient friend.

We didn't know Savimbi because he had been in the bush leading his guerrilla forces, and we did not want to know Dr. Neto because he was in our terms "a Marxist." Our bias against such a person was so great that the CIA's files and biographic sheet totally discredited him.

When I first came back from Vietnam and took over this job, people were briefing me, saying that Dr. Neto was a psychotic poet who gets drunk and kills people. That was the way this rather astute and impressive African statesman was described to me inside the CIA. We did not like him. This is why the U.S. Government was committed through the CIA to his destruction.

Mr. BONKER. Was this source of information valid?

Mr. STOCKWELL. No, sir, it was not valid. At least I talked to scholars who had contact with Dr. Neto for many years, including recently, and all vigorously disagreed with the CIA assessment of Neto. They said of the three individuals, he was the most intelligent and most astute politician, although Savimbi clearly is the most charismatic.

Mr. DROZ. Professor Bender, since you traveled through that country recently, could you comment on the extent of UNITA's control in the southern region and their strength in the area? In addition, do you have any information about FNLA activities in the northern region and FLEC activities in Cabinda?

Mr. BESSEA. Mr. Chairman, I do not like the word control and I think it is misused too often. Ever since the beginning of the struggle against the Portuguese, the word control has been a tricky one. In fact, if you permit me, I would like to throw in a parenthesis. I find it somewhat amusing that members of the Government are now concerned about UNITA control or FNLA control, because during the war against the Portuguese, it was dismissed out of hand.

But I do not like the word control because I do not think it tells us very much. If you mean by control areas of Angola that UNITA holds that the MPLA or Cubans cannot enter, they do not control an inch of Angola. If you mean by control areas and people that UNITA dominates but the MPLA can move in and out of, then perhaps it is a more meaningful question. Even with this definition, I cannot say for absolutely certain, but I think Savimbi's own admission is he controls about a third of the southern half of the country. However, it depends on which UNITA spokesman is talking how much of Angola they claim to control.

Sometimes they talk about two-thirds of the entire country. But if we look at the areas that UNITA operates in and perhaps we can say dominates, these are parts of Angola that are very sparsely populated. In some areas, there are only one or two people per square mile.

Therefore, I am not surprised to see various outsiders marching through southern Angola with UNITA and not finding any MPLA or Cuban troops. The same thing happened during the war against the Portuguese. There are parts of these same areas through which the MPLA, UNITA, and the Portuguese would sometimes simultaneously

take outside visitors and would never see anybody else, and then announce that they control the area because they didn't meet anybody else.

It is more tricky in the more populous central highlands. I think Leon Dash's articles in the Washington Post in August of 1977 indicate that UNITA does exercise a certain amount of domination over a number of people, particularly among the Ovimbundu people of this area. However, it is erroneous to suggest that all of the Ovimbundu—who are the largest ethnic group in the country—support UNITA. There are a lot of Ovimbundu who support the MPLA. Whether they do it enthusiastically or out of resignation, I do not know. Whether they do it 24 hours a day, day and night, I don't know. Even Dash admits he doesn't know what went on in villages after he left or at nighttime. As I said, I think this whole question of control is very, very tricky. It is misunderstood. It is misused. While you are delving into this, keep that in mind. I think you would do everybody a great favor.

I am sorry, you also asked about FNLA. They do seem to be operating in pockets in the north. My trip was canceled along certain roads in the north because bridges or roads were washed out or because the FNLA were up there. Some of these pockets are just remnants left over from the civil war. They are not even in contact with Kinshasa.

One friend of mine, involved in an operation in the north, found money with some FNLA over a year old, from before Angola switched its currency. These FNLA people didn't know within a year there was a new monetary system. Many seem to be very isolated. Others seem to be operating, again, with the help of mercenaries. For example, in late January there was an attack on the port city of Ambriz, about 70 miles north of Luanda, the capital, by a group of FNLA and mercenaries. The mercenaries may be giving the FNLA a new shot in the arm.

Mr. DIOS. I would like to also get your observations about the current status of Portuguese and other European expatriates in Angola. Last week when we were having our hearings on Mozambique, Prof. Alan Isaacman pointed out that despite the fact that a lot of Portuguese have left Mozambique, they did so because of their own assessments of the situation, and not because of anything Frelimo was doing to them.

As a matter of fact, Frelimo has consciously tried to let the Portuguese know that they are welcome to stay.

I wonder if you have any comment on MPLA's policy in regard to expatriates?

Mr. BENDER. My own calculations are that about the time the Portuguese coup in April 1974, there were roughly 325,000 Portuguese in the country. Today—and this is a guesstimate—there are roughly 20,000 Portuguese in Angola. They left for a variety of reasons including fear of retribution for acts they committed in the past. Many left because they were caught in the crossfire and, in part, because the Portuguese Government made it easy. Portugal brought ships and allowed them to put all their belongings—and other people's belongings—in crates and ship them out.

As for the Portuguese who are there today, I think there are two types of white Portuguese. One, probably the majority continued to

be somewhat racist or at least still hold very pejorative attitudes toward Africans, but the MPLA is very tolerant. In fact, when I talked to some officials—without mentioning names but describing conversations I had with some Portuguese—they were not at all surprised. They said you must be more patient and tolerant. They have necessary skills and as long as they keep their mouths shut and do not cause us trouble, we can get along with them.

I can say, as I indicated in my testimony, there is no question in my mind whatsoever—and I wrote a book about race relations in Angola—before. As somebody who is white traveling around the country, I never felt a scintilla of hostility towards me because I was white by any Angolan.

I might add, with exception of one person out of roughly 200 persons I met, I never felt a hostility for being an American. On the contrary, most people were excited to meet an American and wanted to know what the latest films were, when we are going to recognize them, this and that; no hostility at all.

I would say a great deal has to do with President Neto because he has put multiracism at the top of the list after his commitment to socialism. He talks about the importance of amicable race relations almost every day on radio and TV. Therefore, I would say that the whites who remain are not harassed.

Mr. DIOS. President Neto's wife is Portuguese, is she not?

Mr. BENDER. She is Angolan now. She took an Angolan citizenship, but she was Portuguese.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, could I follow up on your question?

If the public sentiment in Angola is so favorable to America, and if President Neto is interested in trade relations with our country—indeed we have Gulf Oil and Boeing and other large corporations entering into commercial contracts with Angola—what would be the result if we were to follow Mr. Turner's suggestion and provide indirect or military aid or transfer of arms to UNITA? Would you see a rapid deterioration in these relationships?

Mr. BENDER. I am absolutely sure there would be a rapid deterioration. Moreover, I think any American official who suggests that American corporations would benefit from a UNITA government versus an MPLA government just does not understand either of those two parties. I am not suggesting that UNITA would be more hostile than the MPLA, but it is hard to imagine them being more favorable to American business in the country than the MPLA has been. There are a lot of indications that UNITA might be more hostile to American corporations because we have not aided them and UNITA appears to be cozying up very closely with the French. It is curious that initially the Angolan struggle in 1973, 1974, and 1975 was a Sino-Soviet one evolving into a Soviet-American contest in 1975-76. Now I am seeing the emergence of a French-American struggle over the corporate side of Angola, and I think the French are cleverly outwitting us and trying to get us in there to do some of their dirty business so that they can inherit what would remain. I do not have proof of this, but it sure seems that way. And I think we may look foolish in this respect not only to a number of Africans but to Europeans as well.

Mr. DIOS. This is a very important point you just made about the status of Gulf Oil under a government which was controlled—I am a little sensitive about using that term now.

Mr. BENDER. Good.

Mr. DROS. By UNITA or by FLEC, I do not think that that enterprise would enjoy its present favorable relationship. There have been numerous attempts on the part of these other forces, particularly FLEC, to blackmail Gulf Oil. They threaten the security of Gulf Oil. There was also a tremendous outcry on the part of UNITA and other forces at the time that Gulf renewed their operations.

You recall they suspended their operations. When they renewed them, they entered into an agreement with the MPLA. There is no question that Gulf Oil would pay very dearly if MPLA, for whatever reason, were deposed from power.

I would like also, Professor Bender, to get your comment on the other activities of Cubans in Angola. There was so much stress upon their military activities in the media that, despite efforts of other people who have been there to indicate what else they are doing, I think further clarification is necessary.

Mr. BENDER. Most people that cite the Cuban nonmilitary role in Angola point to the medical field where there are roughly 900 Cubans now who are either working as doctors, nurses or medical technicians in the country and in some provinces like the one I visited in the north, Uige, bordering Zaire, there is better medical coverage than ever existed under the Portuguese, thanks to the Cubans.

However, I think it is the area of construction of housing where Cubans are playing the most significant role in the country. I recall from my conversation with the Minister of Housing and Construction that there were something in the area of 1,500 Cubans working in construction last year and this year it is going up to 2,500. It may have reached that already.

I should note as a parenthesis, the Angolan Government now is paying for all the expenses involved with the Cuban civilian technicians in the country, salaries as well as housing and maintenance.

In addition, Cubans are playing a very significant role in the educational field at all levels from primary school through the university. A team of about 750 Peace Corps type volunteers arrived this spring, who are teaching now and in some cases reaching areas that the Portuguese never reached in the country.

There are Cubans also involved in agriculture, a very significant input in agriculture in fact, and in banking.

Since we are on this, my own observations and information from Angolan officials is that the figures the National Security Council has released on the Cuban presence in Angola are extremely misleading because they tend to eclipse the civilian component of Cubans who are there, by considering most of them as military. It is my understanding that if any Cuban in Angola who is in the Army Reserves, which, in Cuba, includes a large number of people—even if they go down to act as civilians—for example, as doctors in a Luanda hospital—they are considered troops by the National Security Council. This tends to exacerbate the fears in America about this ominous or invidious role of Cubans when, in fact, many are performing very innocuous and important civilian functions. And one cannot overemphasize how important the Cubans in the civilian sector are to the functions of the country on a day-to-day basis. After all, you don't lose 300,000 Portuguese who performed literally every important function, be it in

the private or public sector, on a daily basis, and maintain an economy as modern as the Angolan one smoothly functioning at all. It just cannot happen. They need some kind of help. They have chosen Cubans.

Mr. BONKEE. If the gentlemen would yield, I gather you agree with Andy Young, that the Cubans may be a stabilizing force?

Mr. BENDER. To be frank, I do not even think it is a question of agreeing. It is such an obvious fact that for anybody to deny it indicates that the person does not appreciate the realities of Angola.

Mr. STOCKWELL. Sir, one question that was asked of me a while ago that we did not back to is important. That is, what could be accomplished by arming UNITA now? I wanted to answer that because it is so important. The answer is they cannot win. When we had a full program going, UNITA could not win; they could not handle the combined-MPLA-Cuban force, and the Cubans are not going to leave. I believe the thinking now is to create a Vietnam for Cuba in Angola. Tie them up so they will have all the problems we had in Vietnam. I wanted to mention that because it is so fallacious we will tie ourselves up as well in terms of casting the United States on the wrong side, discrediting ourselves as we have done so often, as we did in the Congo when we hired European and South African mercenaries to represent us in the field, and these were brutal men. They brutalized the blacks in the Congo, and that cast us in the unfortunate role of supporting that kind of brutality.

In Angola we hired French and Portuguese. The Portuguese who had just lost the colonial war were our champions in the field. This was the height of foolishness. Now we are considering putting in troops to counter the Cuban presence, garrisons of either American troops or combined forces or the French or someone in the Shaba. I am distressed that once again the world newspapers have front page photographs of white soldiers in the Congo who are representing the United States, flown in on our planes, standing over prostrate blacks, abusing them. This is what I mean in saying we just can never seem to cast ourselves with the forces of the present and future in Africa.

Mr. BONKEE. If our purpose then is to stir up a little mischief for the Cubans to keep them preoccupied with a war in Angola, what would be the response of other African leaders such as Kaunda, for instance, who was just here, if we were to commit our resources just to prolong some fighting and devastation in Angola?

Mr. STOCKWELL. Kaunda's position is so complicated that I would not be able to comment offhand without having been involved in conversations with him recently. He has got problems that conflict in many different ways. But I think without any hesitation I would say that other African statesmen would vigorously condemn what we are doing.

Nyerere, for example, and others, are going to complain vigorously that we are rearming UNITA and continuing to destabilize that country in order to create problems for Cuba. That is a very cynical policy in terms of the Angolan people who are going to die in the process.

Mr. BENDER. Nigeria has recently asked Cuba to help them with some low-cost housing in Lagos. Those familiar with Lagos understand how important that can be. It is important to recall Nigeria's role during the Angolan civil war. Once it became apparent that the

CIA and South Africa were intervening on the side of FNLA and UNITA, they not only switched to the MPLA but became probably the strongest supporter of the MPLA in Africa and have remained so ever since. I am sure the President himself, in his conversations with Nigerians, knows the reaction of the Nigerian leaders to this kind of proposed intervention in Angola. Nigerians would be livid. I am sure it would come at a considerable cost to our African policy. As Mr. Stockwell said, practically every leader but a few conservative leaders from the former French colonies would bitterly attack the United States, if we became engaged in this kind of covert intervention again.

Mr. Dinos. We had a report, Mr. Bender, that on the 12th of January, 12 Catholic bishops in Angola signed a letter to the government protesting violations of religious freedom. I wonder if you had any information about the relationship between the Catholic Church and the MPLA government?

Mr. BEXON. There quite evidently has been a deterioration, but it is by no means a break. And it is an extremely complex issue. In part, it relates to the Catholic control over the educational system. This is a problem, known by those who are familiar with the post independent period throughout Africa—Nigeria. Many newly independent countries, for example were confronted with the dilemma of what to do with the missionary controls over the schools when you are trying to implement a whole new school curricula.

I know the Catholic Church resisted such efforts in Angola in the educational field. Also the Catholic Church owned a radio station, had its own periodicals and so forth. In some cases I hear some broadcasts took positions that were contrary to the government's. In these times the government is not that tolerant or indulgent of attacks coming in official journals so they closed down the radio station and I believe one of the periodicals. These and other acts led to the denunciation by the bishops of the Neto regime which led to a counterattack by the Neto regime.

Since that time I think there has been some effort to smooth it over. I do not believe we could say there has been a break by any means. Neto himself, I do not think, wants to have a break. He and other members of his government have talked about the importance of having good relations with the church.

Another concrete example, the city of Uige which used to be called Carmona which I visited in the middle of January comes to mind. The Catholic bishop of that area controlled lands that just never ended, and he sits in this gigantic palace on top of a hill. Some of these lands were taken away and turned into cooperative chicken farms and other types of agricultural activities, and the Catholic Church bitterly protested this. Therefore, it is not surprising that the government and the Catholic Church would end up on a collision course over these issues and others. As to the nuncios and the details, I really have not looked into it.

Mr. Dinos. I think you have put that relationship into a perspective that is entirely different from what we had previously understood. The impressions that one may have gotten from that report concerning violations of religious freedom, did not, apparently give the total picture.

Mr. BENDER. They do not have the same freedom to operate in Angola that they did under the Portuguese; that is true. If that is a violation, then it has definitely been violated.

Mr. Dinos. Mr. Stockwell, you indicated that the CIA continued to support the mercenaries in Angola and delivered arms a couple months after the passage of the Tunney amendment. How were these operations financed, to your knowledge? Through whom?

Mr. STOCKWELL. My knowledge is quite specific on that subject. We used the residue, the remaining \$5 million of the \$31.7 million. When the Tunney amendment passed the Senate on December 19, our objective was to spend that money as quickly and effectively as possible to get more arms into the FNLA and UNITA to encourage them to keep fighting while we lobbied and scurried about to find a way of continuing. Also, we were looking for another \$3 million which we thought would keep things from collapsing altogether.

Mr. Dinos. Through whom or through which countries were these funds or supplies delivered?

Mr. STOCKWELL. We were working just as we had before. We continued to work through Kinshasa, primarily, to deliver the equipment. Some of the \$5 million was spent to purchase combat rations in Salisbury, Rhodesia and fly them into Gago Coutinho. We flew 145,000 pounds of arms from Kinshasa through Lubumbashi into Gago Coutinho.

Mr. Dinos. Your reference to Kinshasa reminds me of a communication that was addressed to, "The Honorable Members of Congress," in February of this year by FNLA over the signature of Holden Roberto. It is in English. It does not appear to be a translated document.

I wonder if you know who might be involved in the production of Roberto's releases of this type?

Mr. STOCKWELL. I certainly did know at the time. If I planned at it, I might be able to tell you if I recognize it, if it is something we wrote.

Mr. Dinos. While you are looking at that, let me ask Professor Bender a question.

You made a point that I have made several times; namely, that if our allies, and Brazil in particular, do not find any special problems in recognizing Angola, why do we? Brazil is obviously not a leftist leaning government by any stretch of the imagination. The Brazilians would be concerned about any kind of military security problems in the Atlantic sealanes and they are much closer to these matters than we are. How do you explain the differences in perception between our NATO allies and Brazil and the United States in this regard?

Mr. BENDER. I think initially after the civil war, our attitude, at least as expressed to me by the Assistant Secretary of State at the time, was that we do not want to give them "that victory." He wanted to hold off for a while. Then came the mercenary problem and Kissinger said we will never recognize the MPLA because of the trial and execution of four of the mercenaries. He was not around that much longer however to carry out this policy.

Once the Carter administration came in and indicated that it was going to adopt a new attitude, not just the statements by Andy Young, but Carter himself, seemed to premise that change on the fact that the Cubans had to begin to reduce the size of their forces in the country, and that they did begin to do that in the spring of 1977. But then, as

we know, Castro verified to Barbara Walters in an interview on foreign affairs last May, exactly a year ago, that he was stopping the withdrawal of his troops because of threats to the Neto regime.

Now, those threats in 1977 included at least 50 major attacks by South Africa and Zaire on the country and it included a good deal of propaganda from the other side. They also included an attack on the Neto faction of the MPLA by a dissident faction within the party which, incidentally, received support from the Soviet Union to some degree, which tried to install another group of—non-Neto—MPLA who adopted a black racist and extreme leftist line. Their attack was essentially on Neto's policy of nonalignment and multiracialism. The Cubans felt that it was very important to preserve the Neto line and, therefore, they sent more troops not only to withstand the attacks in the north and south, as well as UNITA and FNLA attacks, but against these dissidents within the MPLA itself. There was an increase, in my calculation, of about 20 percent of Cubans that had started in 1977, by the end of 1977, although not all those who were involved in the increases were troops. As I indicated, a number were civilians.

We have decided, somehow, that it is up to us, the United States, to uphold the West's determination not to allow that sort of increase to occur. As I have said, at the very least that is myopic, narrow, absurd. For an American ally on the one hand to recognize a Neto regime and derive benefits from it and suggest the United States ought to hold the line is absurd, although I do not think too many of our allies are doing that any more. In fact, the Scandinavian countries are enthusiastically going into Angola and Mozambique.

One last point on this which has always puzzled me: in a situation like Shaba of March 1977 or this present invasion, here we are trying to understand what is happening, and we do not have information coming out of the country, or the information that we are getting—if it is at all like some of the things I have seen—is poor, if not dismal. Therefore, we are trying to make plans and policies on the basis of this poor information. If we had an Ambassador in the country, we would be able to look into some of these matters, go out and see what the conditions of the Shaba refugees are et cetera—

Mr. BONKER. Would the Chairman yield on that?

I think this is an important point, because most of the releases that have come out of Shaba Province has been through Kinshasa and strongly suggest that Cubans are directly involved. I think this adds a dimension to the conflict which makes it far more important than it really may be at the time. We have been unable to find any hard evidence from the CIA or other Government sources that the Cubans were involved directly, though we know there is some complicity, and there is bound to be, with the Katangan rebels. But the perception is the Cubans are exporting their revolution beyond the borders into so-called pro-West countries. I think this would warrant a different set of actions from this country.

However, we just do not have that information and too often we deal with perceptions. If Mr. Brzezinski and others in the administration do not take care to point out or separate fact from fiction, then we are going to move on false assumptions and make some very dangerous decisions.

Mr. BENDER. My fear, quite frankly, Congressman Bonker, is not only that the National Security Council is not separating fact and fiction, but is contributing to the fiction. That is very dangerous because they are developing a public opinion in this country toward certain actions which both Mr. Stockwell and I have said would be a disaster, and I gather some of our views are shared by members of the subcommittee. A perfect example of why it is important to have American representation that the capital, Luanda, looks as if it is a ghost town, in fact, looks as though a neutron bomb had hit it, a lot of buildings, but emptied of people, it is time to ask what is going on.

The first thing I did was get on the phone and call two different people in Luanda to see if some thing happened. They said everything is the same; perhaps a little bit better but it is basically the same. Luanda by African standards is a bustling capital today. There are people all over; there are cars all over.

Mr. BONKER. Are they American cars?

Mr. BENDER. They are mostly Brazilian-made Volkswagens and Russian-made Fiats. But I think Mr. Stockwell has had a chance to look at that letter now.

Mr. DIOS. Mr. Stockwell.

Mr. STOCKWELL. This document has definite threads of the propaganda lines that we were teaching our propagandists to use. However, its recent date, February 20, 1978, leads me to think it is entirely plausible that it was written by FNLA cadres or their American representatives not on CIA payroll.

Mr. DIOS. I would like also to ask you, Mr. Stockwell, about an article that was in Le Figaro a couple of weeks ago, quoting Jonas Savimbi as saying he knew months in advance about the Shaba invasion. I would like to get your comments on this. If he knew about it that far in advance, how is it that Mobutu did not know about it?

Mr. STOCKWELL. I do not believe that Savimbi's forces have ever gotten along with the Katangese gendarmes. They fought bitterly in 1975. But both operate in the same general area inside Angola. It is quite plausible to me that the invasion would not be a tightly held secret inside the Katangese ranks. By "Katangese ranks," we mean the Lunda peoples. It has been suggested to me quite plausibly, for example, that not all of Shaba's recent invaders came from across the border. It is quite possible that some of them walked out of their houses and unbundled a gun. The blood ties are direct, irrelevant of the border. However, for Mobutu to know, he does run into a kind of hostility of closed ranks and a geographic distance from the Lunda areas and from Henrique de Carvalho where the Katangese are training and operating. For Mobutu to get the intelligence information is much harder.

Mr. DIOS. There are some who believe that he may have just allowed it to happen because he believed that the best way to get international assistance is to lose a war.

Mr. BENDER. Could I say two words about that?

I think anybody who follows that volatile corner that rests between Zambia, Zaire, and Angola knew more or less that it was going to happen. You did not have to have access to intelligence. It is almost an

instant replay of what happened in March 1977. In fact, the events that preceded it are almost the same.

That is say, a warming of relations between Zaire and Angola followed by outbreak of attacks on Angola from Zaire. Although this year there is a new element which is the German missile site (Otrug) in the Shaba Province which makes that whole area look much more ominous, looking at it from the side of Angola.

The second piece of information that everybody, everybody in the world should know, is that the condition of the Shaban or Katangese refugees in Angola was rather desperate. The International Red Cross has considerable material on their condition. The Angolan Government is not in a position to feed what is estimated at a quarter of a million people who are refugees in this very poor part of the country.

Therefore, it was inevitable that they would do something like this, and it was inevitable the Angolan Government would give them the green light in the face of the mounting attacks. I want to say one last thing. They will do it again. We do not need CIA or anybody else to tell us. They are in the same desperate condition. If the attacks from Zaire continue on Angola, there is going to be another green light.

Mr. BONKER. May I, Mr. Chairman?

It seems to me that Shaba Province is the base of wealth for the entire country, and one reason why the people are not fully supportive of Mobutu is that he is extracting all of the minerals and the wealth from the country and not returning it. There is no rebate. And as a result, that area is being exploited. The people very greatly resent this.

So when the Katangans move across the border each year, this seems to be an annual occasion. It is far more tragic this year than in past years. This time they find even a more friendly reception than they had last time. At some point Mobutu is going to lose. When he loses Shaba, it is all over and he falls. If the people who come in take over, appear to be another Marxist government, we will open U.S. News & World Report and there will be another big red star right there in the middle of Africa.

Mr. BENDER. Do you know that as a fact?

Mr. BONKER. Do I know that as a fact?

Mr. BENDER. The person who replaces Mobutu will bring in a Marxist government! There are a considerable number of opposition groups.

Mr. BONKER. If the Katangese prevail, and they are going to have the support, the arms, and the momentum on their side, if they prevail in the Shaba Province, they probably will become a Marxist government. But even if they do not, that kind of violence and indiscriminate killing, which we saw in the last few days, is going to be a prelude to what their government would be like.

I think it would rival Colonel Mengistu's Ethiopia today. We are going to be faced in terms of policy with another reaction or mounting evidence that the Cubans are making even more progress in Africa. So I am wondering whether, despite our distaste for Mobutu, we should not do something collectively with the French and others who have a vested interest in that country. There are minerals which the United States does not have access to in countries. Should we shore up our defense in the Shaba Province and try to work on reforming Mobutu so at least we can have one ally?

Mr. BENDER. I think Mr. Stockwell can enlighten us more on the feasibility of reforming Mobutu than I can. After 15 years of American assistance, I would say that his regime has been a disaster, economically, politically, militarily and I, for one, do not see any great reforms that are going to change this.

But I do want to make one comment, and that is that I would have hoped that somebody who has been as well informed on Africa as you have been, and I followed your interests since 1975, would not so easily slip into the assumption that the Katangese spell Marxist government. As I tried to suggest in my statement, they have only fought for five causes in the last 15 years. Take your pick of which one they are going to be. Are they going to be like the fascist Portuguese who trained them or like the Marxists who have given assistance now, or are they going to be totally different like Amin? Nobody knows what they are going to be like. When they first went into Shaba, we were told that they had to have Cuban training because it was a clean, crisp, efficient operation. Do you think the Cubans trained them to go in and kill like that? Obviously there is a lot more involved in that area than touches upon whether they are Cubans training or the presence of Soviet arms.

Mr. BONKER. The experience in Ethiopia, the Cubans if they do not condone it, tolerate that kind of indiscriminate killing and violence. What worries me about Zaire is that there are important minerals at stake. Zaire is a U.S. ally. Mobutu is bad, but he is not as bad as Mengistu and Amin.

It is the uncertainty that alarms me. I do not know who is going to take over should Mobutu fall. I am concerned about perceptions because we both know how the press will treat this kind of activity and what the U.S. response would be.

At some point, we are going to overreact to a situation in Africa. That is why I think it is in our best interest to help defend borders. And not only that, but territorial integrity is involved. I know there is some legitimacy to the Katangan claims on the Shaba Province. The claims are deeply rooted, but you can find such claims almost anywhere in Africa. Tribal loyalty transcends the border lines. We have to be very careful how we move, at least in terms of military support in Africa. I would much rather see us help out Mobutu, however bad he is, than for us to get involved in backing the UNITA faction in Angola.

Mr. BENDER. Why make it an either/or proposition? I do not think that is necessary. I am not suggesting we drop Mobutu overnight, but something to keep in mind are these long years we supported the Emperor in Ethiopia for all the same reasons. We argued that he may be corrupt and he may be a despot and so forth, but he keeps it together; we are paying that price today. If we run in with the French right now into Zaire to prop up Mobutu, we will pay a price one day. I'm sure equal to what happened in Ethiopia.

I do not think the alternative is necessary to help Mobutu continue this kind of corrupt regime. That is not necessarily the answer. We have directly or indirectly supported all kinds of losers in Africa—including Vorster in South Africa, Ian Smith. Our support for these kinds of leaders, be they white or black, eventually comes to haunt us. I think now might be a good time, as you say, to carefully look at

Mr. STOCKWELL. I do not have any knowledge to that effect. We did dismantle—well, we ceased funding them in about April of 1976. I would have no way of knowing if it has been started up again recently.

Ms. MANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DIGGS. Dr. Ward.

Mr. WARD. I would like to ask Professor Bender one question.

You spoke several times about the policy of nonalignment of the MPLA government. Could you give us some specific examples of what that means?

Mr. BENDER. Yes; I was rather struck last December-January by the stand the MPLA took on some major issues, international issues. For example, on the Middle East, right after the MPLA Party congress in December where they officially became a Marxist party, I would not have expected a neutral position on the Middle East by Neto. Right after the party congress he was asked by Congolese radio and television what he thought of Sadat's initiative towards Israel. He said he would rather not talk about it because that is a very distant and complex issue, and he even resisted making comments on Zimbabwe, which was equally complex but a lot closer.

For somebody who was that indebted to the Soviet Union, I was surprised that whereas for many weeks before the interview, a number of pro-Soviet regimes around the world were supporting their attack on Sadat; Neto did not. The Horn is another example. After all, the Horn is supposed to be a replay of Angola with Cubans and Soviets. Yet, the Angolan Government did not take a stand on it, and when the Ethiopians arrived for the party congress in December, they tried (along with the Soviets) to get a resolution introduced to the congress supporting Ethiopia and condemning Somalia. The MPLA would not allow that or any other resolution on the Horn to be introduced. And until Neto went to Moscow in late March and early April where he met Mengistu, I never saw any comments in the Angolan newspapers which took a very strong stand on the side of Ethiopia; quite surprising, given the fact there are Cubans and Soviets involved.

Another area outside the Mideast and the Horn concerns Namibia. This is a good example, because our negotiators indicate that the MPLA has been very cooperative with the proposals of the five western states for Namibia.—That is, of course, before the recent aggression by South Africa against Angola.—Our negotiators are very pleased over how cooperative they have been.

I guess we could expand that. They have been generally cooperative in their role as one of the 5 front-line states. Angola seems to be taking a cooperative attitude on both Namibia and Zimbabwe and is not at all towing some sort of Soviet line on these two questions.

So I would say that their endorsement of nonalignment is more than lip service, even on these tough issues like the Horn, the Middle East, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Ms. WARD. Thank you.

Mr. DIGGS. How about Cuba?

Mr. BENDER. I would say the MPLA is much more nonaligned than Cuba is in that respect.

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Bonker had a question.

Mr. BONKER. One last question.

As I travel around Africa, I get the impression that the Russians may well be the modern day Ugly American throughout that continent. In recent years they have been thrown out of Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt. Their scorecard is not all that impressive when you tally it. When I talked to leaders in the Horn of Africa a few months ago, they seemed to have a bitter dislike and distrust of the Russians. We have heard Ambassador Young talk about the Russian mentality, and because we asked him how his family liked Africa. The Russians are very arrogant people, especially when it comes to Third World leaders. Probably because the Cubans are there on a day-to-day basis, it is a little bit easier.

President Carter has always pointed out that most of the leaders in Africa have a Christian background, come up through education by missionaries and they have pro-West inclinations. There is a great deal of incompatibility between the Communist doctrine and African tribal faith or their Christian faith, as it may be.

Do either of you, because you are both authors and well-versed on the African psychology and social characteristics, do you really feel that Africa may well be Russia's Vietnam?

Mr. BENDER. Rather than respond to that specific question, I would like to discuss what you said about the Soviets in Africa, being the "Ugly Americans," because I think that is so important. I have written about this factor in my foreign policy article that is coming out next week.

I think there is no question that Angolans, as a general rule, do not like the Soviets who are there. They are generally racists or ethnocentric. Not every one, but as a general rule, they are ethnocentric, they are impatient with Angolans, they do treat them like little children that have to be managed at all times, and the Angolans feel this very much.

I think that any nonwhite who encounters this attitude recognizes it immediately for what it is. And the Soviets probably are the Ugly Americans of the seventies, along with ourselves still. Let's not forget that, and both black and white Americans in Africa I might add. Therefore, it seems to me absurd in the face of this, for the United States to stay out of Angola rather than to go in and compete with the Soviets. If we really have confidence in our society and what we can do for Africa, then it is important that we show that in positive ways rather than scheming of ways to kill more Angolans to score one more so-called victory against the Soviets in that country.

For all the Soviet's "ugliness," if that is the right word, the Angolans need them to protect themselves against the United States, France, and others. Therefore, we are not in a position to capitalize—if that can be capitalized upon—by maintaining our present position.

One last thing I want to say because I have said it a couple times and I cannot emphasize it enough, I think anybody in this administration who agrees to destabilize the Neto regime must be held accountable for destabilizing multiracialism at the same time.

Mr. STOCKWELL. That says it quite well, actually. We are not competitive, however, with the Cubans, in terms of the way they get along with Africans. Most particularly we set ourselves back with things

like the recent photographs in newspapers which had white soldiers, our allies standing over prostrate blacks who were cowering in fear of their lives. The Cubans have never had pictures of such conduct by their soldiers in Africa.

I would also like to mention the devastating extent to which all Americans who travel in Africa now are suspected of being CIA, to the detriment of the fulfillment of their legitimate functions.

The CIA has used every conceivable cover on that continent. Any professor, any tourist, any businessman will have it mentioned to him that he may be CIA. And Africans are quick to tell you that they are reluctant to invite Americans into their homes or to enter into personal relationships with them because they may be CIA. They are quite cynical about Americans now because of this omnipresence of CIA.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you.

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Stockwell, have you had any problems since you separated yourself from the agency, because of your frankness? Have there been any attempts to destabilize you?

Mr. STOCKWELL. No, sir, I have had no reaction.

Mr. DIGGS. Nothing from sources that are rather strange?

Mr. STOCKWELL. I have had no reaction whatsoever yet from the Justice Department or the CIA. I have heard very indirect rumors that the Justice Department is waiting to see what happens to Mr. Snapp before they decide what to do with me.

Mr. DIGGS. You both have been brilliant witnesses and have helped the committee immeasurably. For that we are eternally grateful.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

APPENDIX

Gulf Oil Corporation

1025 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

June 9, 1978

The Honorable Charles C. Diggs
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa
Committee on International Relations
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Chairman Diggs:

On May 11, 1976, we submitted to your Subcommittee on International Resources, Food and Energy a statement on "Gulf's operations in Angola" for inclusion in the record of its report on Disaster Assistance in Angola. That statement described the transition to date of Gulf's operations in Angola following its accession to independence on November 11, 1975.

Your recent letter of May 16, 1978, inviting Gulf to testify before your Subcommittee on Africa regarding U. S./Angolan Relations; asked us to comment on (a) our ability to operate in Angola, in consideration of past and present U.S.-Angolan relations; and (b) our opinion on the prospects for future U. S. investment in Angola.

Accordingly, there is submitted herewith a statement which we believe is responsive to the inquiry contained in your letter of May 16, 1978.

Very truly yours,

Nestor C. Ortiz
Director
International Affairs

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Enclosure

(37)

GULF'S OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA

Despite the fact that the United States has not established diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of Angola, Gulf has been able to continue to operate under its previous concession agreement and to produce and market crude oil from the oil fields located offshore from Cabinda, Angola.

However, following the accession of Angola to independence on November 11, 1975, Gulf was forced to suspend its operations from December 19, 1975 until April 2, 1976 because of border warfare and civil strife which made it impossible to maintain operations in Cabinda. Thereafter operations in Cabinda were resumed on substantially the same terms, and production was rapidly restored to about the same level that had previously prevailed. Crude oil production averaged 123,000 barrels per day in 1977. During 1977 tax and royalty payments received by Angola amounted to approximately \$460 million, although some of this related to earlier years. Currently production is running at around 100,000 barrels per day, in spite of the difficult operating circumstances that have prevailed in Angola.

Gulf's operation is essentially self contained in Cabinda itself. Its housing, maintenance, and storage facilities are located contiguous to the loading and storage terminal at Malongo, Cabinda.

As of April 1978 the company has 283 employees in Angola, of which 248 are local employees. The bulk of these are located at the Malongo terminal in Cabinda. There are 35 expatriate employees of which 23 are Americans.

The cooperation of the Government of Angola with Gulf in maintaining its production operation, and in providing security for its employees and installations has been excellent, not only at Luanda but in Cabinda.

When Gulf's operations were resumed in April 1976 under the new Government, agreement was reached that a new and mutually satisfactory operating agreement would be reached, calling for joint participation under which the Government of Angola would acquire a majority interest in Gulf's exploration and production properties. Satisfactory discussions have been carried out between Gulf and the national oil company of Angola, SONANGOL, looking towards arriving at this Participation Agreement. In the negotiations, with which SONANGOL has been ably advised and assisted by the U. S. consulting firm Arthur D. Little, we have found the Angolan personnel to be knowledgeable and reasonable. There is every reason to believe that very shortly an agreement will be finalized.

We are of the opinion that it would be in the mutual interest of the United States and Angola for the United States to establish formal relations with the Peoples Republic of Angola, and believe that such action would facilitate considerably the development of Angola's petroleum resources and help to free it from economic and military dependence on non-African powers.

There is every indication that Angola would welcome other U. S. private investment, just as it provides a favorable atmosphere for Gulf's continued operations in that country. The establishment of U. S. diplomatic relations with Angola should provide a major contributing factor towards encouraging such investment. We understand that the Government of Angola has had a number of discussions with other oil companies, including U. S. companies, to encourage their participation in Angola's oil resources development, and that it has also had similar discussions with other possible American investors interested in other types of industrial and commercial ventures.

To emphasize Gulf's continued interest in Angola, Gulf has structured a number of substantial investment programs for maintaining and expanding oil production in the Cabinda offshore fields. For example, during 1978 Gulf will initiate projects for offshore Cabinda oil development which will cost approximately \$81 million when completed. This will include a major gas gathering system and compressors to inject gas into the oil reservoirs to increase oil production and enhance oil recovery, as well as drilling a number of new wells, connecting of wells already drilled, and take other measures to increase production efficiency and enhance oil recovery.

On the assumption that very shortly we will have finalized our Participation Agreement with SONANGOL, this would mean that approximately one-half of the aforesaid capital cost will have to be provided by the Government of Angola. Were Angola to become a member of the World Bank, its share of the cost for development of its oil resources, as well as capital for other economic development could probably be obtained from that institution by submitting project loan requests calling for World Bank participation in the investment venture. Considering the general political instability in Central and Southern Africa, it is believed that private capital would be more willing to undertake such investment if it could do so in association with an entity such as the World Bank because of the increased security this would provide.

(From the New York Times, Monday, June 5, 1978)

ANGOLA, THE CUBANS, AND AMERICAN ANXIETIES

(By Gerald J. Bender)

must be reduced or eliminated before any diplomatic relations can be established between Washington and either-Lianda or Havana.

Most Americans assume that the Cubans in Angola and elsewhere in Africa are little more than proxies for the Soviet Union. Rarely is any distinction made between Soviet and Cuban interests, goals, and actions in Africa. As a result, the Cuban presence in any part of the continent is generally perceived as a setback for the United States in its global competition with the Soviet Union. So much national attention has been focused on a perceived Soviet-Cuban threat in Africa that many have forgotten some larger, more important questions plaguing U.S.-Soviet relations. Even if it could be established that the Cubans are nothing more than Soviet proxies, for example, the problem of how to act toward Soviet-backed regimes or movements in the Third World would remain.

The Lessons of Vietnam

American foreign policy toward Third World conflicts in which the Soviets are involved has been shaped by two competing perspectives—that of the global strategist and that of the area specialist. Generally, the globalists look first (and at times exclusively) at the ramifications of the conflict for overall East-West relations. If the Soviets are thought to be acting badly, the globalists argue that the United States should back a competing side or withhold U.S. cooperation in some other area of special interest to the Soviet Union. The area specialists, on the other hand, focus (also at times exclusively) on the local causes of conflict—the ethnic, religious, racial, or national factors behind them. They counsel against U.S. involvement in a struggle simply as a reaction to Soviet participation.

American specialists on Southeast Asia, for example, continually warned against grafting a global construct onto local conflicts fired by historical, ethnic, political, and economic realities. They argued that it was a mistake to lump the Chinese, the Khmer Rouge, and the Vietnamese into the same category—an argument whose truth is quite evident today. One of the presumed lessons of Vietnam was that the United States should not become entangled in Third World disputes, even if the Soviets are involved, so long as the major issues at stake are local in nature and not fundamental to the basic interests of the United States.

"The very style that [once] earned U.S. citizens the reputation of 'Ugly Americans'... appears to characterize the Soviets in the 1970s."

Apparently not all American policy-makers understood that lesson, for at the same time the United States was making its final withdrawal from Vietnam in early 1975, the globalists within the Ford administration, led by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, began clandestine intervention in another local conflict—in Angola. Although the Senate halted U.S. participation in the Angolan war in December 1975, thus handing a victory to the area specialists, that hardly ended the debate.

In 1976, Jimmy Carter campaigned against the Ford administration's globalist posture in Angola. Shortly before the election he asserted:

I think that the United States' position in Angola should be one which admits that we missed the opportunity to be a positive and creative force for good in Angola during the years we supported Portuguese colonization. We should also realize that the Russian and Cuban presence in Angola, while regrettable and counterproductive of peace, need not constitute a threat to United States' interests, nor does

that presence mean the existence of a Communist satellite in the continent. Once elected, Carter chose Congressman Andrew Young as his ambassador to the United Nations. Less than two months before the election, Young had headed before the Senate African Affairs Subcommittee that the United States should begin reversing its southern Africa policy by recognizing the MPLA government in Angola. "In his new post, Young urged the United States not to withhold recognition of the MPLA on the basis of the Cuban presence. The Cubans, he asserted, were helping to provide order and stability in the newly independent country."

The new Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance, appeared to join Carter and Young in rejecting the globalist attitude toward Africa. In mid-1977, Vance asserted that:

The most effective policies toward Africa are affirmative policies... A negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be futile. Our best course is to help resolve the problems which are opportunities for external intervention.

During the early stages of the Carter administration, the Anglo-American character of U.S. policy on Africa was apparent in the American posture toward the negotiations for a settlement in Rhodesia. It was also reflected in the administration's relatively calm reaction to the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province, its support of participation by the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in the Namibian negotiations, its pressure on the government of South Africa, and its well-known attitude toward the fighting in the Horn.

Today, it is apparent that the globalist perspective has come back to life in Washington, thanks largely to the growing influence of Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Whether Carter appeared to share Young's keep-out approach to Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa throughout most of his first year in office, the president clearly took up Brzezinski's re-

GERALD J. BENDER, visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, has visited Angola three times, two of them under a Rockefeller Foundation grant since independence. During the 1973 crisis in that country, he was on the staff of then Senator JOHN F. TUNNEY (D-California), who sponsored legislation halting U.S. participation in the Angolan war.

For an assessment of Cuba's decision to intervene in Angola from the perspective of Cuban interests, see Anthony J. Leacock, "Cuba, African Activism, International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1, Summer 1977, pp. 7-19.

train after the Soviet-Cuban military presence in Ethiopia increased dramatically in early 1978. By March, in a speech at Wake Forest University, Carter was suggesting that Soviet military and diplomatic activities in Africa were poisoning East-West relations, a message repeated by administration spokesmen at every available opportunity.

The president has made a grave error in adopting Brezhnev's globalist attitude toward the presence of Soviets and Cubans in Angola. This attitude overlooks basic Angolan politics and is detrimental to overall U.S. global interests. It undermines American credibility in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World and it will continue to do so until the United States demonstrates that it understands the local realities of individual developing countries as something more than minor acts in the great superpower drama. A clarification of the background to and effects of the Cuban presence in Angola should help lay to rest the fear that it represents a major Soviet victory in southern Africa.

A Helping Hand

Portuguese colonialism left a grim reality for Angola's new government. Until the 1960s, Portugal showed little interest in educating Africans; as a result, when independence came in late 1975, over 90 per cent of the population was illiterate. The Portuguese community had monopolized virtually all skilled jobs and many of the unskilled ones, too—including those of taxi drivers, doormen, elevator operators, and even lottery-ticket hawkers. Few Africans had the educational, occupational, or linguistic skills requisite for running a modern, independent nation.²

Americans have some understanding of the legacy of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and of the devastating effects on the

Angolan people first of the long war for independence and then of the civil war. But they have heard little about the incredible sack of Angola by the approximately 300,000 Portuguese who fled the country during the 1975-1976 civil war. The departing colonialists essentially stripped Angola clean of such basic things as pharmaceutical products, office equipment, and all forms of public and private transport. Only 2,000 heavy-duty trucks remained of the 10,000 that had served as the backbone of the internal distribution system, and this became a basic cause of food shortages in several parts of the country. What the Portuguese could not take with them—in large crates, shipped without charge by the Lisbon government—they destroyed. That included public and private records. Most of those who fled seemed determined to guarantee their own long-standing forecast: that Africans would never be able to govern Angola.

"Neto has staked his political career on a stubborn commitment to the policies of mismanagement, multiracialism, and socialism."

Admittedly, until many more Angolans have been trained to administer the country's economic, educational, health, and technical services, foreign civilian assistance will be vital to the nation's economy. For the moment, the bulk of this assistance is provided by the Cubans, a circumstance that will probably continue to be a fact of life in Angola for some years. Pointing to the Cubans' technical skills, multiracial background, minimal ethniccentrism, linguistic similarities, dedication to hard work, and tolerance for less than optimal living conditions, most Angolans seem to welcome their presence, despite American and other Western complaints.

Angolans who defend the Cuban role often note the large number of Cuban doctors, nurses, and medical aids (expected to reach 900 this year) who help sustain An-

gola's health services. Yet it is perhaps in the area of civil construction that Cuban assistance has been most impressive. Approximately 1,100 Cubans, including 82 engineers, worked on construction projects in Angola during 1977, and the Angolan ministry of construction and housing, Manuel Rosendo de Oliveira, expects that number to rise to 2,500 by the end of 1978. (While the Angolan government only paid room and board for the Cuban assistants in 1977, this year it is expected to cover all their expenses including salaries.)

Rosendo says that the Cubans are helping Angola to become self-sufficient in construction. In January 1977, the ministry employed only 3,500 Angolans at all levels and only seven of the 407 construction companies in operation before independence were functioning. By December 1977, the number of Angolan construction workers had risen to 41,034, and 178 construction companies were open. Moreover, most construction materials are now being made locally; imports are limited to window glass, door locks, paint pigments, and some electrical and plumbing supplies.

The Angolan government is in the midst of its first effort to improve Luanda's slums, where almost half a million people live. A large housing project is being built on what was once a golf course for the Portuguese and foreign diplomatic and business communities. When completed, "Project Golf" will provide housing for some 10,000 individuals from the adjoining slum. The Cubans have introduced a semiprefabrication process, developed in slum clearance programs around Havana, which is being used for housing as well as in the construction of four primary schools, a hospital, and a compact shopping and commercial center. Except for a dozen Cuban technicians, all of the 1,500 workers on Project Golf are Angolans.

Cuban technical assistance extends to agriculture, the transportation sector, and education. One recent example of educational assistance involves the arrival in An-

gola last spring of more than 700 young Cubans to teach in primary schools and the first levels of secondary schools throughout the country.

Foreign technical aid is not coming only from Cuba. Luanda's hotels are filled with Soviets, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Czechoslovaks, Poles, East Germans, Brazilians, and some British and Scandinavians. Even Americans are represented—by technicians from Boeing, National Cash Register (NCR), Mobil, Citicorp, Texas Instruments, and Gulf Oil—although their presence in the capital is less visible.

"Kissinger's globalist approach actually contributed to an increase in the number of Cuban troops in southern Africa."

Many of Angola's foreign visitors are having difficulty adapting to the day-to-day inconveniences of life in Luanda. The electricity is occasionally shut off between midnight and 7 AM for repairs, elevators routinely stall, and the phones and switchboards often do not work. Soviets and East Europeans also complain about the darkness of Luanda's night life. Angolans, however, maintain their own lively social life, in which Cubans—be they, if any, of the other foreigners—occasionally participate.

The difference between Cuban-Angolan social relations and those of Angolans with advisors and technicians from other socialist countries is quite dramatic. The Cubans work directly with Angolans, whatever the task. They seem immensely popular in the country, perhaps because they do not manifest the cultural and racial arrogance of many other foreigners. The Cubans, whose own lifestyle closely approximates that of Angolans, make relatively few demands on the government. According to one Angolan official, "When the Soviets arrive here, they usually demand rooms in the best hotels or well-furnished houses with air condi-

² For further information on Portuguese domination in colonial Angola, see Gerald F. Butler, *Angola: Under the Portuguese (Baltimore, University of California Press, 1972)*.

tioning six new stores and refrigerators which cost us a lot of our precious foreign exchange—whereas we can put five or six Cubans in a four-bedroom apartment with motorized on the floor and we will never hear a complaint."

Another high official, when asked about possible racial problems between Soviets and Angolans, responded that "it is hard to find racial problems where no racial relations exist." Other than its annual film week, the Soviet Union appears to have little cultural impact in Angola. Apparently the Soviets have not altered the attitudes and behavior that have made them unpopular from Cairo to Conakry and from Mogadishu to Maputo. The very style that earned U.S. citizens the reputation of "Ugly Americans" during the 1950s and 1960s appears to characterize the Soviets in the 1970s. Throughout the continent, Africans complain that the Soviets are disdainful, impatient, and ethnocentric, and that they treat them like difficult children. In this respect, Americans (black or white) and Soviets in Africa have a great deal in common, suggesting that the Ugly American syndrome is a product of highly industrialized societies, irrespective of ideology or economic system.

The Kissinger Vacuum

Angola has been forced by its circumstances to depend heavily on the Soviet Union, but this does not mean that the Angolans choose to continue this dependency. Naturally, they cannot leave their reliance upon a single superpower if the United States and China refuse to normalize relations. In addition, neither the Ford nor the Carter administration has been able to exact even minor concessions from the Soviets or Cubans. Vance's attempt to raise the issue during his April visit to Moscow was only the most recent failure. Neither administration ever succeeded in building a case against the Cuban presence in Angola that is viewed as credible by most other African countries—including Nigeria, as Carter discovered in

March—or even by some of the Western allies.

Kissinger's attacks on Cuban assistance to the MPLA in 1975-1976 lacked cogency and credibility, because they were made in a vacuum. By not acknowledging that the South African and Zairian regular troops, as well as assorted mercenaries from Western countries, were fighting in Angola on the side of the FNLA and UNITA, he painted a one-sided picture of the Soviet Union and Cuba attempting "to take unilateral advantage of a turbulent local situation" (as he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1976). Without the Cuban military assistance that arrived in late 1975, however, the MPLA would undoubtedly have been crushed by the combined forces of South Africa, Zaire, UNITA, FNLA, and the mercenaries.⁴ In fact, the magnitude of Cuban help needed to repulse the intervention of South Africa and Zaire was foreseen by some top American intelligence experts. John Stockwell, who was chief of the CIA's Angolan Task Force, claims to have warned the Interagency Working Group in early October 1975 (when there were less than 1,000 Cubans in Angola) that if additional Zairian and South African troops were brought onto the conflict, "I suggest that we think in terms of 10,000-15,000 Cuban soldiers, a squadron of MiGs, and 100 or so tanks." Stockwell, in an interview on the CBS television program, "60 Minutes," last May, added that had the Central Intelligence Agency's "violent option not existed in Angola, we wouldn't have had Cuban soldiers entrenched in the country with great credibility, looked upon as... heroes of the people of Africa."

⁴ A number of those who participated in the Angolan civil war, when and why can be found in Gerald J. Bender, *Kissinger in Angola: Ambassador at a Point* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 15-191. According to a review book on the CIA's role in the Angolan war by former agent John Stockwell—*In South Africa: A CIA Story* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977)—Kissinger's attacks on Cuban troops also found, in part, on fraudulent materials prepared by the CIA.

Brzezinski has now apparently created his own version of the Kissinger vacuum in which to view the continued Cuban role in Angola. Less than a month after taking office, Carter received signals from both Havana and Luanda indicating an imminent reduction in the number of Cuban troops in Angola. Neto and Castro were both on record saying that the Cuban troops would stay only as long as they were needed—that is, until they could be replaced by MPLA troops. In January 1977 that need appeared to be declining. Roughly 16,000 Cubans (soldiers and civilian technicians) were still in the country, but American officials verified a troop reduction that continued into the spring. Then, in May 1977, Carter announced to Barbara Walters of ABC News that he had halted the Cuban pullout the previous month because of new external threats to the Neto regime. That same month, an extremist faction within the MPLA staged a bloody attempt to overthrow the Neto regime, and the number of Cubans increased again. The size of the Cuban military presence can be expected to continue to vary in accordance with the intensity of external and internal threats. The Angolans, Cubans, Soviets, Nigerians, and others have all recently cited such attacks on the Neto regime as justification for the approximately 20 per cent increase in the number of Cuban troops during 1977.

Plots, Real and Imagined

Relations between the MPLA and Zaire have been strained since the early 1960s, principally because of the latter's continued support of the FNLA. It is no longer a secret that thousands of regular Zairian troops fought alongside the FNLA during the Angolan civil war. Since the end of that war, in addition to giving sanctuary and sustenance to the FNLA, which has continued sporadic raids into Angola, Zaire has assisted the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave

of Cabinda (FLEC) in attacks against southern Cabinda, the northernmost province of Angola, which is not contiguous with the rest of the country but is wedged in between Zaire and the Congo Republic. Furthermore, planes of southern origin, but taking off from Zaire, have recently visited Angolan airports, occasionally bombing villages along the northern border. In late 1977, Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko reportedly increased his assistance to UNITA and was in close touch with its leader, Jonas Savimbi.

"The issue should not be the mere presence of Cubans in Africa, but where and when... they represent a threat to American or African interests or security."

The Angolans also believe that Zaire has been involved in several real or imagined international plots against the RPA. The most notorious of these, "Cobra 77," uncovered in February 1977, supposedly involved plans for a four-pronged invasion of Angola around Christmas of the same year. South Africa, Zaire, France, and Western mercenaries were all allegedly involved.

Another bone of contention is a West German government-subsidized firm, the Orbital Launch and Rocket Corporation (OTRAG), which is testing missiles in the Shaba province of Zaire. According to the Germans, the project merely involves private scientific trials of missiles to be used for launching weather and communications satellites. But that version is disputed by Tadi Sauli in the March 1977 issue of *Punch*, and by the Soviets, Angolans, and others who contend that the Germans, with the cooperation of the CIA, are testing cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in a 100,000-square-mile area of Shaba roughly the size of the state of Colorado.

The invasion of Shaba in March 1977 by Katangese gendarmes based in Angola came as no surprise to anyone who followed the

⁵ Barbara Walters, "An Interview with Fidel Castro," *FOREIGN POLICY* 24 (Fall 1977).

The Fractionalists

The most serious threat to the Neto regime has come not from South Africa, Zaire, UNITA, or anyone else mentioned above, but from an extreme faction within the MPLA from an extreme faction within the MPLA from an extreme faction within the MPLA. Ironically, the extreme received some support from the Soviet Union.

In May 1977, this faction was responsible for the third serious attack on Neto's life for the third serious attack on Neto's life for the third serious attack on Neto's life. The leadership from within the MPLA in the 16 years that he has been its leader. At various times since 1962, Neto has been criticized by his more radical colleagues for political and economic policies that were considered too moderate, too dependent on foreign aid, and for generally ineffective leadership. Neto has staked his political career on a stubborn commitment to anti-socialism, multiracialism, the policies of nonalignment, multiracialism, and socialism. His detractors within the MPLA have generally portrayed themselves as true Socialists and the true choice of the black masses.

"The U.S. refusal to recognize the Neto regime... undermines Washington's efforts to play the role of an honest broker."

The origins of the most recent attempt to oust Neto go back to the period of the Portuguese coup in April 1974. One month before that event, the Soviets withdrew their support from Neto. At the time, the MPLA was divided into three factions, and the Soviet Union with Neto's principal rival, David Chipenda. Neto eventually prevailed after a six-month power struggle, thanks in part to the support he received from Nito Alves, Jacob Carras, and several others who would later be involved in the 1977 coup attempt. The Soviets retained their support of Neto since he established his indisputable control over the MPLA in the fall of 1974.

The Soviets, Neto, Alves, and others buried their differences during the 1975 civil

war, but the problems surfaced again after the withdrawal of South African troops in March 1976. In February 1976, Neto publicly criticized dissident groups within the MPLA, arguing that "some people in Luanda seem to want to organize a parallel political movement to the MPLA." The prime force behind this parallel movement — known as "fractionalism" — was Alves.

Alves had been the brash and successful commander of the MPLA's tough First Division in the area of northwest Angola populated by the Dembo people. A dynamic public speaker, he employed a populist style that contrasted dramatically with Neto's more delicate and measured oratory. As Neto's powerful minister of the interior, Alves interjected veiled, racist attacks on whites and mestiços into his many public addresses, and he called for the Angolan economy to be put into the hands of the people. He appealed mainly to the hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers in Luanda, who generally had very little political consciousness and were therefore susceptible to demagogic leaders.

In his quest to replace Neto, Alves was supported by his fellow Dembo, a subgroup of the Kimbunda. In addition to Carras, who is also a Dembo and the deputy commander-in-chief of the MPLA army (and is said to have saved Neto's life twice), Alves forged an alliance with José van Dunem, the political commissar of the army in southern Angola. The common denominator binding the various fractionalists together was their antipathy toward Neto's multiracialism. Whether out of a genuine personal hatred for whites and mestiços or opportunism and a desire to advance rapidly, a number of Africans in the MPLA have perennially attacked the dominance, or even the very presence, of whites and mestiços in the party. Ideologically, those who supported the fractionalists ranged from the far right to the extreme left — in a sense, a coalition not unlike the MPLA itself. The public posture of the fractionalists, however, was distinctly ultraleftist, un-

der the careful guidance of a group of Portuguese who had come to Angola in late 1975 to escape reprisal for their role in the Communist takeover attempt in Lisbon in 1975, and to carry out in Angola the revolution that had failed at home. Most had once been members of the strongly pro-Moscow Portuguese Communist party.

Throughout 1976, the plotters found highly placed support in key ministries, party organizations, and a variety of neighborhood groups that paraded under the banner of "people's power." They planned to take control through a gradual process of infiltrating the party and government, discrediting and sabotaging the state and party apparatus, and finally going public. When Alves and David Aires Machado were dropped from the cabinet in November 1976, the plotters changed their strategy and began to prepare for a military takeover. Six months before the attempted coup, whites and mestiços openly expressed their fears of Alves, and some said they would leave the country if he ever came to power. When asked why they did not check this dangerous threat, Neto and Luís Lusa, the MPLA secretary general and Neto's right-hand man, said that they feared splitting the party by a purge and were also convinced that with time and further political education, the dissidents would come around to accept Neto's policies.

On May 27, 1977, the fractionalists carried out their abortive coup, killing seven of the 33 members of the MPLA Central Committee and many other party officials. But they failed to gain power, essentially because they could not mobilize the very inhabitants of Luanda's sprawling slums whose interests they claimed to represent. They also seriously miscalculated that the Cubans would refuse to intervene on Neto's side. It is not clear whether Alves and van Dunem assumed that the Soviets would aid them openly, but Alves clearly believed that he had the Soviets' blessings for the coup. According to René Lefort of *Le Monde*, Soviet backing for Alves had become so obvious by the sum-

mer of 1976 that the Angolan government expelled a Soviet diplomat.

If the alliance between foreign white ultraracists and black power extremists at the core of the fractionalist movement seems contradictory and inherently unstable, that does not appear to have been perceived by the whites and mestiços who joined the plot. Certainly, white and mestiço fractionalists would have been among the victims of Alves' black-power policies. That foreign whites did not understand this can be attributed partially to the ethnocentric and paranoiac attitudes that still exist in Angola, including among leftist Portuguese and other sympathetic foreign nationalists. The Soviet Union was not the only Communist country to provide encouragement or support for Alves and his followers. Some of those reactions also offer from the ability of globalist theoreticians to influence foreign policy at the expense of area specialists.

The immediate recall and replacement of the Cuban ambassador to Angola after the coup attempt has sometimes been cited as evidence of Cuban complicity in the fractionalist plot, but there is no information to confirm this. On the contrary, Angolan officials maintain privately that some Cuban troops even assisted in putting down the coup. The close personal ties between Neto and Castro have also reduced the crisis. Unlike the Soviets, who have the reputation of being fair-weather friends to Neto in 1974 and again in 1976-1977, the Cubans have apparently not wavered in their support for him during the more than 12 years they have assisted the MPLA. That helps explain their presence in Angola today.

Rebuilding U. S. Anxieties

The presence of Cubans in Africa has alarmed both the Ford and the Carter administrations. Under Ford, Kissinger's global approach actually contributed to an increase in the number of Cuban troops in southern Africa. Brezhnev's similar influence on Carter's policy would have the same

effect. Obviously it is time for the United States to rethink its entire approach to the issue of Cubans in Africa.

This reappraisal should begin by differentiating the Cuban presence in one African country from another, just as the United States community does when considering the presence of the Soviets, Chinese, French, or British in various African countries. For example, the United States generally does not view the Soviet presence in Ethiopia in the same way that it views any Soviet involvement in Nigeria. It follows that a distinction should be made between Cuban activities in Ethiopia, on the one hand, and in Sierra Leone, Tanzania, or even Angola on the other. The issue should not be the mere presence of Cubans in Africa, but where and when do the Cubans represent a threat to American or African interests or security.

The key to making this distinction is the classification and articulation of precisely what Americans find objectionable about the Cuban involvement in Africa. For example, does the United States object to the presence of all Cubans, including doctors and engineers, or only soldiers? Does it object to all Cuban soldiers, including non-combatant instructors (U.S. intelligence classifies as "troops" those Cubans from the regular army or reserves who perform civilian functions in Angola), or only those who fight? Should the United States protest when Cuban soldiers fight in any part of Africa (such as against South Africans in Angola), or only when they help crush self-determination movements, as in Eritrea? Finally, do the more than 1,000 Cuban teachers scattered throughout nearly every province of Angola represent a genuine threat to American goals and interests?

Does the United States oppose the presence of several thousand Cuban soldiers in Cabinda, who help to protect the vulnerable Gulf Oil installations? Is it agitated about other Cubans who help provide security for the teams of Boeing technicians installing radar in seven Angolan airports?

Are U.S. interests threatened when Cuba assists the MPLA regime in thwarting a bloody coup attempt by extreme leftists and black racists?

The United States should be wary of increased Cuban and Soviet influence on the African continent, yet a global approach is not necessarily the best framework for such legitimate concerns. Instead of looking to Moscow or Havana to discover why there was an increase of some 5,000-7,000 Cubans in Angola last year after an initial troop reduction in the spring, the Carter administration could have found the answer in Angola itself. Viewed in the light of Angolan domestic realities that increase has clearly not raised the level of either a Cuban or a Soviet threat to U.S. interests in Angola or in Africa in general.

"Some American corporate representatives . . . privately hope that the Cubans remain. . . ."

Thus far Carter and Brezinski have raised blanket objections to the Cubans in Angola, with no public recognition of their multifaceted and often constructive role in the country. The administration must spell out precisely what it finds objectionable about the Cuban-Angolan relationship. A coherent, practical policy on this issue is especially important today, since it also affects the normalization of U.S. relations with the Angolan and Cuban governments, in ties with many other African nations, and most importantly, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

To most African nations, the American attitude toward the Cubans in Angola smacks of hypocrisy and of an arrogance that Carter pledged to eliminate from U.S. foreign policy. This is generally the attitude of the Nigerian leaders whom Carter recently visited (and with whom, ironically, both the United States and Angola closely coordinate their African policies). During a re-

cent conversation, Paulo Jorge, the Angolan foreign minister, verbalized many of the questions that Africans have raised about American policy.

How does the United States distinguish between the type of foreign aid Cuba is providing Angola and that provided by the United States to other Third World countries? You have more military instructors in Saudi Arabia and Iran than we have Cubans and Soviets combined. We don't criticize Iran's or Saudi Arabia's right to choose their helpers, nor do we criticize your country's right to provide that assistance.

We frankly have a hard time understanding the standards of international diplomacy the United States applies to judge us. Perhaps this is because, as a young nation, we are inexperienced in these matters, but it appears to us that your country is being extremely hypocritical, if not punitive, in its attitude toward us.

Carter claimed that his trip to Africa last spring was intended in part to assist in the transition to majority rule in the southern part of the continent. Yet, his administration has refused to recognize the Angolan government, one of the key front-line states designated by the Organization for African Unity to assist in that transition in Namibia and Rhodesia (and whose cooperative attitude has been cited privately by one of the American negotiators as having greatly facilitated the Namibian discussions). The United States faces an enormous task in breaking down African suspicions and distrust, given the legacy of past American policy in southern Africa. The U.S. refusal to recognize the Neto regime only serves to nourish these suspicions further and thus undermines Washington's efforts to play the role of an honest broker.

Carter has argued that "the establishment of relations does not involve approval or disapproval [of a government], but merely demonstrates a willingness on our part to conduct our affairs with other governments directly." Every close American ally has re-

cognized the Luanda government, confident that there is something to gain from conducting face-to-face relations. Every major American corporation presently operating in Angola—including Gulf, Mobil, Texaco, NCR, Boeing, Citicorp, and others—lives immediate recognition. Some corporate representatives complain that it is difficult to find American technicians who are willing to work in a country where they have no diplomatic protection. Moreover, most of these businessmen do not support the administration's position on the withdrawal of the Cubans. In fact, they privately hope that the Cubans remain, to provide security and to continue their vital role in keeping the country's modern sector functioning (from fixing elevators in the cities to repairing bridges in the hinterland).

The State Department sponsored a symposium on Angola last February that was attended by academic representatives from major American corporations, journalists, congressional staff, and a cross section of officials from the department itself. At the end of a day and a half of discussion, all agreed to the proposition that it is in the best interests of the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Angola as soon as possible. Noticeably absent from the symposium was a representative from the National Security Council, which holds a contrary view that it has apparently been able to impose on the president.

If Carter continues to view Angola through Brezinski's narrow globalist perspective, then the prudent may be the one to undermine his own 1976 campaign hope that the United States "be a positive and creative force for good in Angola." If the United States misses that opportunity in Angola, its prospects may also suffer in the rest of southern Africa.

BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY

P.O. Box 3707
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A Division of The Boeing Company

June 2, 1978

The Honorable Charles C. Diggs,
Chairman, Sub Committee on Africa
Committee on International Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Diggs:

We are pleased and appreciate the opportunity to respond to your recent request regarding our experience with Angola.

The Boeing Company has had a commercial business involvement in Angola for about five years. Our business interests are in two related areas of civil aviation: as a supplier of a commercial jet transport aircraft to the airline of Angola and as a contractor to the government responsible for the selection, acquisition, installation and check-out of air navigation and communication equipment and facilities as part of the air traffic control system in Angola. Airplane sales have included three 737 aircraft, of which two have been delivered. Work on the air traffic control system was initiated in 1974 and is nearing completion.

Our experience in working with both airline and government personnel during this period has been very satisfactory. We have found them to be capable, responsible, intelligent businessmen interested and involved in the development of their country's air transportation system, and all business commitments made by the Angolan government or airline have been promptly satisfied.

The Angolan airline has maintained their preference for United States equipment, in spite of the absence of government relations with the United States. We believe, as is true in other areas of Africa, that European manufacturers have offered aircraft to Angola with no political conditions specified and with assurances that no future trade embargo would prevent their delivery.

Based on this experience, we do not believe that Boeing business in Angola has been hindered by the absence of a U.S. Government Mission in Angola. However, establishment of such a mission could benefit U.S. business in general, as such a step would strengthen commercial relations between Angola and the U.S. Whether or not a mission is established, we strongly endorse continuing commercial trade relations as an important means of communication between the United States and Angola.

Again, we thank you for this opportunity and please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Very respectfully,

O. M. Roetman

O. M. Roetman
Director, International Sales

29-726 107

TEXT OF STOCKWELL TELEGRAM TO CONGRESSMAN DON BONKER,
MAY 31, 1978

Congressman Don Bonker
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Bonker: Generally I came away from the subcommittee meeting reassured that such people as yourself are so well informed and so keenly interested in the problems of Zaïre and Angola. This is measured against the Administration's policy towards Angola which I find anxious and regressive.

After a few days reflection on your question of what we should do to secure the Shaba province against loss to radical exile forces I am increasingly concerned that we will pursue a policy of military support to Mobutu which will have disastrous long term effects.

A joint military force in Shaba would place US troops in the position of killing African blacks. This would have an explosive effect on American blacks who tend at best to be skeptical of Mobutu.

Our relationship with Mobutu over the years has in fact been a dubious thing. Repeatedly it has cast us in the role of hiring white mercenaries to support his policies. And while he has failed to move the country in the direction of its economic and social potential he has diverted vast sums of its monetary resources and of our aid to show projects to the ineffective army and to his own coffers.

The only policy which can retrieve our interest in Shaba while avoiding another disastrous military adventure potentially worse than Vietnam will be a recognition of Angola and a serious policy of reconciliation towards that nation, a vigorous diplomacy to discourage Cuba's military adventuring and to encourage Cuba to use its energies to support the peaceful development of Angola and a program to bring the Katangese back into Zaïre in a peaceful capacity.

The latter would require the economic reconstruction of the Shaba, a less oppressive approach to its government and specific inducements to the exile Katangese.

The other alternative of military support to Mobutu of polarization, conflict and confrontation can only compound our problems in Shaba and Angola and perpetuate our unfortunate past and present losing policies in Africa.

You, sir, have my sincere respect and support on these matters. Please advise if I can help in any way. Very respectfully

John Stockwell