14 Failure to anticipate the coup in Portugal in April 1974 and that country loss of its determination to retain its African colonies. Underestimation of the potential scope of the Soviet Angola gram response would not likely exceed 10 million. By February 1976, the Soviet program had topped 400 million. The CIA failed to foresee the Cuban response, that Cuba would introduce 15. 000 regular army troops into the conflict. The failure to foresee the decisive negative reaction of key Afri.
enn leaders to the presence of South African military on our side of the conflict The false intelligence from various CIA human intelligence sources that MIG jet aircraft were present in Angola in November 1976. The failure of the CIA to provide adequate intelligence coverage of the war, of the politics of Angola, about the MPLA, and even about the CIA own allies. The State Department African Affairs Bureau complained in writing to Secretary Kissinger about this Inst deficiency.
It is now a matter of public record that the Congress blocked further escalation of our involvement in Angola by passage of the Tunney amendment to the fiscal year 1976 Defense appropriations bill. This amendment was approved by the Senate on December 19, 1975, and by the House on January 20, 1976.
But for 21, months after the passage of the Tunney amendment in the Senate, the CIA continued to support mercenaries fighting in Angoln and to deliver arms to the FNLA and UNITA.
In July of 1978 the MPLA controlled Luanda and 12 of the 16 Angolan provinces. The United States mounted its covert operation to oppose them, ignoring repeated overtures from MPLA leaders and the advice of its consul general Tom Killoran in Luanda calling for cordial relations between the United States and the MPLA. The CIA program drove the MPLA into the Soviet Cuban camp. In July 1975 there were no non African armies on the African Continent and most prominent African statemen would be have objected to the introduction of any such armies.
By February 1976, the MPLA had effectively won the civil war and controlled all major cities, ports, and mineral and agricultural resources. But approximately 15, 000 Cuban soldiers were now present, widely accepted by most African leaders because of their anger and frustration with the CIA paramilitary intervention and its alliance with South Africa.
Now there are over 30, 000 Cuban troops in Africa, in three major areas of conflict: Angola, Ethiopin, and Mozambique. Their presence is accepted even by leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambin. Not surprisingly, the People Republic of Angola (PRA) is hostile to our interests in Zaire. In the past 18 months it has permitted two invasions of Zaire by the Katangese. At the same time the Zairian economy is further disrupted by the continued guerrilla warfare waged by UNITA forces which has ensured that the Benguela railroad cannot be re opened to carry Zaire copper to Western markets, even if the PRA would permit.
And yet, appallingly, the Carter administration is pressing for a repeal of the Clark amendment so that it can resume covert military support to those Unita forces. Such a policy will guarantee that a few years from now the southwestern flank of Africa and the Shabn Province of Zaire are still the scenes of bitter conflict.
15 How many times does the United States have to suffer the humiliating failure of duplicitons CIA covert operations before it learns that they don work? When will we recognize the limitations of our power to manipulate the forces of nationalism and liberation in the Third World, and cease to east ourselves in losing roles because of our mistrust of peoples movements! As in Southeast Asia, our African policies are dominated by a superficial understanding of the forces at work, and by the of movements we label radical and then drive Soviet Union In 1975 the only role which the United States could have played in Angoln in our own long range interests was the statesman role of noninvolvement in the conflict pressing for a reduction of hostilities and welcoming the ultimate winner into the family of nations to identify with the forces of the future in southern Africa and to Today this is still the only role which will enable the United States share. Buotis. Thank you very much, Mr. Stockwell positively in that region peaceful evolution and development. want to thank both of you gentlemen for very provocative presentations that will obviously add immeasurably to these deliberations, Let me yield to the ranking minority member, Mr. Whalen.
Mr. WHALEN. Professor Bender, think you indicated that you recently visited Angola. What was your impression regarding the status of the economy there! Recent reports have indicated there has been considerable deterioration.
Mr. BENDER. would say, having visited Angola in December 1976, January 1977 and comparing that with December 1977 and January 1978, there has been a remarkable recovery. This is not to say the economy is going well, but, for example, while it was true. last year, so forth, this does not seem to be the case now, at least that was able to see. visited all the major markets in Landa three or four times. went to markets 900 miles outside of Luanda and saw food. did not see the aspect of starving and so forth that some reports indicate is the today. just did not see that. think the economy is in a difficult state, particularly in the agricultural sector and probably will re main so until the fighting in the central highlands subsides because after all the central highlands of Angola is the breadbasket of the country and that makes agricultural recorery problematic. think there are also indications that the economie recovery is occurring; for example, in the areas of the iron ore mines down in the south in Cassinga.
When was in Angola in January of this year, a group of about 20 Yugoslavian engineers went down there to see abont opening it up, and thought about that immediately when the South Africans invaded Cassings because clearly their intention was not only to kill supporters of Swapo, but to delay the opening of the mine and to cause economic problems for the Neto regime.
Mr. WHALEN. Are the Cuban troops visible! What is their role!
To what extent are they involved in the fighting!
Mr. BENDE. do not know about the fighting because did not go out on any operations, so am really not in a good position to know about that. In the capital of Lunds, you see many, many Cubans, although you do not always know if they are civilians or soldiers