70 71 tionary leadership be attributed is to the The PREPARED STATEMENT OF JORGE DOMINGUEZ, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 18, 1970 The Cuban government has had an active foreign policy toward Africa inre the early 1900s. That was part of its efforts to counter the policies of the government to isolate Cuba throughout the world. Cuba early and activist African policy is nie heltered then, and do still today, that it is the date of derived from the Ideologien commitments of the revol roottefore, are the long term underpinnings of Cuba African policies. The to assist their comrades whenever that is feasible. Strategy and beller seale, forms and methods have, of course, changed but Cuba is not a new to African affairs in the late 1970s, nor can those African policies merelyt There have been several changes in Cuba African policies from the 1990s to the 1970s within the context of a long term evolving Cuban concern with that broadening of objectives. Cuba no longer fears to continent. The first Sheme and Its worldwide policies are still defined ternational Isolation as it objectives of its own. The Cuban government now perceives itself as havine in opposition to the United States, but Cube now has more general noten good dent of international influence on diplomacy has come to have the acteristics of a mn for power, cover fets base of current country. There htchar array out the worla. The Colan government rejects the view. implicountries througb.
menta of government officielse toner countries should have parochin more rights to be concerned with African Affairs than does policies. vennent has to government, according to the Cnbons overnment resohet so tight to questen the presence of Cuban combat troops in Afrien, or of Soviet military and civilian personnel in Cuba, so long as the United States has military forces stationen abroad. From this perspective, the western hemisphere now has two mator powers, the United States and Cuba. And while the Cuban government recognizes the incomparably greater power of the United States, it does not recognizes claims that Cuba shonla curtall its influence to its own boundaries alon This view, of course, has implications for Cuban policies everywhere, not just In Africa second change in Cuba African policies has been a far more sustained stup The most dramatie shift, of course, ocenrred Horn of Africa, as Onha dropped its earlier support of Eritrean rebels to support the Ethiopian govern ment. In fact, however, Cnha has always had a preference for dealing with governments rather than with their oppositions. The main thing that has changed is that there are now more governments willing to deal with Cuba and to seek its support third change has been one of scale. Cubn presence in Africa was connted in Algeria or Guinen did not entail very large forces. The Cuban presence in the hundreds, by and large in the 1960s. Support for such governments as Congo (Brazzaville) in the mid 1960s was perhaps the largest such contingent but its size pales in comparison with the contemporary Cuban presence in Anzola and in Ethiopia. The change in scale has been made possible by several important changes within Cuba Cube could not have sent such large forces overseas in the 1960s. At that time, all military forces were needed for the defense of Cuba Itself against posibile extemal attacks, and or the defense of the government against internal efforts to overthrow it. Morover, the technical quality of the Cuban armed forces was very low. In the 1960s, too. Onha needed every possible physician or constructina worker for tasks at home. The Cuban economy had collapsed in the early 1900s.
and then it collnpsed again, even more severely, in the closing years of that dernde By the 1970s, important changes in all these factors made it possible for Caba to expand its overseas presence. The fear of external invasion and of internal erentually making vietories possible in two African wars. The Cuban economy to modernize weapons inventories and to professionalize military personnel recovered impressively during the early 1970s, as the world price of sugar rose and improvements were made in internal economic unnagement. While the growth performance of the Cuban economy in the late 1970s has been poor (just above zero growth of gross product per capita in constant prices. it has not been negative. Moreover, Cuba is now beginning to produce a surplus of professional in a number of fields particularly health care who thus become available for foreign aid projects as well as for foreign contracts in the case of some governments that can pay for these services. Finally, Caba bad a baby boom in the early 1960s; many of these are now of time military age. The result as been that Cuba per capita military commitment overseas is about the same as that of the United States at the peak of the Vietnam WAT. discussion of the Cuban presence in Africa needs to distinguish between the more common foreign aid programs and the two special cases of Angola and Ethiopia. The general Cuban foreign aid programs emphasize providing personpersonnel, rather than to provide the funds for the medical equipment. Cuba nel, not cash, for civilian and military projects. Cuba prefers to send health might also send construction personnel to build a hospital, or to build dams and nerally rather than to provide financing for such projects. Cuba will provide tion, sports, fishing, military and police training, and even bodyguard services.
officers, within the armed forces or in civilian settings.
The Cuban government has also been willing to provide training for political One consequence of Cuba reliance on personnel, rather than cash, has often been the need to form consortia with other Communist governments whenever a foreign aid program becomes quite large. Cuba can handle alone small programs of foreign assistance, to Tanzania or to Equatorial Guinea, for example. But Cuba has needed and has sought the participation of other Communist gorerments in the larger projects in Angola, Ethiopia or South Yemen. The Soviet Union and East Germany have been its principal partners in these endeavors.
Foreign aid packages provided by these consortia can be quite attractive. The cash, and the Soviets and the East Germans may provide the hardware and Cubang may provide the training. The Cuban government programs have a high political content, however. For countries that wish to receive Cuban assistance but wish to maintain some distance from Cuba own brand of socialism, this political content may present a problem. But in Angola or in Ethiopia, Cuba political education programs appear to have helped to strengthen these governments political strength within their respective armed forces and civilian organizations.
The Cuban government has made it clear that it prefers these kinds of foreign aid althgrams to the larger and costlier commitments to Angola and to Ethiopia has also made clear that these commitments remain quite firm. The Cuban design been to reduce the military combat component of the Cuban presence in Angola and in Ethiopia and to increase the civilian component. That MPLA was securely enough in power in Lunnda that Cuban military forces could be reduced. This process was reversed, however, in the spring 1977 with the first invasion of Shaba province in Zaire by exiles operating out of Angola.
The Luanda and Havann nts came to the clusion that a larger Cuban military presence was required. Internal weaknesses in the MPLA control of Angola, and Internal dissension within the MPLA, also persuaded the of need To analyze the nature of the Cuban military presence, and of the Cuban clvilian and military balance in Africa (especially in Angola and in Ethiopia. It is important to recall some essential features of the Cuban armed forces. The Cuban government decided to deemphasize reliance on permanent standing force in the early 1970s. Instead, it has come to rely on a large military reserve force. The degree of combat skill and readiness of the military reserve, of course.
varies a grent denl from unit to unit. But my own estimate is that Cuba order of battle for the defense of the homeland remains above 300, 000 when one includes the ready reserves (I am conscious that this estimate is about twice bigger than the government estimates. The Cuban government has a high the The basis for the testimony can be connd in my hook, Coba: Order and Revolution Cambride: TATAM Unrealty Press 1978. And in the Weinste artesa Rens inttonart Coba in the World Arena per TSH Press, 1970) The Armed And Poreen Relations ad Core of Mesa the Afburch Press 1970) Icon Forelen Polley Porcie Embargo of Cuba mone other sem pertinent is my testimony. US Trade and contrasented to the comer sentative forefroiton. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of teppe.